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Abstract 
Since Batain Island was targeted for development by Soeharto's New Order government 
in the late-1960s, it has undergone a significant transformation, physically, economically 
and politically. 
This study describes and analyses that transformation. Whilst the results of development 
on Batam Island before 1988 were quite limited, and highly reliant on the oil industry, 
changes to the investment regime in 1989, as well as other reforms, has brought far-
reaching changes - a massive influx of investment and the growth of an export-oriented 
manufacturing sector. What was once a sparsely populated island of subsistence farmers 
and fishermen is today a seemingly thriving manufacturing, industrial and tourism area. 
Through an examination of domestic factors, such as state and non-state institutions, 
individuals and business, as well as external factors such as international economic 
conditions and foreign capital, the study also considers what the experiences of 
developing Batam Island tell us about the policy-making processes in Indonesia, and 
about Indonesian political economy under the New Order in general. 
It is argued that Indonesian political economy is characterised by what might best be 
described as elite politics. Patrimonialism and the closely-connected features of patron-
client relationships and intra-elite politicking have consistently dominated the policy-
making processes under the New Order government presided over by President Soeharto. 
This is not to deny the existence of other influences. Indonesian societal groups have 
demonstrated that they can have policy input. Likewise, external variables have affected 
the policy environment However, whilst societal influences are not a major constraint on 
the Indonesian state's policy-makers, it is recognised that policy-making is not confined 
simply to actors within the state apparatus. 
In tracing Batam's development, various political and economic interactions become 
apparent - between domestic and international variables, between public and private 
interests, between state and civil society, and within the state itself - illustrating that while 
the main focus of studies of Indonesian political economy should be on the state, non-
state influences must also be analysed in order to explain how political and economic 
actions in Indonesia are best understood. 
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Introduction 
The history of the development of Batam Island since the 1970s is the history of the attempt to 
accomplish a sttategic vision of President Soeharto, the philosopher-statesman of Indonesia's 
development over the past twenty-five years. This far-sighted perspective ... specifies the 
development of Batam Island into an industrial, ttading and ttanshipment area and as a tourist 
destination ... [The] Batam Authority led successively by Dr Ibnu Sutowo, Professor J.B. Sumarlin 
and myself, has made serious efforts to translate President Soeharto's vision into concrete action 
plans and investment programs and succeeded in changing the face of the island. 
B. J. Habibie, 8 May 1992.1 
1 
In one sense, this study is concerned with what has been described as Indonesian 
President Soeharto's "strategic vision". Since the emergence of Soeharto's New Order 
government in the mid-1960s, Batam Island has played an important role as a strategic 
and economic outpost for Indonesia, and more specifically the government in Jakarta. 
When Batam was targeted for development as a base for foreign oil contractors in the 
late 1960s, it was a sleepy back.water of fishermen and subsistence farmers. Over 
twenty-five years later, Batam is a busy industrial, manufacturing and tourist area. 
In a deeper sense, however, this study is an exploration of economic policy-making 
under the New Order government of President Soeharto which came to power in 1966 
following a period of social, political and economic upheaval. It is therefore a study of 
Indonesian political economy. Political economy is concerned with the way in which 
politics influences aspects of economic policy-making and the way in which economic 
factors influence political processes and outcomes. Therefore, the analytical tools of 
both economics and political science disciplines are applied in order to reach an 
understanding of the processes of economic policy-making. 
The aim of political economy is essentially to provide an understanding of who and 
what determines economic policy, and the answer lies in several key questions. How 
has economic change occurred? How significant have policies been? How have those 
policies been formulated? How significant have external factors been? How significant 
have domestic factors been? 
1 B. J. Habibie; "Technology and the Singapore-Johor-Riau Growth Triangle", speech delivered to Tripartite Meeting 
and Seminar on Economic Development in the Growth Triangle and its Environmental Impact (Batam, 8 May 1992). 
2 
Political economy involves the interaction of economic and political forces, especially 
political and economic structures, such as political institutions and central economic 
features. Selection of development strategy, and the choice and timing of economic 
policies depend heavily on political and economic considerations. Other factors such as 
personalities and ideas, as well as local, regional, national and international influences, 
and other inputs must also be taken into account. In a sense, and as Gilpin put it, 
political economy is an "eclectic mixture of methods and theoretical perspectives. "2 
For those reasons, this study also has broader implications, especially for students of 
Southeast Asian political economy, where debate revolves around the relative merits of 
"state-centred" and "society-centred" approaches to political and economic 
development. 3 The central question is how political and economic actions are best 
understood. Does the state act upon its own, or are its actions shaped by non-state 
influences and pressure from societal actors? Indonesia is an important part of this 
debate, and as a result this study seeks to contribute it. Do state-centred approaches to 
political economy need to be supplemented by a focus on societal actors or non-state 
institutions in order to understand its true character? 
The central purpose of this study is, therefore, to contribute to our understanding of the 
nature of economic policy-making and development strategies undertaken by New 
Order Indonesia. Whilst much has been written on Indonesian political economy under 
the New Order, these studies have raised numerous and differing accounts of 
Indonesian politics. The aim of this study, therefore, is to qualify or confirm prevailing 
understanding of Indonesian political economy in order to uncover the major factors 
which determine economic policy in Indonesia. 
, There are several reasons why a study of the development of Batam Island can add to 
our understanding of the economic policy-making processes in Indonesia. It is argued 
that a study of the political economy of Batam will provide important insights into 
Indonesia's political economy in general, for the development of Batam has occurred 
within a national political and economic context. There are important parallels to be 
drawn. 
Firstly, the Batam Island story takes place over more than twenty-five years, beginning 
with the advent of the New Order in the mid-1960s, and continuing up to the present 
2 Robert Gilpin ; The Political Economy of International Relations. (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1987), p 9. 
3 See Richard F. Doner ; "Approaches to the Politics of Economic Growth in Southeast Asia" The Journal of Asian 
fillli1ill, Vol. 50 No.4 (November 1991), pp 818-849. For the more general debates in political science, see for 
instance Myron Weiner & Samuel P. Huntington (eds); Understanding Po1itica1 Development (Little, Brown & Co., 
Boston 1987). B.C.Smith; Understanding Third World Politics : Theories of Political Change and Devel!u:iment 
(Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1996). 
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day. As a result, the policy processes, policy debates and attendant policy shifts 
involved in the development of Batam Island not only reflect, but highlight the 
processes occurring at the national level. 
Batam is not about regional development but rather about "development of a region". 4 
This means that although Batam is geographically distant from Jakarta, it is in fact 
administered directly from Jakarta. The core is not necessarily Jakarta, and the 
periphery Batam, for the core has to a certain extent located itself directly on the 
periphery. In other words, Batam may be geographically peripheral but it is politically 
central. For that reason the development and administration of Batam, and the overall 
policy set-up has followed closely developments at the national level. 
The Batam story sheds light on key elements of the Indonesian political structure, 
including the President, the Cabinet, the bureaucracy and other leading political 
personalities and institutions. Changes in the national policy stance, and the main 
players at that level, are crucial in viewing and understanding the changes in policy on 
Batam, and vice-versa. 
Secondly, the development of Batam Island fits neatly with the general thrust of 
economic policies initiated at the national level by the Indonesian government. The 
physical and economic transformation of Batam occurs in the context of the economic 
transformation of Indonesia from a resource dependent and import-substituting 
economy characterised by high levels of state intervention, towards one which is more 
outward-looking and in which manufactured exports and the private sector play a much 
greater role. 
The change in national policy stance from inward to outward-looking industrialisation 
is crucial in viewing the change of policies on Batam. Despite early hopes, Batam was 
the focus of stymied development from the mid-1970's until the late 1980s, when 
regulatory changes began weaning Batam from its economic nationalist structures and 
continuing dependence on the oil industry and oil-related business, and in that way its 
development reflects the changes at the national level. Just as economic policy shifts 
occurred nationally, and created changes nationally, they also brought about changes 
almost simultaneously on Batam Island. 
The aim of this study, therefore is to outline what the economic transformation of 
Batam Island tells us about Indonesian political economy under the New Order. The 
central question is what major factor, or factors, determine economic policy in 
4I am grateful to C. P. F. Luhulima of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (UPI) for this point Interview, 4 March 
1994. 
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Indonesia. It involves an examination of domestic factors, such as state and non-state 
institutions, individuals and business, as well as external factors such as international 
economic conditions and foreign capital. What has occurred on Batam Island will shed 
light on the leading personalities and actors, central elements of the political structure, 
and factors of the economy most centrally involved in Indonesian policy-making. 
The following chapter reviews conceptual, theoretical and empirical approaches to 
Indonesian political economy as they have been applied to the New Order, and 
identifies where, or indeed if, revisions need to be made. It also stands as an 
introduction to the central players and the background to the story of Batam Island. 
Then follows in chronological order, the main study of the development of Batam 
Island : its beginnings as a base for foreign oil contractors under the control of Ibnu 
Sutowo and the national oil company, Pertamina, during the early 1970s (Chapter 
Three); the attempts of economic ministers, led by Sumarlin, to introduce liberalising 
economic and policy measures and to seek cooperation with Singapore in the late 1970s 
(Chapter Four); a nationalistic and inward-looking approach under the tutelage of 
Habibie through the 1980s (Chapter Five); the introduction of liberal economic 
regulatory changes together with joint cooperation with Singapore in the early 1990s 
(Chapter Six); and finally, the creation of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth 
Triangle (Chapter Seven). s The final chapter summarises the main arguments and 
conclusions of the thesis. 
5The divisions used in this study differ from those used by the Batam Industrial Development Authority, which 
describes the development periods ofBatam as follows: 1971-76, Preparation Period under Dr lbnu Sutowo; 1976-
78, Consolidation Period under Prof. Dr. J.B. Sumarlin; 1978-83, Main Infrastructure Development Period under 
Prof. Dr. Ing. B. J. Habibie; 1983-, Capital Investment and Continuation oflnfrastructure Development Period under 
Prof. Dr. Ing. B. J. Habibie. 
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2 
New Order Political Economy 
There have been two prominent features of Indonesian political economy in the New 
Order period. The first is a highly centralised and authoritarian policy-making system. 
The second is the significant shift that has taken place in Indonesia's economic structure 
from agriculture towards manufacturing industries. 
Much has been written about these two features, most accounts of Indonesian political 
economy differing only in the degree of their stress on the pluralistic and monistic 
elements of the policy-making processes, and in their explanation of the economic 
successes (and failures). All, however, are in general agreement that Indonesia is an 
authoritarian state which provides few opportunities for participation. This chapter 
draws on both empirical and theoretical works to explain the main features of 
Indonesian political economy under the New Order. 
What needs to be stressed from the outset is that Indonesian political economy is not, 
and has never been static. Indonesian politics, economics and society have changed 
considerably and significantly over the three decades of the New Order, and today are 
perhaps far more complex than at any time in the past It is only with this in mind that 
analysis of the Indonesian polity and economy can be made. 
The New Order Polity 
Indonesia's official ideology, Pancasila, would have Indonesians and outsiders alike 
believe that under the New Order government of President Soeharto, all policy 
decisions are reached only after a great deal of consultation and discussion 
(musyawarah) in search of a consensus (mufakat). The reality, however, has been quite 
different It has long been argued by observers of Indonesian politics that policy-
making and policy formulation in Indonesia are confined mainly to members of the 
state apparatus - the general consensus being that Indonesia is an authoritarian state, 
one which is dominated by the vertical and horizontal outreach of the military, state 
institutions and senior state officials, and whose virtual monopolisation of influence 
over policy formation has meant that there is little scope for those outside state 
structures to influence policy. 
6 
Anderson argued in 1983 that the New Order was a State-qua-State, an institution with 
a life and interests of its own, run by and for its officials and hardly requiring societal 
support. As a state-qua-state, the regime was cut off from Indonesian society, and 
allowed little room for give and take on policy issues, or for sensitivity to public needs.1 
It was an argument predicated on the 'strong state' thesis, whereby the state is insulated 
from, and politically autonomous from, societal interests and forces; is well-organised 
and cohesive, with leverage to impose controls and allocate resources; and, is able to 
sustain those features over time. 
Indeed, one key feature of New Order politics is the overwhelming importance of the 
Executive in determining policy. One basis for this centralisation of power is Article 
33 of the 1945 Constitution which states that all areas of the economy of crucial 
significance to the welfare of the people must be controlled by the state. This has been 
used to provide a constitutional, and thus legitimising, argument for ensuring that 
power lies in a strong central executive and that key economic decisions are made by 
the government. 
It is Indonesia's non-participatory system that has given the President and his ministers 
so much latitude, enabling them to implement policies by ministerial or presidential 
decree. Legislation passed by the DPR (Indonesian Parliament) never restricts the 
decision-making power of the Executive. Although divided into various committees 
charged with overseeing the work of the government, legislation is debated in the DPR 
only after final drafting, and is almost always passed without amendment. 
However, Indonesian political economy is more complicated than Anderson's state-qua-
state for, whilst illuminating in several respects, Anderson's thesis tends to ignore the 
roles of several elements. As Crouch noted at the time Anderson put forward his state-
qua-state thesis, Indonesia was not a strong state, particularly when based on the ability 
to independently formulate and implement policy. 2 There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, the state is dominated by the position of the Presidency, and the personality of 
the person holding that appointment. Secondly, the existence of patron-client linkages 
and patrimonial practices, as prevailing between business and the state, has meant that 
the policy-formulation processes are often breached. Thirdly, the state is not an 
internally cohesive unit, and competing coalitions and internal differences in regards to 
1 Ben Anderson ; 'Old State, New Society : Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective ' ~ 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.xvn No.3 (May 1983), pp 477-496. See also McVey's related argument that the New 
Order state had retained all the characteristics of the Dutch colonial state. Ruth McVey ; "The Beamtenstaat in 
Indonesia" in Ben Anderson & Audrey Kabin (ed) Intei:gretin& Indonesian Politics: Thjrteen Contributions to the 
~(Cornell University, Ithaca 1982), pp 84-91. 
2Harold Crouch; Domestic Political Structures and Re&ional Economic Cooperation (ISEAS, Singapore 1984). 
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economic strategy has meant that leverage to implement coherent policies is not all-
encompassing. Fourthly, the state is not immune to either domestic societal or to 
external influences. These elements, and they vary across sectors and issues, are crucial 
to a full understanding of Indonesian political-economy under the New Order. 
Presidential Domination 
At the apex of executive government in Indonesia is President Soeharto. Soeharto has 
achieved a remarkable degree of personal authority and power over the past thirty years, 
particularly since the mid-1970s, and his role in key policy decisions is substantial. In 
fact, the political system reflects his personality and his personal style to such an extent 
that they should not be disregarded in any analysis of Indonesian political-economy. 3 
As noted by Schwarz : 
Suharto's shadow extends so broadly over the Indonesian landscape that a discussion of any aspect 
of public policy must begin with Suharto's role in the debate. 4 
Beneath the President is the Cabinet, appointed directly by the President. Unlike 
government under President Sukarno, most cabinet ministers are not political operatives 
in their own right, and instead only formulate and implement the policies of the 
government.5 According to President Soeharto, 
In our government's system, ministers are in the position of the President's assistants and therefore 
are responsible to the President. In liberal or parliamentary systems, ministers may act on their 
own. But in our system of government, in accordance with the 1945 Constitution ... our ministers 
are the assistants of the President. .. 6 
In practice, Indonesia's Cabinet is not a decision-making body, but meets mainly to hear 
guidelines from the President and report to him - playing essentially the role of 
administrative coordination. Soeharto has described the workings of executive 
government in Indonesia as such : 
My assistants submit their reports directly to me and I give them my instructions immediately. 
Some report individually; others present their reports at meetings ... 
30n Soeharto's background see : O.G.Roeder; The Smmni: General : President Soeharto of Indonesia (Gunung 
Agung, Jakarta 1989); Soeharto : My Thou&hts. Words and Deeds - An Autobioi:rnphy (PT Citra Lamtoro Gung 
Persada, Jakarta 1991); Michael Vatikiotis ; Indonesian Politics Under Suharto : OrdeL Development and Pressure 
for Chani:e (Routledge, London 1993), pp 1-31; Adam Schwarz; A Nation in Waitini: : Indonesia in the 1990s 
(Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1994), pp 24-48. 
4 Adam Schwarz; A Nation in Waitin& : Indonesia in the 1990s (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1994), p xi. 
San the other hand, there is no doubt that several government ministers have played highly political roles with both 
state and society. They include, in particular, Ali Murtopo, Sudharmono, Adam Malik and Benny Murdani. 
However, the overwhelming majority of Ministers have not been political operatives. Those that have played 
political roles have generally done so with Presidential approval. 
6soeharto: My Thoui:hts. Words and Deeds - An Aytobioi:rnphy (PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, Jakarta 1991), p 
370. 
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My assistants report to me, seek my directives and check whether their thinking is correct. People 
sometimes wonder, "What's the matter with these ministers? Whenever they have seen the 
President, they always say that what they intend to do is 'according to the President's directions'." 
But that's what actually happens. When they come to see me, they want to receive my 
instructions, my opinion on this or that Of course they have their own views and plans. But they 
want to check these out with me to ascertain that everything is in order and that there is nothing 
they have neglected to consider. I give them my directives so they will not act independently of 
others. This is how things work. 7 
A similar picture is presented by lbnu Sutowo, a fonner close associat:e and head of the 
national oil company, Pertamina, although in a different tone : 
Everyone, without exception, does the bidding of Soeharto, and he is suspicious of anyone who 
acts without his permission. He can't take criticism. He wants everyone to follow his line 100 per 
cent. But with what consequences for the country? Just look around you. You never hear a 
minister make a major pronouncement without it being noted that he just emerged from a meeting 
with Soeharto, or that it was the President's wish that it be so. Soeharto has no interest in creative 
and independent actions. Look at the people around him now. Even when they know big 
mistakes are being made, they remain silent and agree. No one has any guts.8 
All economic policy is coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Coordination, which 
oversees more than a doren government departments and several government agencies. 
The actual involvement of government ministries depends on the policy in question, but 
usually involves those of finance, trade and industry. Ministers issue ministerial 
decrees, but policies are usually discussed and approved at regular economic 
coordination meetings, a forum that ministries will often use to seek the support of the 
Minister for Economic Coordination before initiating the policy process. Typically, the 
Minister of Economic Coordination, the key player in economic policy processes, will 
also seek a Presidential recommendation before the actual implementation of a 
ministerial decree. Presidential approval must be obtained for a Presidential decree or 
instruction. Policy recommendations must be channelled through the Cabinet Secretary 
at the State Secretariat. If the decree is a joint ministerial decree, then all relevant 
ministries must approve it. Where agreement cannot be reached on issues of serious 
concern, the matter is raised directly with the President. 
1 Soeharto : My Thouehts. WOTiis and Deeds - An Autobioempby (PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, Jakarta 1991 ), pp 
367, 369-70. It is apparent from Soeharto's description that he resents the amount of credit attributed to some of his 
ministers for Indonesia's social and economic accomplishments, and feels a need to claim all the credit for 
Indonesia's successes for himself. For example, ministers dropped from the Cabinet in 1993 and who had put in 
decades of service were done so without public mention. 
8 Adam Schwarz; A Nation ip Waitin& : fudooesia in the 199Qs (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1994), p 24. 
9 
Within ministerial meetings, there is seldom full-fledged discussion or debate. If it does 
take place, debate is usually about the allocation of resources, invariably between 
economic ministers and project and sector promoters, with Soeharto in attendance as 
referee balancing the protagonists.9 Essentially political debate and conflict among 
ministers is confined to either one-on-one discussions between ministers, or takes place 
in interdepartmental meetings designed to reach agreement or compromise on issues of 
mutual concern, and for policy coordination. Very rarely does ministerial conflict 
become public. 
The importance of the President becomes clear in the context of Batam Island where his 
personal support for the project, relationships with his ministers and involvement in 
major policy decisions suggest that he was the key player in the policy-making 
processes. 
Patrimonialism and Patron-Client Ties 
Two explanations of Indonesian political economy in the late 1970s held that 
administration was based on patrimonial links, rather than rational or legal values in the 
Weberian sense. Neither explanation denied that the state monopolised policy, but 
argued that various distinct elements within the state structure influenced the policy-
making processes. 
The Bureaucratic Polity concept, as applied to Indonesia by Jackson, held that political 
power was located in the bureaucracy, key elements of which included the Executive 
and the military. Because the state had been appropriated by bureaucrats who ruled in 
their own interests, policy-making was therefore about competition for personal 
advantage, and not over questions of general policy. As a result, patron-client ties 
overrode the importance of political institutions and were used for gaining access to 
policy-makers. 1o 
The concept of Patrimonialism was used by Crouch to point to the existence of 
traditional features in the political system, especially the patrimonial politics of earlier, 
pre-colonial Javanese empires. In particular, Crouch highlighted the importance of 
political and financial patronage derived from the President and other key elements at 
the apex of the political structure. Political competition at the elite level depended on 
91nterview with fomer ministers Mohammed Sadli, 22 July 1994, and Radius Prawiro, 29 July 1994. 
lOK.D.Jackson ; 'Bureaucratic Polity : A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communication in 
Indonesia' in K.D.Jackson & L.W.Pye (eds) Political Power and Communication in Indonesia (Berkeley, 1978), pp 
23-42. 
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access to the President, and was about power, the distribution of appointments and 
opportunities for profiteering. 11 
Two patrimonial features of Indonesian political-economy deserve mention here. The 
first concerns the operations of executive government and the role of the President. 
Executive government in Indonesia exhibits several patrimonial features, particularly in 
the President's relationships with his ministers, and in the way policies are formulated, 
decided and made into law. The second concerns the importance of patron-client 
relationships, for both political and financial purposes, which interact within the wider 
political structure. These features have had an important bearing on Indonesia's 
political system, for whilst the actual processes of policy-making are generally insulated 
from societal pressure, they are characterised by political competition for policy 
influence and political power, particularly among groups and individuals around the 
President. Policy-making is therefore essentially viewed as a struggle between 
contending factions competing for the President's ear. As Schwarz put it, 
In Soeharto's Indonesia, titles and positions do not necessarily imply political power. What counts 
is access to Soeharto. 12 
One of the most enduring features of the New Order has been the numerous political 
and economic coalitions between Soeharto, senior bureaucrats and army officers with 
leading Indonesian business corporations. A disparate group themselves, the cronies -
essentially businessmen who enjoy a steady flow of patronage in the form of business 
opportunities and other favours such as the monopoly rents created by market 
restrictions - have consistently and persistently influenced government decisions. 
They have had easy access to Soeharto, and often a familial relationship with him. In 
return for supporting his patronage activities, they have amassed enormous wealth 
through government-generated import and trade monopolies, privileged access to 
government contracts and the ability to bend government policies in their favour. Some 
of the most prominent in this group are Chinese-Indonesian businessmen Mohammed 
(Bob) Hasan, Prajogo Pangestu and Liem Sioe Liong, and pribumi (indigenous) 
businessmen (and women) dominated by the President's immediate family and close 
relatives. 
11 Harold Crouch ; 'Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia' World Politics Vol.XXXI No.4 (July 1979), pp 
571-587. Anderson also discussed patrimonialism in "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture" in C.Holt ( ed) .c.ulm 
and Politics in Indonesia (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1972). 
12Adam Schwarz; A Nation in Waitin& ·Indonesia in the 1990s (Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1994), p 174. 
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Besides the. President, the leading group of officials generating and dispensing 
patronage are those based in the State Secretariat, the administrative arm of the 
Presidential office responsible for liaison with the central bureaucracy. Clientelistic 
alliances, however, pervade the bureaucracy, from the very top to the very bottom. As a 
result, most of these officials and their business partners resist market-opening reforms 
. because they eliminate lucrative sources of income arising from regulatory controls. 
As noted by Robison, 
For :most domestic corporate groups ... the springboards to business success were the state-
allocated monopolies, which gave access to crucial sectors of economic activity. Forestry 
concessions, import licenses, distributorships for basic commodities, and contracts for 
construction and supply were allocated by the state, and the most successful capitalist groups 
were those that were able to gain access to tbese.14 
Therefore, one key feature of Indonesian political economy is the patrimonial and 
clientelistic nature of policy-making within the state structure. This feature has heavily 
influenced the way in which policies are formulated and enacted. Cronyism has, at 
times, acted as a brake on economic reform, and given the impression that government 
ministers wield nothing like the clout of leading cronies. On the whole, however, 
cronyism and patron-client relationships involve only personalised and particularist 
concessions and not broad-based political or major economic issues. At the level of 
general economic policy-making, these businessmen generally do not have anything 
approaching the influence of the technocrats in the bureaucracy, although there are, and 
have been, exceptions. 
On Batam Island, Patrimonial practices are evident in the way in which policies are 
formulated, decided and enacted, whilst Clientelistic relationships dominated the 
economic landscape in the early 1970s, and later in the 1990s. 
Intra-elite Politicking 
Taking the concept of Bureaucratic Pluralism, Emmerson extended the notion that 
influence over policy formation was based only on patrimonial links, by including intra-
state competition for policy influence. Emmerson argued that politics under the New 
Order was more pluralistic than previously thought since serious debate did in fact take 
place among various agencies within the bureaucracy. As a result, political competition 
was about both the distribution of personal advantage among client groups, as well as 
substantive policy issues within the state. 15 
14Richard Robison ; "Industrialisation and the economic and political development of capital : the case of Indonesia" 
in Ruth McVey (ed) Southeast Asian Ciwitalists (Cornell, New York 1992), p 70. 
15oonald K. Emmerson ; 'Understanding the New Order : Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia' Asian SllfNy, 
Vol.xxm No.11(November1983), pp 1220.1241. 
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Whilst the style of policy-making has changed over time, albeit only slightly, there have 
been two main constants. Firstly, as described above, there is Soeharto - he personally 
appoints his key ministers, his cabinet and his personal staff, is the final arbiter in 
accepting or rejecting advice, and heads a structure of political and financial patronage. 
Secondly, Soeharto has had two main groups of economic advisers - the technocrats, 
and a diverse group of economic nationalists - and they have influenced both the policy-
making processes and policy choices. 
The first group, the economists or 'technocrats', are mainly US-trained economists from 
the University of Indonesia who have been the chief source of macro-economic policy 
under the New Order. The technocrats are philosophically committed to a market-
oriented policy framework, a strategy emphasising labour-intensive industrialisation 
and regulatory reform. In line with the prescriptions of the World Bank and other 
international financial organisations, they have argued that in a labour-surplus economy 
the emphasis should be on export-oriented manufactures that can absorb cheap labour 
rather than capital-intensive industries, which need protected domestic markets in order 
to survive. Their prominent say in policy formulation has won and maintained the 
confidence of foreign governments, financial institutions and investors. 
Among the most prominent of the technocrats have been Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali 
W ardhana, Sumitro Djojohadikusomo, Mohammed Sadli, Emil Salim, Radius Prawiro, 
Johannes Sumarlin and Subroto. By no means an homogenous group - factions 
developed over the years as their numbers grew - their cohesiveness has been quite 
remarkable, and on most matters of principle and policy they appear to be in accord. 
The technocrats have remained personal advisers to the President or members of 
Cabinet for many years. The key to their longevity has been their relationship with 
Soeharto, and that connection appears to be founded on the fact that they not only 
worked well together but that their policies also worked reasonably well. Soeharto has 
relied heavily on his economic ministers, particularly when resources were tight and 
choices difficult. One-time Minister for Industry, Soehoed, described the technocrats 
I 
approach: 
The technocrats are very good at scaring the Old Man. They keep him on the razor's edge, and 
that's how they get their way. They tell him that if he doesn't follow their suggestions the people 
will go without food and clothes, or the economy won't grow.16 
However, the technocrats have never enjoyed a monopoly over economic policy-
making, and their decisions are only operative with Presidential support. The 
16Adam Schwarz; A Nation in Waitin& ·Indonesia in the 1990s (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1994), p 54 fn 7 
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technocrats can count among their public supporters those who see gains in economic 
liberalisation - business people, professionals, intellectuals and foreign companies - but 
by no means, however, do these groups constitute a substantial political base of support. 
The technocrats' real basis of power has been the support of Soeharto - when he 
favoured rivals, they had to submit and do their best under less than ideal 
circumstances. Their influence has been especially weak where crony and military 
interests were involved, and their policies have been regularly challenged by groups 
advocating investment in heavily protected industries oriented to the domestic market. 
At such times they have been reduced to providing guidance and persuasion towards 
what they considered to be the desired end. As Vatikiotis noted, the extent to which the 
technocrats acted under constraint was clear in a succession of annual World Bank 
reports in which 'fine so far but where is the rest' always seemed to be the message.17 
Whilst the technocrats have played a major role in determining the broad strategy of 
economic policy and in formulating the details of particular policies throughout the 
period of the New Order, their fortunes have fluctuated over the years. A typical view 
in the 1970s was that Soeharto gave them only a limited mandate to carry out economic 
reform in order to guarantee annual infusions of foreign aid and investment, but not 
enough power to make fundamental reforms in the way the government operated or to 
force cooperation from other ministries. This situation changed somewhat in the mid-
1980s, when the collapse in oil prices persuaded Soeharto to allow the technocrats to 
begin a substantial and sustained series of economic reforms. To some extent, however, 
they have also suffered from their own successes. In bad times, they have enjoyed a 
broad mandate to determine economic policies. At other times, particularly when the 
economy improved, their influence has been more restricted. At all times, however, 
they have had control over the economically important finance and monetary portfolios. 
The second broad category of economic advisers have been the economic nationalists.18 
Made up of very diverse elements, they have generally been opposed to the doctrine of 
the free market and instead been committed to the notion that strong and focused state 
intervention in the allocation of resources can accelerate the process of industrial 
development. They argue that it is worth paying the short-term costs of protectionist 
policies in order to promote the development of state enterprises and pribumi 
(indigenous) entrepreneurs who cannot as yet compete in either domestic or world 
markets. 
17Micbael Vatikiotis; Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order. Deyelopment and Pressure for Chan&e (Routledge, 
London 1993), p 17 4. 
18Tbis group bas been referred to variously as the 'nationalists', 'interventionists', 'tecbnologues', 'engineers' and 
'technologists'. 
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Two of the most forceful exponents of the view that the government should maintain a 
large role in the economy have been Ibnu Sutowo, head of the national oil company 
Pertamina until the mid-1970s, and since the early 1980s, Minister for Research and 
Technology, B. J. Habibie. Both have maintained that Indonesia can never hope to 
catch up economically with industrialised nations without a concerted, government-led 
push to speed up the natural pace at which technology is transferred among nations. 
Both have been described as a 'dynamiser' for their ability to quickly formulate and 
decisively implement programs of economic development, unconstrained by 
bureaucratic obstacles. 
Like the technocrats, the economic nationalists do not necessarily have an institutional 
base - those in the Cabinet are the dominant public face.19 They have relied on key 
personalities who, in the case of both Ibnu Sutowo and Habibie, had strong presidential 
connections. However, they hold some appeal for those who are ideologically 
predisposed against any move towards a more competitive and market-oriented system, 
and favour regulation, protection and more import-substitution. 20 Indonesian 
nationalism, generally pro-pribumi and resentful of the fact that Chinese Indonesians 
wield economic power disproportionate to numbers, has coloured much of the political 
and economic history of Indonesian since independence, particularly in the pre-1966 
period. It has fairly widespread public and some intellectual support, including 
elements within the armed forces, state sector employees and some very vocal 
components of the press. 
Soeharto's allegiance to each group of economic advisers - the technocrats and the 
economic nationalists - as well as to the cronies, has fluctuated over time, according to 
economic and political variables, both domestic and international. This has meant that 
the process of economic policy-making is a political contest between groups who 
compete for policy influence and political power in Cabinet and around the President. 
Competition between the three groups is over both substantive policy matters and the 
distribution of opportunities and spoils of office, and they coexist in a sometimes 
conflicting, sometimes cooperative relationship. As Liddle put it, 
... the economists are the producers of wealth, the patrimonialists are the distributors of a large 
· portion of it for political purposes. the nationalists are the embodiment of [Soeharto's] dream for 
more rapid progress towards an industtialised, internationally powerful Indonesia21 
l 9The views of lbnu Sutowo and Habibie are not necessarily synonymous with closed-minded economic nationalism 
but are perhaps a focus point for those groups. 
20For a discussion of the economic nationalists during the 1970s, see Richard Robison ; Indonesia : The Rise of 
~ (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986). 
21R.William Liddle; 'The Relative Autonomy of the Third World Politician: Soeharto and Indonesian Economic 
Development in Comparative Perspective' International Studies Quarterly No.35 (1991), p 419. (403-427) 
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Intra-elite politicking has given the appearance that different parts of the government 
are working at cross-purposes, for the New Order governmen~ has pursued a 
contradictory mix of liberalising and protectionist economic policies. Nevertheless, 
Indonesia's economic record has been impressive, as shown by the growth of the 
economy at an average rate of7.6% between 1970-80, and 5.5% between 1980-90.22 It 
is clear, therefore, that intra-elite politicking has influenced the policy-making 
processes, and is a key feature of Indonesia's political economy. 
On Batam Island, differences among key senior Indonesian officials were crucial to the 
policy-making processes. Conflict was particularly marked between the technocrats 
and nationalists who competed to impose their respective developrnent strategies. 
Societal Influences 
The above description of Indonesian political economy under the New Order has 
focused heavily on the state, from which it can be concluded that policies tend· to 
represent less the product of lobbying by interest groups than compromises between the 
competing elements within the ruling elite. None of these explanations, however, allow 
for any significant inputs from links outside the state apparatus, or explicitly 
acknowledge that a structural relationship exists between the state and socio-economic 
forces, and that limitations on the state are imposed by existing and prevailing social, 
economic and political conditions. 
However, several explanations emerged in the late 1980s to explain how society, non-
state and societal groups have come to bear some influence, albeit minor, on Indonesian 
policy-makers. 23 They can perhaps be separated into three theoretical camps - one 
corporatist, one pluralist and the other structuralist - and they describe quite different 
means of influencing policy. 
Reeve used the term Corporatism to describe the state-controlled corporatist system of 
interest representation in Indonesia, which consists of regularised and state-designated 
channels for political representation based on function. 24 Authoritarian corporatist 
structures contain and restrict society politically and contribute to . the persistence of 
patrimonial, or clientelistic, connections as the principal mechanism for the 
advancement of interests in the policy process. As such, the Indonesian corporatist state 
demands mono-loyalty based on economic achievements and economic benefits created 
22world Banlc; World Deyelownent ReJ10111982, World Bank; DeyelQllllent Regort 1992 (Washington DC) 
23Interestingly, at this point an influential school of political scientists were arguing that more focus should be placed 
on the state rather than society. See Peter B.Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (eds).; Brin&in& the 
State Back: In (Cambridge University Press, New York 1985). 
24See David Reeve ; "The Corporatist State : The Case of Golkar " in Arief Budiman ( ed) State and Civil Society in 
Indonesia (Monash University, Melbourne 1990), pp 151-176. 
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by the state. Whilst Corporatist channels are essentially a means for control through co-
optation, they do allow some measure of input through mainly internal channels. 
The major corporatist channels are organised along vertical and functional lines. They 
include the various groupings which make up the state-run political organisation, 
Golkar, numerous interest-based organisations such as KADIN (Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce), and other social and political groups which adhere to corporatist 
government stipulations and controls. These groups tend to have general policy input 
but they can also have influence on particular policies. 
In the late 1980s, several observations of the New Order state allowed for the 
participation of extra-state actors in the policy-making process. In contrast to 
Corporatism, most used the term 'pluralism' to indicate a less structured arrangement in 
which societal groups organise independently of the state. For instance, the term 
Managed Pluralism was used to describe the policy-making process as somewhat 
pluralistic but managed in the sense that the managers of policy are relatively few in 
number and protected from public scrutiny, accountability or a need to compromise.25 
Similarly, Constrained Pluralism explained that the policy-making process was not just 
a matter of 'once-for-all' decisions by the government, but included an awareness of a 
need to gamer public support. 26 
In particular, Liddle's concept of a kind of Restricted Pluralism was used to argue that 
the central state apparatus did not monopolise the policy process, and that there was 
more beneath-the-surface political activity than hitherto thought, describing the 
interplay of a range of state and non-state actors in policy formation and debate, and 
often in an other-than-clientelistic fashion. 21 Such extra-state actors include the press 
and intellectuals. State actors include members of the DPR and Provincial governments 
because, whilst they are considered part of the state, their interests can vary from those 
of the government. The influence of these actors is both direct and indirect, either 
through state reaction to demands, or through 'anticipated participation', whereby the 
state pre-empts demands. According to Liddle, 
The complex pattern of repression, performance legitimation, and symbolic legitimation has 
created and now sustains within and outside the political system, a solid base of support. .. 28 
25John Bresnan; Mana&in& Indonesia: The Modem Political Economy (Columbia University Press, New York 
1993). 
26ne authors argued that the gradual and incremental implementation of deregulatory measures in the late 1980s 
was done in part to win public acceptance and support for the changes. M.Hadi Soesastro & Peter Drysdale ; 'Survey 
of Recent Developments' Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies V ol.26 No.3 (December 1990). 
27The term is Macintyre's. R.William Liddle ; 'The Politics of Shared Growth : Some Indonesian Cases" 
Comgarative Politics (January 1987), pp 127-146. 
28R.William Liddle; 'Suharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions' Pacific Affairs, Vol.58 No. 1 
(Spring 1985). 
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Pluralistic societal input through outside, and sometimes even public channels such as 
that emanating from the media, academics, the DPR, and business associations is rarely 
formal, and the government often acts in the face of it These interests, and their 
articulation, have changed remarkably over the last twenty-five years. 
Consistent with the pluralist approach, Macintyre argued that state-centred approaches 
to Indonesia's political economy need to be supplemented by a focus on society in order 
to understand the character of the Indonesian state in the 1990s, particularly in light of 
the changes brought about by economic policy changes, observing that business in 
Indonesia has come to develop new and independent political capabilities through 
broad-based industry associations seeking significant changes to existing government 
policy.28 
Maclntyre's study of the political activities of industry associations illustrated the 
process whereby the weakening of the state's capacity to maintain networks of 
patronage, combined with the growth of a domestic capitalist class, has created 
opportunities for elements of smaller domestic producer groups to secure their interests 
via political organisation. According to Macintyre, 
[I]ndustry bodies are being converted from formalistic institutions primarily serving the 
government's desire for extra-state political action into insttuments for the advancement of 
business causes. 29 
The Structuralist approach, as developed by Robison, can also be included here because 
it is concerned with non-state interests. Robison argues that a domestic capitalist class 
is emerging in Indonesia which is coming to stand independently of the state, and 
consequently is the most important domestic non-state actor. However, rather than 
directly influencing policy, he argues that the principal constraint on policy-makers is 
not direct representation by capitalist groups but rather the indirect pressure applied by 
capital, both domestically and internationally. In this sense, by emphasising that 
capitalist power is indispensable to the economy, the state, while exercising a degree of 
autonomy, must always consider the consequences of economic policies which threaten 
the flow of investment and trade, and continued economic growth. 30 
28Andrew Macintyre; Business and Politics in Indonesia (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1991). 
29 Andrew Macintyre (ed) ; Business and Goyernment ip lpdustria}isip& Asia (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1994), 
p256. 
30ilichard Robison; The Rise ofCaoital (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986). Richard Robison; "Authoritarian Stat.es, 
Capital-Owning Classes and the Politics of Newly-mdustrialising Countries : the Case of Indonesia" World Politics 
VolJCU No.l (October 1988), pp 52-74. 
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It can therefore be concluded that state officials cannot always act independently of 
interests and voices in the wider polity. Several societal, and other, actors have at some 
time or other had an influence on the makers of economic policy and the policy 
formation processes, but their role and input has been limited. Despite the existence of 
non-state or societal input through either corporatist, pluralist or structuralist means, it 
is clear that the government's restrictions, and limits on, political participation have 
been extremely successful. Societal input, therefore, remains weak and, where it 
occurs, is the exception rather than the rule. 
This is no less so on Batam Island where societal influence is weak in the face of the 
government. However, since the mid-1980s there is a noticeable trend of increased 
non-state pressure upon, and on occasion input into, the policy-making processes. 
External Influences 
A further policy influence is that of the global economic system. Few accounts of 
Indonesian political economy have taken account of the influence of external factors 
and actors on the policy-making processes in Indonesia, and where they have, have 
generally been within a framework of dependency.32 
Dependency theory, as applied to Indonesia in the early-1970s, took the view that the 
integration of Indonesia into the global economic system meant the subordination of the 
Indonesian economy to the needs of foreign capital. The New Order state was described 
as a client 'showcase' state, whereby the government and its officials, by restructuring 
the Indonesian economy and facilitating the entry of international capital, represented 
and served the interests of comprador and foreign capital in return for kick-backs. 
Because bureaucrats behaved in a patrimonial style, reserving business opportunities for 
themselves, their political allies and clients, they prevented the emergence of a viable 
and independent domestic capitalism. 33 Dependency theory appeared to have a strong 
basis until a spate of nationalist economic policies, reflecting public sentiment in the 
mid-1970s, placed severe constraints on foreign capital and protected both domestic 
industry and the development of domestic capital. 
32see for instance an article which argued that the economic ministers had adopted 'neo-colonial' economic ideology 
during their studies in the United States. David Ransome; 'The Berkeley Mafia' Ramparts (October 1970). There 
have also been several recent explanations of Indonesia along the lines of Dependency Theory. In particular, Tanter 
argued that the Indonesian state was "Rentier Militarist", stressing that external conditions explain the emergence and 
reproduction of the New Order state, and arguing that as a rentier state Indonesia is dependent on an essentially 
rentier orientation to the world economy. Richard Tanter; "Oil, IGGI and US Hegemony: Global Preconditions for 
Indonesian Rentier-Militarism" in Arief Budiman (ed) State and Civil Society in Indonesia (Monash University, 
Melbourne 1990), pp 51-98. See also Wayne Robinson; "Imperialism, Dependency and Peripheral Industrialisation: 
The Case of Japan in Indonesia" in Richard Higgott & Richard Robison (eds) Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political 
Economy of Structural Chan" (Routledge & K.egan Paul, London 1985). 
33Rex Mortimer ; 1ndonesia : Growth or Development' in Rex Mortimer (ed) Showcase State : The illusion .pf 
Indonesia's Accelerated Modernisation (Angus and Robertson, Sydney 1973). 
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Whilst Dependency Theory drew attention to the influence of external variables, it 
failed to adequately explain the situation in Indonesia. Firstly, denial of the 
development of national capital failed to appreciate its substantial presence. Quite 
clearly domestic capital has emerged in Indonesia and both confronts, as well as 
integrates with, foreign capital. In particular, the New Order period has witnessed the 
emergence of a large and diversified domestic private business sector, one which is 
dominated by large conglomerates.34 Moreover, Dependency theory ignored the fact 
that domestic factors also affect national responses to external constraints. Clearly the 
relationship between national and foreign capital is a complex one, and contingent on 
both changing and dynamic domestic and global conditions. 
External variables can influence policy choices, indirectly and directly, for even the 
most insular of countries has external relations. How these influences are perceived, 
however, remains a matter of debate, for the consequences of external influences may 
not be as negative as Dependency Theory purports. That is to say that external 
influence does not automatically mean external control, for rarely is external influence 
not countered by domestic measures. However, it is not the aim here to argue the 
relative positive or negative consequences of external influences but to outline particular 
features of these influences and how they might impact on the policy-making process. 
It is also not to argue that domestic factors should be neglected in favour of external 
factors. Put simply, what needs to be better understood is the influence of external 
actors on the economic opportunities facing Indonesia, and its domestic capabilities to 
profit from these opportunities. 
It is clear that the international economic system can influence development, providing 
a country with both economic and political choices.. In Indonesia's case, it must be 
remembered that the recovery of the economy under the New Order government in the 
late 1960s was due to an injection of foreign resources - aid and investment capital. 35 
Reliance on foreign borrowings also meant that multilateral lending agencies have some 
leverage on Indonesian policy-makers. For instance, a 1992 World Bank report claimed 
that, 
The impressive growth of Indonesian industry was a testimony, among other things, to the Barik's 
sound analysis, advice and influence. 36 
More importantly, however, the global economic system can place external constraints 
on a country economically, and influence the growth of national capabilities necessary 
34The emergence of a number of these very large and diversified domestic groups is well discussed in Richard 
Robison ; Indonesia : The Rise of Capital (Allen and U nwin, Sydney 1986). 
35See for instance: Mohammed Sadli; "Survival of the New Order Economy" Jakarta Posl 11March1996. 
36such policy input is transmitted through internal and confidential government channels. World Bank; ~ 
Bank Sugport for Industrialisation in Korea. India and Indonesia (Washington 1992), p 43. 
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to contend with those external conditions politically. An obvious example of this 
influence was Indonesia's national balance of payments problems in the early to mid-
1980s. Reliant on commodities for the bulk of its export earnings, Indonesia suffered 
from the impact of the international recession. The decline in global prices for key 
commodities led to a sharp economic slowdown. At the same time, however, the 
international economic system provided an opportunity for Indonesia. Those same 
externally induced economic shocks which created balance-of-payments problems for 
Indonesia in the mid-1980s appear to have been the catalyst for regulatory reform of the 
Indonesian economy which has assisted Indonesia in obtaining more benefits from the 
global economic system. The importance of this influence is clear in the context of the 
early 1990s when Indonesia's shift to an outward-looking economic strategy through the 
promotion of labour-intensive manufactured exports is forcing it to compete for 
international market share. 
Furthermore, as trade and economic factors have come to play a greater role in 
Indonesia's international relations, Indonesia's foreign policy has become more 
pragmatic and tempered with economic realities. Witness Indonesia's recent interest in 
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation) and AFf A (ASEAN Free Trade Area), as 
well as its own unilateral trade and investment measures, all of which have led to a 
diversification of Indonesia's external economic relations, and all of which impact on 
Indonesian economic policy-makers. 
There are perhaps two main external variables which can, or do, bear some influence on 
Indonesian policy choices and responses. The first is that of foreign states or 
governments, and the second that of foreign capital. Both these factors can do so 
directly and indirectly. 
Foreign governments or nation-states can influence policy decisions in a number of 
ways. One such means is by direct pressure or through sanctions, usually through the 
use of trade or aid as leverage. For example, the United States suspended credits and 
aid funds to Indonesia in mid-1973 in order to force the Indonesian government to place 
more controls on the borrowing activities on the national oil company, Pertamina. 
Other examples include the United States' use of the threat of withdrawal of trade 
preferences in return for improved labour conditions in Indonesia during the 1990s. 
Geographical proximity to other countries can also influence, and even limit possible 
policy choices. In Indonesia's case, they include countries with which it shares a 
common border - Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and 
Australia - as well as those countries in the region that have strategic importance - India, 
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China and Japan. Such influence, of course, can change over time according to geo-
political realities. 
On occasion it may lead to confrontation, and at other times may lead to cooperation, 
through bilateral agreements and pacts or multilateral arrangements. For instance, 
Indonesia's relations with the neighbouring city-state of Singapore in the late-1960s 
were marked by suspicion and confrontation and led to several policy decisions aimed 
at reducing Singapore's entrepot role in the region. By the early 1990s, however, 
Indonesia-Singapore relations were at an all-time high and involved numerous 
cooperative agreements in military, economic and political spheres. 
Foreign capital too can influence government policy, through either direct 
representations to seek concessions or favourable conditions through a bargaining 
process, or by indirect means. In particular, international economic change and the 
demands of foreign capital have made it increasingly difficult for the Indonesian 
government to maintain nationalist economic structures. In an environment in which 
capital is scarce, and footloose foreign investors can choose among host countries, 
governments are often likely to come under pressure to maintain competitive policy 
environments. It is this indirect influence which is perhaps the more powerful. 
There is no doubt the economic restructuring processes begun in the mid· 1980s have 
worked to the advantage of international capital. Whilst these changes are partly the 
consequence of domestic capital's inability to mobilise sufficient investment to maintain 
levels of growth and to finance the hoped-for export drive as the state's capacity to fill 
this role declined, they were also partly a government response to an economic crisis, 
driven by the need to create conditions conducive to low-cost production for export and 
an increased volume of foreign investment. As Robison noted, these terms involved 
opening the economy to international investment and trade : 
As this process of integration into the new international division of labour develops, success in 
attracting invesunent will depend largely upon the existence of conditions attractive to 
international investors (which may include Indonesian capitalists themselves). 37 
Foreign capital might also influence policies via its relationship with domestic capital. 
Those foreign investors without good political connections of their own can and do 
benefit from links with Indonesian domestic capital. In particular, foreign capital can be 
37Richard Robison ; "Industrialisation and the Economic and Political Development of Capital : The Case of 
Indonesia" in Ruth McVey (ed) Southeast Asian Capitalists. p 88. · 
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attracted to crony businessmen with patrimonial relationships with government officials 
in order to utilise their access to government policy-makers. 38 
Furthermore, at the same time as foreign capital can benefit from links with domestic 
capital, local enterprises can develop new capabilities through international linkages. 
For instance, collaboration with foreign capital may expand the capabilities of local 
capitalists. As Robison noted, 
[T]he joint venture does not lead inevitably to the subordination and decline of the domestic 
partner. Integration with foreign capital through the joint venture may equally be the mechanism 
where domestic capital moves to a higher state of capital accumulation, corporate organisation, and 
technological complexity. 39 
In particular, foreign capital may influence the organisational resources as well as the 
political strength of local companies vis-a-vis the state. Mackie has noted in Southeast 
Asia that a link with foreign capital is less likely to be a source of national economic 
dependency and more likely to be a potential mitigator of business dependency on 
domestic political patronage. 40 Indeed, the power of internationally-linked domestic 
businesses to set the agenda for state policy may increase as they consolidate a base of 
social and political power outside the state apparatus. 
It may be the case that external linkages and challenges encourage corporatist 
arrangements, through both the organisational strengthening of local entrepreneurs as 
well as through closer public-private sector cooperation. Anek has described the 
situation in Thailand where the need for export-oriented economic policies encouraged 
stronger public-private cooperation. 41 In Indonesia, one domestic response might be 
the emergence of government-business cooperation in order to take advantage of 
regional and global economic trends. 
Furthermore, as trade and economic factors come to play a greater role in Indonesia's 
international relations, including foreign policy, one of the new harbingers of wider 
Indonesian interests might well be its entrepreneurs and large corporations. As a result 
there is likely to be pragmatism and accommodation in areas involving trade, leaving 
38 As Macintyre noted, a reputation for patrimonial connections is an extremely valuable commercial asset, enabling 
the best-connected of business people to become proxy political patrons themselves. Andrew Macintyre ; "Power, 
Prosperity and Patrimonialism: Business and Government in Indonesia" in Andrew Macintyre (ed) Business and 
Goyemmeot in IndustriaJisin& Asia (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1994), pp 244-267. 
39Richard Robison; Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986), p 197. 
40J.A.C.Mackie ; "Changing patterns of Chinese big business in Southeast Asia" in Ruth McVey (ed) Southeast 
Asian Capitalists, pp 180-182. 
41 Anek Laothamatas ; No loom a Bureaucratic Polity : Business Associations and the New Political Economy of 
Thailand (PhD Dissertation, Colombia University, New York 1989). 
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some room for Indonesia's corporate sector to bear some influence on economic and 
foreign policy. 42 
All external variables mentioned above involve foreign-domestic linkages - the impact 
of the international economic system on domestic economic and political choices, the 
influence of other nation-states and of geo-political realities, and the role of foreign 
capital and its relationship with policy-makers and domestic capital. One aim of this 
thesis will be to identify where, or indeed if, any of these external variables can 
influence the strength, the strategies and the organisational capacities of domestic 
interests, both economically and politically, and are a more important policy 
consideration than is often recognised. 
The influence of external variables is clearly apparent on Batara. The international 
economic system, international capital and foreign governments all impacted on the 
policy choices facing Batam. Singapore in particular, by virtue of geographic 
proximity, was an important consideration in the minds of Indonesia's policy-makers. 
There are, therefore, several central characteristics of Indonesian political economy. 
The most important are those that occur at the elite level of the political and policy-
making structure, and they are closely inter-connected - the dominance of the President, 
the patrimonial nature of politics, the importance of patron-client relationships and the 
persistence of intra-elite politicking. There are non-state features of the Indonesian 
polity, both societal and external, but the general view is that their influence is limited. 
This study will highlight the relative importance or influence of these features of 
Indonesian politics. 
The New Order Economy 
Since 1965 Indonesia has undergone a remarkable economic transformation from a 
resource-dependent and import-substituting economy characterised by high levels of 
state intervention, towards one which today is more outward-looking and in which 
manufactured exports and the private sector play a much greater role. (See Table 2.1) 
Following the economic chaos left behind by the previous government of President 
Sukarno in 1966 - low levels of trade, negligible foreign-exchange reserves, hyper-
inflation, and production at 20-30% of capacity - the New Order government of 
42Michael Vatikiotis; "Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s" Contemponu:y Southeast Asia Vol.14 No.4 (March 
1993), pp 359-60. 
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President Soeharto moved to stabilise the economy, and to shift economic policy away 
from direct controls and heavily interventionist policies. An economic strategy, 
determined by the technocrats with the assistance of World Bank experts and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), placed immediate priority on controlling inflation, 
rehabilitating physical infrastructure, and obtaining foreign aid and private investment 
in order to restore Indonesia's industrial production capacity. As part of an outward 
looking approach, the liberalising reforms reflected both the orientation of economists 
themselves and the conditions demanded by western creditors. 
Reliance was placed on market forces to stimulate trade and production, assisted by 
foreign aid from the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (1001), in which the two 
main donors were the US and Japan. Foreign investment laws were liberalised in order 
to restore investor confidence and entice foreign capital back into Indonesia, and a 
generous package of incentives was introduced. The trade regime was overhauled, 
enabling raw materials and capital goods to again flow into the country. With almost 
immediate improvements in production, momentum continued to pick up in the early 
1970s marked by a sharp increase in foreign investment and rising international oil 
prices. 
Table 2.1 
Indicators of Economic Development, mid-1960s and early 1990s43 
mid-1960s I early-1990s 
Real GDP per capita 
-Growth(%) ±0 ±5 
-$1991 190 610 
Gross Domestic Investment 
(%ofGDP) 8 35 
Shares of GDP(%) 
- Agriculture 53 19 
-Industry 11 40 
- Manufacturin2 8 21 
43Hal Hill ; The Indoru;sian Economy Since 1966 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p 5. 
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Liberal economic policies, however, lost some momentum in the early-1970s following 
the international petroleum boom which saw an enormous increase in prices for oil. 
Combined with a reassertion of nationalist sentiment and interventionist economic 
theories which argued that foreign investment benefited only a few, the government's 
resolve to institute liberal reform was dulled. These nationalist attacks developed into 
student demonstrations in Jakarta against what was seen as an open door to foreign 
investment, and culminated in riots during the 1974 state visit of Japanese Prime 
Minister Kakuei Tanaka. Directed against Japanese 'neo-colonialism' and exploitation 
of the Indonesian economy - Japan, large and visible, provided one third of all foreign 
economic assistance and Japanese investment in Indonesia had increased from US$30m 
in 1971 to US$100m in 197344 - the incident became known as Malari (Malapetaka 16 
Januari or 16 January Disaster). 
The result of the nationalist attacks, combined with increasing oil revenues which 
removed revenue constraints, was an almost complete overhaul of liberal economic 
measures. Trade and industry policies were redirected towards promoting import-
substitution industrialisation, and the re-introduction of high tariff and non-tariff 
barriers protecting domestic industries. The most important restriction was that 
imposed on foreign investment immediately after the rioting in early 1974, which 
obliged foreign investors to enter into joint ventures with local partners, and closed 
several sectors to foreign investment. Whilst the joint-venture partnership was nominal 
- the foreign partner often provided equity capital, management, technology and 
operating capital while the Indonesian partner often contributed only land - the cost to 
investors was real, and the rush to invest in Indonesia came to a rapid end. Realised 
PMA (Penamanan Modal Asing or Foreign Investment) decreased through the late-
1970s and early-1980s. While the restriction applied to all foreigners, it contributed 
especially to a sharp retreat by the Japanese. 
The influx of oil revenues enabled the government to play a more aggressive and active 
role in financing, protecting and subsidising domestic capital, and in direct investment 
focused upon the creation of a national industrial sector. In 197 4, oil accounted for 
22% of GDP and 70% of export earnings.45 Its share of government revenue increased 
from 25% in 1971 to 48% in 1974, peaking in 1981 at 62%.46 At the heart of the new 
state-led industrial strategy were large resource-based and industrial projects involving 
oil refining, minerals processing, steel mills and engineering works. 
44Kunio Yoshihara ; lftPanese Investment in Southeast Asia (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1978), p 67. 
45wing Thye Woo, Bruce Glassbumer & Anwar Nasuti.on; Macro economic Policies. Crises and l.on&-term Growth 
in Indonesia. 1965-1990 (World Bank, Washington 1994). 
46Hal Hill ; The Indonesian Econom,v Since 1966 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p 46. 
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The one serious challenge to the government's plan was caused by the Pertamina crisis 
in 1975-76 when the state-owned oil company ran up debts of US$10.5 billion. The 
crisis focussed attention on billion-dollar projects, inefficiency, corruption, and 
unrestrained foreign borrowing. However, the massive financial rescue operation did 
not lead to any real change in overall economic orientation and the government was 
able to continue with a high level of state involvement in the economy. Whilst the 
Indonesian Cabinet in the late 1970s was notable for the inclusion of several prominent 
supporters of the physical approach to development, the government continued with 
cautious borrowing, a prudent fiscal policy, and concern with controlling inflation 
throughout the rest of the 1970s, reflecting the continued control of the techncrats over 
macro-economic policy. 
The state-led industrial strategy continued until 1982 when international petroleum 
prices began to fall, causing balance-of-payments problems and foreshadowing an end 
to the period of oil-financed growth and state-led industrialisation. The immediate 
result was a reduction in development expenditure and the introduction of austerity 
measures. One of the first measures was the cancellation of several heavy industrial 
projects in 1983. 
Eventually, however, the government had to adjust to further decreases in earnings from 
oil and exports, and was forced to retreat from most heavy industrial development It 
also meant that fundamental structural change was necessary. Faced with the 
imperative of generating more foreign exchange, the technocrats worked to undo much 
of what the nationalists had done. Initially the pace and extent of their economic 
reforms were moderate, and confined to technocratic areas of influence, particularly in 
finance and macro-economic reform. However, by 1985-86, the deteriorating economic 
situation, caused by further oil price declines, forced the hands of economic policy-
makers and the government to gradually re-introduce liberal trade, investment and 
economic policies. Thus began a series of structural reforms of the Indonesian 
economy, generally referred to as the deregulation period. Between 1985 and 1995 
over twenty-five major economic reform packages were introduced. 
While a number of factors contributed to the reorientation of economic policy, it is 
generally agreed that the single most important catalyst for change was the severe 
balance of payments pressures experienced by Indonesia in the mid-1980s.47 The 
47 Andrew Macintyre & Sjabrir; "Survey of Recent Developments" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.29 
No.1(April1993), p29. See also the following. Sjabrir with Colin Brown; "Indonesian Financial and Trade Policy 
Deregulation : Reform and Response" in Andrew Macintyre & Kanishka Jayasuriya (eds) The Qynamics of 
Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific (Oxford University Press, Singapore 1992), 
pp 124-137. Andrew Macintyre ; "Politics and the Reorientation of Economic Policy in Indonesia" in Andrew 
Macintyre & Kanishka Jayasuriya (eds) The Qynaroics of Economic Policy Reform. in South-east Asia and the 
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decline in oil revenues, due to the sharp drop in world oil prices that occurred in 1986, 
falling world commodity prices which impacted upon Indonesia's traditional 
agricultural, mineral and energy exports, and the resultant deteriorating balance of 
payments provided the political will necessary for substantial deregulation and 
economic reform to take place. 
The decline in export income and tax revenues severely affected the capacity of the 
state to finance development and the types of major industrial projects implicit within 
an ISi (Import Substitution Industrialisation) framework. It also meant increased 
influence for the IMF and World Bank, for as the government encountered fiscal crises 
and as foreign debt problems escalated, the government became increasingly reliant on 
foreign aid and loans, thus increasing the influence of international financial 
institutions. The changes were also the consequence of domestic capital's inability to 
mobilise sufficient investment to maintain levels of growth and to finance the hoped-for 
export drive as the state's capacity to fill this role declined. 48 Therefore, the process of 
regulatory reform since the mid-1980s can be explained as a pragmatic response to the 
constricted economic situation in which Indonesia found itself as oil revenues continued 
to fall. 
The pace and extent of economic reform since 1986 has been nothing short of 
remarkable. Wide-ranging reforms to the trade and investment regimes, and 
deregulation of the banking and financial sector, have witnessed impressive and 
positive results - reduced dependence on oil, increased non-oil exports and non-oil 
government revenues, a stronger manufacturing sector, and increased foreign and 
domestic investment 49 
The thrust of the reform process has come from private-sector-led export-oriented 
industrialisation. A World Bank report had noted in the early 1980s that the Indonesian 
government engaged in policies and practices that inhibited any advance towards 
manufacturing for export, stimulation of the private sector and promotion of labour-
intensive industries. 50 Yet, the most impressive feature of the policy reform drive of the 
South-west Pacific (Oxford University Press, Singapore 1992), pp 138-157. M.Hadi Soesastro ; "The Political 
Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia" Asian Swvey, Vol.29 No.9 (September 1989), pp 853-869. 
48Richard Robison ; "Industrialisation and the economic and political development of capital : The case of 
Indonesia" in R.McVey (ed) Soutbeast Asian Cagitalists , p86. 
49The sectors of the economy most extensively affected by deregulation have been finance, trade and investment 
However, since the economic focus of Batam Island is on trade and investment, the details of financial deregulation 
are not discussed here. These measures are well discussed in Sjahrir with Colin Brown ; "Indonesian Financial and 
Trade Policy Deregulation : Reform and Response" in Andrew Macintyre & Kanishka Jayasuriya (eds) ~ 
Dynamics of Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific (Oxford University Press, 
Singapore 1992), pp 126-132. The authors also provide a list of deregulation measures from June 1983 until June 
1989. 
50John Bresnan; Maoagin& Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy (Columbia University Press, New York 
1993), p 216. 
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late 1980s has been the fairly successful and gradual move from ISi to EOI (Export-
oriented Industrialisation), through the encouragement of export industries in order to 
increase export earnings, especially non-oil earnings, although there have been major 
exceptions. 
Since 1987 there has been a dramatic increase in both domestic and foreign investment 
in Indonesia, most of it in export-oriented activities. It occurred in response to 
improvements in a previously unattractive investment climate and in the country's trade 
regime. Foreign investment, the majority of which has been export-oriented, has surged 
into the country with the steady improvement in the investment climate, and has 
occurred mainly in fields in which Indonesia has a strong comparative advantage, such 
as labour and resource intensive activities. 
Foreign investors have been particularly responsive to improvements in Indonesia's 
investment climate, as well as other trade, financial and industrial reforms. Approved 
foreign investment increased from US$1billion in 1986/87 to US$26billion in 1994. 
Domestic investors, too, have responded, signifying the growth of a robust domestic 
private sector. Approved domestic investment increased from Rp5.7trillion in 1986/87 
to Rp59trillion in 1994.51 
Several pull factors underpinned this investment boom in Indonesia. Firstly, the 
improved investment climate, particularly for foreign investors, was a result of the 
many reform measures undertaken by the govemment.52 Secondly, the strong and 
sustained domestic recovery of the Indonesian economy. Thirdly, the push of outward 
investment from the Asian NICs and Japan into newly competitive low-wage countries 
such as Indonesia, due to appreciation of their currencies, rising production costs, space 
constraints and environmental concerns. 53 
Growth in the economy has been fuelled in recent years principally by the non-oil 
sector. Trade and other regulatory reforms have now made exporting a more viable 
51Note: There is a tenuous relationship between approved and realised or actual investment. Mari Pangestu; "The 
Indonesian Economy: Booms and Macro-Economic Pressures" Southeast Asian Affairs 1992 (ISEAS, Singapore 
1992), p 142. Anwar N asution ; "Survey of Recent Developments" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies Vol.31 
No.2 (August 1995), p 37. 
52several steps were taken to attract foreign investment, including : allowing 100% foreign ownership, BKPM 
(Investment Coordination Board) investment promotion missions, bilateral investment guarantee agreements, 
bilateral tax treaties, simplifications in the licensing regime, a shorter Negative List, relaxation of local content 
requirements for export-oriented businesses, devaluations which improved the merits of exports, a more 
accommodative attitude towards expatriates, and reducing the minimum required amount of foreign equity 
investment in order to encourage small and medium-scale operations. Thee Kian Wie ; "The investment surge from 
Asia's NICs into Indonesia" in Hal Hill & Terry Hull (eds) Indonesia Assessment 1990, p68-70. Hal Hill; "The 
Economy, 1991/92", in Harold Crouch & Hal Hill (eds) Indonesia Assessment 1992, p31. 
53For example, the four NICs (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore) accounted for 70% of investment 
approvals in the textile, garment and footwear industries in 1989. Hal Hill ; "Manufacturing Industry", in Anne 
Booth (ed) The oil boom and after: Indonesian economic policy and performance in the Soeharto era, p235. 
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undertaking. Reforms not only attracted more foreign investment, but shifted the 
orientation of foreign firms to a stronger emphasis on export-oriented investment, 
leading to a surge in manufactured exports, particularly in labour-intensive industries.S4 
In 1986, 42% of all approved foreign investment projects were export-oriented. By 
1989, 79% of a much-larger number of projects were directed to the export market, 
significantly widening the base of the economy.SS Manufactured exports increased by 
almost 25% in 1991. S6 A similar switch has also been evident in the case of domestic 
investments. The main reasons for this were industrial and trade policy reform 
packages put in place after 1986, which corrected the earlier bias against internationally 
competitive manufacturing exports. 
By the mid 1990s, deregulation had produced several positive results, most significantly 
an overall improvement in the economic structure that existed in the early 1980s. There 
was evidence of a recovery in private investment, foreign and domestic, most of it in 
manufacturing. The private sector was for the first time since independence the driving 
force behind economic growth. Non-oil exports had increased significantly, and the 
economy was less dependent on oil, minerals and primary commodities overall. These 
developments were not wholly attributable to Indonesian government policies, for the 
same years also saw a general surge of investment into Southeast Asia. S7 
However, there is criticism that reforms have been insufficient, particularly as other 
countries have adopted more liberal foreign investment policies. A slackening in 
foreign investment flows in the mid-1990s is of considerable concern, for just as the 
foreign investment boom of 1989-91 fuelled later growth of export industries, a 
slowdown in foreign investment approvals may dampen export industry expansion in 
years to come. There are also doubts about the continued pace of export growth, for the 
investment boom has strained the capacity of infrastructure. Bottlenecks in the supply 
of electricity, telecommunications services and industrial water, and in the operations of 
ports, are emerging as serious constraints on industrial expansion. 58 
Despite the extensive reform of the financial and trade sectors of the economy, the 
sword of state intervention dangles constantly overhead. Key or strategic industries still 
remain under state control. Furthermore, Indonesia continues to suffer from an 
S4niee Kian Wie ; "The investment surge from Asia's NICs into Indonesia" in Hal Hill & Terry Hull (eds) Indonesia 
Assessment 1990, p68. 
5~ee Kian Wie; "The investment surge from Asia's NICs into Indonesia" in Hal Hill & Terry Hull (eds) Indonesia 
Assessment 1990, p70. 
56Hal Hill ; "Survey of Recent Developments" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.28. No.2 (August 
1992),p3. 
S7 John Bresnan ; Manai:ini: Indonesia : The modern golitical economy, pp 264-265. 
S8 Andrew Macintyre & Sjahrir ; "Survey of Recent Developments" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.29 
No.1(April1993), p21. 
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antiquated and unpredictable legal system, widespread nepotism, corruption and 
political patronage. Economic reforms too, are threatened by public unhappiness with 
the rising dominance of foreign investors and ethnic-Chinese businessmen, and the fear 
of a nationalist backlash remains very real. 
Continued economic success will depend largely upon the existence of conditions 
attractive to investors, both foreign and domestic. The state is already finding itself 
heavily involved in ensuring these conditions - low wages, disciplined and 
appropriately skilled workforce, attractive taxation, efficient infrastructure, acceptable 
investment laws, political stability, regularised and transparent bureaucratic procedures 
- yet much will depend on how these conditions are managed. 
It is within the national political and economic context described above that the 
development of Batam Island has occurred. A study of the political economy of Batam 
Island will provide important insights into Indonesia's political economy in general. It 
will shed light on key elements of the political structure, including the President, the 
Cabinet and the bureaucracy, as well as on central features of the economy, such as oil, 
manufacturing, trade and investment. As a result, it will shed light onto what 
determines economic policy in Indonesia. 
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The Pertamina Period 
Batain Island, one of over three thousand islands in the Riau Archipelago, lies on the 
fringes of the Republic of Indonesia, twenty kilometres southeast of Singapore. I 
According to local residents, the name Batain derives from Batu Ampar, literally 
meaning rocks washed in from the sea. 2 Having little historical significance, albeit a 
minor role in the various formations of the Malacca-Iohor-Riau Sultanates between the 
15th and 19th centuries3, the little-known, relatively infertile and low-populated island's 
only relevance to early and mid-20th Century national and international affairs lay in a 
rubber estate during the Dutch and Japanese periods.4 
In the newly independent Indonesia of the 1950s, Batam Island was a flourishing 
operational base for pirates and smugglers.5 By the late-1960s, the local population, a 
mix of Chinese and various Indonesian ethnic groups, including the orang laut (a 
seafaring ethnic group), and consisting mainly of fishermen and farmers of coconut and 
rubber trees, numbered around 3,000. 6 
In 1968, the Indonesian national oil company, Pertamina, in partnership with foreign oil 
contractors began developing a land parcel on the northern coast of Batam as an 
offshore logistic and oil services base. By the height of the oil boom in the early 1970s, 
the whole of Batain Island was being developed by Pertamina, not only as an offshore 
base for the oil industry but also as an industrial and tourist area. As the increasingly 
ambitious plan took form, it stalled due to unforeseen domestic and international factors 
in 1975. 
1 Geographically, Batam Island at 415 km 2 in size, is generally flat, with rolling hills surrounding a ridge that rises 
about 160 m above sea level in the Southeast and covered in secondary jungle. 
2Jalcarta Post. 6 February 1988. 
3Batam Island was essentially by-passed because surrounding islands had better natural harbours and were abundant 
with natural resources. It was, however, an important area for an indigenous seafaring ethnic group known as the 
orang laut, a vital component of the Sultanates who lived off piracy and trade in ocean produce. Leonard Andaya ; 
The Kin&dom of Johar. 1641-1728 (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur 1975), p 44. See also J.G.Schot; 'De 
Batam Archipel' (1882). 
4Suara Pembgruan. 18 February 1993. 
5Indonesian Perspectives, December 1974, p 109. Warta Pertarpjna, Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). 
6Batam Island Investment Guide. (Delta Orient Private Ltd, Singapore, 1975), p 19. 
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The Origins of Development 
Just exactly who came up with the first idea to develop Batam Island, and for what 
reasons, is important when attempting to understand the political economy behind 
Batam Island's development, yet is also difficult to determine. Thinking about 
developing Batam Island began in the mid-1960s, if not beforehand, initially amongst 
Indonesian troops stationed on Batam Island, and then within Pertamina, the Indonesian 
national oil company. 
A Soldier's Idea 
During the mid-1960s, Batam Island was one of Indonesia's front lines during 
Konfrontasi with Malaysia and Singapore. Between 1962-1964, Batam was a base for 
subversive activities against Singapore. Headquartered at Sekupang, the base was run 
by the former assistant naval attache in Singapore, Letnan Bambang Partono, who 
recruited, trained, directed and financed agents in Singapore. 7 
By the height of Konfrontasi in 1965, Batam was stationed by at least 1,000 marines 
operating under KOLAGA (Komando Mandala Siaga or Mandala Vigilance 
Command), which was in charge of coordinating and directing all military activities 
against Malaysia and Singapore.8 Army Commander, General Achmad Yani, was 
thinking of the troops on Batam Island when he described KOLAGA's "single task" as 
"at the right moment to attack and destroy Singapore. "9 
One soldier who visited the island was current Indonesian President, Soeharto. 
According to Soeharto, the origins of the plan to develop Batara Island occurred when, 
as W akil Panglima Dwikora (Deputy Commander of the Konfrontasi campaign), he 
inspected the Sumatra area, including Batara Island. While resting he came up with the 
idea that Batara Island was strategically positioned to replace Singapore, and after 
becoming President he began realising his idea.10 However, if indeed Soeharto did 
come up with an idea to develop Batam Island, he was not the only one to do so. 
7 See Department of Information, Malaysia ; Indonesian Intentions towards Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur 1964), p 16. 
Departemen Pertahanan & Keam.anan ; Sedjarab OJmasi-Qperui Gabungau Dalam Raum Dwjkora (Jakarta 1971), 
pp 25, 56. F.J.George; The Singaoore Saga (F.J.George, Singapore 1985), p353. Harold James & Denis Shiel-Small 
; The Undeclared War : The stozy of the Indonesian confrontation 1962-66 (Leo Cooper, London 1971), p 65. 
8Indonesian Perspectives, December 1974, p 109 . .Kl.mum, 6 December 1987. The KOLAGA Command was 
headed by Air Vice-Marshall Omar Dani, but his deputy Major-General Soeharto (later President) was said to wield 
considerable control. 
9Berita Yudha, 9 July 1965 in Harold Crouch; The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Cornell University Press, 1978), 
p72. See also Departemen Pertahanan & Keamanan ; Sesijarab Qperasi-Qperasi G&bungau Dalam Rapgka Dwilrora 
(Jakarta 1971), p 69. 
l°'fhis story was told during a speech in 1994 which essentially defended the government's decision to develop 
Batam Island against domestic criticism. Suara Pembaruap, 20 February 1994. Kompas, 21 February 1994. 
However, the first to give an indication that it was Soeharto who came up with the idea, was Minister for Research 
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In 1966, Chief-of-Staff of Komstralagall (Komando Strategis Laut Siaga or Marine 
Commando Strike Force), Commodore Fritz Swak, posed a question to his men while 
they sat watching the lights of Singapore from Batam Island, 'Why don't we create 
something like Singapore on this island?' The idea was discussed further, and 
eventually led to a study being conducted by a number of officers. The study, 
containing descriptions, maps, drawings and details such as fresh-water sources and 
coastal-water depths, was presented to the army, and also to Pertamina. President-
Director of Pertamina, Major-General Ibnu Sutowo's response was reportedly that it 
was a good idea but that it wasn't yet the right time for such activity.12 The 
Komstralaga troops were dispersed by newly appointed President Soeharto after the end 
of Konfrontasi towards the end of 1967. 
Pertamina's Idea 
With the end to Konfrontasi, Pertamina took an interest in Batam Island. Its first foray 
was the construction of a 1,500-tons a day drinking-water installation at Sekupang to 
supply its oil storage installation on neighbouring Sambu Island which had previously 
been forced to bring in drinking water from Pladju or, ironically, to buy it from 
Singapore.13 It was, however, the emerging oil boom in Indonesia which first turned 
Pertamina's attention seriously to Batam Island. 
In 1968, Stephen Roszel, Head of the Far East for Ingram Contractors Inc., an 
American company servicing foreign oil contractors, visited Pertamina's DKKA (Divisi 
Koordinator Kontraktor Asing or Bureau for Foreign Contractors) requesting a logistics 
and oil services base.14 When Roszel was unable to find a suitable spot on the north 
coast of Java, the Deputy-Director of the DKKA, Martalogawa, suggested that he try 
and Technology, B.J.Habibie. According to Habibie in 1991, Soeharto had been on Batam during Korrfrontasi with 
Malaysia and apparently found Batam's position to be strategic from economic, trade and military perspectives. After 
becoming President, it was Soeharto himself who pushed and encouraged the development of Batam as a centre of 
industry, shipping, logistics and as a tourist destination. Suara Kazya, 12 November 1991. 
l lThe Komstralaga Command, formed in November 1965 and made up of two brigades, was one of many under the 
command of Rear Admiral Omar Basri (Obi) Syaaf, later Chief of the National Maritime Command (Kohanmanas). 
Details of the KOLAGA Command structure can be found in Departemen Pertahanan & Keamanan; Sedjarah 
<lperasi-<lperasi Gabun&an Dalam Ran&ka Dwikora (Jakarta 1971). 
121nterview with Major (ret) Rein Gonie, a marine and member of Komstralaga based on Batam Island from mid-
1966 to late-1967, 1 August 1994. Those who prepared the study were Fritz Swale, Rear Admiral Omar Basri (Obi) 
Syaaf, Major Y ansen Sitompul and Major Rein Gonie. One of the Brigade Commanders was Brigadier-General 
Anwar, and the Chief-of-Staff was Brigadier-General Tito Soeharto, later 5th Assistant for Civil and Territorial 
Affairs. 
13Pertam,ina : Laporan Tahunao 1969 (Pertamina, Jakarta, 1970). Warta Pertam,ina, July-August 1970 (No.2-3 
Th.V). WartaPertam,ina,Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). 
141ngram Contractors Inc was an affiliate company of the Ingram Corporation, with a central office in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, headed by Managing-Director W.J.Benton. Warta Pertamina, Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). For details on PT 
Ingram Contractors Indonesia, 99%-owned by Ingram Corporation, see Berita Nenra Persexoan Terbatas 
(hereinafter BNPT) No.379 1972. The DKKA coordinated all activities of foreign contractors. At the time it was 
made up of General Hartawan Wirjodiprojo (Director), Col. Rochsidi (Hartawan's Personal Staff), Martalogawa 
(Deputy Director for Services), Hadi Suwito (Legal Department), Ir Harsono Hadiputro (Deputy Director for 
Technical Matters), Ir Wishnu Hidayat (Technical), Ir Darius Siahaan (Technical) and one other in logistics. 
Interview with member of the DKKA, Hadi Suwito, 2 September 1994. 
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somewhere closer to Singapore, perhaps one of the adjacent islands, in consideration of 
the fact that oil exploration had increased in the area following the discovery of new oil 
deposits and that the base could therefore be used by other foreign contractors. Roszel 
flew his light-plane around the area, and decided on Batam Island as the nearest and 
most suitable place. By the end of 1968, Roszel had already surveyed Batam Island 
and built a hut on the north shore at Batu Ampar. Preparations were then made for the 
creation of a base.15 
In early 1969, President-Director of Pertamina, Ibnu Sutowo, together with a team from 
Pertamina, visited Batam Island for the first ti.me, having to wade to shore because there 
was no pier.16 The group met with the local Camat (sub-district Head of local 
government) of Batam, and the Bupati (Regent) of the Riau Islands, Major Edi, who, as 
was often the case in frontline areas, was from the military. After explaining the 
Pertamina idea for a base at Batu Ampar, both authorities granted pennission, with the 
hope that there would be opportunities for local employment, and in return for 
compensation paid by RoszeI.17 
The Governor of Riau, Arifin Achmad, who like all provincial governors had been 
instructed by the Minister of Internal Affairs to facilitate foreign investment, also 
welcomed the idea and signed an agreement to transfer title of a land parcel of 300 ha. 
at Batu Ampar into Pertamina's name.18 With arrangements made, Martalogawa drew 
up a report for DK.KA Director, General Hartawan, who was close to President 
Soeharto and able to solicit his support. With the approval of both· lbnu Sutowo and 
Soeharto, the plan to develop a base on Batam Island could proceed.19 
By mid-1969, PT Ingram Contractors Indonesia had begun building its supply-support 
base at Batu Ampar - which included a 3km-long dirt road, a small pier and a 
warehouse - as a wholly private-sector development, due solely to the pioneering spirit 
of Stephen Roszel and Ingram, Pertamina's role being limited to simply providing 
assistance and supervision from Jakarta and the Pertamina Liaison Officer in 
151nterview with member of the DKKA, Martalogawa, 2 August 1994. 
l 6nie team included Hartawan, Roszel, Suwito, Martalogawa, Rochsidi and others. Interview with Hadi Suwito, 2 
September 1994. 
l 71nterview with Hadi Suwito, 2 September 1994. 
18 An agreement for the transfer of 300 hectares of land at Batu Ampar was later signed in Jakarta on 21 October 
1969 between Pertamina and the Riau Provincial Government. Warta Pertamina., November-Desember 1969. 
Interview with Martalogawa, 2 August 1994. On Mendagri instruction, see l,aporan GubetJlor J>ro.W,nsi Riau 
(Jakarta, October 1969), p 16. 
19Jnterview with Martalogawa, 2 August 1994. Interview with Hadi Suwito, 2 September 1994. The Ministry of 
Transport, Communications and Tourism was also looking at Batam Island. Minister Frans Seda had visited Batam 
Island in 1969, concerned with the smuggling and barter trade in the Riau Islands, and later created a Batam Board 
within his Ministry to explore ways to develop Batam Island as a sea transport hub and tourist site, and came up with 
a US$350 million plan. The plan was rejected by Bappenas, the State Planning Board, and handed over to Pertamina. 
As Pertamina was already working on its own ideas for Batam Island, Frans Seda became an adviser on Batam Island 
to lbnu Sutowo. Interview with Frans Seda, 22 August 1994. 
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Singapore.20 Known as the Batain Island Offshore Base, for use solely for the needs of 
exploration and the development of offshore oil areas in Indonesia, and possibly 
Southeast Asia, it was officially opened by Ibnu Sutowo on the 6 October 1969.21 (See 
Map 3.1). Pertainina described the project as having, 
a very important meaning for offshore exploration in Indonesia and in the future will have a very 
large influence for Indonesian economic growth in general and for the Riau Archipelago in 
particular. 22 
The Indonesian government acted to promote and safeguard the development of Batam 
Island Offshore Base with Presidential Decree No.65, issued on the 19th October 1970, 
which designated Batain Island as a "logistics and operational base for activities in 
conjunction with the exploration and exploitation of offshore natural gas and oil". The 
Decree placed the President-Director of Pertamina in charge of Batam Island's 
·development, and directly responsible to the President. The Decree stipulated that, in 
the first stage, development be limited to projects linked with the operational and 
logistics base for the offshore oil industry. All costs associated with the development 
were to be covered by Pertainina. 23 
Motivations behind the development of Batam Island OtTshore Base 
The development of the Batam Island Offshore Base was timely. The New Order 
government of President Soeharto, having taken control with a promise to restore 
economic stability and promote development, was consolidating its position. The 
1967-68 Investment Laws, the liberalisation of foreign trade and the strengthening of 
political stability had created conditions favourable for the exploitation of new 
commercial opportunities by foreign investors and Indonesian business interests. By 
1969, these government policies were taking effect. 
This was particularly the case in the oil sector where Pertainina had begun courting 
foreign oil-explorers and companies servicing the oil industry. Ibnu Sutowo and the 
DKKA together were essentially a one-stop provider of services and the only liaison 
with the government for investors in the oil industry.24 As one foreign contractor said, 
"Once Pertamina had agreed [to the contract], it wasn't difficult to have it passed 
through the Department of Mines, whilst the representative from the Foreign 
20retro}eum News, June 1972, p2. Interview with Martalogawa, 2 August 1994. 
21Warta Pertamina, November-Desember 1969. Warta Pertamina. January-February 1970 (No.8-9 Th.V). 
22wana Pertamina, April-May 1970. 
23Kc:putusan Presiden No.65 1970 (19 October 1970). For summaries of the Decree at the time, see ~ 
Pertamjna. Desember 1970 (No.7 Th.V). Pertamjna: l.lij!Olan Iahunan 1970 (Pertamina, Jakarta, 1971). 
24n should be noted that whilst a foreign investment team had been established to assess investment applications in 
1967, in the case of investment in the oil industry, it was not consulted. Interview with Mohammed Sadli, 22 July 
1994. Indeed, guidelines for foreign investment formulated by the technocrats were often ignored. Harold Crouch ; 
The Arm.v and Politics in Indonesia (Cornell University Press 1978), p 323. 
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Investment Team only participated by attending the signing ceremony."25 By the end 
of 1969, Pertamina had attracted to Indonesia, some 30 foreign oil companies and many 
more providers of services. 26 
In effect, the Presidential Decree for Batam Island filled a vacuum in the absence of a 
detailed program for the oil sector in Repelita I (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun or 
Five-Year Development Plan), which had only placed priority on the agricultural sector 
and associated support industries. The oil sector was one of the major contributors to 
Indonesia's economic development - between 1966 and 1970 oil production rose by 
85%. 27 With an increasing number of foreign oil companies operating offshore the 
need for a logistics base was immediately felt, and as one of four new oil service and 
supply bases inaugurated to offer services previously supplied by Singapore, Batam 
Island was an important part of the strategy. Not only was Batam Island close to 
Singapore, and to the major supply route through the Malacca Straits, but the island was 
close to offshore oil operations in the Java Sea, and thus was one of the few strategic 
locations for the oil industry in Indonesia. The plan was to create something like the 
'Houston' of Southeast Asia. 28 
President Soeharto's support for the Batam Island project appeared to arise in part from 
security concerns.29 Security concerns were common, both in Jakarta and the 
provinces, in regards to border areas. Indeed, the Batam Island project was said to be 
supported by the military leadership in Jakarta in order to promote 'regional 
resilience'.30 The Governor of Riau was still talking about the threat of a PK.I (Partai 
Kommunis Indonesia - Indonesian Communist Party) resurgence and infiltration in the 
Riau Islands as late as 1969.31 As an example, Sambu Island, an oil installation 
adjacent to Batam Island that stored Kuwaiti crude, was considered to have not only an 
economic role but also a security and defence role. In 1970 the Regional Army 
Commander for Sumatra, Major-General Achmed Thaher, was warning Pertamina 
25etwres. 7 November 1970, p14. 
26Jobn Bresnan; Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy (Columbia University Press, New York 
1993),p 171. 
27rar Eastern Economic Review, 25 December 1971. 
28Jnterview with lbnu Sutowo, 23 August 1994. Interview with former Minister, Mohammad Sadli, 22 July 1994. It 
was also intended to relieve Jakarta as the sole depot for the equipment necessary for offshore exploitation and the 
extraction of oil and gas in the Natuna Islands and Northern Sumatra. Philippe Regnier; Singiwore · City-State in 
South-East Asia (S.Abdul Majeed, Kuala Lumpur 1992), p75. 
29Jnterview with BIBA Secretary, Dr E. Sanger, 20 November 1994. 
30K.C.Tan; "The Pertamina Model of Economic Development in Indonesia, 1965-1975" in Gordon Means (ed) 
DevelQpment and Underdevelopment in Southeast Asia (McMahon University Press, Ottawa 1977), p 40. The 
author's claim that the Batam Island project was prompted by the military leadership is incorrect It was simply 
supported by the military leadership. 
31Liij)Oran Gubernor Proginsi Riau (Jakarta, October 1969), p 19. 
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employees on the island of the dangers of foreign infiltration and subversion in the 
area.32 
However, the main motivation of the Indonesian government was to reduce Indonesia's 
economic dependence on Singapore. In a 1970 speech, inaugurating the first offshore 
platform produced by Ingram on Batam Island in the Java Sea, President Soeharto said 
that Batam Island was just one effort to save foreign exchange and was oriented to the 
possibility of replacing Singapore's role in the future.33 At the same time, however, he 
was stressing to Singaporean officials that whatever means were taken were "purely 
with a view to promoting the nation's economic interests. "34 
Whilst the boom in the petroleum industry did much for Indonesia's financial position, 
its multiplier effects on the economy were still relatively slight. This was partly 
because the companies concerned used Singapore as their regional base for supply, 
maintenance and other activities when offshore operations began. Whilst most of the 
search for oil was conducted in Indonesian waters, Singapore was the regional centre 
for oil exploration. Some 30 of the world's major oil companies had offices in 
Singapore to control their exploration, and oil itself was becoming a rapidly growing 
contributor to the Singapore economy, ranking only second to the rubber trade. 35 This, 
of course, was welcomed by Singapore which, with better housing, office space and 
shipbuilding and repair facilities, was profiting to the tune of about US$15.5 million 
monthly by 1971.36 By 1972, Singapore had become the second biggest refining centre 
in Asia behind Japan, refining 500,000 b/d37, with bulk oil shipments alone making up 
79% of Singapore's total sea-borne cargo.38 By the end of 1970 there were 41 
international oil corporations operating in Indonesia39, mainly in offshore areas, yet 
many of these still found Indonesia's facilities inadequate, and so decided to make 
Singapore their base of operations because of Singapore's sophisticated business, 
communications and transport facilities, and government incentives. 40 
32warta Pertamina, August 1970 (No.2-3 Th.V). 
33warta Pertamina, November 1970 (No.6 Th.V). 
34Lee Khoon Choy; An Ambassac1or's Journey (Times International, Singapore 1983), p 190. 
351n 1970 there were 13 oil companies, 8 geo-physical servicers, 7 drilling contractors, 6 consulting firms and more 
than 45 service, supply and construction firms connected with oil exploration in Singapore. Asia Magazine, 21 June 
1970 in E.Paul ; The Viability of Singapore : An Aspect of Political Geography (PhD Thesis, University of 
California, Berkeley 1973), p 221. 
36par Eastern Economic Reyiew, 25 December 1971. 
37E.Paul; The Viability of Singapore : An Aspect of Politica} Geogriiphy (PhD Thesis, University of California, 
Berkeley 1973), p 219. 
380.G.Thomson; "The Politics of Singapore's Energy Needs", Petroleum News, December 1972, pp 2-7. 
3~, 31August1970. Different figures are given in Singapore Economic Bulletin, 31October1970, pp 34-35 
(37 companies at the time) and Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 December 1971 (40 companies at the time). 
40E.Paul ; The Viability of Singapore : An Aspect of Politica} Geography (PhD Thesis, University of California, 
Berkeley 1973), p 219. 
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Indonesians at the time were resentful of the spillover of profitable economic activities 
to Singapore, and felt that such activities should remain in Indonesia. 41 Singapore had 
long acted as an entrepot for Indonesia's exports and imports, and with the advent of the 
oil exploration boom, appeared to be profiting further. It was only natural that the 
country in whose territorial lands and waters the oil was found would desire to keep the 
profits and the sophistication of the industry to itself. Pertamina and the Indonesian 
government endeavoured to achieve just that - a shift of the centre of gravity of the 
regional oil industry away from Singapore. Minister of Mining, Sumantri 
Brodjonegoro, indicating the Indonesian government's irritation with the growth of 
Singapore as an operating base for oil exploration, later said, 
Singapore has been clever in building up all the service facilities needed for exploitation of oil and 
minerals and it ta1ces advantage of its good location. We must acknowledge it is well equipped in 
providing these services. But we would like to provide them ourselves, so we now encourage 
investors to set up servicing bases in Indonesia. 42 
Pertamina and the government's idea of developing Batam Island was intended to 
reduce dependence on Singapore, which at the time handled some 90% of Indonesia's 
imports/exports, initially by competing directly with Singapore's oil servicing and 
processing industry, such as by carrying out engineering work currently handled in 
Singapore and elsewhere. 43 Indonesia clearly wanted to reduce its economic 
dependence on Singapore, and for some in Indonesia the development of Batam Island 
was not viewed as being based on joint growth or cooperation but as both a political 
and economic instrument, or a type of non-military confrontation, against Singapore. 
Indonesian attitudes towards Singapore could perhaps be best summarised as "a mixture 
of suspicion, admiration and anxiety." 44 
The idea of competing with Singapore was not new. In October 1968, days after 
Singapore executed two Indonesian marines, the Indonesian government announced it 
would begin curtailing Indonesia's Singapore trade, as well as new measures to end 
smuggling, in order to minimise the benefits Singapore might derive from economic 
development in Indonesia. 45 
Smuggling was of major concern to the government. The Riau Islands adjacent to 
Singapore had, since colonial times, been very much under the influence of the 
41Kawin Wilairat; "Singapore's foreign policy in the 1970s: The reconciliation of global and regional interests", 
Southeast Asian Affairs 1974, (ISEAS 1974), p 294. 
42Dick Wilson ; The Future Role of Singapore (Oxford 1University Press, London 1972), p 92. Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 11 November 1972. 
431nterview with Mohammad Sadli, 22 July 1994. Interview with Dr Sanger, 20 November 1994. 
44From an article by Max Karundeng which appeared in Sinar Harapan in January 1970, quoted in Dick Wilson ; 
The Future Role of Sineiwore (Oxford University Press, London 1972), p 46. 
45Justus M. van der Kroef; Indonesia Afim' Sulcamo (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver 1971), p 114. 
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Singapore dollar, which circulated side-by-side with the rupiah. Whilst much of the 
trade was traditional and for barter, many 'traders' had influential backers. 46 In 1969 it 
was estimated that smuggling and illegal trade cost Indonesia about US$50 million 
yearly in export taxes, equal to the expected budget deficit, and more in import duties, 
in addition to damaging Indonesia's own commercial and industrial activities.47 
Obviously reducing Singaporean commerce or halting smuggling was easier said than 
done, but the feelings, perhaps reminiscent of President Sukarno's Konfrontasi, 
continued to linger. It was of course also difficult to see how Pertamina's plans could 
reduce Singapore's importance in the oil industry. 
In essence it was the nationalists, led by Pertamina, who were wanting to compete with 
Singapore, and for most Indonesians it was simply believed or presumed that Batam 
Island was to be developed as a competitor to Singapore.48 Many, in fact, asked one of 
history's imponderables - had the Dutch not occupied the Riau Archipelago in 1819, 
Stamford Raffles might have settled Batam rather than Singapore. It could generally 
not be admitted openly, but Indonesia cherished the ambition to acquire an instrument 
capable of reducing its economic dependence on Singapore. Mochtar Lubis, editor of 
the Jakarta newspaper, Indonesia Raya, declared that, 
Singapore must be stopped from remaining an island of prosperity for itself, siphoning riches and 
fortunes from all the countries around her.49 
Those in government circles simply stressed that it was not a hostile act but simply 
healthy competition with Singapore. 50 Some even saw Singapore as playing a helpful, 
even necessary role, in Indonesia's development by providing services which Indonesia 
could not. Chairman of the Foreign Investment Coordinating Board, Soehoed, 
predicted that "Singapore could become a good source of technology and finance for 
Indonesia", through complementary economic activity.51 Indonesian politician, 
Soebchan, described Singapore in 1970 as, 
a great communication centre that the region can benefit from .. .It is not a question of jealousy so 
much as seeing Singapore as an economic asset to the region. 52 
46confidential Interview with one-time resident, 21 November 1994. Dick: Wilson ; The Future Role of Sinn119re 
(Oxford University Press. London 1972), p 44. 
47 Justus M. van der Kroef ; Indonesia After Sukarno (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver 1971 ), p 174. 
481nterview with former minister, Emil Salim, 18 August 1994. Interview with former Pertamina executive, Trisulo, 
27October1994. 
49Dick Wilson; The Future Role of Sinegpore (Oxford University Press, London 1972), pp 45-46. 
50Jnterview with Mohammad Sadli, 22 July 1994. 
51straits Times, 6 November 1971 in Dick Wilson; The Future Role of Sineiume (Oxford University Press, London 
1972),p46. 
52Straits Times, 23 November 1970. 
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Ibnu Sutowo was on record as saying that the development of Batam Island was not, 
and need not be, antagonistically competitive with Singapore, a position he held 
unwaveringly in public. 53 Whilst the idea of competing with Singapore was in the back 
of their minds, those working on the Batam Island project avoided stating so outright, 
since Batam relied on Singapore's transhipment facilities. 54 For lbnu Sutowo, it was 
Batam Island's location on the Malacca Straits, and proximity to Singapore, that gave 
the island its raison d'etre. Batam Island could take advantage of Singapore's business 
facilities and infrastructure, would be geared to supplying the Singapore market, and 
could exploit any spillover of Singaporean industry or international demand for 
Singapore's tourism facilities.55 
Singapore was very apprehensive about the political situation in Indonesia at the time, 
and it was also wary of the development of Batam Island, for in some ways its 
development could be seen to be counteracting Singapore. 56 When the development of 
Batam Island officially began, Jakarta's plan was seen as a hostile act in Singapore. 
Singapore was disposed to take Batam Island's potential seriously, since work on Batam 
was designed precisely to take work away from Singapore. Yet whilst Singapore 
looked at the plans with certain misgivings, the development of Batam Island was never 
perceived as a threat, particularly as it relied on Singapore's transhipment facilities. 
Singapore's Foreign Minister, S.Rajaratnam, remarked at the time that Singapore would 
benefit from Indonesia's plans to develop Batam Island, and believed that Batam Island 
was not a threat to Singapore. 57 Singapore was unlikely to suffer, at least in the near 
future, and Indonesians working on the Batam Island Project continued to stress that its 
development would create activity for Singapore. 58 Indeed it was hoped that Singapore 
would be able to help speed up the development of Batam Island. On presenting his 
credentials in July 1970, incoming Singapore Ambassador Lee Khoon Choy, was told 
by President Soeharto that he was "glad that there would b~ cooperation between 
Singapore and Indonesia to make the [Batam] project a success. "59 Yet, when it came 
to offers for Singapore to invest in Batam Island, there was little interest, for the simple 
reason that Singapore needed to "help itself first". 60 
53G.G.Thomson ; "The Politics of Singapore's Energy Needs", Petroleum News, December 1972, pp 2-7. 
541nterview with former Secretary-General of Oil and Gas, Wijarso, 3 November 1994. 
551nterview with Ibnu Sutowo, 23 August 1994. 
561nterview with assistant to former Foreign Minister Adam Maille, Adhayatman, 26 October 1994. 
57straits Times, 14 September 1972. Interview with former Singapore Foreign Minister, S.Rajaratnam, 28 
September 1994. 
58sin&apore Economic Bulletin. 31August1971, p 39. 
59Lee Khoon Choy; An Ambassador's Journey (Times International, Singapore 1983), p 190. 
60Jnterview with former Singapore minister, Dr Goh K.eng Swee, 29 September 1994. Ibnu Sutowo held several 
discussions with Dr Goh K.eng Swee about the possibility of Singaporean involvement in Batun. No agreement was 
reached apparently because Lee Kuan Yew wanted government support in addition to that of the Head of Pertamina. 
Interview with Martalogawa, 2 August 1994. Interview with former Pertamina Head of Public Relations, Marah 
Joenoes, 7 November 1994. Indonesian Minister Frans Seda proposed to Dr Goh K.eng Swee in June 1970 to use 
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Batam Island as a site for an industrial estate. Dr Goh Keng Swee was in favour but Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
was not Interview with Frans Seda, 22 August 1994. 
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Whatever the case, Indonesia's decision to develop Batain Island came at the lowest ebb 
in Singapore-Indonesia relations, which remained cool until 1973. Relations between 
Singapore and Indonesia during the mid to late-1960s were poor to say the least. 
Konfrontasi, during which time Indonesia had militarily threatened the new nation-state 
of Singapore, was effectively over in 1965 and officially in 1967. Diplomatic relations 
which had been officially established between Singapore and Indonesia in 1967, after 
official recognition in June 1966, soured dramatically in 1968 when Singapore executed 
two Indonesian marines caught carrying out intelligence work and placing bombs 
which killed civilians during Konfrontasi. The fact that this was done in the face of a 
plea for clemency from President Soeharto had apparently caused great insult. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, bilateral relations between Singapore and 
Indonesia were to be characterised by mutual suspicions and considerable 
misunderstandings, particularly with regards to smuggling and Singapore's refusal to 
publish export-import statistics with Indonesia, despite periodic statements that all was 
well. Indonesia-Singapore relations were to shift from hostility to friendliness, but it 
was to take several years before Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and 
Soeharto were to meet 61 
Pertamina and 'Batam Base' 
Interest in, and development of, Batain Island grew steadily following Pertamina and 
Ingram's decision to create an offshore logistics and oil services base. A number of 
foreign companies entering the Indonesian market soon followed and established 
operations at the newly named 'Batain Base'. (See Map 3.1) Encouraged by the 
growing interest, as well as its own expansion, Pertamina began work on its own base 
on Batain. 
The development of Batam Base 
President Soeharto, together with a number of Ministers visited Batain Island on 12 
May 1971, to officially inaugurate 'Batam Base•.62 Reports were apparently mixed, but 
there was little doubt that Batam Base was taking shape, nor that Batam Island was 
61 Interview with former Singapore Ambassador to Indonesia, Lee Khoon Choy, 11 October 1994. A good 
description of that period of diplomacy is in Lee Khoon Choy ; An Ambassador's Journey (Times International, 
Singapore 1983), pp 187-263. 
62sinK'@pore Economic Bulletin, 31 August 1971, p 39. Pertamina: l&porao Iahunap 1971 (Pertamina, Jakarta, 
1972). Another visitor was Minister of Manpower, Laksdya Mursalin, who observed the labour situation in February 
1971. Warta Pertwin!b Maret 1971 (No.10 Th.V). Pertamina: Laooran Tahunao 1970 (Pertamina, Jakarta, 1972). 
Ten members of the DPR-GR Commission on industry and mining made a four day observation tour in July 1971. 
J>ertamina : Laporan Tahunan 1971 (Pertamina, Jakarta, 1972). 
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appropriate as a logistics base. 63 It was strategically placed close to the considerable 
off shore oil exploration and drilling in the surrounding seas, it had sufficient fresh 
water and ample land, necessary infrastructure such as a natural harbour, and important 
facilities like telecommunications, banking and government services. It also had 
attracted five foreign and two domestic companies in addition to Pertamina. (See Table 
3.1). 
Considering the fact that the development of Batam Island had already exceeded its 
brief as a logistics base, Presidential Decree no.74 1971 was issued on 26 October 
1971, replacing the earlier one. The Decree designated the whole Batu Ampar area, 
including Batam Base and Jodoh, an Industrial Estate with the status of private 
entrepot 
Table3.1 
Private Companies on Batam Island 
(as at 31 December 1971)64 
Foreign Companies 
PT Ingram Contractors Indonesia 
Ingram Corporation - USA 
PT Dresser Magcobar Indonesia 
Dresser Industries Inc - USA 
Instube 
USA 
Ednasa Robin Shipyard 
Robin Lo - Singapore 
Ednasa Robin Dredging 
Robin Lo - Singapore 
Domestic Companies 
PT Kunlia Dwi Potra 
Ibrahim Adjie 
Double Bell Ranch 
lbnuSutowo 
USA 
USA 
USA 
Singapore 
Singapore 
Offshore Steel Structure 
Construction 
Drilling Mud Production 
Storage 
Building Contractor 
Dredging Contractor 
Contractor 
Cattle Breeding 
631t was reported publicly that the President was pleased with the activities. Warta Pertamina. Juni 1971 (No.I 
Th.VI). Privately, however, it was noted that President Soeharto and his Ministers were generally disappointed 
because there was so little there. Interview with Martalogawa, 2 August 1994. 
64Badan Pelaksana Otorita Pengembangan Daerah Industri Pulau Batam ; L1ll>9ran Iabunan 1974 , Lampiran ill & 
VIII. WartaPertamina, Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). Excludes Pertamina, government offices and banks. 
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To coordinate activities and development, the BIEA (Badan Pimpinan Daerah Industri 
Batara - Batara Industrial Estate Authority) was created, consisting of a Chairman and 
Deputy Chairman appointed by and directly responsible to the President, as well as a 
Committee headed by a Secretary chosen by the Chairman of the Authority. The 
Authority's principle tasks were to plan and develop infrastructure and industrial 
projects in the industrial estate according to a masterplan sanctioned by the President, to 
receive and consider applications to invest in the industrial estate, and to ensure that 
development followed plans. In addition, the Authority was authorised to establish 
contact with all government agencies at both central and local levels, and coordinate the 
activities of those agencies within the industrial estate. 65 
Ibnu Sutowo was appointed Chairman of the BIEA, and Maj-Gen Teuku Hamzah, 
former Commander of the Aceh Territorial Command, as Vice-Chairman. 66 Dr Elrich 
Sanger, concurrently Head of the Legal/Foreign Marketing Board of Pertamina, was 
appointed BIEA Committee Secretary. 67 The Committee, based in Jakarta, met weekly, 
and was essentially in charge of running day-to-day operations, and attracting investors 
to the Batara Industrial Estate. 68 The Committee also made use of Pertamina's Liaison 
Officer in Singapore. 69 Whilst the Decree did not specify where funding would come 
from, all money was in fact to come from Pertamina. According to Dr Sanger, 
We did not need much money from businesses or from the government because we bad our own 
money.70 
On Batara Island, PT Ingram Contractors Indonesia was developing Batu Ampar into 
an offshore oil supply and construction base, and had already finished 20% of the work 
by mid-1971. According to plans, 'Batara Base' was to include a harbour, workshops, 
warehouses and open storage, a dam for water supply, and the preparation of land for 
in-coming oil service and supply companies. By the end of 1971 Ingram had cut a 
650m-long channel and a harbour in the surrounding coral reef, cleared about 250 acres, 
finished the water reservoir, and built warehouses, a medical centre, a 24-room 
65The location of the industrial estate is indicated in a map attached to the Decree. Keputusan Presi4en No.74 1971 
(26 October 1971). The BIEA essentially replaced Pertamina's Batam Island Development Board which had been 
created in 1970 and was made up of General Hartawan as Chairman, Martalogawa as Vice-Chairman, Dr Sanger, a 
Navy Colonel, and a representative from both the immigration and customs ministries. Because of the very early 
relationship with Singapore, whereby all people and goods on Batam Island arrived via Singapore, immigration and 
customs were involved right from the beginning. Interview with Martalogawa, 2 August 1994. 
66suara Pembaruan, 23 October 1987. 
67The members of the Secretariat were Manus S.H., Ir Pedrico and Ir Astoto. Warta Pertam.ina. September 1972 
(No.4 Th.VII). 
681nterview with Dr Sanger, 20 November 1994. 
69Pertamina: Indonesian State Oil Enter.mjse (2nd edition) , Pertamina 1974 , p 145. The Liaison Office in 
Singapore was created on 21 January 1970, and headed by Let-Kol PM Achmad. Warta fertamina, Januari 1970 
(No.8 Th.N). 
70Jnterview with Dr Sanger, 20 November 1994. 
45 
guesthouse and 9 dormitories for workers. 71 High on priorities was a landing strip for 
Fokker Friendships, for easier contact with Jakarta, as Batara Island at that time could 
only be reached by ferry from Singapore in one hour, or by speedboat from Tanjung 
Pinang, which was serviced by air, in three hours. 72 
In addition to developing Batam Base, Ingram was producing offshore drilling 
platforms at Batu Ampar. Ingram had invested US$3.2m by the end of 1970, with a 
budget of US$1m for 1971, and employed 330 people including 60 foreigners. Before 
the end of 1971, Ingram had already produced offshore platforms for Sinclair and 
IIAPCO's (Independent Indonesian-American Petroleum Company) new oilfields in the 
Java Sea, the first of which began operations in December 1970, and an offshore jacket 
structure and was in the middle of building a two-storey dock for Shell Brunei. 73 
On the land prepared by Ingram, Pf Dresser Magcobar Indonesia, owned by American 
company Dresser Industries Inc, was building a barite factory with a 60,000-ton per 
year capacity which would make Southeast Asia self-sufficient in drilling muds for oil 
mining. Operating under a production-sharing contract, the factory opened on 15 
October 1971. By the end of 1971 it had already invested US$2.8m of a planned 
US$3.5m. The barite factory meant that Indonesia could save in foreign exchange, for 
at the time Indonesia imported 35,000-40,000 tons of barite a year from Japan, 
Australia and the United States at US$75-80 a ton. Initially raw materials were being 
imported from Thailand while the Department of Mining searched for barite deposits in 
Indonesia. 74 Also on site was American company, Instube, in a joint venture with 
Pertamina that, by July 1971, had a 10,000-ton stockpile of steel pipes for construction 
estimated to be worth US$500,000, making it the biggest steel-yard in Southeast Asia.75 
Whilst there were reports that not many foreign oil companies paid much attention to 
Batam Island, and that "some even raised their eyebrows", the BIEA Committee, as 
well as Pertamina's DKKA, were having success in attracting interest in Batam 
Island. 76 Whilst there were suggestions that foreign oil companies operating in 
Indonesia would be obliged to use the facilities at Batam Base as they became 
71 Prior to the reservoir, water was imported from Singapore. Warta Pertamjna, Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). Sin&imore 
Economic Bulletin, 31 August 1971, p 39. ~. 28 September 1971. 
72warta Pertamina, Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). Sin&iux>re Economic Bulletin, 31August1971, p 39. Kwm!,u, 28 
September 1971. 
73warta Pertamina. Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). Warta Pertamina. Januari-Pebruari 1971 (No.8-9 Th.V). Kompas, 28 
September 1971. Ouarter)y Economic Reyiew. Indonesia. No.3, pp 5-6. Sin&apote Economjp Bulletin, 31 August 
1971,p39. 
74warta Pertamina, Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). Warta Pertamjna, November-Desember 1971 (No.6-7 Th.VI). 
Pertamjna: L§POtan Iahunan 1971 (Pertamina, Jakarta, 1972). Kwm!,u, 28 September 1971. Sin&AP<>re Economic 
BDlJ.min, 31August1971, p 39. Sin&iux>re Economip Bulletin, 31October1971, p 45. For details on PT Dresser 
Magcobar Indonesia, see BNfI No.304-1975. 
75Warta Pertamina, Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). Sin&imore Economic; Bulletin, 31August1971, p 39. 
76sin&AP<>re Economic Bulletin, 31 May 1972, p 39. Slrajts Tunes, 19 May 1972. 
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available77, Batain Base had attracted the interest of some 18 foreign companies 
producing oil or serving the oil sector, as well as many domestic businesses, reported to 
be interested in either operating from or using the Batam Base facilities. Already 
potential investors were wondering if Batam Island would become a free port because 
many goods imported were only for re-export. 78 
Among the other foreign companies reported to be interested in Batam Base were : 
A very Lawrence, which was to construct open and closed storage facilities; Chicago 
Bridge and Iron Overseas, which was to store tank construction equipment; Dimet, 
which was to build warehouses for paints and zinc compounds; Price International, 
which intended to construct a coating yard; Vickers Ruwolt, which intended to build a 
large covered machine shop; O'Neil Industries, which was to construct buildings; 
Milchem, which intended to store oilfield chemicals; Phillips Petroleum, Rucker 
Petroleum Service and Vetco which intended to store oil field tools; and lnteragencies, 
a food company looking to supply food to the developing region and ships involved in 
the oil search. 79 
An Indonesian bank, Bank Dagang Negara, opened a branch at Sekupang with full-
fledged status on 27 July 1971, to service the growing number of investors and 
workers. 80 Meanwhile, Batain Base had attracted the attention of local people and 
newcomers - the population of the nearby town of Sungai Jodoh had increased from 
300 in 1968 to 1,000 in 1971 and 2,000 by 1972 - nearly one quarter of Batain Island's 
population which according to the 1971 census numbered 8,000.81 
While Batu Ampar was being developed as an industrial area for foreign investors, 
Pertamina began developing Sekupang as an administrative and business centre, as well 
as for its own logistics purposes. By the end of 1971, Pertamina's base camp was near 
completion, with the first stage consisting of a power station, telecommunications 
centre and housing for employees. 82 
Pertamina increasingly saw Batain Island as a natural staging point for oil-related 
activities, and quickly assumed responsibility for developing the island and providing 
the necessary funds for basic infrastructure and suitable support facilities and services. 
77Peter Polomka; "Indonesia's future and Southeast Asia" Adelphi Pgper No.104 (Spring 1974), p 10. 
78~, 28 September 1971. 
79warta Pertamina. Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). Quarterly Economic Reyiew. Indonesia, No.3, pp 5-6. Sineiwore 
Economic Bulletin, 31 August 1971, p 39. Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 25 December 1971. ~. 28 
September 1971. 
80warta Pqtamina, August 1971 (No.3 Th.VI). 
81Batam Island Inyestment Guide. (Delta Orient Private Ltd, Singapore 1975), pp16-t7. 
82warta Pertamina, Juni 1971 (No.1 Th.VI). Sinegpore Economic Bulletin, 31 August 1971, p 39. Batam Telecom 
was to be linked with Jakarta, Singapore, Sambu, Tanjung Uban, Natuna, Pladju and Dumai. 
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Batam Island soon became the principal focus of the oil industry and its development 
became increasingly associated with Pertamina and, as a result, with its President-
Director, Ibnu Sutowo. 
Pertamina - A National Development Company 
Both historically, and in style, Pertamina was a phenomenon of the New Order. Until 
the coup of October 1965, Ibnu Sutowo headed just one of the three national oil 
companies operating in Indonesia. Sustained lobbying by Ibnu, who had given both 
material and political support to pro-Soeharto forces in the immediate aftermath of the 
coup, ended in 1967 with the emergence of a single oil company, Pertamina, under 
Ibnu's direction.83 
Oil was the biggest single contributing sector of the Indonesian economy, and as oil 
prices began to rise, particularly after 1973, Ibnu Sutowo saw an opportunity for 
Pertamina to grow fast, for as overall production rose, the quantities of oil due to 
Pertamina from the production-sharing arrangements with foreign oil companies far 
exceeded domestic demand.84 This increased oil was able to be used both directly, and 
as security, to launch Pertamina on the road to becoming an integrated oil company 
engaged in supporting industries, petrochemicals, refining, tankers and international 
marketing. The development of Batam Island fitted neatly into this plan, and played an 
important role in Pertamina's overall aims for the Indonesian oil industry.85 
However, Pertamina not only controlled the nation's vast petroleum resources but had 
become the spearhead of an ambitious national development drive by Soeharto's New 
Order government. By 1974, the company had an estimated $1.7b in annual sales, 
$3.7b in assets and 40,000 employees. 86 Pertamina's annual budget was US$1,900m or, 
to put it into perspective, half that of the Indonesian govemment.87 To a large extent, 
Pertamina was semi-political, in that it took on a social welfare role. Ibnu Sutowo 
boasted that US$500,000 of Pertamina funds a year was devoted to aid purposes - the 
building of mosques, roads, television stations, etc. 88 As its interests spread beyond oil, 
Pertamina became a conglomerate, and a 'national development' company. 89 
83For background on the growth of Pertamina, see Anderson G.Bartlett etal. ; Pertawina: Indonesian National Oil 
(Amerasia Ltd, Tulsa 1972). See also Anthony Goldstone ; "What was the Pertamina crisis?" Southeast Asian 
Affairs 1977 (ISEAS 1977), p 123. 
8400 industry development was an integral part of total national development, for in 1972-74 oil accounted for half 
of total commodity exports and about 74% in 1974-75. Sevinc Carlson ; Indonesia's Oil (Westview Press, Boulder 
1977), p 53. 
85xnterview with Wijarso, 3 November 1994. 
86seth Lipsky (ed) ; "The Billion Dollar Bubble", Asian WaU Street Journa}, 1 January 1978, and in The Billion 
Dollar Bubble (Dow Jones, Hong Kong 1978). 
87'The Pertamina Affair: As seen by 'Euromoney' for June 1975' in Sinnpore Economic Bulletin, July 1975, p 17. 
88'.Iilm!, 31August1970. 
89 Anthony Goldstone; "What was the Pertamina crisis?" Southeast Asian Affairs 1977 (ISEAS 1977), p 125. 
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Ibnu Sutowo gave his concept of a national development company a very specific 
meaning, where oil would be 'the main force to accelerate the development of the 
country.'90 Ibnu offered a quicker route to national development than that offered by 
the technocrats. Pertamina would place itself at the vanguard of development, and its 
growth would advance the whole economy.91 According to Ibnu Sutowo, 
Because the oil industry is large and it needs many services, I think the oil industry should be and 
could be very valuable in the development of the country. It can even be the main force to 
accelerate the development of the country ...... Development has to start with development of the 
people. Very often we have something very big, very good, very modem which will create a lot of 
production and a lot of income for the government, without any effect in the development of the 
people. I think this kind of profit, this kind of invesbnent is very well for the Ministry of Finance. 
But it is not very helpful for bringing Indonesia closer to the technical age •••... As I said before, the 
best way to make the oil industry one of the accelerators in the development of Indonesia is to 
create as many services as possible in Indonesia, and using that opportunity to train as many 
Indonesians as possible in the shortest time.92 
To an impressive degree, Pertamina was Ibnu Sutowo. Ibnu Sutowo himself conceded 
that, "Pertamina and Sutowo are very difficult to separate from each other."93 Ibnu was 
one of the most effective men in a nation embalmed in red tape, operating in a 
freewheeling fashion largely beyond government control, running Pertamina as a 
personal fiefdom almost as a 'state within a state', and setting his own rules as he went 
along, relentlessly diversifying and expanding. Sutowo purposely sidestepped the 
government bureaucracy, which questioned his methods, by reporting directly to 
President Soeharto. Sutowo seemed to have a hand in every major project in which 
things were getting done, but only Sutowo knew which of his operations made a profit, 
yet always insisting that profits were less important than developing the skills the 
country required. 94 According to Ibnu, 
If we were just an oil company trying to make a profit for our shareholders, Pertamina would not 
be doing a lot of the things we are doing. However, our shareholders are all the people of 
Indonesia, and we are a development company for the nation.95 
90retroleum NewS, October 1973, p 28. 
91Anthony Goldstone; "What was the Pertaminacrisis'l", Southeast Asian Affairs 19TI (ISEAS 1977), p 125. 
92Ibnu Sutowo ; Development has to start with development of people , address to Indonesian Petroleum 
Association, Jakarta, 23 June 1972. For other examples see also Minjak untuk Kemakmuran Rak:jat, (Dinas Humas 
Pertamina 1970) and Ibnu Sutowo ; Prospects of Oil for our nationa} prosperity, address to Science Education 
Teaching Institute, Bandung, 14 March 1972. 
93~, 31August1970. 
941..ouis Kraar; "Oil and Nationalism Mix Beautifully in Indonesia"~. July 1973. 
95Ruth Sheldon Knowles ; Indonesia Today : The Nation that Helps Itself (Nash Publishing, Los Angeles 1973), p 
118. 
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Ibnu Sutowo and Pertamina had their detractors, and their supporters. Outside the 
government, Ibnu Sutowo's critics, primarily Mochtar Lubis' newspaper Indonesia 
Raya, charged that Pertamina was primarily a boondoggle for Sutowo and army 
officers, because it provided an important source of funds for the military. 96 One 
reason why Pertamina affairs were clouded in secrecy, balance sheets never published 
and profits never announced, was in order to disguise its role as the "most important 
source of funds for the army during the early phase of the New Order ... "97 
Yet, criticism of Pertamina from outside the government was inhibited by the belief that 
many of the projects undertaken, though not subject to cost-accounting or feasibility 
studies, were fundamentally worthwhile. At the heart of these debates about 
Pertamina's role was a conflict between Pertamina's need for autonomy and the 
desirability of public accountability. 
In government circles, the technocrats, beginning 1970-71, and perhaps under pressure 
from Indonesia's foreign creditors, became concerned with Pertamina's foreign 
borrowings for projects that would take longer to build than the loans would run.98 
Their efforts to promote greater controls on state finances brought them in direct 
conflict with Pertamina, which sought to maintain its authority. In return, Pertamina 
and lbnu Sutowo's allies felt the technocrats were a drag on development, alleging 
subservience to the IMF (International Monetary Fund). 99 
The technocrats' prominent say in policy formulation had won and maintained the 
confidence of foreign governments, financial institutions and investors, but their 
influence weakened where military interests and Pertamina were involved. The 
technocrats were initially not inclined to tamper with Ibnu Sutowo and Pertamina 
because of its capacity to attract foreign investment capital and generate foreign 
exchange that was so badly needed in the early years of the New Order. The 
technocrats perhaps also regarded the Indonesian part of the oil sector as one of the 
military-run sectors of the economy, effectively beyond their jurisdiction but which 
would eventually be brought under control. 
96.Khong Cho Oon ; The Politics of Oil in Indonesia : Eoreien Company-Host Government Relations (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1986), p 166. See also Harold Crouch ; The ArmY and Politics in Indonesia (Cornell 
University, 1978), Chapter 11. 
97Harold Crouch; The ArmY and Politics in Indonesia, p 275. It was perhaps for that reason that nothing came of 
the recommendations of the Commission of Four which reported on corruption in Indonesia. See J.A.C.Mackie "The 
Report of the Commission of Four on Corruption" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. November 1970 (Vol.VI 
No.3). 
98seth Lipsky; "The Billion Dollar Bubble", Asian Wall Street Journal. 1January1978. 
99Jnterview with lbnu Sutowo, 23 August 1994. 
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In the case of oil, complete control was in the hands of lbnu Sutowo and he exercised 
determining influence on government policy. While formally responsible to the 
Minister of Mines, lbnu Sutowo insisted on complete autonomy.100 In practice, lbnu's 
line of responsibility went over the heads of ministers and directly to Soeharto. lbnu 
Sutowo had little cooperation with other ministers, particularly the technocrats - he 
didn't need it because of his access to Soeharto. Bappenas (Badan Perancang 
Pembangunan Nasional or National Planning Board), a technocratic stronghold led by 
Widjojo and Sumarlin, did not approve of Pertamina's activities because it did not make 
plans according to the formula used by the technocrats.101 Other economic ministers, 
especially Ali W ardhana, Radius Prawiro, Sumitro and Emil Salim, were also 
critical.102 Whilst Soeharto was attracted to the clarity of the technocrat's economic 
analysis and planning, he also admired how lbnu got things done. Essentially the 
President looked for a balance and lbnu was seen as a balance to the Western-trained 
economists - he was seen as a nationalist by comparison. 
In the case of Batam Island, Ibnu Sutowo invariably had his own way due to his close 
relationship with the President, and for the most part Batam Island was not a major 
issue between Ibnu and the technocrats, at least initially. In the end it was Soeharto 
who made the decisions and decided policy if there was conflict.103 The development 
of Batam Island was seen publicly as yet another tugas, or Presidential assignment for 
lbnu Sutowo. 104 
As an indication of the style of government policy-making at the time, the power of 
both Ibnu Sutowo and Pertamina, and the confidence shown by the President in lbnu, 
the Presidential Decrees of 1970 and 1971 which concerned Batam Island did not 
involve debate or discussion either in cabinet or in public. BIEA Committee Secretary, 
Dr Sanger, who wrote the Presidential Decrees, described the process as follows: 
If Ibnu Sutowo as President-Director of Pertamina and I as his Assistant bad already agreed on [the 
Decree], there was no further discussion. It would be agreed to straight away by [the 
President].105 
Oil and nationalism were a volatile mixture and at the time, both economically and 
politically, Pertamina was a key institution of the New Order. Pertamina was very 
important politically - not only was its brand of nationalism very appealing but it 
lOOttarold Crouch ; The Ann,y and Politics in Indonesia (Cornell University, 1978), pp 243, 276. 
101 Interview with Ibnu Sutowo, 23 August 1994. 
102Interview with former minister, Frans Seda, 22August1994. 
103Interview with former minister, Mohammed Sadli, 22 July 1994. Interview with former minister, Radius 
Prawiro, 29 July 1994. 
104Warta Pertamina, November 1970 (No.6 Th.V). 
105Interview with Dr Sanger, 20November1994. 
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brought community programs to development projects by providing benefits to local 
communities often outside the development programs of the technocrats. I 06 
Economically, lbnu Sutowo showed what Indonesia could do - in many ways it was 
thanks to Pertamina's successes that Indonesia emerged from near bankruptcy to 
become a major supplier of petroleum to the world. Yet, despite Pertamina's economic 
importance and numerous successes, Sutowo alone could not decide all of Indonesia's 
future priorities. Indeed, there was room for improving management methods, 
improving its debt structure and producing public accounts like other major 
corporations. 107 
Pertamina was clearly shaped as much by Sutowo's boldness and personal enthusiasm 
as by Indonesia's development needs. lbnu Sutowo himself believed very strongly that 
all Indonesians would benefit from the demonstration effect created by his company, 
and followed the policy of using Indonesia's oil revenues to modernise and develop 
other high-technology industries. lbnu was convinced that modem technology was the 
key to Indonesian development : 
According to me, 'the way to accelerate development is to accelerate acquisition and development 
of technology' .108 
Pertamina spent heavily on modem, technologically-advanced industries and skills, 
with the expectation that they would filter in to other economic sectors. The transfer of 
technology, and the development of Indonesian skills, was considered by some as the 
greatest contribution of oil to Indonesia's development.109 lbnu began elaborating his 
'development strategy' by 1973 to explain and legitimate Pertamina's growth. It 
ascribed technologically advanced industries such as oil a leading role in Indonesia's 
economic development, and thus was directly opposed to the technocrats' focus on 
agriculture, rural infrastructure and small labour-intensive industry. 
In addition, Ibnu Sutowo wanted to ensure that Indonesia received maximum benefit 
from the development of its natural resources, and so undertook to supply the services 
required to support the search for oil. lbnu said, 
If we want the oil business to increase the state income in a direct way, we must attempt to ensure 
that the money used for the development of oil resources is mostly spent in Indonesia. One of 
l061nterview with lbnu Sutowo, 23 August 1994. 
107Louis Kraar; "Oil and Nationalism Mix Beautifully in Indonesia"~. July 1973. 
1081bnu Sutowo; Strate&i Minyak dan Gas Bumi dan Transfer ofTechnolo&y (Pertamina, Jakarta 1975), p 26. 
l@1nterview with former Pertamina executive, Gozali, 18 November 1994. Sevinc Carlson ; Indonesia's OU 
(Westview Press, Boulder 1977), p 53. 
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Pertamina's objectives is to see that services needed for the exploitation, production, processing, as 
well as transportation of oil are mostly available in Indonesia.11 O 
One of the conditions that Pertamina required of its foreign contractors was that they 
should be based in Indonesia, while at the same time it was Pertamina's objective to see 
that services needed for the exploitation, production, processing, and transportation of 
oil, as well as skilled personnel, were largely available in Indonesia.111 lbnu Sutowo 
certainly understood the requirements. These services included office space, housing, 
land, refining, air and sea transportation, communications, training, and other services 
such as hospitals. Pertamina launched a multi-million dollar drive to lure foreign 
investors in the oil field to base their operations in Indonesia instead of Singapore, and 
these efforts to displace Singapore as the base for oil exploration in the area included a 
US$1.6m oil centre in central Jakarta,. a multi-storey hospital, the logistics base on 
Batam Island and other facilities for foreign businessmen. 112 
Sutowo felt that Indonesia profited in several ways from this policy, and through 
continued expansion Pertamina became the dominant economic enterprise in Indonesia, 
even meriting a place in Fortune magazine's list of the world's two hundred largest 
companies.113 By 1973 it had branched out from oil into refineries, liquefied natural 
gas, petrochemicals, fertiliser, oil tankers, steel, airlines, hotels, highways, insurance 
and even experimental farming. 114 lbnu had considerable standing in the international 
business community and its operations appealed to an immense diversity of interests -
bankers, suppliers, oil companies and foreign government officials. Minister for Mines, 
Mohammad Sadli, later said that the government agreed to the non-oil ventures, 
... so as to take advantage of Pertamina's potential and the confidence that is held in Pertamina in 
the business world - especially the foreign business world - in order to attract overseas capital to 
lndonesia.115 
Pertamina undertook many government projects on direct presidential orders, and 
without financial assistance often had to resort to loans, both to develop oil and to 
handle special assignments. President Soeharto reportedly told visiting US Vice-
President Agnew in 1973 that the oil company undertook many government projects on 
110Khong Cho Oon; The Politics of Oil in Indonesia: Forei&n Company-Host Goyenunent Relations (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1986), p 166. 
111 Interview with Wijarso, 3 November 1994. 
112Many foreign businessmen engaged in various projects in Indonesia based their operations in Singapore because 
Jakarta could not offer modem business and recreation facilities. Singapore was reported to have set aside US$100m 
in modem facilities for businessmen. Sin&apore Economic Bulletin, 31 October 1970, pp 34-5. 
113Raja Segaran Arumugam; "Indonesia: Internal developments and external outlook" Southeast Asian Affairs 
.1216., (ISEAS 1976), p 182. 
114 Seth Lipsky ; "The Billion Dollar Bubble" Asian Wall Street Jownal. 1 January 1978. 
115 Sinar Harapan, 21-24 May 1975 in John Bresnan ; Maoaein& Indonesia : The Mociern Political Economy 
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direct presidential orders and was not given a budget to finance them, maintaining that 
Pertamina had to borrow money, both to develop petroleum and to handle the special 
assignments.116 
Whilst some of Pertamina's subsidiary activities, such as the Krakatau Steel complex, 
were undertaken at the specific request of President Soeharto, Sutowo's hand in the 
development of Batam Island was strong. Sutowo made the project very much his own 
and planned to shape Batam into Indonesia's Singapore. While Pertamina was to raise 
money for an enormous range of projects, the development of Batam Island into a giant 
industrial complex and a centre of Indonesia's petroleum activities was one of the 
largest, most ambitious, and certainly most grandiose project undertaken by Pertamina 
to diversify the Indonesian oil industry at the time. 
Almost a mini-national development plan by itself, the emerging Batam Island scheme 
aimed at converting the scantily populated grassland island into the principal 
administrative, supply and trans-shipment centre for the entire South-east Asian oil 
industry, as well as into a major industrial and commercial centre. The ambitious long-
term development plan was to call for oil refineries, power stations, supporting 
infrastructure, seven miles of wharfage, shipyards, oil-rig plants, a free-trade industrial 
zone, agricultural development and tourist amenities.117 
The New Scheme for Batam 
On 28 April 1972, in Tokyo, Pertamina signed a protocol agreement forming a joint 
venture partnership with Nissho-Iwai Co. Ltd of Japan, and Pacific Bechtel Corporation 
of the USA, for the purpose of developing a Masterplan for the industrial development 
of Batam Island.118 The Masterplan would cover oil refineries, metal fabricating 
plants, tourism, agriculture, an industrial free trade zone, and necessary infrastructure 
such as electricity, fresh water, harbour and port facilities and community facilities.119 
The joint venture partnership was reportedly created at the initiative of lbnu Sutowo 
and Pertamina, who envisaged a much-broader development of Batam.120 The foreign 
partners - Nissho-Iwai, a major Japanese trading company with extensive interests in 
Indonesia and said to have a big influence on the Japanese government, and Pacific 
1161.ouis Kraar ; "Oil and Nationalism Mix Beautifully in Indonesia"~. July 1973. 
117Donald W. Fryer & James C. Jackson; Indonesia (Ernst Benn Ud, London 1977), p 191. The idea for such an 
expansion of activities had most likely been around for some time. For example, the idea of a tanker terminal on 
Batam Island had been suggested in 1970. IDwnu. 7 November 1970. 
118 Sin&QPON Economic Bulletin. 31 May 1972, p 39. 
119Batam Island Mastexplan, p 1-1. 
120The Asian, 23-29 April 1972. 
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Bechtel, a worldwide engineering contractor which had been active in Indonesia for 
more than ten years - brought with them engineering experience and an interest in the 
projects envisaged in the Masterplan. 121 
For Pacific Bechtel, the infrastructure requirements and the types of industries desired 
on Batam, provided enormous opportunity for engineering contract work, as well as the 
immediate task of developing the Masterplan. For Nissho-Iwai, whose main interests 
were in the iron and steel sector, the oil refineries and metal fabricating plants on Batam 
offered an opportunity for new business, and it quickly set out to make a feasibility 
study for an oil refinery.122 
It was, however, to become clear that Japan would be a major beneficiary of the new 
scheme for Batam Island. The fact that Japanese companies intended to be major 
investors, that the joint venture agreement was signed in Tokyo, and that the 
announcement of the scheme coincided with a huge loan from the Japanese government 
to Indonesia all pointed to significant Japanese influence. 
Japanese interest in Batam Island 
In early May 1972 President Soeharto visited Japan, returning with an agreement for 
US$200m. in untied aid to be used for improvements to the Indonesian oil sector, in 
return for guaranteed supplies of oil through normal commercial channels and the 
provision of facilities necessary to service Japan with 58 million kilolitres of low-
sulphur oil for a period of ten years.123 The coinciding of the Batam Island Masterplan 
announcement with the President's visit led to speculation that the loan was intended, in 
part, to be used to help finance the Batam project. 124 
At least one source claimed that the credit was solely applied to Batam Island. 125 Yet, 
it is not clear whether the loan was to be used for Batam Island, let alone for the 
Indonesian oil industry, because no announcement was ever made about the projects or 
purposes for which the aid was to be used.126 Certainly the Japanese loan was untied, 
121 The two foreign corporations had apparently offered themselves for the project because they considered the 
project to be a profitable one. Interview with Dr Sanger, 20 November 1994. Both had considerable access to the 
Indonesian government, including President Soeharto. Nissho-Iwai executives met with the President on 14 May 
1973. Current Affairs Translations, May 1973 Bulletin. Senior Director of Bechtel, Steve Bechtel, met the President 
on 16 March 1974. Current Affairs Translations, March 1974 Bulletin. 
122The Asian. 23-29 April 1972. 
123 Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May 1972. 
124Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May 1972. H.W.Arndt ; "Survey of Recent Developments", Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, July 1972 (Vol.VIII No.2), p 22. 
125 Alois Osterwalder; "Japanese spheres of interest in South-East Asia" in Bernhard Dahm & Werner Draguhn (eds) Politics. Society and Economy in the ASEAN States (Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1975), pp 256-57. 
126on that point and for details of the 1972 Oil Loan, see Wayne Robinson; The Politics of Japanese-Indonesian 
Ener~y Cooperation. with particular reference to the period 1972-76 (PhD Thesis, Monash University 1980), Ch.4, 
pp 140-203. 
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and it was inherent that at least part of it would be used for projects to contribute "to the 
development of the oil sector in Indonesia", but doubts about its application to the oil 
sector could be raised since the loan·had been negotiated by the technocrats, and not by 
lbnu Sutowo and Pertamina.127 However, considering Japan's interest in Batam Island, 
and a World Bank Report which noted a tentative plan for the use of the loan, whereby 
some US$10m would be used by Pertamina for "facilities for foreign oil contractors", it 
would be safe to presume that at least part of the loan was allocated to the Batam Island 
project.128 
Interestingly, the Japanese government had embarked on a period of 'resource 
diplomacy' aimed at promoting good relations with oil-producing nations. Dependence 
on natural resource imports had compelled Japan to adopt a multilateral trade policy in 
order to spread the risks inherent in such dependence. As a result, resource trade 
occupied the attention of Japanese foreign economic policy-makers.129 Typically, in 
exchange for oil supplies, Japan would offer technical and financial assistance in a 
variety of economic development projects, predicated on corporate participation. 
Whilst largely financed by the Japanese government, these operations would be 
conducted by Japanese multi-nationals. Japan's first energy white paper, published in 
1973, emphasised cooperation with oil-producing nations. 
Oil foreign policy must be developed on the basis of international cooperation .. .It will be 
necessary for Japan to actively cooperate in the economic development of the oil-producing 
countries, beginning with industrialisation, and to take on large-scale development projects as 
'national projects' involving both government and the private sector. Growing out of this 
approach, in the future it will be necessary to establish both comprehensive and concrete policies 
in response to the specific situation in each producing country, beginning with the promotion of 
direct deals, or even further, joint management and investment enterprises in a mutually profitable 
form..130 
Batam Island was to be one such 'development project', and of enormous importance to 
Japan's oil-related foreign policy. Essentially Japan's participation was recognition of 
Indonesia's long-term strategic importance to Japan as a source of raw materials and 
energy, and it also provided a number of important strategic and economic benefits for 
Japan. 
127 Jean Aden Bush ; Oil and Politics ip Indonesia. 1945 to 1980 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), p 365. 
128 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Develo11meot Issues for Indonesia (December 1, 1972), 
Annex 5, pp 28-29. 
1291ntemational Development Centre of Japan ; Study of Ecnnrnpjc Deye!.Qgment of Indonesia (March 1973), p 134. 
See also Frank Langdon; "Japanese Policy Towards Southeast Asia" in Mark W. Zacher & R.Stephen Milne (eds) 
Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia (Anchor Books, New York 1974), pp 327-354. 
l30Japan Petroleum Yearbook (Tokyo 1978) in Ronald A Morse (ed); The Politics of J311ap's Enenx Strate&Y 
(University of California, Berkeley 1981), pp 67-68. The Energy White Paper was published by MID's Natural 
Resources and Energy Agency in 1973. 
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Firstly, Japan was concerned about future usage of the Malacca Straits, which in 1971 
carried 90% of Japanese imports of crude oil.131 Japan had been alarmed by recent 
Indonesian moves regarding the control of heavy traffic through the Malacca Straits.132 
Various proposals for controlling the Malacca Straits had been made - toll fees based on 
tonnage to be used for the maintenance of adequately dredged shipping lanes in the 
shallow waters of the Straits, the banning of supertankers more than 200,000 tons 
because of navigational hazards and threats to ecology, and an alternative route 
whereby supertankers bound for Japan would use the more time-consuming and 
expensive route through the Lombok and Makassar Straits.133 
There is no doubt that the threat to control or close traffic through the Malacca Straits 
was a strategy used by Jakarta to exert bargaining power vis-a-vis Japan. In fact, there 
is reason to believe that an understanding was reached between Japan and Indonesia 
concerning future Japanese usage of the Straits of Malacca, and that this understanding 
was directly related to the 1972 Oil Loan and to Indonesia's plans to develop Batam 
Island.134 
An oil refinery and terminal on Batam Island would mean that the Straits of Malacca 
could have more economic use for Indonesia, clearly helping to alter Indonesia's 
attitude towards the control of heavy sea traffic through the Straits. Furthermore, it 
could cater for the millions of barrels of Middle-Eastern crude oil which could be 
loaded onto Japanese supertankers after refining at Batam Island, guaranteeing Japanese 
oil supplies and access to the Malacca Straits. Credence is added to this by the fact that 
the Master Plan called for the use of 200,000-ton tankers to service the Batam refineries 
via a terminal constructed on a small offshore island in deeper water. 135 According to a 
representative of Nissho Iwai, 
Crude oil imported from the Middle-East will not be shipped directly to Japan but will be refmed 
firstly on Batam.136 
131 E.Paul ; The YiabililY of Sin&gpore : An Apct of Political Geo&nmhY (PhD Thesis, University of California, 
Berkeley 1973), p 326. 
132These proposals, particularly the diversion of shipping from the Straits of Malacca ~d Singapore to the 
Indonesian Straits with the intention of servicing oil tankers coming from the Middle East at other Indonesian ports 
such as Cilicap instead of Singapore, also posed a serious threat to Singapore's position as the dominating port of call 
for oil tankers passing through the Straits of Malacca and as the centre for foreign oil companies conducting off-shore 
oil exploration in Southeast Asia. Michael Leifer ; Malacca. Sinegpore. and Indopesia (Sijthoff and Noordhoff, The 
Netherlands 1978), pl 10. 
133c.V.Das & V.P.Pradhan ; Oil Discoyezy and Technical Chan&e in Southeast Asia (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore 1973), p 84. Ouarterlv Economic Review, Indonesia, No.11973, p 9. 
134Michael Leifer; Ma1acca. Sin&gpore. and Indonesia (Sijthoff and Noordhoff, The Netherlands 1978), plll. 
135Petroleum News, January 1973, p4. 
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Secondly, concerned about the dominant position of foreign companies in Japan's 
petroleum supply as well as the country's heavy dependence on Middle-Eastern oil, 
Japan was interested in both setting up oil channels to the Middle-East outside the 
control of Western oil companies, and in ensuring Indonesian oil supply during any 
Middle-East crisis. Japan hoped that the securing of a refinery on Batam Island would 
weaken the dominance of US refiners in Japan and would also challenge the vertically 
integrated operations of Caltex and Stanvac in Indonesia, as well as the western-owned 
refineries in Singapore.137 
Japanese companies were quick to announce plans to build oil refineries on Batam 
Island. One Japanese venture included Nissho-Iwai, with Maruzen Oil and Daikyo Oil, 
two independent refiners which had strong backing from Mm (Japanese Ministry for 
International Trade and Industry) for the Batam Island oil refinery.138 A second, 
involving Mitsubishi Oil, also expressed intent to build a refinery on Batatn.139 They 
were to be the first wholly-owned Japanese refineries outside Japan. The fact that the 
refineries would be situated outside the Indonesian customs area also meant that 
Japanese petroleum companies could attempt to persuade the Japanese government to 
accept oil refined on Batam as being of domestic origin for customs purposes.140 
The refinery projects also promised access to Indonesia's growing production of crude -
for Japan, the advantage of Indonesia's crude oil in terms of quality and transportation 
costs vis-a-vis Middle Eastern crude oil was estimated to be around US$0.60 to 
US$1.20 per barrel141 - although these Japanese groups were apparently also interested 
in attracting the joint participation of a Middle-East member nation of OPEC 
(Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries). The Kuwait National Petroleum 
Company was apparently the first choice142, although Saudi Arabia was also 
approached about the possibility of cooperating with Indonesia and Japan in building a 
refinery on Batam.143 
137wayne Robinson; The Politics of Japanese-Indonesian Eneray Cogperation, with particular reference to the 
period 1972-76 (PhD Thesis, Monash University 1980), pp 213, 374. 
138wayne Robinson; The Politics of Japanese-Indonesian EnereY Cogperatiop. with particular referepce to the 
period 1972-76 (PhD Thesis, Monash University 1980), pp 374. Announced in December 1972, the Nissho-lwai 
group's 100,000 b/d refinery, at a cost of US$100m, would be used for export of Middle-East crude, and would be 
completed by the end of 1976. Bulletin Pertamina, 05/01/1973 (No.l Th.IX). 
1391n January 1973, after making their own studies of the overall development project, including the oil refmery, the 
Mitsubishi Group announced its plans to construct a 100,000 b/d oil refinery at a cost of about US$120m by 1977 to 
produce petroleum products from crude oil from the Middle East for shipment to Japan. Asia Research Bulletin, 1-31 
March 1973, p 1712. Petroleum News, April 1973, p 12. Another report said that the refmery would have a 
processing capacity of 500,000 to 1,000,000 barrels of crude oil. Data for Decision, 5-11February1973, p 495. 
140The Asian. 23-29 April 1972. 
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Thirdly, Japan was attracted to the construction of a refinery, terminal and storage base 
on Batam Island because of concerns with pollution from the oil industry in Japan. 
Japan's land shortage, expensive labour market and the fact that Middle-East crude with 
its high sulphur content was pollutant-laden had dictated that Japan find an extra-
territorial site for its refining terminal.144 One reaction to the planned Batam Island 
refinery came from the Jakarta newspaper, Indonesia Raya, which called on the 
Indonesian government to provide strict environmental conditions on the refineries plan 
because of concerns with pollution.145 Nonetheless, Japan would have been aware of 
Singapore's concerns about the pollution hazards of the nearby refineries, and would 
have wanted adequate safeguards so as not to affect Japan-Singapore relations.146 
Lastly, Batam Island could play a role in Japan's 'develop and import' strategy, through 
which intermediate goods, such as steel and refined petroleum products, would be 
produced at sites close to energy and raw materials, then imported for final fabrication 
in Japan.147 Indeed, the submissions to build oil refineries came with additional 
promises of bringing more industry with them. Credence is added to this because of the 
involvement of Nissho-Iwai in construction work on Batam Island and the development 
of the Masterplan which envisaged large industrial areas and a refinery complex.148 
Therefore the planned development of Batam Island, particularly that concerning the oil 
industry, meant that Japan could guarantee oil supplies through access to Middle-
Eastern crude oil via the Malacca Straits, ensure access to Indonesian crude and refined 
oil, and reduce dependence on western oil suppliers and refiners, in addition to reducing 
pollution in Japan. For Indonesia, the oil industry developments on Batam Island 
promised to boost the proportion of Indonesian oil exports going abroad as refined 
products, would provide a modest amount of labour and service earnings as well as tax 
revenues for the government, and would mean higher f.o.b prices for Indonesian crude 
as Japan passed on transportation cost savings to Indonesia, whilst the oil refineries 
would represent an important step nationally for Indonesia. 149 
144us Embassy, Jakarta ; Indonesia : Petroleum Industry Developments and Outlook. 197U73. C.V.Das & 
V.P.Pradhan ; Oil Discoyezy and Technical Chan&e in Southeast Asia (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore 1973), p 83. Imul!2, 20 May 1972. 
145us Embassy Translation Unit Press Review, 13December1972. 
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period 1972-76 (PhD Thesis, Monash University 1980), p 383. 
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The Batam Island Master Plan 
Research for the Masterplan and various feasibility studies began in May 1972 and was 
to cost US$1.2m.150 The study, led by Pacific Bechtel, was carried out by a team of 
specialists, and involved visits to Batam Island and discussions with government 
officials and private companies in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia. 151 
Pacific Bechtel's mandate was: 
to develop Batam Island industrially as part of a broad program to improve the Indonesian 
economy, increase foreign exchange earnings, create more employment, and effect a shift in 
population from the more crowded areas to those less populated.152 
The rationale behind the development of Batam Island was to use the island's strategic 
location and other favourable attributes to attract foreign investment and generate 
significant foreign exchange earnings through export-oriented industries, thereby 
stimulating continued Indonesian development. The criteria used for the evaluation of 
potential industries were that they should be labour intensive, relate to port and freight 
activities, use or process Indonesian raw materials, manufacture products with growing 
and available world markets, support and complement the agriculture sector, and 
complement activities in Singapore and existing or planned major activities on Batam 
Island and its environs. Benefits for the Indonesian economy were expected to be 
increased employment generation, increased foreign exchange earnings through 
increased exports and value-adding through semi-finished and finished products. 
The Master Plan required a total investment of US$372m, comprising US$122m from 
public funds, US$158m from private funds and the remaining US$92m from either 
public or private sources. To be provided over ten years - the target year for completion 
of Phase 1 was 1984 in order to coincide with the government's planning cycle, and also 
to allow sufficient lead time for construction of the major industrial projects - half of the 
funds would be required during 1975n6 for construction of the refinery and associated 
facilities. The initial development, consisting of refinery construction, a power plant, 
port facilities and a hotel, was intended to be in operation by January 1977. 
Infrastructure development would continue through the life of the program, keeping 
pace with industry and agriculture needs, whilst industries in the free trade zone would 
increase incrementally over time. It was suggested that public financing for the Master 
Plan was feasible through bilateral and multilateral assistance agencies, such as the 
150Batam Island Investment Guide. p 57. 
151 Batam Island Mastemlan, p 1-1. Kompas, 12 May 1972. &m:ml!l. 12 December 1972. Meetings of the joint 
team were held in San Fransisco on 26 August 1972. Warta Perta.mina. September 1972 (No.4 Th.VII). Petroleum 
&n. Vol.6 No.2 1975. Discussions also took place in Singapore in October 1972. Indonesia Newsletter, 24 
November 1972 (No.47 1972). 
152Batam Island Maste[plan, p 1-1. 
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World Banlc, and that private financing was available through the US and Japan Export-
Import Banks and from commercial and merchant banks.153 
The Master Plan predicted that by 1984, primary employment would be 12,500 and 
secondary employment 27,500, with a total population on Batam Island of 100,000. 
The economic impact for 1984 was estimated to be worth US$1 lm from primary jobs, 
US$93m from value-adding, US$80m from possible net foreign exchange earnings, 
with additional benefits being training, the introduction of new technology and 
increased domestic savings.154 Batam Island would be a forerunner in industrial 
development, deviating from Indonesia's economic path - the projection for 1984 was 
that the economic structure of Batam Island would be 70% industry and 30% 
agriculture, whilst for Indonesia it would still be 80% agriculture and only 20% 
industry .155 
The Master Plan provided for a balance between industry and agriculture, and the 
formation of integrated forward and backward linkages between industries - agricultural 
products would be processed on the island, metal fabricating plants would supply the 
refinery, the refinery would supply fuel to the utility plant, etc. It also provided for 
linkages with the rest of the Indonesian economy, since Batam Island could serve as a 
processing and transhipment point for other Indonesian goods. Because Batam Island 
was relatively undeveloped, it was believed that it provided an exceptional opportunity 
for a planned development, not hindered by existing facilities, and isolated from the 
central bureaucracy .156 
It was decided to focus the development of Batam Island around one key industry - the 
refinery. The 100,000 b/d refinery, to cost US$104.5 million, would use imported 
Persian Gulf crude oils to produce asphalt, petrol, bunker oil and other grades of fuel oil 
for re-export. The facility would also have fuel storage facilities and harbour 
infrastructures capable of accommodating 200,000-ton supertanlcers.157 Considering 
conditions in the international petroleum market were very buoyant, the enormous 
refinery complex as the centrepiece of the planned development was appropriate, 
although its economic feasibility would depend overwhelmingly on the cost of crude oil 
and the prices obtained for refined products. 
153Batam Island Master Plan. 2-1. 
154Batam. Island Master P\an. 2-1. 
155 Batam Island Investment Guide. p 51. 
156Batam Island Master Plan, 2-1. 
157 Batam Island Master Plan, 2-2. 
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Other industrial, agricultural, and tourism projects would create a major new industrial 
complex. Metal fabricating plants would meet the heavy demand for off shore 
structures, tanks and pressure vessels, while shipyards would build supply vessels. A 
US$44m port and harbour facility would cater not only to visiting oil tankers but to the 
lucrative transhipment trade between Singapore and Indonesia, making Batam Island a 
major staging point for Indonesian foreign trade. Also included was a US$55m utility 
plantl58 
A free-trade zone was planned to attract export manufacturers and processors to Batam 
Island. The planned candidate industries would be labour-intensive, and would utilise 
domestic raw materials, for the purpose of diversifying the Indonesian economy. 
Potential fields of investment included wood processing, fisheries, fabricating plants, 
agricultural and chemical plants and the manufacture of agricultural equipment.159 
Increased local agricultural output - 1500 ha. was allocated for fruit and vegetable 
production and 1500 ha. allocated to cattle production - was planned. Tourism was also 
included, and would be directed towards the Singapore market.160 
The Master Plan's other major recommendations were that the industrial development of 
Batara Island should be under one single development authority, that cooperation with 
Singapore be encouraged, that a customs-protected zone be established, and that 
sufficient infrastructure be installed to make the location attractive to industry. The 
Master Plan noted that development on the island would be constrained by limitations 
of water and land, and recommended that development favour those industries with low 
water requirements, high employment and high value-added per hectare. The 
possibility of later linking up with surrounding islands such as Bintan was considered if 
Batara Island reached its capacity. 
With regards to Singapore, it was recommended that Indonesia should hold discussions 
in the early planning stages to ensure that development on Batara Island would be 
mutually beneficial to both economies. Batara Island would require the following 
facilities from Singapore : port and harbour facilities, infrastructure such as housing 
during the early construction phases, recreation, educational and medical facilities for 
foreign investors, personnel and financial institutions. The development of tourism 
would require that better immigration and customs procedures with Singapore be 
established. The Master Plan also took account of the fact that Singapore's Jurong 
158Batam Island Master Plan. 2-2. 
159Batam Island Master Plan. 2-3. 
l(j()Batam Island Master Plan. 2-3. 
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Industrial Park was reaching its full capacity 161, and that Batam Island was able to offer 
Singapore a low-cost labour pool for labour-intensive industries which may become 
increasingly uneconomical to Singapore. It was noted that Singapore's future growth 
may have to be redirected towards greater cooperation with its neighbours. 
Whilst the Master Plan foresaw the creation of a model trade zone and industrial centre, 
free from the sort of red tape that ensnared enterprises in the rest of Indonesia, it was 
later criticised by a foreign consultant as a rather cursory effort, lacking real depth. 162 
However, the authors had noted that because of schedule and budget limitations the 
feasibility studies were necessarily of a preliminary nature and at that time did not 
permit detailed market analyses, economic studies or physical surveys. As a result the 
plan, as presented, was "intentionally broad and intended to be flexible" .163 Pacific 
Bechtel concluded that, 
The industrial development of Batam Island appears technically and economically feasible. There 
do not appear to be any obstacles that cannot be overcome. Sufficient fresh water and food can be 
supplied locally at a reasonable cost. There is sufficient land area f<X' economic development and a 
satisfactory site for harbour and port facilities. The impact of the projected development on the 
Indonesian economy is positive, and it appears that financing can be arranged.164 
The Masterplan recommended that the development program be under way by 1 
January 1974. In the meantime it recommended a number of specific actions, the most 
critical being : Indonesian government approval of the plan; the establishment of a 
development authority; an agreement on a refinery; and the arranging of finance for 
infrastructure development. 165 
Approving of the Masterplan 
The Batam Island Masterplan was submitted to Ibnu Sutowo on 11 December 1972, 
along with a letter of intent to build a refinery from the Japanese consortium led by 
Nissho-Iwai. Both companies involved in the development of the Masterplan- Nissho-
161 Interview with member of the BIEA Secretariat, Pedrico, 17 November 1994. 
162The Crux Consulting Group; The Crux Report (1977), p 154. 
163Batam Island Master Plan, 1-1. 
164Batam Island Master Plan, 1-1. Much of this section is based on the details provided in the Master Plan 
document, except where indicated. A complete summary of the Master Plan can be found in Batam Island 
Investment Guide, pp 57-104. General details about the Master Plan can be found in the following sources. Kompas, 
17 November 1972. Asia Research Bulletin, 1-31March1973, p 1712. Asia Research Bulletin, 1-31August1973, 
p 2097. Petroleum News. vol.5 No.2 1974, pp 15-17. Pertamina: Indonesian State Oil Entermjse (2nd edition), 
(Pertamina. Jakarta 1974), p 145. Petroleum News, Vol.6 No.2 1975, p 11. Far Eastern Economic Reyiew , 2 May 
1975. Straits Times. 19 May 1972. Sevinc Carlson; Indonesia's Oil (Westview Press, Boulder 1977), pp 61-62. 
165Batam Island Master Plan, 2-3. 
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lwai and Pacific Bechtel - reiterated their interest in taking part in the development.166 
Pertamina then set about arranging finance, seeking government approval and 
establishing a development authority for Batam. 
The World Bank optimistically suggested that, "The economic justification, timing and 
finance of the infrastructure and refinery project for Batam Island would, of course, be 
put to Pertamina's new Board of Commissioners for consideration."167 At the 
beginning of 1972, Pertamina had been placed under a Board of Commissioners, 
consisting of the Minister of Mines as Chairman, Minister of Finance as Deputy 
Chairman and three other Ministers, for the purpose of raising the government's 
influence over the company.168 However, because the Board of Commissioners had 
difficulty refusing any of Ibnu Sutowo's schemes prior to 1975, it is doubtful whether it 
was consulted over Pertamina's plans for Batam.169 Despite this, the need to obtain 
government approval for the US$372m. Masterplan still meant that the processes 
would involve considerable negotiation with the technocrats. 
It was to be one of the few occasions when Ibnu Sutowo and Pertamina did not have 
complete say over their plans. The reasons were many, and varied, ranging from the 
President's own concerns, the reaction of the technocrats, and to Indonesia's relations 
with Singapore, and it was to be almost a year before any official announcement 
regarding the Masterplan was made by the government. 
Technocratic Concerns 
On 29 December 1972, the Batam Island Masterplan was submitted to President 
Soeharto, whose immediate reaction was the announcement that it would be studied by 
the government, in particular by Bappenas.170 How much of, or indeed if, the 
Masterplan would be implemented depended on the government's decision, the terms to 
be negotiated with prospective investors, and the availability of acceptable financing 
for both public and private sector portions of the plan.171 
166The group consisted of Nissho-Iwai, Daikyo Oil, Maru:zen Oil Coy, and the Industrial Bank of Japan. Pertamina: 
Laporan Tahunan 1972 (Pertamina, Jakarta, 1972). Pertaroina : Indonesian State Oil Enterorise (2nd edition), 
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It is clear that when he took his Masterplan idea to the President, Ibnu Sutowo was told 
that the project must not just fulfil the needs of Pertamina but that the plan must fit into 
the overall national strategy.112 Soeharto's conditions for the Masterplan had been that 
the development of Batam Island not be outside the Repelita, that it must have the full 
support of, and be financed by the private sector, and that it must complement, not 
compete with, Singapore, and these had apparently been considered by the team 
drawing up the Masterplan.173 
The World Bank's position on the development of Batam Island was not clear. The 
International Development Association (IDA), a World Bank affiliate, had been 
encouraging Indonesia to develop bonded export processing zones and industrial 
estates for labour-intensive industries oriented to export.174 The IDA's position on such 
industrial estates was that they were important principally to take advantage of 
economies in the provision of infrastructure facilities. The IDA, however, stressed that 
they should be prevented from becoming enclaves for foreign enterprises and not be 
limited to large firms.175 In addition, the IDA noted that the location of estates was 
extremely important, for they do not foster industrial concentration unless they are 
close either to raw materials, or to markets, and that "the establishment of industrial 
estates ... in areas in which industry is not already growing has in most circumstances 
been unsuccessful ... " 176 
The IDA report further noted that a bonded warehouse-free trade port system was likely 
to be of assistance only to specifically export-oriented companies which were generally 
foreign companies. It noted that their contribution to employment was not very 
significant in absolute numbers, that they generally contribute little value-added, and 
that their total contribution to the balance of payments may not be very significant. 
Whilst noting that such areas should not be discouraged, the IDA recommended a 
balanced approach which included the development of local industries for international 
trade as well. 177 
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The technocrats' own position on the idea of the Batam industrial and free trade area 
was unclear. Several ministers supported export-oriented industrial and free-trade 
areas, and it was precisely because of its export platform nature that the Batam project 
received the nod from Bappenas.178 However, according to media reports, Bappenas 
had several concerns - pollution, little employment generation, few economic benefits 
and foreign exchange earnings - in spite of the benefits outlined in the Masterplan. 179 
Bappenas apparently also had doubts about how the project could be fulfilled. One 
official said, 
Does Batam really need to be built as intensively as that; complete with an export harbour 
especially for oil, with an industrial area on par with Jurong, requiring facilities from roads to an 
airport.180 
It is very doubtful, however, that these reports accurately portrayed the position of the 
technocrats. Indeed there appeared to be some confusion over Bappenas's position on 
the Masterplan at the time, to the extent that it wanted complete control over the Batam 
project.181 It was even suggested that there were two plans for Batam Island -
Pertamina's plan for an oil supply and logistics base which would become the 'Houston' 
of Southeast Asia, and Bappenas's plan to make Batam Island a national industrial area 
- and that the plans were to be integrated.182 However, the view that the Masterplan 
was unfortunately designed without the participation of Bappenas, and that it should 
have been invited from the very beginning to give its views, was wide of the mark. 183 
Bappenas did not have its own plan but it did have concerns, most of which had been 
taken into account in the Masterplan. 
The technocrats gave their support to the overall focus of the Masterplan, and had made 
their position clear to those involved in drawing it up.184 Bappenas's position had been 
that Batam Island was not to compete with, but must have inter-linkages with, be 
complementary to, and act as a hinterland for Singapore, whilst at the same time taking 
advantage of Singapore as a centre for the oil industry. In addition, Batam Island must 
not be a non-earning activity, must not use subsidies, must not be limited to Pertamina, 
and must be financed through the private sector.185 
l78~, 17November1972. 
179'.Imw2, 8 September 1973, p 49. 
180'.Imw2, 8 September 1973, p 48. 
181 Personal Interview with former Pertamina official, 27 October 1994. 
182see remarks made by Abihasan Said. Kompas, 23 May 1973. One editorial suggested Batam Island had been 
affected by the existence of 2 planning bodies, 2 budgets and 2 planning programs. Sinar Harapan, 2 September 
1976. 
183"The dilemma ofBatam Island", Indonesian Oil and Gas, November 1975 (No.4 Vol.1), p 2. 
184Interview with member of the Masterplan team, Pedrico, 17 November 1994. 
185Interview with former minister, Emil Salim, 18 August 1994. 
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Whilst the Batam Island Masterplan was not incorporated into Repelita II, drawn up by 
Bappenas in 1973, there were some references to overall planned developments, and 
these presumably had the approval of Bappenas. According to Repelita II, Batam 
Island would "be developed into an industrial area", which would include a 
petrochemical industrial centre, an oil refinery and general regional infrastructure 
development such as harbour and airport expansion.186 
The technocrats did, however, have one major concern with Pertamina's plans for 
Batam - the US$372m. price tag, of which between US$122m. and US$214m. was to 
come from public funds. Pertamina reportedly requested US$200m. 187 Finance 
Minister, Ali Wardhana, however, was apparently only prepared to offer US$100m., 
presumably through off shore loans and not from budgetary sources. Ibnu Sutowo 
rejected the offer, well short of Pertamina's request, on the basis that the initial inputs 
for the oil industry developments planned for Batam Island were necessarily high due 
to technological and other factors. 188 
Ibnu's request for funds came at the same time that the IMF had discovered that 
Pertamina had taken out a large loan in 1972 without the knowledge of the Ministry of 
Finance. It was a turning-point in Ibnu-technocrat relations. The IMF was applying 
considerable pressure on the Minister to control Pertamina's activities, to the extent that 
a further IMF Agreement was not signed in April 1973, and the United States 
suspended credits and aid funds to Indonesia.189 This had dramatically sharpened the 
conflict between the technocrats and lbnu Sutowo, and may well have influenced the 
attitude of Ali W ardhana towards funding the Batam Island project. 
In addition to the amount of funds requested by Pertamina, Ali Wardhana apparently 
felt that Pertamina's plans for free-trade status would tum Batam Island into a 
smugglers centre. 190 Indeed, it was suggested that the delaying of approval of the 
Masterplan was caused by fears that Batam Island may develop into another Sabang 
Island debacle.191 A free port during Dutch colonial rule, the free port status of Sabang 
Island was revived by Sukarno during Konfrontasi as an economic weapon against 
Singapore, but its role soon declined and the island had become heavily involved in 
186Repelita II. Book N, pp 62, 65, 66-7. 
187 ~ 8 September 1973, p 48. 
188Interview with lbnu Sutowo, 23 August 1994. 
189 Jean Aden Bush; Oil and Politics in Indonesia. 1945 to 1980 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), pp 376-77. 
190Interview with Pedrico, 17 November 1994. 
191 See remarks by BIDA Chief Executive, Abihasan Said. ~ 20 October 1973. 
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smuggling operations.192 In 1970 official estimates of the value of smuggled goods 
entering Sabang free port were put at US$lm. a day.193 
To some extent. this was a victory for the technocrats. In their battle with Ibnu Sutowo 
and Pertamina over the financing of the Batam project, they had refused to outlay 
budgetary monies or to approve the amounts requested by Pertamina. The victory, 
however, like other attempts to place controls over Pertamina, was to be a shallow one. 
In August, President Soeharto stated that Batam would not be financed from the 
government's budget, but instead would rely on funds which Pertamina could procure, 
and on the activities of private investors.194 
Left to seek funding offshore, Ibnu sidestepped the technocrat's regulations covering 
foreign borrowings, as he was to do on several occasions, and obtained funds for the 
Batam project from Japan, the USA and Singapore. 195 As one Pertamina official said, 
If the government is reluctant to provide money, there are still other avenues for obtaining 
funds.196 
The time needed to acquire the funds caused some delay, but the implementation of the 
Masterplan began as soon as funds were available, regardless of official 
announcements. In the end Batam Island remained very much a Pertamina project, in 
style and in practice. Chief Executive Officer for Batam Island, Abihasan Said, was 
later quoted as saying, 
If we had to wait for approval of the Master Plan, work would never begin. But the work we are 
doing is not in conflict with the Master Pian.197 
1921ts failure to become an export channel lay partly in poor infrastructure and the regulations imposed upon it, the 
fact that it lay on the old shipping routes, and a weakness of backward linkages into the Sumatran hinterland. 
However, perhaps the main reason for its decline was the regulation in August 1971 requiring full duty be paid on all 
goods taken out of Sabang. Until then, duty was paid only when goods entered ports in the Indonesian customs area, 
a system which proved unworkable because of smuggling. Boediono Ibrahim Hasan ; "An Economic Survey of DI 
Aceh" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, July 1974 (No.2 Vol.X), pp 45-46. 
193 Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 February 1970, p S 1. 
194.Kwm!l!l, 24 August 1973. 
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196l:mu!2,, 8 September 1973, p 49. 
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However, despite the tacit approval of Bappenas for the overall strategy for the 
development of Batam, and its own ability to obtaining funds, Pertamina faced another 
obstacle to overcome before it could go ahead with its plans. That obstacle was 
Indonesia-Singapore relations. 
Diplomatic Concerns 
It is clear that the Indonesian government's efforts to develop Batam Island gave rise to 
speculation that it was meant as a rival to Singapore as a free port, and that any 
immediate action on, or sanctioning of, the Master Plan may have been delayed so as 
not to jeopardise Lee Kuan Yew's upcoming visit to Jakarta, and Indonesia-Singapore 
relations in general. 
Minister for Industrial Affairs, M. Jusuf s refusal to answer questions about Batam 
Island when meeting the DPR Commission VI later in the year, was interesting for not 
only the fact that he told them that it was a socio-political matter, meaning that it was 
not an economic matter, but that he referred them to Foreign Minister Adam Malik, 
suggesting that the Foreign Ministry played some part in delaying official 
announcements on Batam Island. 198 In fact, following the first Lee-Soeharto meeting 
in May 1973, there was speculation that Pertamina might even scale down its plans for 
Batam Island, in order to allay Singaporean concerns.199 
Secretary of State, Sudharmono, was to refute suggestions at the time the Masterplan 
was submitted, that Batam Island had the aim of competing with Singapore, adding that 
many Singaporean investors had shown interest. 200 Whilst a number of Singapore-
based companies had expressed interest in setting up plants on Batam Island, 
particularly labour-intensive industries and companies wanting to escape the pollution 
regulations in Singapore 201, in general, Singaporean business circles viewed Batam 
Island with concern, as a possible competitor and a threat to Singapore's dominating 
role as an industrial centre and free port in the region. 202 
If successful, Batam Island built along the lines of the Master Plan, could constitute a 
formidable rival to Singapore as a free port for larger ocean-going ships and an oil-
refining centre, and capable of exporting Indonesian manufactured goods. On the other 
hand, as the implementation of the Master Plan would require a closer working 
relationship with the Singapore government, it could also have a positive effect on 
198 Cwent Affairs Translations, September 1973 Bulletin. 
199retroleum News, July 1973, p 17. 
200~, 29 December 1972. 
201 Indonesia Raya, 1August1973 reported in Petroleum News, October 1973, p 30. 
202Jnterview with businessman. Claude Reghenzani, 30September1994. Asia Research Bulletin. 1-31May1972, p 
957. Petroleum News, July 1973, p 17. Straits Times, 19May1972. 
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Singapore-Indonesia relations. It was already clear that Singapore derived benefits 
from the proximity of Batam Base, particularly from the handling and transhipment of 
construction materials and machinery. As one Singapore newspaper headlined, 
"Singapore is Vital in Batam 's Master Plan." 203 
Goh Chok Tong, later to become Singaporean Prime Minister, and who at the time was 
with the economic planning unit and asked to advise on policy towards the possible 
economic rival location, later reflected on the Batam Masterplan. 
As a young officer, I was asked to study the masterplan of Batam to see the impact on Singapore. 
In other words, to put it frankly, would the development of Batam have a favourable or adverse 
impact on Singapore. I took some time to study the details of the plan and I came to the 
conclusion that Batam's development would be to the benefit of Singapore. 204 
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Jakarta in May 1973, representing the 
most important contact between the two countries since the end of Konfrontasi, and 
almost immediately he and Soeharto became quite close. 20s The Batam project was 
discussed at meetings between the two leaders, including proposals for Singapore to 
participate in the development of the island. 206 The Singaporean Foreign Minister, 
Rajaratnam, had earlier referred to the Minister of Finance, Goh Keng Swee, as having 
"given assistance to the [Batam] project", indicating either financial or other 
assistance. 201 Despite that, speculation continued as to whether the project was 
planned with the objective of competing with, or cooperating with Singapore. 2m 
In order to dispel speculation in Singapore about Indonesia's motives in developing 
Batam Island, particularly in government circles, a team of top Singaporean 
government officials visited Batam Island in July 1973, in what were described as the 
very first 'contacts' with the Indonesian government on possible joint cooperation to 
develop the island. The team purportedly was to take a 'first-hand' look at the 
possibility of making a feasibility study on Batam Island's tourist potential, but most 
likely also looked into the feasibility of Singapore's participation in the industrial and 
oil-related projects. 200 Ibnu Sutowo made a reciprocal visit to Singapore in order to 
discuss the possibility of cooperation in the oil industry. 210 
203Business Ttmes, 12 March 1973. 
204straits Twes, 29 June 1986. 
205For Soeharto-Lee discussions see Straits Tim.es, 25-26 May 1973. Interview with former Foreign Minister, 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, 4 August 1994. 
206Kawin Wilairat; "Singapore's foreign policy in the 1970s: The reconciliation of global and regional interests", 
Southeast Asian Affairs 1974 (ISEAS 1974), p 294. 
207L3ngQ, 26May1973,p7. 
2mFar Eastern Economic Reyiew, 13August1973. 
209The 18-member team led by the Port of Singapore Authority Chairman, Mr Howe Yoon Chong, included 
Permanent Secretary in the Finance Ministry, Ngiam Tong Dow. New Nation. 17 July 1973. New Nation, 26 July 
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Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, later made an unofficial visit to Batam in 
197 4, accompanied by several senior officials, including the Minister for Defence and 
the Head of the Port of Singapore Authority.211 Met by lbnu Sutowo, they visited 
Pertamina's operations centre at Sekupang, and the industrial area at Batu Ampar where 
some 100 Singaporeans were working as welders for an oil-rig production company. 
Lee Kuan Yew was apparently pleased to see that a large number of Singaporeans were 
employed on the island, and that it was clear that Batam Island was not going to be a 
competitor to Singapore. 212 Lee left Batam Island with the impression that it would 
complement Singapore, and told officials in his entourage to assist with the project in 
any way. As a result immigration and the movement of goods between Singapore and 
Batam Island was eased.213 
On a diplomatic level, Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore, Let-Gen Rukmito 
Hendraningrat, outlined a five-point plan for promoting "prospects of cooperation 
between Indonesia and Singapore", which included development of the Riau islands, 
specifically Batam. 214 Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, suggested there was mutual 
benefit: 
They [Singapore] have limited space. They cannot make anything they like. That's why they are 
very happy to have extensions in Batam. The problem, of course, is to select what kind of industry 
in Batam and what kind in Singapore ... The more we develop the area around Singapore the greater 
is Singapore's chance for making profit. 215 
Singapore Ambassador to Indonesia, Lee Khoon Choy, also spoke about cooperation 
onBatam: 
With proper arrangements, Singapore can make a useful contribution towards the development of 
the Bataam [sic] project Joint efforts are now being made to develop Bataam into a cattle ranch 
whereby it can supply Singapore with a continuous flow of cattle for the slaughter house in Jurong 
or for re-export. With Singapore's technological knowhow in ship-building and ship repairing, one 
can explore the possibility of joint ventures in the ship-building industry or any light industry on 
1973. Dr Goh K.eng Swee later suggested that Singapore become involved in the development of tourism on Batam 
Island. Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 August 1974. 
210Straits Times. 12 June 1973. Warta Pertamina, Juli 1973 (No.2 Vol.VIII}. At some point lbnu held discussions 
with Goh K.eng Swee about Singapore financing a 500,000 b/d refinery on Batam Island. Interview with Dr Sanger, 
20 November 1994. In August 1974, Pertamina and the Singapore Pelroleum Co. agreed to cooperate in the oil 
industry. Straits Times, 1 September 1974. 
211 The unpublicised trip was organised by the Ambassadors of both countries, Head of Security General Yoga and 
BIDA. Interview with Lee Khoon Choy, 11 October 1994. Interview with Abihasan Said, 16 August 1994. 
2121nterview with Abihasan Said, 16 August 1994. 
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Bataam Island. Given stable conditions and adequate arrangements, much can be done to promote 
Singapore's participation in the development of Bataam for mutual benefit.216 
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President Soeharto, however, had the last word. In a speech to the Indonesian 
Exporters Association on 23 August 1973, he indicated his approval of Pertamina's 
plans, thus ending any lingering conflict between lbnu and technocrats over the 
Masterplan, and publicly stated that the project was not meant to rival Singapore, but 
would be used to update Indonesia's trade facilities. According to Soeharto, the Batam 
Island project was necessary for the promotion of Indonesia's trade and economy. 
We must develop Batam Island as a centre of our export commodities and a free port. But the 
project is not meant to rival Singapore. 217 
By the end of 1973, any major misunderstandings about Batam Island between 
Singapore and Indonesia appeared to have been cleared up, and as Soeharto indicated 
above, plans for Batam Island were to proceed. With government approval of plans, 
the overcoming of concerns in Singapore, and the obtaining of funds, Pertamina went 
ahead with its plans to develop Batam Island along the lines envisaged in the 
Masterplan. One further step remained, the establishing of a development authority for 
Batam Island. 
The Batam Industrial Development Authority 
On 22 November 1973, Presidential Decree No.41/1973 declared all of Batam Island an 
Industrial Area with emphasis on an entrepot role, essentially sanctioning Pertamina's 
plans for Batam as outlined in the Masterplan.218 It had long been stressed that the 
development of Batam Island was a government project, not Pertamina's, but now its 
authoritative body was to officially make decisions, and carry out its activities, on 
behalf of the government. 
The government had first begun to assert its influence on the Batam Island project in 
1972 when Major-General Dee Hernomo, former Chief-of-Staff of KOSTRAD, was 
appointed Vice-Chairman of the BIEA. As government representative, Hernomo was 
in charge of day-to-day coordination of the industrial zone from Jakarta, reporting not 
216New Directions, October 1973, No.l Vol.l. 
217 Sin~;;ipore Economic Bulletin, 31 August 1973, p 36. Soeharto explained that whilst Indonesia had experienced 
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regard." The benefits of such a development were increased foreign-exchange earnings and state finances savings. 
Indonesia Newsletter. 3 September 1973 (No.35 1973). See also Asia Research Bulletin. 1-31August1973, p 2104. 
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only to Ibnu Sutowo but directly to the President.219 When it came to creating a new 
development authority, the government, on the insistence of Bappenas, arranged the 
structure of supervision of Batam Island in such a way that it gave the government 
more control over what was essentially a Pertamina-run and Pertamina-staffed 
project. 220 
The most important feature of Presidential Decree No.4111973 was that it considered 
"that in order to intensify and facilitate the development of the Batam Industrial Area, it 
is necessary to review and to upgrade the management of Batam Island as an Industrial 
Area, as stated in Presidential Decree No.74/1971."221 This was done through the 
setting up of three separate bodies to develop, administer, manage and supervise the 
Batam Industrial Area - the Batam Industrial Area Supervisory Board (Badan Pengawas 
Daerah Industri Pulau Batam), the Batam Island Industrial Development Authority 
(Otorita Pengembangan Daerah Industri Pulau Batam or BIDA), and the Batam 
Industrial Corporation (Perusahaan Perseroan Penguasahaan Daerah Pulau Batam or PT 
Persero Batam). 
The Batam Industrial Area Supervisory Board, made up of senior ministers of the 
Indonesian government, was to be responsible for supervising the implementation of 
policies, co-coordinating policies of various government agencies, and to provide BIDA 
with directives concerning the industrial development of Batam Island in conformity 
with the government's policies. The Board, directly responsible to the President, 
consisted of the following members : Minister of State for Economy, Finance and 
Industry/Chairman of Bappenas (Chairman of the Board), Minister of Internal Affairs, 
Minister of Finance, Minister of Trade, Minister of Industry, Minister of 
Communications, Chairman of the BK.PM, and Governor of Riau Province. BIDA was 
also to be assisted by a team of assistants comprising the Director-Generals of Internal 
Revenue, Customs and Excise, Sea Communication, Trade, Development and 
Manpower, Land and Immigration. 222 
The Batara Island Industrial Development Authority (BIDA) was given responsibility 
to promote and manage the development of Batam Island into an Industrial Estate, to 
develop and control transhipment activities, to plan and construct infrastructure and 
2191n 1972 Hemomo was appointed by Soeharto as Vice-Chairman of BIDA, after the death of the previous Vice-
Chairman Brig-Gen Teuku Hamzah, to act as the "government representative". Prior to that he was Chief of Staff of 
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Pharma Putra. 
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other facilities, and to handle investment applications. In addition it was given all 
administrative rights to land on Batam Island. In carrying out its duties, it was directly 
responsible to the President, and it was to give priority to guidance from the 
Supervisory Board. 223 
Modelled along the lines of the Jurong Town Corporation in Singapore, BIDA was 
essentially an instrument for integrating several departments and to lessen complicated 
bureaucracy in a small area, thus facilitating private investment. It was to be isolated 
from the centre, and thus free from social and administrative interferences which 
normally handicapped investment in Indonesia. Essentially BIDA was set up because 
the regional capacity and administration was not there, and would in any case be unable 
to deal with the Singapore government, if required, or make decisions fast. 224 BID A's 
staff remained unchanged from the BIEA. Dr Ibnu Sutowo became Chairman, Major-
General Hemomo was Vice-Chairman, and Dr Sanger was Secretary. 225 
PT Persero Batam (Batam Industrial Estate Management Corporation) was also formed 
for the purpose of developing and financing the construction of infrastructure needed to 
facilitate transhipment, trading and industrial activities on Batam Island. 226 Essentially 
a bonded warehouse administrator, the state-owned company was directly responsible 
to the Minister of Finance, and given responsibility for the control of the movement of 
goods in and out of Batam, as well as handling supervision of customs collection. 221 
On Batam Island, supervision of day-to-day operations was placed in the hands of the 
Chief Executive Officer, Colonel Abihasan Said, who was appointed in 1972 by Ibnu 
Sutowo who had known him in Palembang during the Indonesian revolution.228 
Abihasan held concurrently the position of Pertamina Liaison Officer in Singapore, and 
later also that of Pertamina Site Manager for Batam Island because of the large number 
223 Ke,putusao Presiden No.41 1973. 
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of Pertamina projects being undertaken. 229 Abihasan's position oversaw some forty 
projects, consisting of Pertamina's logistics base at Sekupang, joint ventures with 
foreign investors at Batu Ampar, as well as assisting the private ventures of foreign and 
domestic investors and carrying out infrastructure projects outlined in the 
Masterplan. 230 
Whilst it had taken longer than anticipated, Ibnu Sutowo completed all the 
recommendations outlined in the Masterplan - government approval, financing, and a 
development authority - for development to be under way by 1 January 1974. With 
everything in order, Ibnu Sutowo gave orders for the Batam project to be completed as 
fast as possible. 231 
Economic Activity on Batam Island, 1974 
Pertamina was carrying out the largest number of projects on Batam Island, primarily 
the infrastructure and community projects outlined in the Masterplan. These projects 
included an airstrip, jetties, wharves, godowns, a power plant, a telecommunications 
centre, roads, office buildings, housing, warehouses, a water purification plant, fresh 
water reservoirs, a mosque, a church, schools and a health centre. 232 
Pertamina was also running its own logistics base at Sekupang. Pertamina Batam was 
to differ from the existing Pertamina organisational framework in that it was not a 
production unit By late 1974, Pertamina Batam had begun to take over Pertamina Unit 
VII's facilities on Batam Island, effectively defining a role for itself, strengthened by 
the decision to create the position of Site Manager for Pertamina Batam. 233 By the end 
of 1974, 272 Pertamina employees were stationed on Batam.234 
Beginning in April 1974, Pertamina goods began entering Indonesia via Batam, and by 
the middle the year Pertamina's logistic base at Sekupang was fully functional, and it 
was expected that all goods for Pertamina would be unloaded through Sekupang 
harbour.235 The first transhipment was done in early 1974, when without a harbour, a 
229under Surat Keputusao Direktur-Utama Pertamina No.1918/Kpts/DR/DU/1974. Bulletin Pertam.ina. 4 October 
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42,000 ton shipment of imports for Pertamina destined for Belawan, Cilicap and South 
Sumatra was unloaded onto barges off the Batam coast at Sekupang. 236 
In addition to wholly-owned Pertamina subsidiaries servicing foreign oil companies -
PT Elektronik:a Nusantara (Elnusa), which serviced land and offshore operations, and 
PT Pertamina Tongkang, which operated transportation vessels servicing offshore oil 
operations237 - Pertamina had a number of joint-ventures with United States, Japanese, 
Hong Kong and Australian companies producing exploration and production 
equipment. (See Table 3.2). Those joint-ventures on Batam Island, in full or part 
operation by the end of 1974, included238 : 
- PT Chicago Bridge and Iron Indonesia, which provided construction equipment for 
offshore oil companies; 
- PT Dresser Magcobar Indonesia, which produced drilling muds; 
- PT Patra Vickers Batam, which provided heavy engineering facilities and services; 
- PT Toyo Kanetsu Indonesia, which fabricated storage tanks; 
- PT Puma Bina Indonesia, which provided supply, fabricating and construction 
facilities; 
- PT A vlau Fabricators Indonesia, which provided engineering services; 
- PT Kuda Laut Batam Island, which supplied foodstuffs, equipment and services. 
Pertamina also owned a steel processing plant at Batu Ampar, designed to support 
development of Indonesia's oil industry. Built by Taisei International Corp. of Japan on 
a 'tum-key' basis, the Pertamina Steel Plate Processing Plant (PSPPP) began operations 
on the 22 June 1974. On a two hectare site with its own harbour, it had a yearly 
capacity of 60,000 tons, and was reportedly filling orders from the Middle-East, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Saipan and Indonesia by the end of 1974.239 
2361nterview with Abihasan Said, 27 October 1994. 
237PT Pertamina Tongkang was managed by Tong Djoe. Jean Aden Bush; Oil and Politics in Indonesia. 1945 to 
.12&2 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), pp 407, 411. 
238compiled from the following sources. Ke&iatan dan Prqyek Pertam.ina: 1970 std Pesember 1974 (Pertamina, 
Jakarta 1975), p 4. BPOPDIPB ; l.aporan Tahunan 1974. Batam Island Investment Guide, p 127-130. H.W.Amdt; 
"Survey of Recent Developments", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies July 1974 (No.2 Vo.X), pp 26-27. 
Petroleum News. Vol.5 No.41974, p 6. Bulletin Pertamina, 28 June 1974 (No.26 Th.X). Indonesian ferspectives, 
December 1974, pl13. ~ 13 August 1975. Pertam.ina Bulletin April 1975 (no.4 Vol.4). Current Affairs 
Translations, November 1974 Bulletin. According to Aden, the following joint-ventures also operated on Batam 
Island, but there are no other sources confirming them - PT Brown and Root Indonesia (20% Pertamina, 80% Brown 
and Root, USA) manufacturing offshore construction components; PT Nippon Steel Construction (Nisconi); PT 
Permiko Engineering and Construction; PT Pertafenikki; PT Sankyo International. Jean Bush Aden ; Oil and Politics 
in ln<ionesia. 1945 to 1980 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), p 407. Jean Bush Aden; "Entrepreneurship and 
Protection in the Indonesian Oil Industry" in Ruth Mc Vey ( ed) Southeast Asian Capitalists (Cornell University, New 
York 1992), p92. 
239Bulletin Pertamina, 28 June 1974 (No.26 Th.IX). Indonesian Newsletter, 28 June 1974 (No.17 1974). Pertamina 
.BDJkWl, July 1974 (No.7 Vol.III). Petroleum News, Vol.5 No.4 1974, p 6. Indonesian Perspectives, December 
1974, p113. The PSPPP was a preparation for a shipyard. Interview with Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. The PSPPP 
was later listed as one of the debts unpaid due to the Pertamina Crisis, which was US$0.4m as of 31 December 1976. 
Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 23 December 1977. 
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Table 3.2 
Foreign Companies on Batam Island 
(as at 1 December 1974)240 
In Operation 
PT McDermott Indonesia 
86% McDermott - USA 
14% Bob Hasan - Indonesia 
PT Dresser Magcobar Indonesia241 
90% Dresser Industries Inc - USA 
10% Pertamina 
PT Chicago Bridge and Iron Indonesia 242 
49% Chicago Bridge and Iron - USA 
51 % Pertamina 
PT Patra Vickers Indonesia 243 
50% Vickers Ruwolt Pty Ltd - Australia 
50% Pertamina 
PT Kuda Laut Batam Island 
50% Interagencies - Hong Kong 
50% Pertamina 
Ednasa Robin Shipyard Pte Ltd 
Robin Lo - Singapore 
Ednasa Robin Dredging Pte Ltd 
Robin Lo - Singapore 
Taisei International Corporation 
Taisei Corporation - Japan 
In Preparation 
PT Puma Bina Indonesia 
Pacific Bechtel - USA 
Pertamina 
PT Avlau Fabricators Indonesia244 
49% A very Lawrence - Singapore 
51 % Pertamina 
PT Tongkat Mas Indonesia 
Tong Holdings - Singapore 
PT Masari Karya - Indonesia 
PT Toyo Kanetsu Indonesia 245 
35% Toyo Kanetsu KK - Japan 
14% Nissho-lwai Co. Ltd - Japan 
51 % Pertamina 
USA 
USA 
USA 
Australia 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Singapore 
Japan 
USA 
USA 
Singapore 
Japan 
Offshore Steel Structure 
Construction 
Drilling Mud Production 
Engineering Services 
Supplies 
Machine repairs, Spare parts 
supplier 
Foodstuff Services and 
Supplies 
Building Contractor 
Dredging Contractor 
Building Contractor 
Engineering Services and 
Supplies 
Engineering Services and 
Supplies 
Tourism Complex 
Steel Tank Fabrication 
240BPOPDIB; l&porao Tahunan 1974 , Lampiran ill & Vill. Petroleum News. Vol.6 No.2 1975, p 11. B..iW!m 
Island Investment Guide (Delta Orient, Singapore 1975), pp 107-140. 
241.B.Nf'.I No.361 - 1971. .B.Nf'.INo.314-1974. 
242BNPT No.311 - 1974. 
243.B.Nf'.I No.274 - 1974. 
244~ No.136 - 1977. 
245.B.Nf'.I No.279 - 1975. 
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When work began on its logistics base in 1970, Pertamina carried out most projects 
itself. Much of the work was pioneering - heavy equipment was brought into a harbour 
consisting of beached barges D-Day style, and roads were planned with a map and 
compass from the seat of a bulldozer.246 However, from 1973, particularly as work 
began on the Masterplan, most of the larger projects began to be sub-contracted. 
Because developments on Batam were so dominated by Pertamina, private-sector 
investments were few, and where they existed were closely associated with Ibnu 
Sutowo and Pertamina. Ibnu Sutowo made contracts, mainly for non-oil-specific 
construction and light engineering, available to foreign associates, and to domestic 
companies entering the oil service sector dependent on Pertamina for most or all of their 
contracts. A number of Pertamina contracts on Batam Island were awarded to 
associates of lbnu Sutowo and Pertamina. 
The Robin Group of Companies, run by Singaporean entrepreneur, Robin Lo, was the 
main Pertamina contractor. 247 It was alleged by critics that Lo was on close terms with 
both President Soeharto and lbnu Sutowo248, to the extent that they actually owned 
Robin Shipyard, Robin Air and an office building in Singapore and that Robin Lo was 
only nominee for the companies. 249 There is no doubt that Robin Lo received many 
facilities from Pertamina through his relationship with lbnu Sutowo - he was the main 
contractor for Pertamina supplies and transportation, he ran tours in Singapore for 
Pertamina officials, and was operating as a tanker broker for Pertamina 2.50 - and the 
same went for projects on Batam Island. Later it was claimed that many Lo projects 
were done without BIDA's knowledge.251 
Ednasa Robin Shipyard (Pte) Ltd carried out construction of a port, jetty, godowns, 
water reservoir, water treatment plant, roads, airstrip and telecommunications building, 
employing over 1,800 people, two-thirds of which were Indonesians, making it the 
largest employer on the island. 252 Ednasa Robin Dredging (Pte) Ltd carried out 
dredging work at Sekupang and Batu Ampar, employing 58 foreigners and 217 
Indonesians. 253 
246Jnterview with Abihasan Said, 27 October 1994. Sinar Harapan, 23 December 1983 
247Petmleum News. vol.5 No.2 1974, p 17. Petroleum. News, Vol.5 No.4 1974, p 6. Petroleum. News, Vol.6 No.2 
1975, p 12. llW&b!, March 1978, p 11. 
248par Eastern Economic Review. 2May1975. It was said that Lo was originally from Indonesia. Philippe Regnier 
; Singapore : City State in Southeast Asia (S.Abdul Majeed&. Co., Kuala Lumpur 1992), p 70. 
249Brian May ; The Indonesian Tragedy (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1978) , p 300. 
2.50Warta Pertamina, January 1974 (No.8 Th.VIII) . .Imm2, 25 September 1976. Far Eastern Economic Review. 22 
October 1976. 
251~.28January1977. ~. 29January1977 . .e.&l2&w., February 1977. 
2521n 1974 it employed 1243 Indonesians and 618 foreigners. BPOPDIPB; l&porao Tahunan 1974. 
253 BPOPDIPB ; Liijx>ran Jahunan 1974. Batam Island Invesbnent Guide, p 130. 
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Another major Pertamina contractor was PT Kumia Dwi Putra, owned by Ibrahim 
Adjie, a former Commander of the Siliwangi Army Division who had been close to 
President Sukarno. President Soeharto, who had been known to win over dissident or 
potentially dissident officers by encouraging them to go into business with assistance 
wherever they needed licences, credits or contacts, apparently assisted Adjie in setting 
up the business.254 Beginning operations in 1971, the company built housing, roads, a 
storage depot, a helipad, government offices, and a water treatment plant.255 In 1974 it 
was employing 202 Indonesians, and enjoying a 150% increase on work over 1973.256 
Table 3.3 
Domestic Companies on Batam Island 
(as at 1 December 1974)257 
Pf Kunlia Dwi Potra 
Ibrahim Adjie 
Double Bell Ranch 
IbnuSutowo 
Adiguna Shipyard258 
50% Pontjo Nugro Susilo 
50% Pf lndopbing 
Pf Tunas Shipyard259 
80% Pf Adiguna Shipyard 
20% Sofjan K.enawas 
Pf Sibasco260 
80% Haji Abihasan Said 
10% Haji Mohammad Zen 
5% Sjaifullah 
5% Nona Sririyanti 
Pf Potra Batam 261 
30% Haji Abihasan Said 
30% Nyonya Masnun 
20% Abubakar Bastari 
20% Haji Mohammad Zen 
Contractor 
Cattle Breeding 
Dockyard 
Shipyard 
Shipping/Cargo Handling 
Contractor/Supplier 
254Personal Interview, 30 September 1994. On Soeharto's slrategy, see Harold Crouch; The Anny and Politics in 
Indonesia (Cornell University Press 1978), p 222. Harold Crouch ; "Palrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia" 
World Politics Vol.31 No.4 (July 1979), p 577. 
255Batam Island lnvestinent Guide. p 131. Petro1eum News, Vol5 No.4 1974, p 6. 
256BPOPDIPB ; l&POran Iahuoan 1974. 
257 Badan Pelaksana Otorita Pengembangan Daerah lnduslri Pulau Batam ; Laporan Jahunan 1974 , Lampiran m & 
vm. Petroleum News, Vol.6 No.2 1975, p 11. Batani Islansi Investment Guide (Delta Orient, Singapore 1975), pp 
107-140. Excludes Pertamina, government offices and banks. 
258 fil!ln: No.276 - 1971. 
259BNf'.I No.275 - 1974. 
260BNf'.I No.304 - 1975. 
26l BNfI.No.285 - 1975. 
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J7f Batu Batam Nusantara262 
80% Abdurrani Junus 
Brick Factory 
20% Tuldman Tugiono 
J7f Elham Batam Base263 
30% Abubakar Bastari 
Shipping/Cargo Handling 
30% Haji Loth Hamid 
20%Hanafie 
15% Haji Mohammad Zen 
5% Daniel Burhanuddin 
J7f Tirta Kencana Batam 264 Contractor/Supplier 
50% Abubakar Bastari 
50% Lily Rochana 
J7f Batam Mulya Makmur265 Contractor 
80% Mulya Jaya 
10% Haji Muhammad Zen 
5% Ali Niti Sastra 
5% Bratanata Elya 
J7f Cahaya Batam 266 Contractor 
,.':i 30% Mulya Jaya 
. . . . - . - . ' . . 30% Alfan Mukti 
20%Mustafa 
20% Ratna Eliny 
J7f Karana Line Shipping 
Bob Hasan 
J7f Teknik Umum Electricity Contractor 
EddyKowara 
J7f Caputra Entetprise Ltd267 Contractor 
Heru Pramono 
NudinHardi 
OeyEngTie 
Lim Manufacturing Contractor 
J7f Pratama Raya Engineering Machinery and Vehicle Repair 
J7f Natoputra Wira Contractor/Labour Supplier 
J7f Pendito Batam Contractor 
J7f Pan Nusantara Fishing 
J7I'Merlion Furniture Supplier 
J7f Krisna Cacra Pura Telecommunications Contractor 
J7f Kusno Ranch Mixed Farming 
]7f Putra Kalimantan Heavy Equipment Supplier 
J7f Pondok Batam Restaurant 
262BN.fl No.71 - 1974. 
263:a.tifl..No.550 - 1975. 
264.lllifINo.731 -1975. 
265:a.tifl..No.306 -1975. 
266:a.tifl..No.579 - 1975. 
267
.DNeINo.282-1972. 
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Other successful contractors were those with close connections to Pertamina. BIDA 
Chief Executive Officer, Abihasan Said, was majority shareholder in at least two 
companies on Batam - PT Sibasco, a shipping and stevedoring business, and PT Putra 
Batam, a building contractor268 - and his partners were involved in several other 
companies. Pertamina Head of Telecommunications, Rani Junus, owned PT Batu 
Batam Nusantara, a brick-making factory.269 (See Table 3.3 for details of all domestic 
companies operating on Batam Island in 1974). 
Ibnu Sutowo, and family members, owned a number of enterprises operating on Batam 
Island. 210 PT Adiguna Shipyard, which produced and repaired small sea-going craft, 
began operations in 1973. Robin Lo was said to have provided the technical know-how 
to establish Adiguna and supervision of the operation. 271 Another Sutowo shipyard 
operating on Batam was PT Tunas Shipyard, a joint venture between Adiguna and Tong 
Djoe (Theng Lian Joo), a Chinese businessman who had known Ibnu in Palembang 
during the Indonesian revolution, where he ran smuggling operations between 
Singapore and Palembang. 272 Tong Djoe jointly owned Tugu Insurance Co. with 
Pertamina, Head of Caltex Indonesia, Julias Tahija, and Pacific Bechtel, which insured 
all Pertamina shipping. 273 Pertamina orders were often directed towards Adiguna and 
Tunas, which were major suppliers to Pertamina. 274 
The Sutowo family-owned property-developing company, PT Masari Karya, jointly 
owned with Sjarnoebi Said, brother of BIDA Chief Executive Officer, Abihasan, began 
work on a tourist project in early 1974, which planned for a 200-room international 
hotel, 120 cottages, a golf course, horse-riding facilities, a dolphin aquarium, tennis 
courts, swimming pools and a crocodile farm. 275 At an estimated cost of Rp9 ,800 
million, the tourist project, owned by PT Tongkat Mas, was a joint venture with Tong 
Holdings Ltd of Singapore, which was reportedly owned by Tong Djoe's Tunas 
Group.276 
268 See respectively lllif'.I No.304-1975 and lllif'.I No.285-1975. 
269lllif'.I No.71-1974. 
270 According to Aden, additional Sutowo companies operating on Batam included PT Tunas Travel, a joint venture 
travel agency with Tong Djoe, and PT Nugra Santana, a consulting fll'lll, but there is no evidence to verify this. Jean 
Bush Aden; Oil and Politics in Indonesia. 1945 to 1980 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), pp 411-412. 
271 Richard Robison ; Indonesia : The Rise of Capital (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986), pp 315, 320, 351. 
272 Abihasan Said; Bumi Sriwijaya Bersimbah Darah (Yayasan Krama Yudha, Jakarta 1992), p 98. Jean Bush 
Aden; Oil and Politics in Indonesia. 1945 to 1980 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), pp 411. 
273Richard Robison; Indonesia: The Rise ofCiwital (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986), p 319. 
274Howard Dick; The Indopesian Inter island Shigpin& Ipdustr,y : A Case Study in Competition and Reeulatioo 
(PhD Thesis, Australian National University 1977), pp 81, 116. Richard Robison ; Indonesia· The Rise of Ciwital 
(Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986), p 353. 
275BPOPDIPB; Laporan Tahunan 1974, p 9. New Nation, 26 July 1973. New Nation. 11February1974. :BAtlm 
Island Ipyestmept Guide, p 115,120. Jean Aden Bush ; Oil and Politics ip Indopesja, 1945 to 1980, (PhD Thesis, 
Cornell University 1988), p 414. On PT Masari Karya, 50% owned by lbnu Sutowo and 50% owned by Sjarnoebi 
Said, see lllif'.I No.891 - 1973. 
276Richard Robison; Indonesja: The Rjse ofCiwital (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986), pp315, 352. 
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On Karimun Island, adjacent to Batam, PT Karimun Granite, a joint-venture between 
PT Indophing, partly-owned by Ibnu Sutowo, and a Malaysian company, operated the 
only granite producing quarry in Indonesia. m The quarry was the first project to 
become operational based on a kontrak karya in the mining sector. Ibnu's explanation 
of how he became a partner in the project is illuminating. When he learned that a 
contractor in Singapore needed granite, he got government permission to have it 
shipped from Kari.mun, and though he invested nothing he collected 50% of the profits. 
"I just arranged it".278 The quarry played an important role in supporting the 
development of Batam island. From the beginning of operations under the kontrak 
karya, signed on 4 October 1971, up until 1975, Batam Island was Karimun Granite's 
main market, accounting for some 90% of production. 279 
Owned by Ibnu Sutowo, Batam Double Bell Ranch was raising 1,327 head of 
Australian cattle, specially bred for tropical conditions, on 388 hectares. 280 Robin Lo 
was involved in the project from the very beginning, developing and managing the 
ranch, putting up capital and paying the bills, and may well have been a share-
holder. 281 It was conceived that the ranch, with a 16,000 head capacity, would supply 
Singapore with a continuous flow of cattle for the slaughterhouse in Jurong or for re-
export. 282 
2771nterview with Claude Reghenzani, 30/0911994. Sutowo's share of PT lndophing was estimated to be between 
25-50%. Richard Robison; Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986), pp 315, 353. The 
kontrak karya states that PT Karimun Granite was a joint venture between PT lndophing and Gammon Southeast 
Asia Berhad. Kontrak Kazya antara Republik Indonesia dan PI Karimup. See also Indonesian Newsletter, 24 
August 1972 (No.32 1972). Hendra Asmara ; "An Economic Survey of Riau", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
~(November 1975 (No.3 Vol.xi), p 34. 
278~. 31August1970, p 36. 
2791n 1974, it made 55 shipments to Batam Island. BPOPDIPB ; Liu>ran Tahunan 1974. Between 1975 and 1980, 
the company shipped little granite to Batam Island, its main markets being Pertamina's LNG facilities in Aceh and 
Kalimantan. Today, some 10% of production goes to Batam Island, the rest to Singapore. Interview with President-
Director of PT Karimun Granite, Claude Reghenzani, 30 September 1994. Indonesia : A suryey of US business 
qmzortugities (US Dept Commerce, May 1977), p 191. 
280The arrival of the cattle from Australia in 1972 was quite an event As no quarantine had been provided, all cattle 
on Batam Island were bought by Pertamina, slaughtered and then given to the villagers. In that way quarantine 
conditions were met. When they arrived, rather than unload them in Singapore, a line of barges was set up from the 
shore at Sekupang to the ship. The 'cowboys' and horses rode off first, followed by 837 pregnant cows which ran off 
in scattered directions, many falling overboard and having to swim to shore. Interview with Abihasan Said, 16 
August 1994. 
281 Interview with consultant to the project, John Leake, 26 April 1995. According to Robison, it was a joint venture 
with Robin Lo, but there was some speculation about ownership at the time. Initially Pertamina named Robin Lo as 
the owner, but in 1975 he claimed that he was never involved, and it was .then suggested that he either relinquished 
ownership or retracted his name from being associated with the ranch. Head of Caltex Indonesia, Julias Tahija, was 
also suggested as a shareholder. Richard Robison; lndogesia: The Rise of Capital (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 
1986), p 351. far Eastern Ecogomic Review. 2 May 1975. One somce said that CV Riau Makesa Fann was owned 
by lbnu Sutowo, the director of which was Sudarsono, the Head of Immigration on Batam Island. ~. 13 
December 1975. According to one source, the ranch was being built by Robin Lo <Batam Island Inyestm.ept Guide. p 
130.) and to another by PT Kmnia Dwi Potra <Petroleum News, Vol.5 No.41974, p 6.). 
282BPOPDIPB ; La,porag Tahunan 1974, p 17. See also, Sini:a,pore Economic Bulletin, 31 October 1973, p 29. Nm, 
Nl1iwl, 11 February 1974. Warta PertamiQa, Pebruari 1974 (No.9 Th.VIII). Asia Research Bulletin, 28 February 
1974, pp 2457-2458. Batam Island Investment Guide. p 120. Singaporean veterinary surgeons were helping in the 
cattle breeding project after requests for assistance were received by the Primary Production Department of 
Singapore's Ministry of National Development New Natiop, 13 March 1974. 
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The facilities developed by Ingram, including its oil-rig construction operation, had 
been bought in 1972 by PT McDermott Indonesia, a joint-venture involving close 
associate of the President, Chinese-Indonesian businessman Mohammad (Bob) 
Hasan.283 By 1974 it employed 295 foreigners and 635 Indonesians, and had produced 
37 offshore steel-structures worth approximately US$24 million. 284 When Bob Hasan 
took control of the operation, the relationship with Pertamina became strained because 
numerous facilities were given to the operation in the belief that it was a Pertamina 
joint-venture but which had become without notice a Bob Hasan joint-venture. 285 
Another Bob Hasan company also operated on Batam, the shipping operation, PT 
Karana Lines. 
In 1973, government offices included customs, immigration, quarantine, airport, and 
manpower, with the addition of telecommunications and police in 1974. 286 There were 
two government banks by the end of 1974 - Bank Dagang Negara at Sekupang had 120 
account holders (93 in Batu Ampar and 27 in Sekupang), and Bank Bumi Daya which 
opened at Sekupang in June 197 4 had 35 account holders. 287 
There was considerable discussion over the appropriateness of Batam Island as a 
location for a wood processing industry. In mid-1973 the Director-General of Forestry, 
Soedjarwo SH, visited Batam Island to look at the possibility of building a wood 
business for Batam's needs and for export, and in early 1974 about ten Indonesian and 
Singaporean investors undertook a survey in cooperation with the Directorate for the 
possibility of setting up sawmills and plywood factories at Tanjung Uncak. 288 At least 
two domestic plywood manufacturers were expected to begin construction there by the 
beginning of 1975. 289 
lbnu Sutowo soon began inviting other Southeast Asian countries to participate in 
Batam's development, as a symbol of ASEAN self-reliance in the post-Indochina 
period. Official, investigative and promotional visits were a constant feature on Batam 
Island - some 8,000 visitors came via Singapore in 1974.290 They included visits by 
283 Interview with lbnu Sutowo, 23 August 1994. At a cost of only US$4.1 million, the operation apparently made 
US$5 million profit in the first year. Interview with former manager, Machnun Kamaluddin, 19 November 1994. 
284In 1974, Production value was Rp9.715.252.434,85. BPOPDIPB ; Luioran I&hunan 1974. Batam Island 
Investment Guide. p 115. 
285 Interview with Machnun Kamaluddin, 19 November 1994. Interview with Abihasan Said, 27 October 1994. 
286BPOPDIPB ; Laporan Tahunan 1974. Batam Island was even used by the Department of Commerce for the re-
export of luxury cars that had illegally entered Indonesia. Anekatan Bersenjata, 13 February 1975. 
287 Batam Island Investment Guide, p 131. 
288He visited on 12 April 1973. Bulletin Pertamina, 18 May 1973 (No.20 Th.IX). BPOPDIPB; LUJOran Tahunan 
.1fil, p 17. Batam Island Investment Guide. p 120. 
289 Hendra Asmara ; "An Economic Survey of Riau", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (November 1975 
(No.3 Vol.XI), p 36. 
290Visitors via Singapore numbered 6,000 in 1973. BPOPDIPB; LiijJOI'aD Tahunao 1974. 
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various Indonesian Ministers, members of the DPR, foreign businessmen, journalists, 
staff from the Indonesian embassy in Singapore and various Singapore-based 
Ambassadors, and top Singaporean officials. 291 
The Batam project was being billed by Ibnu Sutowo as vital to the future of all 
members of ASEAN and the rest of Asia, as it would fulfil the need for a logistic base 
which could support the entire oil exploration activities of Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Burma and Indonesia. In a speech given in Singapore in December 1974, 
lbnu articulated his thoughts on Batam Island's future role in Southeast Asia. 
In this context I think it is complementary if I reveal our ideas and planning on the island of 
Batam. 
Batam Island is twelve miles south of Singapore. The fact that it is sparsely inhabited and, 
therefore, has only minimum infrastructure at the present time will in turn be made into an 
advantage. If you have visited the Gulf Coast of the United States where the first major offshore 
fields were developed commencing in the late 1950's, you will know that the offshore petroleum 
support facilities stretch along a ninety mile area. Huge tracts of land are needed for these 
facilities and this will be the strength of Batam, coupled with its location and close proximity to 
the commercial, communication and transportation facilities of Singapore. Batam is not intended 
as competition to Singapore, but rather as a vast area for the industrial development needed for the 
further growth of petroleum industry in this region. In this regard Batam is complementary to 
Singapore. 
Our eventual goal is to lower the cost of producing petroleum. It is critical for the proper 
exploration and development of oil fields that materials be "on-hand, on-time". In this regard we 
can no longer solely rely on logistics facilities located outside of Southeast Asia. Singapore no 
longer has large amounts of land nor the number of workers which is necessary. Therefore, we 
are proposing Batam as a logistics facility for all of Southeast Asia There will, of course, be 
smaller support bases spread throughout this region, however, none of these bases, for various 
technical and economic reasons, offer the potential for expansion which is presented by Batam. 
The invitation for development of Batam is open to all and we do hope delegates here today will 
be among those participating. 
I point out to the development of Batam only to emphasise that, in order to develop a strong 
Southeast Asia oil industry, which represents an alternative choice for consuming developed 
291 Interview with Abihasan Said, 27 October 1994. On Ministerial and DPR visits see~ 20 October 1973. In 
November 1973, a group of Australian oil consultants visited. Current Affairs Translations, November 1973 
Bulletin. Journalists visited on 11 January 1974. J>ertamina Bulletin, February 1974 (No.2 Vol.ill). On 29 April 
1973 the Ambassadors of Thailand and the Philippines visited. Bulletin Pertam.ina. 1 June 1973 (No.22 Th.IX). 
Singaporean visitors included the chief of police and various secretaries. Bulletin Pertamjna, 1 June 1973 (No.22 
Th.IX). 
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nations, we in this area must develop our own self-sufficiency so that we in tum can contribute 
towards the solution of the world energy problems. 292 
There were good reasons for Ibnu Sutowo to be optimistic about Batam's future. By 
most accounts, the Batam Island project was both impressive and successful. During 
1974, there were five new foreign investors, making a total of twelve, and 14 new 
domestic entrants, making a total of 24. By the end of 1974, there were over 6,000 
workers employed in various capacities, 1,000 of which were foreign workers, mainly 
from Singapore; visitors numbered around 8,000 a year; ships calls numbered over 
2,000 a year; and the value of goods leaving Batam Island's harbours for 1974 had 
reached Rp20.257.875.621,45.293 
The optimism, however, was to be short-lived. By the end of 1975, development of 
Batam Island along the lines outlined in the Masterplan had been more or less 
indefinitely postponed. The origins of the downturn lie in political developments in 
Indonesia during 1974, compounded with external factors and problems unforeseen in 
the Masterplan - worldwide recession and inflation, an energy crisis due to a rise in oil 
prices on the international market and continued controversy over the future of the 
Straits of Malacca - and finally the mounting financial crisis within Pertamina. 
A Dream turns Sour 
Much of Batam Island's growth had up until 1975 been due to the attractiveness of the 
project, the increased importance of the Straits of Malacca as a major international 
shipping lane, the widening search for oil in surrounding waters, as well as rising 
regional and world demand for petroleum products. However, by early 1975, Batam 
Island's development was facing problems. 
There were two main and inter-related reasons, and they were not removed from 
developments at the national level. The first was a direct result of the recession in 
industrialised countries in 1974 and 1975 which resulted in reduced exports of oil and a 
decline in petroleum industry activity. The second was a result of the financial crisis in 
Pertamina. As with many Indonesian government and Pertamina projects at the time, a 
worldwide shortage of credit and skyrocketing capital-goods prices cast considerable 
doubt upon the future of the Batam Island project. 
2921bnu Sutowo ; Indonesia's Experience and Example, (speech at Pacific Basin Energy Conference) Singapore, 
10/12/1974, in Petroleum. News, Vol.5 no.9 1974, pp 16-17. Reports also in Berita Yudha. 12 December 1974 and 
22 January 1975. Pro&res. December 1974. Bulletin Pertamina. 20 December 1974 (No.51 Th.X). Pertamina 
B.ulJ&1in, January 1975 (No.1 Vol.V). See also Ibnu Sutowo ; Strate&i Minyak dan Gas Bumi dan Transfer of 
Iecbnolo&y (Pertamina, Jakarta 1975), especially pp 22-23. 
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The Postponement of the Batam Project 
The first indication that there were problems on Batam Island was the fact that no 
agreement had been reached between the Indonesian government and private investors 
on the building of the oil refinery complex, the key project in the Batam Masterplan. 
The three oil refinery submissions were still under negotiation at the end of 197 4, but 
by the middle of 197 5 it was apparent that plans for the refinery complex had been 
scrapped altogether. 294 
The main reason for the failure of the refinery complex to materialise was a slump in 
the international oil business, combined with waning Japanese interest because of huge 
oil price increases. Japanese domestic consumption of oil had fallen considerably 
following the international ~il price hikes in 1973-1974, and this severely reduced the 
desire of Japanese oil companies to invest overseas. In fact as early as 1973, a Japanese 
government report considered that a petro-chemical industrial centre in Indonesia was 
not a highly profitable undertaking because of the slump in the world petro-chemical 
industry, and that Indonesia could only hope for such an industrial centre to break even 
in the long term. 295 
According to Julias Tahija, Head of Caltex Indonesia which had put forward one of the 
three submissions to build a refinery on Batam, by mid-1974 the Batam Island project 
based on refining Middle-East crude for shipment to Japan was no longer attractive 
because the huge increase in world oil prices placed a premium on crude purchases 
rather than higher-priced refined products. 296 Even Singapore's big refineries were not 
operating at full capacity because of reduced demand for oil. 297 
For Japan, the decision was clear-cut - it had to choose between continuing to import 
crude or to refine and process on Batam Island. The Batam Island oil refineries were to 
process Middle-Eastern crude for export to Japan, which was initially thought feasible 
because of Japan's desire to locate highly pollutant industries in other countries -
Middle-Eastern crude has a high sulphur content as opposed to the low-sulphur 
Indonesian crude which is shipped to Japan for refining. 298 However, the huge increase 
in oil prices, combined with the continuation of a price dispute between Pertamina and 
Saudi Arabian oil suppliers, mean that the Batam refineries were no longer viable, and 
294phyllis Rosendale ; "Survey of Recent Developments' in Bulletin of lruionesian Economic Studies, November 
1974 (Vol.X No.3), p 21. 
295 International Development Centre of Japan ; Study of Economic DeveloJnnent of Indonesia (March l 973), pp 54-
55. 
296~, 23 May 1973. Wayne Robinson ; The Politics of Japanese-Indonesian Ener&y Coqperation. with 
particular reference to the period 1972-76 (PhD Thesis, Monash University 1980), p 328 f.14. 
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Japan switched attention again to securing large quantities of crude oil for refining at 
home.299 
The decision was further augmented by recent accidents involving large tankers in the 
Malacca Straits. 300 Traffic and oil spills in the Malacca Straits had become a real 
problem. With overcrowding in the Straits and the danger the shallow waters posed to 
supertankers, the Indonesian government was campaigning to channel crude oil traffic 
through the Sunda or Lombok Straits. 301 These moves cast serious doubts about Batam 
Island's future for, since Batam Island's refinery complex envisioned the use of 
200,000-ton super-tankers, its operation would be placed in jeopardy if.traffic were 
discouraged in the Malacca Straits. In fact, Nissho-Iwai, the Japanese backers of one of 
the Batam oil refineries, was showing more enthusiasm for plans to build a refinery in 
Palau or on Lombok Island. 302 
With the huge oil price increases of 1974-1975, Japan switched attention again to 
securing large quantities of crude oil for refining at home, and the Japanese submissions 
from Nissho-Iwai and Mitsubishi to build refineries were withdrawn. Unable to 
regulate Japan's economic priorities, Indonesia scrapped plans for the oil refineries on 
Batam. Further, in the wake of the nationalist Malari riots, Indonesia was also less 
interested in the refinery complex because it was mainly to handle Middle-Eastern 
rather than Indonesian crude. Whilst Minister for Mines, Mohammad Sadli, would not 
cancel out the possibility of building an oil refinery on Batam Island, a spokesman for 
Pertamina's Liaison Office in Singapore, Ors Sumarno Dipodisastro, admitted that the 
refinery was, 
... no longer in the picture ... There is now no key project on Batam, and we are not following the 
Masterplan's suggestion that the refinery be the focal point of development. 3'13 
On the industrial estate, the more-than-half-a-dozen foreign companies engaged in oil-
related activities, continued to make good progress. Southeast Asian oil exploration 
299Petroleum News. Vol.6 No.2 1975, p 11. Japan soon switched from Indonesian to Chinese oil - by 1976, only 
43.4% of Indonesian crude exports went to Japan, down from 71.4% in 1973. Wayne Robinson ; "Imperialism, 
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Southeast Asia : Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Chan&e (Routeledge, London 1985), p 208. 
· 300par Eastern Economic Review, 30 May 1975, p 54. 
301 Petroleum News, Vol.6 No.2 1975, p 11. Ibnu Sutowo apparently saw the Lombok proposal as a competing 
alternative to the Batam project. Wayne Robinson ; The Politics of Japaoese-Indonesian Enet&Y Cooperation. with 
particular reference to the period 1972-76 (PhD Thesis, Monash University 1980), p 328 f.14. The Batam project 
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22 November 1975. 
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had been increasing, so demand for offshore steel structures, equipment, supply vessels, 
and other services was enough to ensure continuing business for those already 
established on Batam Island. For example, PT Dresser Magcobar's factory was 
working at full capacity producing oil drilling muds worth around US$5m in 1974, of 
which 80% was delivered to the nearby Java Sea oil fields, while PT McDermott was to 
fill Indonesia's potential market for offshore drilling rigs, estimated to be US$25 
million a year or an annual average of 10 new rigs. 304 
However, the slump in the international oil business did have the effect of scaring off 
any new entrants into the Indonesian oil services sector. Furthermore, as the refinery 
complex had aimed to attract service industries and promote a positive industrial 
climate on the island, many facilities which depended on the refineries were either 
postponed or shelved indefinitely.305 Recently-formed foreign joint ventures, PT Toyo 
Kanetsu, PT Avlau and PT Puma Bina, which had all been granted their licences, 
delayed construction because their investments were designed to support the refinery 
facilities. 306 
The free trade zone, too, had difficulty in attracting foreign or domestic investment at a 
time of worldwide recession. 307 Private sector investment in the free trade zone was 
disappointing. At the end of 1974 there was only a brick factory, run by a domestic 
company, PT Batu Batam Nusantara, which had a capacity of 40,000 bricks a day. 
Aside from some interest shown by Singaporean plywood factories and sawmills, there 
was no further visible development of the zone. 3<11 
A further factor affecting investment on Batam was the domestic political situation in 
Indonesia during and following the Malari riots in January 1974. Directed at 'neo-
colonialism' and foreign exploitation of the Indonesian economy, the assertion of 
nationalist sentiment and interventionist economic strategies resulted in the imposition 
of restrictions on foreign investment. These restrictions had the effect of severely 
reducing the attraction of Indonesia, and Batam, as a location for investment, and 
contributed to a sharp retreat by foreign investors. 
Proximity to Singapore also had an effect on new investment on Batam. Major 
attempts by the Batam authorities to woo foreign investors could have been construed 
304par Eastern Economic Review, 2 May 1975. Petroleum News, Vol.6 No.2 1975, p 11. Batam. Island Investment 
.Qi,ikk, p 130 
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1975. 
88 
as a threat to the Singapore economy, and open rivalry between the two islands would 
have endangered Batam's chances of success because of its heavy reliance on free 
access to Singapore's facilities and markets, particularly the supply of skilled labour and 
raw materials.309 Since Batam Island's success depended, in great part, on Singapore, 
BIDA did not embark on any kind of 'hard sell' campaign to push Batam Island towards 
foreign investors. 
The second major reason for the problems on Batam Island was the financial crisis 
within Pertamina. Pertamina had long been criticised for being a 'state within a state', 
and it soon became apparent that it had been overzealous in its pursuit of development. 
In June 1975, it was officially announced that as of March 1975 Pertamina owed 
US$3. l billion in foreign loans and overdue oil-revenue payments to the government, 
as well as US$113 million overdue to local contractors. The causes and reasons given 
were many - because of bad financial management; because of unfavourable world 
financial and economic conditions; and because of differences in points of view 
between lbnu Sutowo and Indonesia's top technocrats about the best ways to achieve 
development and to control Pertamina - yet essentially the problem stemmed from 
Pertamina's heavy reliance on short-term borrowings to finance long-term projects. 
Pertamina had pursued this policy because of restrictions that in effect forced it to seek 
government, that is the technocrats', approval for long-term loans but seemed to include 
a loophole for short-term borrowings.310 Minister for Mines, Mohammad Sadli, later 
explained the situation to the DPR : 
It is true that the Government knew of, and moreover agreed to, various non-oil ventures being 
carried on by Pertamina. But the agreement of the Government was given to enable the enterprise 
to better carry out its main activities, and the raising of further financial resources was not to be 
allowed to become a strain on the company, let alone on the Government. The Government 
agreed to Pertamina's non-oil development activities so as to take advantage of Pertamina's 
potential and the confidence that is held in Pertamina in the business world - especially the 
business world - in order to attract overseas capital to Indonesia. .. 
However, without the knowledge or agreement of the Government, Pertamina took on large and 
heavy financial commitments to finance business ventures ... the majority of which were not 
economically justifiable nor directly connected with Pertamina's main activities ... 311 
309par Eastern Economic Review, 2 May 1975. Petroleum News, Vol.6 No.2 1975, p 12. See remarks made by 
Abihasan Said in New Nation, 11February1974. 
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Special projects, related or unrelated to petroleum, appear to have been Pertamina's 
nemesis. Whilst it was clear that the initial development of Batam Island was funded 
from income received from the production-sharing agreements, the implementation of 
the Master Plan was to be funded with short-term loans.312 lbnu Sutowo told an 
Indonesian newspaper that the real trouble was the failure of a major long-term loan to 
come through. 
The problem was that in 1974 we made an agreement for a twenty-year loan. The total involved 
was $1.7 billion. We regarded the loan as secured - the loan agreement had already been signed. 
Because the money had to be taken in a lmnp sum - this was part of the agreement - we took steps 
to use the funds to initiate projects, including Krakatau Steel and Batam Island. We obtained 
short-term loans which were essentially bridging finance. Well, the long-term credit did not 
come, and that was the problem. I still don't understand why the loan disappeared, just like 
that313 
It is clear that Batam Island's development was financed through ad hoc short and 
medium term loans, and it was also closely related to the purchase of oil tankers. The 
Batam Island plan was linked to other oil-related facilities in the Indonesian archipelago 
- the Cilicap refinery, Lombok storage facilities and the tankers. The idea was to 
integrate Pertamina's facilities and tanker fleet into the Middle East-Indonesia-Japan oil 
trade, with immense military/strategic and financial implications. Indonesia would 
require Middle Eastern supplies of oil to Indonesia and Japan to ship 50% of oil passing 
through the facilities on Indonesia-flag tankers. Preliminary discussions of the plan had 
been held in 1974-75 by lbnu Sutowo and Mohammad Sadli with Kuwaiti and Japanese 
officials. 314 
Pertamina's financial crisis was to have a massive impact on Batara. Under the 
Masterplan, over half of the total capital outlay would be required in 1975176, and it 
was exactly at this time that Pertamina experienced financial problems. In August 
1975, after several months of reports that the Batam project was being trimmed back, 
BIDA Chief Executive Officer, Abihasan Said, finally admitted to Jakarta journalists 
that there had been a slowdown with some projects because of a lack of funds.315 
Construction of roads, sewerage systems, water reservoir, port facilities and other long-
term facilities/projects outlined in the Masterplan had already been delayed due to 
Pertamina's difficulty in paying contractors.316 When Pertamina Director of Finance, 
312Mara Karma; lbnu Sutowo (PT Gunung Agung, Jakarta 1979), p 255. 
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Haji Taber, finally withheld all funds, Pertamina's operations on Batam, and that of its 
contractors, effectively stopped altogether. 317 
As the Pertamina crisis unfolded, Pertamina officials, under considerable pressure, 
began distancing Pertamina from the Batam Island project. lbnu Sutowo, himself, had 
long tried to explain that Pertamina was not a part of BIDA but merely one of the 
companies which were using Batam as a place for operations. 318 In 1975, Pertamina's 
Liaison Officer in Singapore, Dr Sumarno Dipodisastro, attempted to clarify 
Pertamina's actual role in the development of Batam Island, in effect distancing 
Pertamina from the project, saying that it was not under the ownership and. directorship 
of Pertamina, but was an Indonesian government project.319 It was a difficult argument 
to make. Pertamina was in effect the Batam Authority. BIDA was staffed with 
Pertamina employees and both BIDA and Pertamina were headed by the same person, 
Ibnu Sutowo. 
Against a chorus of critical press comment, Pertamina published an investment guide to 
Batam Island in which the introduction claimed that it was neither a Pertamina project 
nor entirely dependent on Pertamina's financial condition and without government 
support. According to the guide, 
Recently an exaggerated financial problem facing Pertamina, which was cynically reported by 
correspondents who pretended to be authorities on Pertamina or the Batam project, has provided 
strong grounds for those who had already passed their verdict from the start that the Bat.am project 
is amere dream.320 
There were good reasons for being defensive, for as the Pertamina crisis unfolded, 
Pertamina's critics quickly moved onto the offensive. Many questioned whether the 
Batam Island project had gone the way of many a third-world development project -
plagued by inefficiency, bureaucracy, weak infrastructure, and insufficient 
investment. 321 Batam Mayor Usman later reflected that, 
At first, when development began, Batam was like a Cowboy range. No one complied with the 
regulations layed down by the government 322 
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Indeed, some considered that Batam Island had been over-ambitiously extended into a 
demonstration project, accompanied by a massive investment program by Pertamina. 323 
Many of the investments were said to be fronts, to demonstrate support of Pertamina 
and the development of the Indonesian oil industry. Pertamina's Steel Plate Processing 
Plant was apparently built to show evidence of Japanese steel company investment in 
Indonesia, and the operations at Kabil of a foreign joint venture was simply for' 
show.324 The left-wing scholar, Malcolm Caldwell, claimed that, 
The Batam project has been set up as a 'confrontation with industrial giant Singapore', is 
completely focused on foreign trade, and is hardly concerned with national economic 
development 325 
Others criticised the Batam project for its lack of actual development, and for being a 
'playground' for Pertamina. 326 It was certainly well known that Pertamina threw money 
around, what lbnu Sutowo called 'just shooting', and there is no doubt that many of his 
most trusted staff abused his trust. 327 However, whilst it is clear that there were 
favoured clients, and somewhat dubious contracts signed, it is unclear to what extent 
private profiteering was being carried out on Batam Island. 
At the same time, however, there were questions as to whether the government was 
willing to devote substantial funds to the development of a near-barren island when the 
needs of Indonesia as a whole remained so large, for problems did arise from a lack of 
infrastructure and from weak government administration. 328 It can certainly be 
questioned whether BIDA commanded sufficient resources to create the necessary 
infrastructure and attract investment, in addition to overcoming other problems such as 
the great distance from Jakarta and bureaucratic regulations. 329 There is no doubt that 
BIDA experienced trouble in having funds guaranteed and in preparing annual budget 
projections, for funding was provided on an ad hoc basis. 330 
At a local level, the project had made little direct impact on the rest of Riau province, 
and was unlikely to in the near future. 331 The relocation of local people for industrial 
projects posed some problems - in 1974, 2000 hectares of land were appropriated, 
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requiring relocating occupants and providing compensation332 - and there were 
instances of people being driven from their land without adequate compensation to 
make way for Pertamina projects, indicating that the development of Batam Island was 
not all smooth going. 333 
The government finally announced on 25 September 1975 that there had been a 'slow 
down' in the development of Batam Island as a direct result of Pertamina's financial 
difficulties. The DPR-Komisi VI reported that all infrastructure projects had stopped, 
workers retrenched or layed-off, and heavy equipment and machinery abandoned. 334 
By the end of 1975, the development of Batam Island had been more or less indefinitely 
postponed. 335 Minister for Mines, Mohammad Sadli, clarified that the government still 
viewed the project as basically sound, but that the government intended to cut back its 
participation and encourage greater investment by private firms. 
It is clear that Pertamina can now no longer invest the large amount of funds needed to complete 
the [Batam] project, so we shall see to what degree the private sector is able to play a bigger role in 
completing the project.336 
Clearly there were two main and inter-related reasons for the problems on Batam 
Island, and they were not removed from developments at the national level. The first 
was the recession in industrialised countries in 1974 and 1975 which resulted in 
reduced exports of oil and a decline in petroleum industry activity. The second was the 
financial crisis within Pertamina. The days when the government could short-cut the 
development process by loading projects onto Pertamina, which had a reputation for 
getting things done, had come to a close. 
When the Indonesian government began to audit the operations of Pertamina, and 
eventually take over its non-oil activities, the Batam development plan was to come 
under intense scrutiny. Quite clearly more aspects of the ultimate Batam were on 
drawing board than on ground, so it appeared to be a prime candidate for cancellation. 
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The Government takes over the Batam Project 
In June 1975, President Soeharto appointed a committee to look into the financial 
standing and structure of Pertamina, the Bank of Indonesia having already taken over 
management of Pertamina debts when it had failed to make loan payments. Presidential 
Decree No.11 1975 created a technical team to look at Pertamina's non-oil related 
projects, financial affairs, and to re-negotiate contracts. Headed by army generals, Piet 
Haryono and Hasnan Habib, and technocrat, Dr Sumarlin, it began to scrutinise the 
state oil corporation. The committee surveyed all of Pertamina's actions, practices, 
dealings, contracts and finances, and it became clear that the giant company had been 
mismanaged and overexpanded, and from that time on Pertamina activities and projects 
began to be curtailed. 337 The main recommendations of the committee were to create 
two working-groups, one to look at tankers, headed by Radius Prawiro, and the other to 
renegotiate loans, headed by Sumarlin. 338 
The options for all Pertamina non-oil projects under reconsideration were : 
implementation as planned, a reduction in magnitude, reorganisation and modification, 
a slowdown in development, transfer to another agency, or cancellation.339 Under these 
conditions, one could not have been optimistic about the keenness of the government in 
committing itself to the Batam project and Masterplan. The Batam scheme was 
regarded as a prime candidate for cuts in scale, and there was speculation that the role 
of the island would be confined to just a logistic base for oil exploration as was 
originally intended. 340 
Government investigation into the Batam project began in July when the Ministers for 
Defence, Mining, Commerce and State Administration, as well as the DPR Commission 
VI, visited Batam Island.341 Minister of State for Administrative Reforms and Vice-
Chairman of Bappenas, Dr J.B.Sumarlin, was charged with making an inventory of 
developments on Batam Island. He was troubled by the systems of administration and 
accounting used, and the reorganisation of the administrative and financial systems was 
to take some time. 342 Sumarlin's first priority, however, was to re-evaluate the value or 
worth of all projects - finished, half-finished or just begun - and to re-negotiate all of 
Pertamina's contracts. 
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Officials from Jakarta claimed that many of Pertamina's contracts were grossly over-
costed, and sought to re-write or re-negotiate contracts in order to reduce costs. 343 
Contractors, both foreign and domestic, were informed in September 1975 that all 
projects were frozen until investigatory teams had determined which were to be 
continued.344 Most contractors were unenthusiastic with the alternatives - reduce costs 
quoted in contracts, reschedule debts owed to them or have their contracts renewed -
but the offer was not so unreasonable considering many had done well out of Pertamina 
in the past. Sumarlin stressed that many "had greatly profited from their association 
with Pertamina".345 Indeed, it was widely felt in official circles that many of the 
companies had won the contracts as favours, or through other means, such as where 
"contractors were selected before tenders were called and official contract prices 
exaggerated". 346 
Initially, most projects were simply reconsidered or delayed as contracts were 
renegotiated and projects restudied. However, after investigation, several projects were 
cancelled and the rest "continued with modification in design and scope."347 By the 
middle of 197 6, major Singaporean and Indonesian firms responsible on Batam had 
pulled out because of either uncertainty about Batam Island's future or because their 
contracts had been cancelled. Facing a reduction in contract costs of 30%, some 8 
foreign and domestic contractors left Batam Island following the renegotiations. 348 
Major contractors on Batam Island in fact abandoned half-completed turn-key projects, 
leaving behind expensive equipment for scrap. 349 
The major contractor to leave was Robin Lo. It was reported that after rejecting 
Sumarlin's demands to cut his costs by 30%, and then being told his contracts had been 
cancelled, Lo packed up and departed Batam, leaving behind several unfinished 
projects, and taking as much of his equipment from the island as was feasible. 350 One 
family member put it, 
On Bat.am we had a turn-key project, but they ran out of money, so we Ieft.351 
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For instance, Lo had been paid US$3.7m out of US$5.5m to build the Sungai Harapan 
Water Reservoir at Sekupang, but only parts had been finished.352 Lo had also been 
paid US$13.5 million out of an unfinished US$38 million road project.353 Problems 
further compounded when some 1,200 labourers demanded compensation from 
Sumarlin because Lo's work had been stopped. According to Sumarlin, an agreement 
had been reached and it was Lo's business that had not paid the workers.354 Lo was 
estimated to have lost 25% of his fortune in the Pertamina debacle.355 
The Nongsa Beach Hotel, or more specifically its foundations and work site, was 
littered with building materials, abandoned by PT Tongkat Mas.356 Dozens of other 
projects were also cancelled or abandoned such as a Marine Merchant School, and a 
Fishery Research Centre - built by Lo, it was an unused modem laboratory with broken 
doors and windows and missing equipment, vandalised because of lack of BIDA 
personnel for security. 357 Many of the abandoned facilities were hobby activities and 
'playgrounds' of Singapore contractors and others. 358 
lbnu Sutowo's cattle ranch had failed due to several factors - a ban on Indonesian cattle 
in Singapore due to an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in lndonesia359, and because 
overall it was not economically feasible. 360 Cattle lived in pasture prepared especially, 
complemented with imported concentrates, but the pasture was not economical for the 
expected product of meat Consultants to the project had suggested a feedlot, but it 
appears that it was not considered economically feasible, and was not attempted. 
However, it is doubtful whether the project would have ever been a success, even as a 
feedlot. The area was short of fresh water and suitable feed, and lacked personnel 
capable of managing such a large project It appears that ultimately the ranch was a real 
estate speculation, able to shore up at least 350 ha. and eventually the 1500 ha. 
allocated under the Master Plan, because from much of the land residential or 
commercial property could be built that overlooked Singapore. 361 
3520n1y the cofferdam and a temporary treatment plant bad been finished, providing only 2,000 cubic metres a day 
from the planned 7 ,500 cubic metres a day capacity. .K.!muza, 29 January 1977. fm.&rn, February 1977. 
353135 km of road bad been opened up between Sekupang and Batu Ampar, but bad not been asphalted. ~. 
29 January 1977. fm.&rn, February 1977. 
354~, 24September1976. 
3551oai&h1, March 1978, p 11. 
356~, 28 January 1977. New Nation, 1March1977. Straits Tunes, 1September1976. 
357~, 28 January 1977. New Nation, 1March1977. 
358Interview with Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. 
359The writer also claimed incorrectly that grass for the cattle bad proved difficult to grow and bad to be imported 
from Malaysia and Thailand. ImmQ, 13 December 1975. 
360Interview with John Leake, 26 April 1995. The ranch was never to make an impact on Riau's livestock industry. 
Hendra Asmara ; "An economic survey of Riau" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, November 1975 (No.3 
Vol.XI), p 34. 
361 Interview with John Leake, 26 April 1995. 
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The government was not without fault for some of the problems which had beset the 
Batam project The Batam Island Supervisory Board, comprising all Ministers whose 
support was necessary for executing Batam's development program, together with the 
team of assistants, could have strengthened and smoothed the development of Batara 
Island. However, the Supervisory Board had in fact never sat, and even by 1975 the 
teams of assistants promised had not been appointed. 362 Supervision and guidance 
which the Batam Island development perhaps required, and BIDA had expected, from 
the Supervisory Board was never given. 
Perhaps knowing his and Pertamina's own capacity, BIDA's chairman, Ibnu Sutowo, 
had made a serious attempt to speed up the development of some basic infrastructure 
and industrial projects by involving Pertamina more deeply. Certainly, the 
infrastructure and manufacturing plants which were established and financed by 
Pertamina had become a catalyst for the development of Batara Island. As a result, 
however, it was one of the projects which led Pertamina into financial trouble -
Pertamina had spent US$100m on the development of Batam Island.363 
However, by most accounts, Batam Island was already functioning as an important 
logistics base. 364 Despite Pertamina's problems, new investors in the oil sector were 
showing an interest in Batara Island. Pertamina continued to set up several joint 
ventures with foreign companies on Batara, including : United Engineers Ltd and 
Airthrust Pte Ltd of Singapore for service and equipment fabrication in February 
1976365, Avery Laurence Pte Ltd of Singapore for the assembly of drilling and 
processing equipment in March 1976366, and Dresser A.G.Lichtenstein of USA for the 
production of rockbits used in oil and gas exploration and mining in December 1975. 367 
362Editorial staff: The DilemmaofBatamlsland, lpdonesia Oil and Gas, Vol.I No.4, Novem~ 1975, p 9. 
363oPDIPB; Data Kemwuan Pembipgupan Paerah lndustri Pulau Batam sawzai!dsmno bulan Amil 1991 (Jakarta, 
Mei 199I ). Various other figures abounded, but BIDA's official estimate is the most reliable. A figure of US$5-IOm. 
with another US$30m. committed at the end of I974 is given in "The Development ofBatam Island: Current Status 
and Prospects' (mimeo, US Embassy, Jakarta 07/11/I974) in P.A.Wellons ; Borrowing by Developing Countries on 
the Euro-Cumocy MarJret (OECD, Paris I977), p 211. US$2Im is given in Asia Research Bulletip, 28 February 
1974, pp 2457-2458. A US$60 million figure was given in lndopesia Oil and Gas, Vol. I No.4, November 1975, p 9. 
A figure of S$75 million for the period before early I973 was given by New Nation, Il February 1974. A figure of 
US$200m. was given in ,Kwmm, 29 January I977 and~. February I977. The US$372 million figure for the 
period up to I978 came from Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 20 April 1979. A figure of US$107,296,687.71 for the 
period I971-75 was given in PMB-LIPI; Tr&disi dan Potepsi Sosial Ekonomi Masyarakat Riau Ke,pulauan. (Jakarta 
I993), p 27. Other figures provided by BIDA Chief Executive Officer, Soedarsono were more than Rp600 million in 
Komoas, I2 January 198I and Suara Karva, 5 February I98I, and around US$500m. (RP307.5b) before I978 in~ 
Harapap. 20 April I981. 
364us Embassy, Jakarta ; Indonesia's Petroleum Sector (June I976). Ref : Jakarta A-105. I!mmQ, 22 November 
1975. Indopesia: A survey of US business o.pportugities, (US Department of Commerce, May 1977), p 6. 
365united said the project was a base for the companies expansion into Indonesia. Petroleum News, May I976, p6. 
Straits Times, I7 March I976. Bulletip Pertamipa, 5 March I976 (No.10 Th.xII). Singapore Economic Bulletin, 
April I976, p 26. It was to fabricate equipment for the oil refinery but never went ahead because no oil refmery and 
competition. Interview with MC, 10/I I/I994. 
366Bulletip Pertamioa, 5 March I976 (No.IO Th.xII). Singgpore Economic BulJetip, April I976, p 26. 
367Bulletin Pertamipa, I2December1975 (No.50 Th.XI) Pertamioa Bulletin, January I976 (No.I Vol.V) 
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It was clear that Batam had gained a toehold as a logistics base and a transhipment 
point for oil-related projects but that its future rested on private sector investment. 
Meanwhile, debate about the future of the Batam Island project, both public and within 
government circles, raged in Indonesia. The basis and grounds of the arguments for 
and against Batam Island varied from one official to another. Bappenas and other 
economic ministries were reportedly dissatisfied with the project as it currently stood, 
yet it was not clear whether the objection or dissatisfaction lay in the belief that the 
project was based on unsound grounds, or on the organisational structure of the project 
As long as the Batam project was to be carried out by an independent authority free 
from Bappenas's control or supervision, such an uncoordinated project was bound to 
interfere with the implementation of the Repelita. 368 As a result, there were many who 
mistakenly believed that the technocrats tried to cancel the project because it was not in 
the Bappenas plan. 369 When questions about the fate of Batam Island were raised with 
the Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board, Barli Harlim, at a hearing with the 
Commission VI in late 1975, Harlim frankly explained that the BKPM and Bappenas 
had already begun chalking out a plan for Batam Island. 370 
Those at the Ministry of Finance were perhaps more concerned with the source and 
method of financing the Batam Island project than anything else, for an autonomous 
government project to be financed from a non-budgetary source could upset the state 
budget Since Repelita II aimed primarily at raising agricultural output and the standard 
of living of the rural population, the Batam Island project would be of secondary 
importance in terms of financial priority. Minister of Finance, Ali Wardhana, was 
particularly concerned over existing smuggling activities which might be encouraged 
even further by the development of the free trade zone. Others cast doubt about Batam 
because Indonesia had already failed once in the past in trying to develop a free port 
project, on Sabang Island. 371 
One senior official apparently based his doubts on the fact that Batam Island was 
underpopulated, and a lack of manpower on the island would cause the failure of the 
project, a fact that could only be avoided if transmigration was inexpensive, yet 
massive migration accompanied by a crash program of massive education was almost 
impossible. 372 
368Editorial staff: The DilemmaofBatamlsland, Indonesia Oil and Gas, Vol.1 No.4, November 1975, pp 1-2. 
369Interview with DPR member, Jacob Tobing, 11 August 1994. 
370Editorial staff: The Dilemma ofBatam Island, Indonesia Oil aod Gas, Vol.1 No.4, November 1975, pp 1-2. 
371 Editorial staff: TheDilemmaofBatamlsland, ln<fonesia Oil aod Gas, Vol.1 No.4, November 1975, pp 1-2. 
372Editorial staff: The DilemmaofBatamlsland, ln<fonesia Oil and Gas, Vol.1 No.4, November 1975, pp 1-2. 
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Jacob Tobing, Chairman of DPR Commission VI, led a team to Batam in late 1975 and 
was of the opinion that while the idea was right, the waste was not, but that 
development should continue because it was "only natural" .373 In fact most 
government ministers and senior officials were of the opinion that already too much 
had been placed on its success to stop the project. 374 
The Indonesian government was to determine that the development of Batam was a 
project of central importance to the development goals of Indonesia. In the end, 
perhaps, it was President Soeharto who, having supported the project from the 
beginning had much face to lose, ensured the development of Batam Island would 
continue. In mid-1976 the government officially took over the Batam Island project, 
deciding to continue with its development because of its apparent economic feasibility 
and national importance. 
In fact, Soeharto first began exerting his control over the Batam project in late 1975 
when he appointed Air Vice-Marshall Sujatmiko as BIDA Chief Executive Officer on 
Batam Island, although the formal power to make such an appointment was the 
preserve of the Chairman of BIDA, at that time Ibnu Sutowo.375 In November 1975, 
Abihasan Said was transferred from his positions as BIDA Chief Executive Officer, 
Pertamina Liaison Officer in Singapore and Site Manager of Pertamina Batam, and 
returned to the Defence Ministry.376 
It was decided that Pertamina could retain its Steel Plate Processing Plant at Batu 
Ampar, and its logistics base at Sekupang, as they were related to the oil sector, and in 
February 1976 they were transferred to Pertamina Unit VII by the caretaker Site 
Manager of Pertamina Batam, Ramli Bahauddin. All Pertamina foreign joint-ventures, 
projects, buildings, assets and personnel on Batam Island were now the responsibility 
of, and managed by, Pertamina Unit VII. 377 Pertamina's involvement in BIDA, and in 
the non-oil aspects of Batam's development was effectively over. 
3731nterview with Jacob Tobing, 11August1994 . .K'.wlu!ll. 27 September 1975. 
3741nterview with Mohammed Sadli, 22 July 1994. 
375 Sujatmiko was 'dropped in' by Soeharto as the government's representative on Batam Island, replacing Abihasan 
Said in November 1975. Sujatmiko had been a commander under Soeharto in the Irian Jaya and Confrontation 
campaigns. Between 1965-68 he was Airforce Commander of Regional Air Command I in Sumatra and then 
Assistant to the Airforce Chief-of Staff, as Chief of the National Air Defence Command (K.ohanudnas) until his 
appointment to BIDA. Interview with Sujatmiko, 16 August 1994. Sujatmiko had already taken over from lbnu as 
Chairman of Persero Batam in 1974. Interview with Hemomo, 22 August 1994. 
3761nterview with Abihasan Said, 16August1994. Merdeka, 21November1975. Petroleum NeWS, February 1976, 
p 6. Hanum Faeni became Liaison Officer until the office closed on 31August1976. Sin&apore F&onomic Bulletin, 
October 1976, p 47. 
377Bulletin Pertamina. 13 February 1976 (No.7 ThJCII). Bulletin Pertamina. 27 February 1976 (No.9 Th.XII). 
Pertamina Bulletin, March 1976 (No.3 Vol.5). Interview with Piet Haryono, 8 August 1994. 
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Ibnu Sutowo was released as Chairman of BIDA following his dismissal as President-
Director of Pertamina on 4 March 1976.378 In July 1976, Prof Dr. J. B. Sumarlin was 
appointed Chairman of BIDA, while Major-General Hernomo retained his position as 
BIDA Vice-Chairman. Batam Island had essentially and effectively been disengaged 
from its origins and association with Pertamina, and embarked on a very different path 
of development under the technocrats. 
Though the Pertamina crisis proved to be a drain on the government's finances, it 
provided the Ministry of Finance and technocratic government planners with the 
opportunity to exercise greater control over the state oil enterprise. The technocrats 
were glad to have a chance to put Pertamina under control and bring its problems out 
into the open. They confined the company to the petroleum and gas business, divesting 
it of all non-oil enterprises. The technocrats' handling of the Pertamina crisis reinforced 
their already strong international reputation and placed them in an enhanced position of 
power within the Indonesian government. 
Like many of Pertamina's non-oil activities, the Batam Island project was a prime 
candidate for cancellation, but because of the President's own support for the project, as 
well as the technocrats' belief that it could be beneficial for Indonesia, it was decided to 
proceed with the development. 
Policy-making 
Policy-making on Batam during the period 1968-1976 exhibited several of the major 
features of New Order politics - Presidential Domination, Clientelism and Intra-Elite 
politicking. As expected, societal input was weak, if not non-existent, while external 
influences were clearly apparent. There were several obvious reasons for this. Firstly, 
Batam Island was administered directly from Jakarta, and therefore the main features of 
policy-making reflected those existing at the centre. Secondly, Batam Island was a 
Pertamina development and took on many of the features of its organisational, 
administrative and business style. Thirdly, Batam held strategic importance for 
Singapore and Japan. 
At the apex of the policy-making structure for Batam Island was Soeharto. The Batam 
project could not have gone ahead without his consent, and whilst his influence was not 
obvious on a daily basis, he remained the key power-broker. It was Soeharto who was 
able to convince Singaporean Prime-Minister Lee Kuan Yew that Batam did not 
constitute an immediate threat to Singapore. It was Soeharto who intervened when 
3781n March 1976 lbnu issued two Surat Keputusan about land on Batam Island (Surat Keputusan 
No.111/Kpts/K/OPDIPB/1976), probably his last actions as Chairman ofBIDA. 
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conflict broke out between Ibnu Sutowo and the technocrats over the Masterplan, 
particularly the US$372m price tag. It was also Soeharto who left the major daily 
decision-making processes to Ibnu Sutowo, although he placed Hernomo in a position 
to exert some influence on his behalf where necessary. Soeharto, however, left most of 
the decisions to Ibnu Sutowo, giving Ibnu almost complete freedom. 379 
With a mandate from Soeharto, Ibnu Sutowo had complete control over the Batam 
Island project. Any legislative needs were simply passed on to Soeharto in final draft 
form for immediate consent, whilst choice of development plan, and of types of 
investment, were the sole prerogative of Ibnu, at least initially. Most importantly, 
however, Ibnu Sutowo controlled all Pertamina contracts on Batam Island. 
The rise of many pribumi businessmen was directly attributable to successful access to 
Pertamina contracts.380 Ibnu Sutowo made contracts, mainly for construction and light 
engineering, available to domestic companies entering the oil service sector, resulting in 
dozens of privately-held Indonesian companies being dependent on Pertamina for most 
or all of their contracts, the majority of them construction firms. A number of 
Pertamina contracts on Batam Island, mainly for non-oil-specific construction, were 
awarded to pribumi businessmen, including Ibnu's assistants. Others went to his foreign 
associates, Robin Lo and Tong Djoe. 
Ibnu Sutowo, and family members, also owned a number of enterprises on Batam 
Island. There is no doubt that Ibnu often exploited opportunities for making private 
investments.381 As Robison noted, the boundaries between Ibnu's public and private 
empires were often blurred - his partners and clients in private business included 
employees, contractors and business partners of Pertamina. 382 Ibnu Sutowo admitted, 
"I personally stay out of anything connected with oil. But people are happy to deal with 
me because they know who I am." 383 As a result the stable of private companies owned 
by the Sutowo family grew, to the extent that Ibnu Sutowo headed the largest private 
indigenous business group in Indonesia, as well as on Batam. 
3791nterestingly, Soeharto does not appear to have taken interest in the sources of financial patronage open to him on 
Batam Island, although there is evidence to suggest that the activities of Ibrahim Adjie and Bob Hasan were owed 
something to Soeharto. 
380When oil exploration began all oil service companies operating in Indonesia were foreign owned and managed, 
and it was not until the early and mid-1970s that Indonesian companies began moving into the services sector. 
Pertamina was an important factor in the emergence of a domestic capitalist class because it was a major source of 
contracts for supply and construction, and generated a variety of manufacturing and service industries. It should be 
noted that lbnu's promotion of Indonesian participation in the oil service market stopped short of direct intervention 
in foreign contractor's choices of suppliers of oil services. Jean Bush Aden ; "Entrepreneurship and Protection in the 
Indonesian Oil Industry" in Ruth McVey (ed) Southeast Asian Capitalists (Cornell University, New York 1992), pp 
89-93. 
381 Jean Aden Bush; Oil and Politics in Indonesia. 1945 to 1980 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), p 406. 
382Richard Robison; Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986), p350. 
383'.l.:ilm., 31August1970. 
101 
Apart from Soeharto and Ibnu Sutowo, the only remaining influence on the policy-
making processes on Batam were the technocrats. Whilst the technocrats generally had 
little influence where lbnu Sutowo, Pertamina and the oil industry was concerned, they 
were aware of Ibnu's ability to attract foreign investment, and on Batam he had been 
able to do so with relative success. The technocrats did, however, make their concerns 
with the Batam Island project known, conflict finally coming to a head with lbnu over 
the cost of the Masterplan. In most respects, however, the influence of the technocrats 
remained limited until 1976 when they were handed the project by Soeharto, and placed 
their stamp clearly on the project. 
Societal influence on the Batam project remained weak, if not non-existent. The reason 
was simple. Batam Island was isolated from mainstream Indonesian society. The local 
population was small and politically marginal and lacked mechanisms for influencing 
Pertamina or the Indonesian government. Even the Riau provincial government was 
weak in the face of Pertamina and the national government. 384 The DPR, members of 
which made several visits to Batam, generally supported the project. But even at the 
height of the Pertamina crisis its influence was limited. Business associations 
concerned with Batam were non-existent, and where business had influence it was 
through clientelistic channels. 
One major feature of Indonesian political-economy was starkly absent, that of ABRI. 
As the most powerful New Order institution, ABRI permeated Indonesian politics, 
society and economy. Whilst there is no doubt that the military leadership supported 
the Batam project because of security concerns with all border areas of Indonesia, direct 
ABRI influence conspicuously stopped there.385 
ABRI were also noticeably absent from economic developments on Batam. New 
business opportunities generated by the influx of foreign investors and foreign capital 
were exploited elsewhere in Indonesia by those with political influence, particularly 
those of the military elite and their civilian associates. As Crouch has noted, the private 
business opportunities of military men had expanded in association with the inrush of 
foreign corporations and the government's encouragement of private business activities 
created conditions in which military-backed enterprises prospered, especially in the oil 
industry. 386 Military-sponsored enterprises were frequently given favoured treatment 
by army officers occupying key positions in the bureaucracy, most often when seeking 
384 As Bresnan noted, it is known that Ibnu Sutowo helped provincial governors with projects that were locally 
significant, most likely in order to placate local concerns over loss of influence. It is likely that he also helped them 
personally. John Bresnan; Mana&ing Indonesia: The Modem Political Economy (Colombia University Press, New 
York 1993), p 185. 
385 ABRI personnel, if indeed there were any based on Batam, remained confined to the naval base at Tanjung Uban 
on Bintan Island, adjacent to Batam. 
386Harold Crouch ; The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Cornell University Press 1978), p 329. 
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licenses, credits and contracts. Military officers were well placed to benefit and, in 
association with Chinese businessmen and foreign investors, they increasingly 
dominated commercial life. 387 
The oil sector was a major source of finance for the armed forces, ie. as an independent 
source of funds. 388 It was widely reported that funds were made available by lbnu 
Sutowo to high officials which they could draw on at their discretion and that Pertamina 
also provided funds to the Indonesian military.389 There is certainly a strong possibility 
that the close relationship between ABRI and Pertamina extended to Batam Island. It 
was suggested that the placement of Hernomo, former KOSTRAD Chief-of-Staff, as 
BIDA Vice-Chairman indicated that Batam Island was just another 'well' for the 
army.390 Yet because developments on Batam were so dominated by Pertamina, 
private-sector investments whether military-backed or not were few, and this is perhaps 
the reason behind the absence of ABRI influence on Batam. 
External variables were to play an important part on the policy choices facing Ibnu 
Sutowo and the Indonesian government on Batam Island. Whilst improved domestic 
conditions in the late 1960s were important in attracting investors, favourable 
international conditions, especially for the oil sector made investment in the Indonesian 
oil industry attractive. Under those conditions, the development of the oil services and 
logistics base on Batam was a viable, if not attractive, proposition. In the same way, 
however, it was unfavourable international economic conditions - a recession and 
decreased demand for oil in 1974/1975 - which partly turned Pertamina's plans for 
Batam Island on its head. 
Foreign capital played an important part initially, for there is no doubt that the origins 
of the development of Batam lie in Ingram's choice of Batam for its logistics base, and 
that this decision was crucial to Pertamina's entry to the island. Furthermore, the need 
to meet investor conditions in order to attract and maintain foreign investment on 
Batam meant that foreign capital had an important influence on the policy processes. 
However, the role played by foreign capital was not as negative as dependency theorists 
387 Harold Crouch ; The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Cornell University Press 1978), p 274-5. 
388 Hamish McDonald ; Soeharto's Indonesia (Fontana, Melbourne 1980), p 115. It was generally accepted that only 
40-50% of the military's real expenditure came from official budgetary allocations, and that the shortfall was met 
through a variety of means such as military-controlled state corporations, Pertamina and military-owned private 
companies. Far Eastern F&onomic Review, 8 February 1980. 
389Peter Mccawley ; "Some consequences of the Pertamina Crisis in Indonesia" , Journal of Southeast Asian 
.s.tml.ies.. March 1978 (No.1 Vol.IX), p 2. Funding of top army officers was said to continue into the early 1970s. 
Jean Bush Aden; Oil and Politics in Indonesia. 1945 to 1980 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), p 415. 
390us Embassy Translation Unit Press Review, 9 January 1973. Hernomo held a 10% share in PI Dharma Rimba 
Kencana, a company associated with Kostrad and overseen by the Y asayan Dharma Putra Group. lll:if'.I No.154-
1972. Richard Robison; CIQ2italism and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia. 1965-1975 (PhD Thesis, University of 
Sydney 1977), Appendix B, p xv. 
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argued at the time, for Pertamina's insistence on joint-ventures with foreign investors, 
even before the post-Malari investment regime, gave Pertamina the upper-hand. 
Ibnu Sutowo virtually underwrote the growth of the Indonesian oil services sector by 
setting up partnerships between Pertamina and foreign producers for exploration and 
production equipment. Would-be investors wanting an inside track on contracts with 
Pertamina and off shore oil companies, or political access/protection, thronged to Ibnu 
Sutowo with offers of joint ventures.39l As one report stated, "So many foreigners are 
following the Pertamina route [to joint ventures] that the company's waiting room has 
taken on the air of a mini United Nations."392 Ibnu guaranteed minimal Indonesian 
interference in foreign contractors activities as an essential term of their entry into 
Indonesia - such as virtually unrestricted personnel movements, and freedom from 
import duties or Indonesian corporate taxes393 - whilst most of these joint-ventures 
were protected from outside competition. 394 A joint-venture with Pertamina, especially 
on Batam Island, provided protection for a foreign investor. 
On Batam Island, Pertamina-affiliated companies received preferential access to 
financing and to Pertamina contracts and made them formidable rivals for other 
Indonesian and foreign entrants into the oil servicing and supply industry.395 A joint-
venture with Pertamina was often part of the price of admission to Indonesia, especially 
after 1972396, and many were encouraged to set up on Batam Island. In the year to June 
1974, 16 joint-ventures were formed, making a total of 29, a quarter of which were with 
foreign companies on Batam Island. 397 
Foreign governments also had influence on the Batam Island policy processes. In fact, 
it is quite likely that the Batam Masterplan had its origins in Japanese government 
concerns to secure an oil-tanker route through the Straits of Malacca, combined with a 
desire to invest in Indonesia's oil industry. If Japan was not the instigator, it was 
certainly an important influence on policy, and this was demonstrated in the Masterplan 
391 Retiring Pertamina officials were frequently given positions in these largely foreign-managed companies. Jean 
Aden Bush; Oil and Politics in Indonesia. 1945 to 1980 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), p 412. For example, 
Dr Sanger was the first President-Director of PT Toyo Kanetsu Indonesia. Builetin Pertamjna, April 1975 (No.4 
Th.N). eurrent Affairs Translations, November 197 4 Bulletin. 
392us Embassy, Jakarta; Indonesia Pelroleum Rem (July 1974). Ref: Jakarta A-108. 
393 Jean Bush Aden ; "Entrepreneurship and Protection in the Indonesian Oil Industry" in Ruth McVey (ed) 
Southeast Asian CAPitaljsts (Cornell University, New York 1992), p94. 
394From 1972 Pertamina and foreign oil contractors had been required to choose subcontractors from among those 
oil service companies registered with the Directorate of Oil and Gas, and beginning 1974 designated oil service 
subsectors were declared closed to companies not already registered with the Directorate, although this ruling did not 
cover domestic companies. Jean Bush Aden ; "Entrepreneurship and Protection in the Indonesian Oil Industry" in 
Ruth McVey (ed) Southeast Asjan Capitaljsts (Cornell University, New York 1992), p93. 
395 Jean Bush Aden ; Oil and Politics in Indonesia. 1945 to 1980 (PhD Thesis, Cornell University 1988), p 409. 
396 Jean Bush Aden ; "Entrepreneurship and Protection in the Indonesian Oil Industry" in Ruth McVey (ed) 
Southeast Asian Capitalists (Cornell University, New York 1992), p92. 
397us Embassy, Jakarta; Indonesia Petroleum Re,wrt (July 1974). Ref: Jak:artaA-108. 
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itself which contained several features of primary interest to Japan. Furthermore, when 
Japanese interest in Batam Island declined, several key elements of the Masterplan were 
laid to rest, clearly illustrating the linkage. 
In particular, geographic proximity made Singapore a serious consideration in the 
minds of Indonesia's policy makers, but it also created the dilemma of whether to 
compete with or complement Singapore. At the same time as Pertamina and nationalist 
elements had the aim of competing with Singapore, the Indonesian government needed 
to allay Singaporean concerns that this was the case. Batam was a topic of discussion 
between Soeharto and the incoming inaugural Singaporean ambassador to Indonesia at 
their first meeting in 1970, and remained on the agenda in all subsequent diplomatic 
discussions, including meetings with Lee Kuan Yew. If not a direct influence, 
Singapore indirectly influenced Indonesian policy-makers, and that influence has since 
remained with the Batam project. 
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4 
The Technocrat Period 
When technocrat, Dr J.B. Sumarlin took charge of the Batam Island project in mid-
1976, he immediately set about restoring investor confidence and reorganising the 
administrative and organisational structure of BIDA. Sumarlin, with the support of 
several other technocrats, then set about changing the nature of the Batam project as a 
whole, introducing regulatory reforms that reoriented development towards 
complementing Singapore. 
In late-1978, responsibility for Batam was handed to Dr B. J. Habibie, who pursued the 
completion of the technocrat's complementary approach to Singapore. This culminated 
in an agreement between the two countries to cooperate in the development of the 
island. 
The Technocratic Blueprint for Batam 's Development 
In a meeting on 23 September 1976, following discussions with the two most senior 
technocrats - Minister for Finance, Ali W ardhana, and Minister for Economic 
Coordination, Widjojo - President Soeharto told BIDA officials, Sumarlin, Hemomo 
and Sujatmiko that the Batam project, having been reconsidered and reprioritised, 
would be re-started. 1 In a significant move, aimed at raising investor confidence, 
Widjojo joined BIDA Chairman Sumarlin in announcing President Soeharto's 
decision.2 
Widjojo outlined the four main priorities for Batam Island's development - as a 
transhipment centre; a centre for marshalling; a centre for the manufacture of exports; 
and as an industrial area. 3 This broadening of the scope of development took into 
account the contraction of the oil services sector in the late 1970s, and the doubtful 
prospect of an oil refinery being built on Batam, and significantly changed the focus of 
development towards becoming an industrial zone for the relocation of Singaporean 
lcurrent Affairs Translations, September 1976 Bulletin. Interview with former BIDA Vice-Chairman, Hernomo, 22 
August 1994. For doubts about the feasibility of the Batam project see the Editorial in Sinar Harapan, 2 September 
1976. 
2~, 24September1976. 
3~, 24 September 1976. Sumarlin also mentioned these four priorities. fJ.:s2ml,, December 1976. ,Kwmu, 5 
May 1977. 
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industries. 4 The decision was to be a significant victory for the technocrats; who had 
long argued that the development of Batam should be focused on complementary 
activities with Singapore. 5 
Sumarlin announced that the renegotiation of Pertamina's contracts had been 
completed, and that several important infrastructure projects had been prioritised for 
completion - the Sekupang harbour for transhipment, the Batu Ampar harbour for 
bonded warehouse and industrial needs, and building and maintenance of roads and 
water and electricity supply facilities. 6 
Sumarlin also announced that there would be a revamp of BIDA's organisational and 
administrative structures.7 BIDA's main tasks were to coordinate current contracts, 
assess investment applications, maintain and secure investor facilities and general 
infrastructure, make further studies, provide information and market Batam Island to 
potential investors. 8 
Most importantly, Sumarlin announced Cabinet approval of budgetary funds for the 
development of Batam. It was reported that BIDA's initial budget was US$200m, but 
no time frame was given, and the actual amount of government investment realised in 
the period 1976-1978 amounted to only US$8m.9 Significantly, however, it marked the 
beginning of the development of Batam being funded from the national budge~ With 
the budget allocation and the announcement of several infrastructure projects, BIDA 
was now able to begin making new efforts to lure foreign investment to Batam. 
President Soeharto, together with several senior Ministers, inspected Batam Island on 
29-30 November 1976, for the purpose of reaffirming the development of Batam and to 
restore investor confidence in the project. 10 When receiving foreign and domestic 
investors, Soeharto said that the government was committed to the development of 
Batam Island, and promised administrative liberalisation and the provision of physical 
4New Natiop, 1March1977. Interview with former Pertamina Liaison Officer in Singapore, Sumamo Dipodisastro, 
31 August 1994. Interview with former BIDA Chief Executive, Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. 
5Interview with former minister, Emil Salim, 18 August 1994. 
6~, 24 September 1976. Konu;ias, 29 January 1977. 
1~, 24 September 1976. It also marked the beginning of a switch-over period whereby many of Pertamina 
employees working for BIDA returned to Pertamina. Several did decide to stay. Interview with Sujatmiko, 24 
August 1994. 
81nterview with Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. 
9BIDA; Data Kemajuan Pembangunan Daerah lndustri Pulau Batam sampai/dengan bulan April 1991 (Jakarta 
1991). According to BIDA officials, the budget was very small and constraining. Interview with Sujatmiko, 24 
August 1994. At the announcement Sumarlin refused to state how much had been approved. Konu;ias, 24 September 
1976. It was later reported to be an initial U8.$200m. The Sunday Twes, 10 October 1976. Another source put the 
realised budget at Rp10.8b for 1975-1978. Sinar Harapan, 28 December 1983. 
lOJnterview with Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. Those observing included Riau Governor Arifin Achmad, Pertamina 
President-Director Piet Haryono and Ministers Emil Salim and Widjojo Nitisastro. f.mal:a, February 1977. B.Y1laiD 
Pertamiua. 24 December 1976 (No.52 Th.XU). Pertamina Bulletin, January 1977 (No.1 Vol.VI). 
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infrastructure. He added that the government realised that there were deficiencies, 
especially in the administrative field which had most concerned investors, but that the 
government was looking into those problems. I I 
Many companies, foreign and domestic, had been waiting for an announcement from 
the Indonesian government that it was committed to developing Batam Island, that a 
budget had been allocated and that infrastructure work would continue. With those 
conditions met, investor interest in Batam was able to be maintained.12 It did not, 
however, lead to new investments, but to satisfying the needs of existing investors. 
From time to time, Batam was rocked by rumours of massive new investments or a 
rapid pick-up in activity. For instance, it was reported at the end of 1976 that the 
Japanese government had ._nade a loan of US$340m for new projects on Batam, but 
there is no evidence that it eventuated.13 There were rumours that a 3,000 ha site was 
even allotted for a proposed University of ASEAN, where students from all ASEAN 
member-states could study together.14 However, there was little new investor activity 
over this period, and Sumarlin's main aim was to consolidate existing development and 
prepare Batam for the medium-term. 
A New Masterplan 
The downturn in the international oil market meant that a reconsideration of 
development on Batam was necessary, for economic conditions in the late 1970s were 
very different from those when Pertamina's Masterplan was originally conceived. 
Sumarlin realised that much of the commercial and industrial activity envisaged in that 
plan was either no longer applicable or too ambitious and, beginning 1976, started a 
review of developments on Batam Island which was to result in the formulation of a 
new development program and Masterplan. 
llfJ:sl&m, December 1976. K!mwal. 31January1977. Suara Pembaruan, 23 October 1987. 
12StraitsTimes, 1September1976. New Nation, 1March1977. 
13straits Times, 30 November 1976. Straits Times, 12 March 1979. It was reported in September 1977 that BIDA 
had approved a series of development projects worth S$350m. and it was announced that skilled workers from 
Singapore were to be recruited to construct and supervise them. The projects included: a $187.Sm holiday resort on 
lOOha. with a 200 room hotel, golf course, swimming pool, theatre and chalets and facilities for fishing and dog 
racing, catering for Singaporean and foreign tourists coming to Indonesia; a $62.Sm dry-dock able to repair ships 
ranging from 10,000 to 60,000 tonnes; a $37 .Sm abattoir, cattle farm, cold storage and ice factory complex geared for 
the export market; a $37.Sm wood processing plant; a $12.Sm supermarket; and a $12.Sm pipe factory. Two 
Singapore firms, Unitech International and Trans Asia Consultants were reported to have been appointed consultants 
for the projects, said to be joint ventures between Malaysian and Indonesian business interests. Sing~ Economic 
~.October 1977, p 32. Straits Times, 15September1977. There is no evidence tO suggest the realisation of 
any of these projects. 
l 4Planned by Persada (Association of former Indonesian students in Japan), it was never able to secure funding from 
Japan. Singapore Economic Bulletin, May 1977, p 23. 
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The first review was a feasibility study carried out in 1977 by the Crux consulting 
group, apparently at the behest of the World Bafilc.15 The Crux report considered the 
decline in petroleum industry activity, and taking account of existing infrastructure, 
prevailing investor conditions and overall potential, provided guidelines for short-term 
but broad-based development of Batam, embracing a wider vision of future growth 
areas and opportunities. The Crux report suggested an immediate development 
program and recommended further studies to be made. Calling for a new Masterplan it 
concluded that Batam Island represented an excellent opportunity for development.16 
The report was received favourably. Batam Island's problem was clear; it depended 
entirely on the state of the regional oil industry which was in recession in the late 
1970s. It was obvious that Batam Island's overall development strategy, which hitherto 
had been based on the oil and gas exploration industries and downstream energy 
product processing, needed both a change in focus and a new master plan to take 
account of post-Pertamina developments. Considering the changes, a new Masterplan 
was developed, based on a review, evaluation and redrafting of all previous planning 
studies - the 1972 Masterplan, the Crux Report, and various sectoral studies - and 
carried out by a team made up from BIDA, and the Directorates for Urban Planning, 
and Building and Construction from the Department of Public Works. Completed in 
April 1979, the Masterplan was fairly comprehensive, establishing a framework for 
growth and development up to the year 2004, when Batam Island would have a 
projected population of 700,000.17 Reviewed every five years, it remains the guiding 
blueprint for development on Batam Island.18 
The Masterplan covered the development of transhipment facilities, the establishment 
of industrial areas, the development of marshalling areas for the import and export of 
goods, the construction of tourism facilities and the provision of support infrastructure 
such as housing, offices, shopping centres and cultural facilities. The integrated 
development and zonal plan set out in detail the allocation of land for industrial, 
commercial and agricultural use, dividing the island into several major development 
areas, each emphasising particular roles, infrastructure requirements, and priority 
industries and sectors. Its principal objective was to develop the island in an orderly yet 
rapid fashion as a major industrial, commercial and tourism centre in lndonesia. 19 
15rar Eastern f&onomic Reyiew, 20 April 1979. 
16nie report was later criticised for not giving a clear picture of developments on Batam because it relied on 21 case-
studies of businesses either operating on Batam Island or interested in doing so, and lacked a macro-econolI)ic 
approach. BIDA ; 1986 R!Q)011. 
17oPDIPB; Repcana Keraneka Dasar. Tata Ruan& Pen&emban&an Daerab lndustri Pulau Batam (Jakarta, 1979). 
Details can also be found in BIDA; The Batam Develogment Prowm (Jakarta, 1980). 
l81nterview with BIDA Executive, Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
19For details of the plan and land use allocation projections, see BIDA ; The Batam DeyelQgmept ProJRlD (Jakarta, 
1980), pp 17-25. 
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The major recommendations of the Masterplan were : that services for investors be 
orderly, quick and efficient; that incentives and concessions be made for investors; that 
development play a complementary role to Singapore; that private sector involvement, 
both foreign and domestic, was crucial to Batam Island's future success; and that 
because of limited government funds, infrastructure development must be strategically 
targeted. 20 The Masterplan still considered that oil prospects were bright for Indonesia, / 
and that Batam Island could continue to be an attractive location for oil-related 
industries. 21 In addition to the Masterplan, short-term guidelines for development were 
offered based on coming five-year needs, and emphasising basic equipment in the first 
phase - BIDA would concentrate on roads, communications, transport, power and water 
supplies. 22 
Regulatory Reform 
With room to manoeuvre, the technocrats introduced a host of new regulations for 
Batam Island. The aim of each new regulatory reform was to encourage Batam's 
development by stimulating private sector involvement, and by aligning the regulatory 
environment to that of Singapore. Everything that Batam Island required to attract 
investment was provided - lower land prices and harbour tariffs than Singapore, new 
facilities and incentives for investors, and the bolstering of BIDA by giving it control 
over land allocations, investment applications and other areas usually the preserve of 
central government departments. 23 
As Minister for Regulatory Reform, Sumarlin coordinated all activities related to the 
creation of the efficient functioning of the government apparatus. The role was similar 
on Batam where Sumarlin aimed to create a single management for the island. As a 
result, administrative and regulatory reforms provided new guidelines for BIDA on 
land, ports, and investment, and for the execution of policies for the fostering and 
control of the development of Batam Island. 24 
Considering that Batam was surrounded by sea, BIDA was given the right to build and 
control all harbours on Batam Island. 2S The decision placed the harbours of Sekupang, 
Batu Ampar, Kabil and Nongsa under the control of BIDA, with the aim of increasing 
20oPDIPB; Rencana Keraneka Dyar. Tata Ruane Peneembanun Daerab lndustri Pulau Batam (Jakarta, 1979), pp 
6, 8, 20, 65-66. 
21oPDIPB ; Rencana Keraneka Dyar. Tata Ruane Peneemhanean Daerab lndustri Pulau Batam. (Jakarta, 1979), p 3. 
22For details of Stage 1 of the development program. 1979-1984 see, BIDA: The Batam Develownent Prouam. 
(Jakarta, 1980), pp 27-31. 
23interview with Hemomo, 22 August 1994. 
24.emma. Desember 1976. 
251nterview with Emil Salim, 18 August 1994. Whilst BIDA was to build the harbours, the Department of 
Communications retained limited control over them, but all harbour tariffs were to be set by BIDA. Interview with 
Hernomo, 22 August 1994. 
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foreign trade and expediting transhipment activities in line with a national program for 
developing ports and commercial traffic. 26 
BIDA was assigned the right of management (hale pengelolaan) over all land on Batam 
Island, giving BIDA the right to plan land use, utilise land, and assign the right of 
building (hale guna bangunan) and the right of use (hale palcai) to third parties. BIDA 
was also entitled to the receipt of income from all land rates and rentals. 27 
With the aim of creating a one-stop service for investors, investment application 
procedures were also improved to facilitate and accelerate investment and BIDA was 
given full authority to handle and evaluate investment applications for the Batam Island 
bonded area. 28 
Organisational changes were also made to the structure of the Batam Island Supervisory 
Board in order to increase and improve government coordination, integration and 
synchronisation in developing Batam Island. 29 
The most important change was the decision to declare all of Batam Island a bonded 
zone, with the aim of encouraging the development of export-oriented industries and 
facilitating the importation of materials required by manufacturing industries located on 
the island. The regulation effectively meant that imports into Batam Island were free of 
all duties and tariffs, bringing Batam into line with Singapore's free port status. 30 The 
26surat Ke,putusap Bersama Menteri PerdHM&M· Menteri Keuaoeao & Menteri Perhubunean No l49!KpbN01. 
150/KMK/1977 KM 119/0/Phb-77 (24 May 1977). It amended an earlier joint ministerial decree which bad 
specified the coordinates of Batam Island's harbours which bad been designated for Pertamina's logistics base on 
Batam Island in order to facilitate the loading and unloading of goods/equipment needed for oil activities. Sil:ll 
Kcputusap Bersama Menteri Per<iaeao&ao· Meuteri Keuaoeao & Menteri Pedlubuneao No.79JKPB/IVlZ6. KEP: 
481/MK/4/1976. 171/0/PHB-76 (23 April 1976). An earlier decision gave pennission to Pertamina to build and own 
the harbours of Sekupang, Batu Ampar, Kabil and Nongsa for the purpose of facilitating the loading and unloading of 
goods/materials needed for activities connected with offshore oil and gas exploration as a logistics base for 
Pertamina. Surat Kcputusao Menteri Perhubuneao No KM 155/Q/Phb-76 (9 April 1976). 
27The decision was a follow up to provisions stipulated in Kepres No.41 1973 that land use patterns must be carried 
out according to the Master Plan, which was the basis for the administration and management of the land area. In 
addition, it stipulates the payment of compensation for land, buildings and crops acquired as well as resettlement for 
those affected. Included in the decree was the right of control of land on the five sUITOunding islands of Janda Berias, 
Tanjung Sau, Ngenang, Kasem and Moimoi. Surat Keputusap Menteri Da}am Neeeri No.43 (18 February 1977). 
The right of exploitation (bak guna usaba) could not be granted. Hak guna bangunan in Batam is granted for 30 
years, and can be extended for anther 20 years, after which the cycle can be repeated. This right is given to joint-
venture companies. Hak pakai is granted for 10 years and can be renewed for further 10 year periods provided the 
use of land bas not changed. This right is given to foreigners domiciled in Indonesia. KPMG ; Inves1ment in Batam, 
(Singapore, 1993). For full details of the land use system see Prof.A.P.Parlindungan; Hak: Peneelolaap Menwut 
Sistem UUPA (Penerbit Mandar Maju, Bandung 1989), pp 61-83. 
28surat Keputusan Ketua BKPM No.111978 (7 February 1978). It replaced earlier decisions giving BIDA authority 
for preliminary approval over investment applications. Surat Keputusao Ketua BKPM No.10/1/SKIBl{PM/Ill/1977 
& Surat Kimutusao Ketua BKPM No.1/1977. 
29 Altering Kepres No.4111973 it added 4 new members to the Supervisory Board - Ministers for Mines and Energy, 
Public Works and Environment, and President-Director of Pertamina. Keputusap Presic1en No.45/1978 (18 
December 1978). 
30Keputusan Presiden No.4111978 (24 November 1978). 
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government also decided to exempt goods exported through bonded warehouses on 
Batam Island from export duty in order to boost exports.31 Special provisions also 
allowed usually prohibited imported goods to be brought in to Batam if they were for 
processing or re-export. 32 
Not all, however, were to be forthcoming in supporting the new regulatory measures for 
Batam Island. In fact, the President took all senior ministers to Batam Island at the end 
of 1976 and instructed them to support its development, following complaints by BIDA 
Vice-Chairman Hernomo that he was having difficulty coordinating the various 
departments and ministries in preparing the new regulations for Batam Island. 33 The 
move apparently worked, as evidenced by the long series of regulations issued during 
1977-78. 
Whilst the Batam Island Supervisory Board was supposed to support BIDA in the field 
of policy-making, Hernomo found it easier to go straight to the minister directly 
involved for a policy or regulation. The three ministries most often involved were 
those of communications, trade and finance, headed respectively by technocrats Emil 
Salim, Radius Prawiro and Ali Wardhana. Where a reform involved more than one 
minister, and coordination was poor - as one minister would agree and the other not -
Hernomo directly approached the President for a decision. For instance, the Bonded 
Zone ruling in 1978 was intended to be a joint-ministerial decree but as Ali Wardhana 
refused to sign because of long-held concerns with smuggling, Soeharto issued a 
Presidential Decree, effectively over-ruling Ali W ardhana. 34 
The regulations introduced for Batam were an important step towards the liberalisation 
of trade and investment, and the stimulation of foreign and private domestic sector 
involvement on Batam, but more importantly they were the key requirements for 
soliciting support in Singapore for the Batam Island project. 
3 lsin&gpore Economic Bulletin, August 1978, p 25. These general procedures for the entry, clearing and transfer of 
goods in/out of bonded warehouses were outlined in Ke,putnsan Presiden No.2111978 (26 July 1978). New general 
procedures for the entry and exit of goods in and out of bonded warehouses in Indonesia were later stipulated as a 
follow up to Kepres No.2111978 in Surat Kcoutusan Menteri Keuao&an No.470/KMK.05/1978 (4 December 1978). 
It replaced an earlier decision which stipulated provisions for the exemption of goods entering/exiting bonded areas 
from customs, excises, taxes and other levies. Surat Keputusan Menteri Keuao&an No.9/KMK.01/1978 (10 January 
1978). That last decision was a follow-up to the government law establishing bonded warehouses and stipulating the 
basic provisions governing their operation. pp No.20/1972 03 June 1972) iuncto PP No.3111977 (23 July 1977). 
32These special provisions for Batam Island were stipulated in Kegutusap Presiden No.22/1978 (26 July 1978). 
Special procedures for the entry/exit of goods in and out of the Batam Island bonded area were further stipulated in 
Surat Kegurusan Menteri Keuan&an No.471/KMK.0511978 (4 December 1978), in light of the new decision (Kepres 
No.41/1978) declaring all ofBatam Island a bonded zone. 
33mterview with Hemomo, 22 August 1994. 
34Interview with Hernomo, 22 August 1994. Wardbana's concern was perhaps with the customs service because it 
was virtually autonomous even though nominally under the control of the Department of Finance. Bruce Glassbumer 
; "Political-economy and the Soeharto regime", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. VolXIV No.3 (November 
1978). 
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Reconsidering Singapore 
Perhaps the most crucial change introduced by Sumarlin was the increased emphasis on 
Singapore for Batam Island's future development. Indonesia had made various efforts 
in the early 1970s to make Batam Island a competitor to Singapore, but a combination 
of the failure of those efforts and the increasingly warm relations between Jakarta and 
Singapore, resulted in a tum-around in Indonesia's policy towards Batam. Instead of 
trying to develop Batam independently as a competitor to Singapore, the Indonesian 
government now began to look to Singapore as the motor for Batam's development. As 
one Indonesian minister put it, 
In order to become a good partner of Singapore, the business atmosphere and facilities on Batam 
Island will be made equal to those of Singapore. 35 
Batam Island had not received much attention from Singapore for several reasons, 
despite occasional expressions of interest. Firstly, Batam Island was a potential rival, 
capable of luring investors away from Singapore. Secondly, infrastructure was not 
sufficiently developed to meet the needs of Singaporean businesses. Thirdly, the 
Singapore government was still exploring ways to retain investment in, and attract new 
investment to, Singapore through such means as reclaiming several hundred hectares of 
land, ironically with sand which was bought from the waters around Batam. However, 
during the late 1970s, attitudes began to change in both Indonesia and in Singapore. 
The technocrats realised that Singapore, located opposite Batam Island, was in a more 
favourable position to influence Batam Island's development than any other factor. As 
the decrease in oil exploration and production had reduced the viability of the oil 
refinery, the development of Batam Island shifted significantly towards its nearest 
comparative advantage, Singapore. Whilst Pertamina's plan for Batam Island had 
focused on competition with Singapore, the technocrats' strongly favoured linking 
Batam's development to Singapore. Whilst there was some debate within the 
government about the merits of linking Batam Island's development closely to 
Singapore, and about the best way to go about doing so, complementarity won at the 
end of the day. 36 Few government ministers, technocrats, nationalists and others were 
to believe, if they ever had, that Batam Island was viable as a competitor to Singapore, 
at least in the short-to-medium term. 37 
One of first steps towards cooperation was the conclusion of an agreement to sell sand 
from Batam to Singapore. Several of the harbours on Batam Island - at Batu Ampar, 
Sekupang and Kabil - required dredging, but Sumarlin considered the cost to be too 
3Ssin&mme Economic Bulletin, December 1978, p SO. Straits Tunes, 12 March 1979. 
36interview with Emil Salim, 18 August 1994. 
371nterview with former Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, 4 August 1994. 
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high to be viable. By chance, the Singapore government needed over 50 million m3 of 
sand for land reclamation, and was looking for suitable sources. In October 1976, an 
agreement was reached with Indonesia, whereby Singaporean firms would dredge and 
take sand from Batam's harbours at a cost of US$1 m3, a figure set by Sumarlin. Both 
sides benefited from the agreement - Batam's harbours were dredged and Singapore 
obtained sand for land reclamation. 38 
It is important to note that the Riau Governor attempted to stop the October 1976 
agreement to sell sand to Singapore by banning the selling of 'tanah dan air' to 
foreigners. In what was a failed attempt to exert control over what he considered to be 
the preserve of local government authority, the Governor's move was aimed primarily 
at pressuring the central government to pass on at least part of the income generated 
from the selling of sand. The Governor, and his ban, were quickly over-ruled by 
Soeharto. 39 
The regulatory reforms for Batam Island introduced by the technocrats in the late 1970s 
were primarily aimed at creating conditions on Batam similar to those which existed in 
Singapore. This meant bringing facilities, regulations, procedures, taxes, infrastructure 
and other details into line with Singapore. 40 BIDA officials, too, increasing looked to 
Singapore for inspiration. 41 For example, Pf Persero Batam was copying Singapore 
facilities and set-up in the development of its warehouses and godowns, right down to 
the wording of its forms, and the colour of its trucks and vehicles. 42 Anything to do 
with the airport on Batam had to be discussed with Singapore because it lay in 
international airspace controlled from Singapore's Changi airfield. In fact, because of 
proximity to Singapore, the Batam airport was placed on a parallel course to Changi. 43 
Further reforms in support of the economic integration of Batam with Singapore were 
made, many of them following BIDA's study of Singapore's tax and regulatory 
38 According to Hemomo, the cost of mining was US$2 sq.m. of which Singapore paid S$1 sq.m. Interview with 
Hemomo, 22 August 1994. Straits Times, 3 September 1976 . .fm&la, December 1976. ~. 31January1977. 
~. 5 May 1977. 
39Jnterview with Hemomo, 22August1994 . .Kwmm. 31January1977. 
~. 28September1976 . .K.immu. 31January1977. 
411nterview with Sujatmiko, 16August1994. 
421nterview with Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. 
43The airport site in the east was originally only a temporary site, for the airport was to be in the south-west 
However the plan was scrapped because of proximity to Cbangi and because the planned site lay directly under the 
Singapore-Jakarta route. The airport today remains on the site of Pertamina's temporary airstrip in the east. 
Interview with Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. See also Pertamina; Perusahaan PeJ'tambannn Miuyak dan Gas Bumi 
Nwo. (Jakarta, July 1974), p 133. Pertamina ; Appua) Rcgort 197304 (Jakarta, 1974). Petroleum News, Vol.6 
No.4 1975, p 16. Far Eastern Ecopomic Reyiew, 20 April 1979. An airport study fmanced by the French 
government was made by Sovril Avia, of France, and Balfour, of the UK. Interview with Hemomo, 22 August 1994. 
~. 8 March 1979. BIDA; Reocapa Kerap&]ca Dasar. Tata Ruan& Pe0&embao&an Daerah Industri Pulau Batam (Jakarta, April 1979), p 4. 
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system.44 In May 1980, harbour and port tariffs were set lower than in Singapore. 45 In 
June 1980, liberal immigration rules for Singaporeans were introduced.46 In order to 
create a competitive investment environment, a three-month processing of investment 
applications was promised, forwarded to the BK.PM through BIDA, the fastest 
processing time promised in Indonesia.47 BIDA could also issue location approvals, 
the right of use of land, and construction permits. 48 A BIDA Liaison Officer was even 
placed in Singapore for the purpose of promotion. 49 
Following talks between President Soeharto and Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan 
Yew, on 29 November 1976, a Singapore government statement announced that the two 
leaders had agreed to cooperate closely in the development of Batam. 50 Several senior 
Singapore government officials, as well as businessmen, began to take an interest in the 
plans to develop Batam Island and began to make observation visits. The attitudes of 
Singaporean officials and the private sector were varied. In general there were two 
prominent camps - those who wanted to know how far the Indonesian government had 
gone in developing Batam Island and how Singapore could make use of and be 
involved in those activities; and those who felt that success in developing Batam Island 
would later mean competition for Singapore. 
Nevertheless, interest in Batam expressed by Singapore business groups indicated that 
Batam Island was now seen more as a complement than a competitor in Singapore.51 
By October 1976 several Singaporean firms were reportedly negotiating with BIDA to 
start multi-million dollar projects following the approval of the budget by the 
Indonesian government. 52 Singaporean firms were reportedly lining up with prepared 
tender submissions for the construction of the oil refinery and several fabrication and 
light industry projects connected with it. 53 Singapore shipyards were negotiating to set 
44.KwDl2u, 10 November 1978. 
45surat Ke,putusan Meuteri Perhubuneao No.l{M 102/PR.302/Phb-80, (30 April 1980). Surat Ksmutusao Ketua 
OPDIPB No Kpts.0.90.UM.80, (31May1980). Departemen Penerangan; Batam: pjntu Gei'han& Per<launnn dan 
Daerab Industri Indonesia. (Jakarta, 1981), p 34. 
46Leo Suryadinata; "Indonesia in 1979 : Controlled Dissent", Southeast Asian Affairs 1980 (!SEAS, Singapore 
1980), p 140. Sinar HarAPAQ- 21 April 1982. For the changes which gave Batam Island special immigration status 
see Surat Keputusan Dirien Jmmigrasi No.175/SekNIIl/l980, (17 June 1980). Surat l{Qoutusao Menteri Keha]rimao 
No.M-Ot-rw.10.01-80 (7 June 1980). 
47Komoas, 7November1978. 
48The Batam Island Develoment Pm&I"am. (Jakarta, July 1980) 
49Tbe first was Amhar Moelia in November 1978. Bulletin Pertamina, 8 December 1978 (No.49 Vol.XIV). 
50Straits Times, 30November1976. Sinar Har!ilan, 30 November 1976. 
5lstraits Times, 24September1978. In July 1976 a new Singapore-Batam ferry service was inaugurated to meet the 
expected influx of tourists to the island when a multi-million dollar holiday project was completed. It was to be the 
second ferry service, yet was only to be made use of by contractors. Straits Times. 14 July 1976. Singa,pore 
Economic Bulletin, August 1976, p 41. 
52Jbese projects included transit facilities for ships, a processing centre, harbour construction and dredging, and an 
industrial estate. The Sund!&y Tunes, 10 October 1976. 
53straits Times, 12 October 1977. New Nation, 24 June 1978. The plan was included in Repelita ID. Rswelita ID, 
Book IV, p 69-70. 
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up dry docks on Batara in a move to secure business from the area following a new 
Indonesian government ruling which stated that repairs on ships below 1,000 tonnes 
must be carried out in Indonesia. 54 Singapore also offered its services to train 
Indonesian workers working in Batara ports. 55 
Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and President Soeharto met again on 26-27 
July 1978 in Bali and discussed possibilities for cooperation on Batara Island, 
particularly between the private sectors. Lee explained that Singapore was interested in 
investing in Batara, in offering electricity supply, and assisting in other fields, stressing 
the participation of the private sector. 
There is a possibility of more cooperation in Batam, more cooperation between the private sectors 
of the two countries.56 
The Revival and End of the Oil Refinery 
The original plans in 1972 for an oil refinery on Batara Island, developed by Pertamina 
and Japanese investors, had fallen by the wayside in 1974-1975 during a period of 
international recession and high prices for crude oil. By 1976, the Japanese were no 
longer attracted to the Batara refinery and were more interested in building an oil 
terminal on Lombok. According to Sumarlin, however, the opportunity still remained 
open for an interested party.57 
Plans were revived in 1977 after Kuwait agreed to take a big stake in an oil refinery on 
Batara Island. In September 1977, following a June visit by an official Indonesian 
mission to seek finance for the oil refinery, negotiating teams from Kuwait and 
Indonesia agreed in principle on the outline of a US$700-800m. oil refinery on Batara, 
with a capacity about twice the size of any existing Indonesian facility of 200,000 
barrels a day, and in which Malaysia and Japan might also participate. To be largely 
financed by Kuwait, the refinery would use Kuwaiti and Indonesian crude oil as feed 
stock, the refined products to be marketed in ASEAN, Taiwan, Australia and Japan. 58 It 
54Repairs could only· be carried out in Singapore if they were urgent or could not be done in Indonesia. &mitl 
:r.tma, 26 November 1976. A Singapore shipyard, Promet Pte Ltd, announced its plan to open a base for marine 
activities. Sinngore Economic Bulletin, June 1978, p 27. 
55ftl2m&., December 1976. 
56Straits Times, 29 June 1978. Kedutaan Indonesia di Singapura ; "Peningkatan Pengembangan Pulau Batam Dilihat 
dari Segi Hubungan Bilateral lndonesia-Singapura", (Singapore 1980), p 3. 
57~, 24 September 1976. Betita Buana, 24 September 1976. 
58Kuwaiti participation in a Batam Island refinery had first been discussed in 1973 as a supplier to the planned oil 
refineries. US Embassy, Jakarta ; Indonesia's Petroleum Sector (July 1977). Ref : Jakarta A-80. US Embassy, 
Jakarta ; Indonesia's Petroleum Sector (July 1978). Ref : Jakarta A-70. Mark Johnson ; "Oil I : Recent 
Developments" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, November 1977 (No.3 Vol.XIII), p 45. Other sources state 
that the agreement in principle did not fix the cost of construction and the price and capacity of the refinery, nor the 
shares of the Kuwaiti, Malaysian and Indonesian sides. Asia Research Bulletin, 31 May 1978, p 445. BWktin 
Pert:amina, 29 September 1977 (No.39 Ih.x:III). Pertamina Bulletin, December 1977 (No.12 Vol.VI). 
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was initially expected that construction would begin in 1978 and be completed by 
1981.59 
Following a state visit to Kuwait in October, during which President Soeharto had 
expected but did not receive finalisation of financing arrangements, the Batam Island 
Oil Refinery Development Team was created to oversee the construction and financing 
of the oil refinery, and to finalise the details of the project with Kuwait. 60 In June 1978, 
the new President-Director of Pertamina, Piet Haryono, told the DPR Commission on 
Mining that technical teams from the three countries involved would soon begin a 
detailed study of the estimated US$800m project. 61 
The refinery, however, was never to come about. Whilst negotiating teams from 
Kuwait and Indonesia had agreed in principle on the outline of the Kuwait-backed 
refinery project, there were a number of points of disagreement, the most important of 
which was the source of the crude oil to be refined. Kuwait wanted to provide both the 
refinery and the crude oil, leaving Indonesia to provide the refinery site on Batam and 
the markets. However, Indonesia wanted the refinery to be equipped with hydro-
cracking units to enable it to process heavy low-sulphur Indonesian crudes. For 
Indonesia it was not a particularly good deal, because the refinery was essentially to 
process Kuwaiti crude and to secure export and long-term markets in Southeast Asia for 
Kuwait.62 
In January 1979 it was reported that Kuwait had abandoned its plan to finance the 
construction of the Batam oil refinery. 63 However, discussions between Indonesia and 
Kuwait lingered for almost two more years, as did speculation that Pertamina was 
examining alternative sources of financing. 64 No compromise could be made - Kuwait 
insisted on the conditions that the refinery use only Kuwaiti oil. 6S In November 1980, 
59~, 13September1977. Far Eastern EconomicReyj.ew, 140ctober 1977. Petroleum News, October 1977,p 
5. Indonesian Persgectiyes, December 1977. Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 20 April 1979. See also 1lulkWl 
Pertamina. 24 February 1978 (No.8 Th.XIV). Bulletin Pertamina. 21April1978 (No.16 Th.XIV). Kww;zas., 7 April 
1978. 
60par Eastern Economic Review, 14 October 1977. Bulletin Pertamina, 2 December 1977 (No.48 ThJOII). The 
team was headed by Piet Haryono, and its members were representatives from the departments of fmance, foreign 
affairs, security, Bappenas and BIDA. K.eputusan Presiden No.59/1977 (lS November 1977). 
6lsin&iux>re Economic Bulletin. July 1978, p SS. 
621nterview with former President-Director of Pertamina, Piet Haryono, 8 August 1994. Petroleum News, May 
1978, p 4. There were real questions as to Kuwait's commitment. Whilst it may have wanted to spread its eggs and 
create markets in East Asia, its main market was Western Europe. Interview with former Minister of Mines, 
Mohammad Sadli, 22 July 1994. 
63No reasons were given. Kompas, 19 January 1979. Sinnpore Economic Bulletin, February 1979, p 25 • .&I 
Eastern Economic Review. 20 April 1979. 
64us Embassy, Jakarta ; Indonesia's fetroleum Sector (May 1979). Ref: Jakarta A-48. 
6S1n September 1980 the Emir of Kuwait and Soeharto discussed problems relating to the Batam oil refinery. 
Kuwait was reportedly still interested in principal in developing the oil refinery but under certain conditions, 
according to State Secretary Sudharmono. Pertaruina Bulletin, September 1980. The Emir was told that the refmery 
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Kuwait officially confirmed its withdrawal from negotiations to participate in the oil 
refinery, and the Indonesian government put the refinery on hold indefinitely. 66 As 
Sumarlin's replacement as BIDA Chairman, Habibie, was later to remark, 
H someone wants to come to build a refinery, then that is fine, let him come. But we do not 
particularly need a refinery. There is no reason for saying we must have a refinery. 67 
Under Pertamina's Masterplan it had been accepted gospel that Batam needed only one 
key, and massive, project in order to stimulate economic activity and attract investors. 
Whilst the collapse of the refinery might be thought to leave a gaping hole in 
development plans, for the refinery was envisaged as the keystone of industrialisation, 
the technocrats had pre-empted this setback by re-orienting Batam's development 
towards Singapore and export-oriented industries. 
After two years of evaluation, study, consolidation of existing infrastructure, and an 
overhauling of the regulatory environment, significant hope was placed on the future of 
Batam Island. Infrastructure development was to be continued - there was a main road 
network, telecommunications facilities, a temporary airstrip, and three harbours being 
developed. A host of regulatory reforms had been made to improve and facilitate 
development, and most importantly had reoriented future development to 
complementary activities with Singapore. An Indonesian government promotional 
booklet on Batam Island announced at the end of 1979, 
We are convince(sic) that the Batam Island will become, within the immediate five years period, a 
vital industrial centre in this part of the world.68 
The last step needed for the completion of the development strategy initiated by 
Sumarlin was the conclusion of an agreement with Singapore to cooperate in the 
development of Batam Island. This task, as well as that of general investor promotion, 
was handed to Dr B. J. Habibie. 
would be built by the government Departemen Penerangan ; Ba!aJn : Piptu Gerban& Perda&an&an dap Daer8h 
lnduslri Indonesia (Jakarta, 1981 ), p 31. 
66sinnpore Economic Bulletip. December 1980, p 26. 
67Far Eastern Ecopomic Reyiew, 20 April 1979. 
68BKPM ; Batam : Bac!moupd for fuyestors, Jakarta, February 1979. 
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Cooperation with Singapore 
On 28 August 1978, the Chairmanship of BIDA passed from Dr J. B. Sumarlin to Dr B. 
J. Habibie. 69 A German-trained engineer, few Indonesians had heard of him before his 
appointment as Minister for Research and Technology, and Chairman of the newly-
created BPPT (Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi or Agency for the 
Assessment and Application of Technology) several months earlier. 10 
There were several reasons behind President Soeharto's decision to appoint Habibie. 
Firstly, technocratic control over Pertamina's non-oil operations was seen as temporary 
from the beginning. In the case of the Batam project, Sumarlin had fulfilled the role 
required of him. He had audited developments, restored investor confidence, and 
revitalised the planning and administrative frameworks for short and long term 
development. Habibie, on the other hand, was ideally suited to the requirements 
necessary to oversee the infrastructure development and promotion of Batara Island. 
Not only was Habibie very capable of handling the technical components required to 
develop Batara, such as skills-based technologies, sea and air communication and 
transportation, but he was considered to be a more capable promoter than Sumarlin, a 
consideration that was important in raising Batara Island's international profile.71 
Secondly, Habibie had proven access to Soeharto, based on a relationship that went 
back to the 1950s. 72 Habibie's nationalist outlook, in the vein of Ibnu Sutowo, also sat 
well with Soeharto who saw him as providing a balance to the technocrats. According 
to Habibie, whilst Soeharto had confidence in the economic policies of BAPPENAS, he 
felt a need for a countervailing force on the technological side, with a longer-term and 
less cautious view of the benefits of science and technology. 73 
69Keoutusao Presiden No.194/M 1978 (28 August 1978). According to one report, Habibie took up bis position on 
15 September 1978. Mcrc!ekn, 13 August 1990. 
70J:n 1974, Habibie was appointed Technical Adviser to the President-Director of Pertamina on research and 
development in the oil industry and to ensure technological transfer and upgrading of Pertamina's technical 
capabilities, and later Head of Pertamina's Advanced Technology and Aeronautics Division. In the same year, 
Habibie was appointed Technical Adviser to the President of Indonesia, primarily for advanced technology and 
aeronautics. 
71 Interview with Emil Salim. 18 August 1994. Sumarlin was a low-profile and cautious technocrat concerned more 
with details. Interview with Hemomo, 22 August 1994. The BIDA account is that it was not decided to continue 
development of Batam until after the project had been evaluated and assessed by Sumarlin and Habibie had been 
appointed. Kaleidoscgpe, Vol.V No.9 (July 1979). 
72For details, see the President's remarks in A.Makka Makmur (ed); Prof.Drln&.B,J.Habibie: Half a Centuzy (Cipta 
Kreatif & BPPT, Jakarta 1993), pp 5-11. In 1976, during the reorganisation of Pertamina and the settlement of its 
debts, Habibie requested that Pertamina's special advanced technology division be maintained, and its aeronautics 
section expanded and received Presidential support. He was then appointed President of the newly-created Nmtanio 
AirCraftlndustry. Interview with Wijarso, 3November1994. 
731nterview with Mohammed Sadli, 22 July 1994. David George McKendrick; Acqpirin& technoloaical capability: 
Aircraft and commercial bankin& in Indonesia (PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley 1989), pp 50-51. 
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Habibie brought a real drive to the position of BIDA Chairman, perhaps reminiscent of 
lbnu Sutowo, and finding the money for building infrastructure on Batam Island was no 
problem. Habibie's first operating budget was over US$1 lm for financial year 
1979/1980, more than the combined budget of US$8m. for the period 1976/1977-
1978/1979, and for the next decade BIDA's budget averaged at over US$30m 
annually.74 In a move aimed at making the island more attractive to investors Habibie 
boasted, 
The money is there if I need it. 75 
One of Habibie's first moves was to stamp his personal mark and authority on BIDA. 
Habibie quickly replaced many of the Sumarlin appointees with those of his own. 
These included personnel from BPPT, such as BPPT Vice-Chairman Dr Parlin S. 
Napitupulu, and personal family friends, such as Panduwinarta and Dr Nikita 
Boekoesoe. 76 On Habibie's insistence, his brother-in-law, Brig-Gen Soedarsono 
Darmosoewito, replaced Sujatmiko as Chief Executive Officer on Batam Island.77 As 
recompense, Soeharto appointed Sujatmiko as Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore in 
December 1978, bringing to the position a close familiarity with Batam Island.78 
Habibie finally convinced Soeharto to remove BIDA Vice-Chairman, Hemomo, in 
September 1981, and the position of Vice-Chairman was scrapped altogether, 
effectively removing an important means of government influence. Hemomo then sat 
on the prestigious Supreme Advisory Council. 79 This last personnel change finally 
gave Habibie full control of BIDA and was followed by a full restructuring and 
reorganisation of BIDA. 80 
Habibie was at pains to stress that his concept of developing Batam was different from 
his predecessors, but it was to be several years before it became clear what his concept 
entailed. In the meantime, he reiterated the technocrats' stance that Batam Island would 
74BIDA; Data Kemmuan Pembaneunau Daerab Industri Pulau Batam s/d Agri.11991(Jakarta1991). According to a 
news report, APBN funds in the period under Sumarlin between 1975-1978 was Rp10.8m., and between 1978n9-
1983/84 under Habibie they were to be Rp102.lm. Sinar Hargpau. 28 December 1983. Increased funds probably 
also coincided with the implementation of the new Masterplan. 
75par East.em Economic Reyiew, 20 April 1979. 
76futerview with Hernomo, 22 August 1994. Aulm, 13 December 1983. Panduwinarta had been, until the end of 
1978, Indonesian consul in Hamburg. Straits Tunes. 12 March 1979. Boekoesoe was a schoolboy friend's brother. 
A.Makka Makmur (ed); ProtDrJn& B.J Habibie: Half a Centw:y (Cipta Kreatif & BPPT, Jakarta 1993), p 124. 
77 Soedarsono had formerly been a First Cavalry Battalion Commander of the Siliwangi Division, and most recently 
Secretary of Lemhamnas. Straits Times, 12 March 1979. A.Makka Makmur (ed) ; Prof.DrJnri.B.J.Habibie : Half a 
~ (Cipta Kreatif & BPPT, Jakarta 1993), p 124. Interview with Soedarsono, 6 October 1994. 
78Habibie supported Sujatmiko's appointment as Ambassador because it freed the position for his own appointee. 
Interview with Dr Halim, 22 August 1994. Interview with Hernomo, 22 August 1994. 
79Interview with Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. Interview with Hemomo, 22 August 1994. Ke,putusan fresiden 
No.168/M (21September1981). 
80see the following for details. Surat K§putusau Ketua OPDIPB No.Kpts/403/UM/81 (26 October 1981). SD 
Keputusan Ketua OPDIPB No.Kpts/408/UM/81 (1 November 1981). Surat JW>utusan Ketua OPPIPB No.106/Set: 
Kpts!IX!82 (14 September 1982). 
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be open to all types of industry, with emphasis placed on bonded warehouses, an 
industrial estate, and a large tourist resort. 81 However, Habibie had drive and he was to 
bring that drive to fulfilling Soeharto's desire for cooperation with Singapore. 
We have already had too many surveys ... What we need is to get this thing moving. 82 
Looking to Singapore 
The technocrats' plan was to align Batam Island's development closely with Singapore. 
Having instituted various regulatory and administrative reforms required to meet 
Singaporean conditions, all that was further required was an agreement with Singapore 
to help facilitate and expedite trade and investment. Soeharto gave this assignment to 
Habibie who, because of his high profile, became very closely associated and identified 
with negotiations with Singapore for a cooperative approach. 
The 26-27 June 1978 meeting between Lee and Soeharto had not only reaffirmed 
Singapore's 1976 commitment to cooperate on Batam, but was the first clarification that 
Singapore was actually interested in participating in Batam's development. The change 
in attitude towards Batam Island in Singapore was to be an important factor. It had 
become clear to Singapore that if the scheme ever developed as envisaged, the pickings 
for Singapore would be very substantial, and that the two islands would develop in 
symbiosis. 83 Prime Minister Lee was to scold a Singaporean reporter who suggested 
that Singapore might not welcome competition from Batam, 
I am ashamed that a Singapore reporter should be worried about competition from Batam. If 
Batam can compete in any particular industry, then that industry should move from Singapore to 
Batam.84 
On 11 March 1979, at the invitation of Habibie, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew together with several ministers and top government officials visited Batam Island 
to observe development projects. It was clear to the delegation that there was no 
substance to fears that Batam Island would be built to compete with Singapore, 
particularly considering the existing physical conditions, as well as the obvious 
opportunities available for Singapore. 85 Prime Minister Lee requested, 
Please use Singapore as an example or make use of Singapore's present facilities. The more 
developed Batam Island is, the better it is for Singapore. 86 
81 Far Eastern F&onomic Reyiew, 20 April 1979. 
82Far Eastern F.conomic Review, 20 April 1979. 
83Donald W. Fryer & James C. Jackson; Indonesia (Ernst Benn Ltd, London 1977), p 191. 
84Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 April 1979. Straits Times, 12 March 1979. 
85K.edutaan Indonesia di Singapura ; PsmineJcatan Peneembanean Pulau Batam Dilihat dari Seei Hubunean Bilateral 
lnc1ooesia-Sin&N>ura. (Singapore 1980), p 4. 
86.KwmlH, 12 March 1979. 
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A further reason for Lee's visit was talk that a casino would be built at a tourist resort 
on Batam Island, apparently to generate money for BIDA coffers and pay for 
infrastructure development. Lee was known to be strongly opposed to casinos, 
particularly one in such close proximity to Singapore and catering mainly for wealthy 
Singaporeans. As a result of the visit and assurances from Habibie, who called casinos 
"un-Indonesian", Singaporean fears were allayed.87 
The Singapore government had good reason for supporting the development of Batam 
Island. The 'Secorid Industrial Revolution' campaign begun in 1979, and which aimed 
to restructure the Singaporean economy, was encouraging industries using high-
technology, and leaving behind labour-intensive industries. Inefficient or unproductive 
industries were being pushed to move from Singapore, mainly to Johor, Malaysia. 
Batam Island could be a another possible location, with the advantage that industries 
located on the island, like those moving to Johor, could continue to use Singapore's 
modem financial and administrative facilities. The Batam Island Masterplan had taken 
this overflow of industries from Singapore into account. 88 The idea was similar to what 
Habibie was describing as the secret to Batam's development, his 'balloon theory' -
Singapore was like a balloon that expands continuously and will burst under pressure if 
it continues to grow at its present pace, while Batam was like a valve which could take 
the surplus pressure off growth in Singapore. 89 
There were still differences between Singapore and Indonesia. Habibie read Lee's 
position on his trip to Batam Island to be one of actively supporting its development, 
[Lee] bas given me bis full support to develop Batam.90 
Lee, on the other hand, believed Habibie wanted Batam Island to be tapped into 
Singapore, 
As I understand it; [Habibie] wants conditions to mesh in with Singapore, to have a free trade zone 
that will allow complete compatibility with rules and regulations which are minimum in Singapore 
governing the movement of goods and people. 91 
Despite the differences, both appeared prepared to cooperate, although clearly for 
different reasons and understandings. 
87Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 20 April 1979. Interview with Soedarsono, 6 October 1994. Interview with 
Hernomo, 22 August 1994. 
88oPDIPB ; Rencana Kerangka Dasar. Tata Ruang Pengembaogan Daerah lndustri Pulau Batam (Jakarta 1979), p 3. 
89Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 April 1979. 
90Asiaweek. 26October1979. 
91Straits Times, 12 March 1979. 
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Prime Minister Lee's March 1979 visit to Batain Island was to revive much interest in 
the island's development, and was to raise the attention of Singaporeans about the 
possibility of becoming active on Batain Island. 92 As Habibie said, 
If there was no interest, certainly Prime Minister Lee wouldn't come to Batam.93 
Observation visits by both private sector individuals and association groupings 
increased dramatically, including those in garments, electronics, engineering and 
banking.94 One of the largest was a 37-member mission from the Singapore 
Sawmillers Association in September 1979, which was keen to set up a large 
sawmilling and timber working complex on Batara in partnership with Indonesian 
interests. 95 
However, whilst there was increased interest - some 50-70 applications to invest on 
Batain Island had apparently been made by Singaporeans96 - no new investments had 
been realised since 1976. According to the Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore, 
Sujatmiko, most prospective investors were waiting for clearer regulations to be put in 
place, as well as the further development of infrastructure. 97 The Masterplan, 
recognising that new investment would not be forthcoming until there were clearer 
rules and regulations, had already called for regulatory changes. 98 According to an 
expatriate businessman on Batain, 
... there is interest in Batam but the feeling is that the Indonesians are moving too slowly.99 
A major problem was the rudimentary nature of infrastructure on Batam Island, in 
particular the absence of adequate power and water supplies. loo Each of the companies 
which had set up a plant on Batain had constructed or was installing its own electrical 
generating system, and pumping their own water. All of these were large companies 
which could afford to prepare their own infrastructure, and provide their own water and 
power supply.101 However, most Singaporean companies were small and medium-
sized and lacked the resources to build their own facilities and utilities, and most, it 
92straits Times, 8 March 1979. 
93.K!mm!!!, 8 March 1979. 
941n August 1979, 43 public works officials from the Administrative Services Association of Singapore (ASAS) 
made a study tour ofBatam. Asiaweek, 26 October 1979. 
95straits Times, 8 September 1979. Lim Joo Jock; "Singapore in 1979: Bold internal decisions, Emphatic external 
outlook" Southeast Asian Affairs 1980 (ISEAS 1980), p 277. 
96oPDIPB ; Rencana Kerangka Dasar. Tata Ruang Pengembangan Daetah lndustri Pulau Batam (April, 1979), p 12. 
97~, 12 April 1979. 
98oPDIPB; Reocana .Kerandca Dasar Tata Ruang Peogembangan Daerab Industri Pulau Batam (April, 1979), p 12. 
99 Asiaweek. 26 October 1979. 
lOOFor details of existing infrastructure, see BIDA; The Batam Deye1ogment Prowm (Jakarta. 1980), pp 33-37. 
For example, harbour depths at Batu Ampar were said to be not attractive. Asiaweek, 26 October 1979. 
101 Kedutaan Indonesia di Singapura ; J>eningkatan J>engembangan Pulau Batam Dilihat dari Segi Hubungan 
Bilateral Indonesia-Singnpura (Singapore 1980), p 4. 
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appeared, were prepared to wait for the physical infrastructure to be finished as well as 
for other facilities and regulations.102 Since the investment and regulatory climate on 
Batam Island was essentially the same as for the rest of Indonesia - essentially the only 
difference was its designation as a bonded zone - investors who did not or could not 
wait went elsewhere in Indonesia, mainly to Jakarta and West Java where infrastructure 
was better developed, or remained waiting in the wings. 103 
Habibie had acknowledged in November 1978 that it would be cheaper to buy 
electricity from Singapore than to develop power stations on Batam, and discussions on 
the possibility of Singapore supplying electricity and water to Batam Island were held 
over 1978-79.104 In October 1978, talks were held between Singapore's Public Utilities 
Board and Indonesia about a proposal for Singapore to supply electrical power for the 
development needs of Batam. It was initially hoped that an agreement to buy electricity 
would be signed in early 1979, while discussions about the supply of water were to 
continue, because studies were still being made to determine if Batam Island could 
supply itself through a network of dams. These discussions were put forward as proof 
that Indonesia did not intend to develop Batam in competition with Singapore, but as a 
partner in the spirit of ASEAN cooperation.105 
Lee reiterated on his March 1979 visit to Batam Island that Singapore was prepared to 
supply electricity to Batam Island; however negotiations became marred by 
disagreement. There were two choices for the supply of electricity - Indonesia could 
make a capital investment of US$17m to pay for a cable link between Singapore and 
Batam Island, in which case Singapore would only sell the electricity to the island; or 
alternatively, Singapore would finance the capital investment, which meant that 
electricity would come to Batam Island at a higher rate in order to pay for the cable.106 
However, an agreement was never reached, not simply because Indonesia wanted 
Singapore to install the cable to Batam and would pay only the cost of the internal cable 
on the island, but because the agreement needed to be a long-term one for Singapore, 
and BIDA could not predict future consumer demand.107 
102Departemen Penerangan; Batam: Pintu Gerbang Perdagangan dan Daerah Industri Indonesia (Jakarta, 1981), p 
10. 
103BIDA, The DeveloJ;lmentofBatamlsland (Jakarta, 1979), p 2. 
104par Eastern Economic Review, 20 April 1979. 
105 Straits Times, 25 October 1978. K.wm2ili, 7 November 1978. New Nation, 8 November 1978. K.wm2ili, 8 March 
1979. 
106straits Times, 12 March 1979. Kompas, 12 April 1979. Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 April 1979. Leo 
Suryadinata; "Indonesia in 1979 : Controlled dissent" Sotitheast Asian Affairs 1980 (!SEAS 1980), p 140. 
107 It was difficult to guess the number and type of industries in advance, and the costs of any oversupply or lack of 
demand could be very high. Interview with Hernomo, 22 August 1994. 
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Table 4.1 
Foreign Companies on Batam Island 
(as at 31 August 1979)108 
In Operation 
l7f McDermott Indonesia 
86% McDermott - USA 
14% Bob Hasan - Indonesia 
l7f Dresser Magcobar Indonesia 1 ()I) 
90% Dresser Industries Inc - USA 
10% Pertamina 
l7f Chicago Bridge and Iron Indonesia 110 
49% Chicago Bridge and Iron - USA 
51 % Pertamina 
l7f Patra Vickers Indonesia 111 
50% Vickers Ruwolt Pty Ltd - Australia 
50% Pertamina 
l7f A vlau Fabricators Indonesia 112 
49% Avery Lawrence - Singapore 
51 % Pertamina 
l7f Toyo Kanetsu Indonesia 113 
35% Toyo Kanetsu KK. - Japan 
14% Nissho-Iwai Co. Ltd - Japan 
51 % Pertamina 
l7f Milchem Indonesia 
l7f Bataves Fabricators 
Taisei International Corporation 
Taisei Corporation - Japan 
In Preparation 
l7f Indonesian Specialised Carriers 
l7f Drilling Bits Indonesia 
l7f Batam Resort 
l7f Tongkat Mas Indonesia 
Tong Holdings - Singapore 
PT Masari Karya - Indonesia 
USA 
USA 
USA 
Australia 
USA 
Japan 
Bahamas 
Panama 
Japan 
Singapore 
Singapore 
Offshore Steel Sttucture 
Construction 
Drilling Mud Production 
Engineering Services and 
Supplies 
Machine repairs, Spare parts 
supplier 
Engineering Services and 
Supplies 
Steel Tank Fabrication 
Drilling Mud Production 
Oil Production vessels 
Building Contractor 
Sea Transportation 
Drilling Bits Production 
Tourism and Recreational 
Facilities 
Tourism Complex 
108BIDA ; The Deveio.mnent of Batam Island (Jakarta, 1979), pp 6-8. Departmen Penerangan ; Batam : Pintu 
Gerbang Perdaeangan dan Daerah Industri Indonesia (Jakarta, 1980), pp 29-37. BIDA ; The Batam Island 
Develownent Program (Jakarta, July 1980), pp 41, 43, 44-45, 47. A further 17 foreign companies were under 
apllication. 
1()1).BNfINo.361-1971. .BNfINo.314-1974. 
110.lllif'.I No.311 - 1974. 
111.lllifINo.274-1974. 
112.lllifINo.136-1977. 
113.lllifINo.279 -1975. 
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By the end of 1979 there were 9 foreign firms, and 31 domestic private companies in 
operation on Batam Island (See Tables 4.1 and 4.2). According to Habibie, there were 
also about 50 applications from foreign companies to invest capital on Batam Island 
through joint ventures. 114 Besides Singapore, attempts were made to woo American, 
European and Japanese multinationals; Habibie toured several countries in Europe and 
the United States in August 1979 in a bid to attract investors.115 Habibie called on US 
industrialists to invest on Batam because it had all the "facilities one can get in 
Singapore" and could "offer more interesting conditions with cheaper Indonesian 
workers." 116 
Table 4.2 
Domestic Companies on Batam Island 
(as at 31August1979)117 
Pf Kumia Dwi Potra 
Ibrahim Adjie 
Pf Karana Line 
Bob Hasan 
Pf Batu Batam Nusantara 118 
80% Abdmrani Junus 
20% Tukiman Tugiono 
Pf Sibasco119 
80% Haji Abihasan Said 
10% Haji Mohammad Zen 
5% Sjaifullah 
5% Nona Sririyanti 
Pf Caputra Enterprise Ltd 120 
Heru Pramono 
Nudin Hardi 
OeyEngTie 
Contractor 
Shipping 
Brick Factory 
Shipping/Cargo Handling 
Contractor 
114Straits Times. 6 December 1979. On another occasion, Habibie said that 35 businesses were operating, 3 were 
under construction, and 17 applications had been submitted. ~. 21May1979. According to BIDA there were 
only 17 applications from foreign companies. The Batam Island Deyelopment Proiram (BIDA. July 1980), pp 41, 
43. 
115 Straits Times. 22 September 1979. Foreign Ambassadors and representatives from various embassies, as well as 
business delegations also visited. These included the German, South Korean and Singapore Ambassadors, and 
representatives from the French, Japan, and US embassies. Their main queries were about infrastructure and 
regulations. ~. 7 November 1978. A Belgian delegation visited the island in March 1979. Asia Research 
~. 31March1979, p 545. In addition, 41 world bankers, many of whom had been asked to supply credit for 
investment in Batam, visited Batam Island in May 1979. ~. 21 May 1979. 
116 Asia Researcb Bulletin. 31 March 1979, p 545. A US Economic Mission, sponsored by the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, toured Batam in November 1978. Straits Times, 5 November 1978. 
117BIDA ; The Deyelopment of Batam Island (Jakarta, 1979), pp 6-8. Departmen Penerangan ; Batam. : Pintu 
Gerbani Perduanun dan Daerab Industri Indonesia (Jakarta, 1980), pp 29-37. BIDA ; The Batam. Island 
Development Proiram (Jakarta, July 1980), pp 41, 43, 44-45, 47. A further 24 domestic companies were under 
application. Excludes Pertamina, government offices and banks. 
118.lllin No.71 - 1974. 
119
.lllin No.304 - 1975. 
120
.lllin No.282 - 1972. 
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PT Elham Batam Base 121 
30% Abubakar Bastari 
30% Haji Loth Hamid 
20% Hanafie 
15% Haji Mohammad Zen 
5% Daniel Burhanuddin 
PT Pratama Raya Engineering 
PT Natoputra Wira 
PT Trakindo Utama 
PT Pangan Sari Utama 
PT Gandrich Navigation 
PT Elham Forttllle Lines 
PT Esquarada 
PT Mustika Batam Service 
PT Delta Service 
CV Aneda 
PT Layani Raya 
CV Potra Syameru 
PT Laksana Samudra Raya 
PT Mas Potra 
PT Insum Jaya 
PT Mirani Navigation 
PT Aquaria Shipping 
PT Sulita Lines 
PT Gesuri Lloyd 
PTBatmar 
PT Karya Agllllg 
PT Jaya Trade Indonesia 
PT Meta Epsi Engineering 
121 BNf'.I_No.550 - 1975. 
Shipping/Cargo Handling 
Machinery and Vehicle Repair 
Contractor/Labour Supplier 
Heavy equipment workshop 
Beef and Meat processing 
Shipping 
Shipping 
Cargo Handling 
Travel Service 
Travel Service 
Building materials supply 
Restaurant 
Building materials supply 
Contractor/Supplier 
Export 
Supply 
Ferry service 
Shipping 
Shipping 
Shipping 
Cargo Handling 
Contracta: 
Contracta: 
Contracta: 
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However, whilst there was interest from investors in Batam Island, the general feeling 
was reportedly that Indonesia was moving too slowly on the development of 
infrastructure and regulatory reform. 122 This was acknowledged by Habibie, who 
predicted that Batam Island would need at least ten years to become adequately 
utilised.123 Growing cooperation with Singapore, however, meant that the plans for 
Batam Island had a good chance of getting off the ground, even though they were still 
little beyond the embryonic stage, and faced possible political obstacles, particularly 
from nationalist groups in Singapore and lndonesia.124 
The Batam Cooperation Agreement 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and President Soeharto met in Singapore on 17-18 
September 1979 to discuss Singapore's interest in the development of Batam Island. 
Lee had concluded that Singaporean industries which wished to move to Batam Island 
could not afford to pay for the necessary infrastructure themselves, and as Batam 
needed help in building infrastructure, Singapore's position, more or less, was a 
preparedness to invest in infrastructure development. 125 Lee told Soeharto that 
Singapore wanted to help to invest capital in Batam Island, 
provided it was allowed to handle the management for the consttuction of infrasttucture on the 
island.126 
Lee's willingness to cooperate on Batam Island was initially met with a positive but 
cautious response by the Indonesian government. Habibie announced that Indonesia 
welcomed Singapore's participation in Batam's infrastructure development, and that 
Singapore was willing to invest as much as US$1billion during the next 10 years in the 
island's development, a claim never denied by Singapore.127 Soeharto's response was 
simply that the proposal would first be studied.128 The proposal was discussed by the 
Indonesian cabinet on 20 September, but due to the fierce reaction the proposal 
received in Indonesia, a decision was withheld and it was announced that Singapore's 
proposal would be studied further.129 
The public response to Singapore's proposal in Indonesia was far from positive. 
Singapore's reported desire for involvement not only in industrial projects but also in 
122 Asiaweek, 26 October 1979. 
123 Kwmu!l, 21 May 1979. 
124par Eastern Economic Review, 20 April 1979. 
125 Kedutaan Indonesia di Singapura ; Penin&katan Peus:mhaoun Pulau Batam Dilihat dari Se&i Hubun&ao 
Bilateral lndonesia-Sinnpura (Singapore 1980), p 5. 
126New Natiop, 17 September 1979. Straits Tunes, 19 September 1979. Straits Times, 20 September 1979. Ell: 
Eastern Economic Review, 19 October 1979. 
127 Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 October 1979. 
128 Straits Times, 20 September 1979. 
129 Straits Times, 22 September 1979. 
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the management of Batara's utilities infrastructure - in response to Indonesian requests 
for Singaporean participation on Batara - was construed by some Indonesian politicians, 
and the Indonesian public, as a means of territorial expansion. 
Several Indonesian leaders moved quickly to pacify criticisms of the Singapore 
proposal, and to quell any ill-feeling toward Singapore. Secretary of State, 
Sudharmono, explained that Singapore's proposal was only intended to guarantee the 
, return of capital invested in Batara, and that it could be carried out through the foreign 
capital investment law or through management cooperation.130 Vice-President, Adam 
Mallie, expressed understanding for Singapore wanting to guarantee returns for their 
investment. 
We had better study the proposal first before making any comment. The proposal may not have 
negative motives as some people here suggested. 131 
Despite these efforts, criticism erupted in Indonesia, spurred by several leading, 
particularly nationalist, figures who criticised the proposal and called on the 
government to reject it. In the Indonesian parliament, opposition parties questioned the 
government on the management of Batam Island, as if Indonesia would lose 
sovereignty over the island. Dr Chalilc Ali of the United Development Party (PPP) 
accused Singapore of planning to make Batara its satellite, saying Singapore's desire to 
run the management might be a long-term plan for territorial expansion through 
economic expansion.132 Information Minister, Ali Murtopo, was quoted as saying, 
If [the joint development of Batam] should involve our sovereignty, we had better not do it.133 
Habibie quickly shifted positions, describing the proposal as "very shameful indeed", 
and describing Singapore as being in a very vulnerable position, stressing that 
Indonesia was by no means dependent on Singaporean support. 
Soon Singapore will be ready to develop [Batam] simply because it needs to ... We could ask for 
loans from commercial banks or from the ADB or the World Bank. They would surely be willing 
as the prospects for Batam are very bright. 134 
130straits Times, 20September1979. 
131straits Tunes, 22 September 1979. Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 19 October 1979. 
132straits TlDles, 22 September 1994. Leo Suryadinata; "Indonesia in 1979: Controlled dissent" Southeast Asian 
Affajrs 1980 (ISEAS 1980), p 140. Lim Joo Jock; "Singapore in 1979: Bold internal decisions, Emphatic external 
outlook" Southeast Asian Affairs 1980 (ISEAS 1980), p 278. 
133 Straits Times, 22 September 1979. Far Eastern Econom.ic Reyiew. 19 October 1979. Another source quoted 
Murtopo as saying, "If it's thought that this matter [Singapore's participation in Batam's development] could affect 
Indonesia's sovereignty, it's better to forget the whole thing." Asiaweq, 26 October 1979. 
134 Asiaweek. 26 October 1979. 
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One Jakarta editorial stressed that the Batara project must be kept by Indonesia at all 
costs. It argued that whilst Singapore may have the capability, 
the political and strategic position of the island is too important to be easily given away to foreign 
governments and enterprises to be developed and managed .. .It is inconceivable that Indonesia, 
with its vast human and natural resources, cannot do it by itseif.135 
A more moderate Indonesian editorial view was that, 
Singapore's position as an economic role holder is becoming more sensitive, as its location is 
pressed by Malaysia and Indonesia, which both possess rich natural resources and manpower. 
Therefore there is no other alternative for Singapore but to cooperate. In view of its experiences, 
Singapore feels that it is only appropriate if they are used to develop the Batam Island. 136 
The reaction in Singapore was for the most part defensive of Lee's proposal. The 
Business Times said, 
Now is not the time for nationalistic sentiments to dominate issues unreasonably. In the context of 
regional development, it makes eminently good sense for Batam to be developed using techniques 
developed through years of trial and error in Singapore's own pioneering efforts in industrial 
infrastructure.137 
Amidst the strong domestic outcry in Indonesia, Habibie visited Lee on 22 November 
1979 to talk further about how Singapore and Indonesia could cooperate in Batam's 
development. Habibie brought to the discussions his concept of mutual cooperation, 
based along the lines of the Benelux economic association. Whilst he had in mind the 
model of cooperation among the Benelux countries, Habibie reiterated that it had to be 
recognised that Batara Island was still part of Indonesia. Most importantly, however, 
the discussions led to negotiations between the two countries for an agreement covering 
the development of Batara.138 
In December, Indonesia announced that an inter-departmental team had been set up to 
draft the form of projected cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore in the 
development of Batara and to identify possible problems with such cooperation. 139 It 
was generally expected that the team would recommend that restrictions on the 
movement of goods and people between Singapore and Batara be relaxed, and that this 
135Kompas, quoted in Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 19 October 1979. 
136 Asiaweek. 26 October 1979. 
137 Asiaweek, 26October1979. 
138straits Times, 3 November 1979. Straits Times, 26November1979. 
139 Straits Times. 6 December 1979. The team was made up representatives from Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Cooperatives, Communication, Research and Technology, BAKIN, BKPM, Bank of Indonesia, BIDA, 
Justice, Industry, Finance, Security and Defence. Departemen Penerangan; Batam: Pintu Gerbane Peroaeanean dan 
Daerab Indµstri Indonesia, (Jakarta 1980), p 25. 
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could form the basis of an agreement on the joint development of Batam by Indonesia 
and Singapore. 140 Alternatively, the Indonesian Cabinet could decide that Indonesia 
should act unilaterally and implement the proposals without consulting the Singapore 
government 
In late June 1980 the Indonesian Foreign Ministry submitted a draft agreement on 
Batam Island to the Singapore Ministries of Trade and Industry, and Foreign Affairs. 
Interestingly, the agreement was only considered to be a trade and economic issue in 
both Indonesia and Singapore, and the role of the foreign ministries was simply to 
facilitate contact.141 With a draft agreement in hand, Singaporean and Indonesian 
officials began selling the idea to their own domestic. constituents and to their 
neighbours, aiming in particular at the nationalists in Indonesia. 
In July 1980, Lee Kuan Yew visited Jakarta, and discussed the draft agreement with 
Soeharto. Whilst no problems were expected, Lee was anxious to take care when 
handling the issue of Batam Island by clarifying Singapore's role and reiterating 
Singapore's support at the press conference, "lest there be a misunderstanding by the 
Indonesian press at a later stage"142 Lee stressed that Batam Island would be managed 
solely by Indonesia, and explained that the Singapore government would give facilities 
to aid the development of Batam Island and encourage investment, but while the 
Singapore government would favour and support the project and encourage investors, it 
would not invest directly. Lee announced, 
I would like to add a clarification. It is not the Singapore government that is going to make any 
investment in Batam infrastructure and manufacturing projects. The Singapore government does 
not invest in any projects. We are not manufacturers. We agreed that the infrastructure of Batam 
would be managed and will be the responsibility of the Batam Corporation. What Singapore will 
do is to facilitate the movement of goods, persons, communications and materials between the 
Republic and Batam or encourage our investors and other investors to go to Batam.143 
140 New Nation, 28 February 1980. 
141 Interview with Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, 4 August 1994. Interview with former Singapore Foreign Minister, S. 
Rajaratnam, 28 September 1994. 
142straits Times, 5 July 1980. 
143Straits Times, 5 July 1980. Sinegpore Economic Bulletin, August 1980, p 61. Lee Lai To ; "Singapore's 
continuous search for quality" Southeast Asian Affairs 1984 (!SEAS 1984), p 293. Another source quotes, "The 
Singapore Government does not invest in any projects. We are not manufacturers. We have agreed that the 
infrastructure of Batam will be managed and will be the responsibility of the Batam Corporation ... The decision for 
investment will be made by the investors themselves. We do not tell our investors whether or not they should invest. 
We are telling them to consider Batam seriously because it is in Singapore's interests. But the investment decision is 
made by our own investors. Please note that" Far Eastern Economic Review, 11July1980. ~. 5 July 1980. 
':j 
131 
Lee also stressed that it was in Singapore's interest that Bataln Island be developed, and 
that any development would be complementary. 
I think there should be another hub for economic and industrial activity in the Riau islands. We 
are not competing. We are playing complementary roles. 144 
Indonesian government officials also sought to convince those Singaporeans suspicious 
of Indonesia's motives. 
Batam is not aimed at [competing with] Singapore. It is a project which will benefit all ASEAN 
members. Batam will not be another Sabang experiment 145 
In August 1980, Lee further explained Singapore's role to the Antara News Agency : 
The Singapore government will facilitate the movement of goods and personnel, and help in 
transport and communications between Batam and Singapore, so that private investors from 
Singapore, America, Europe and Japan can set up factories in Batam. The Singapore government 
has not been asked to and has no plans for any projects in Batam ... However, what is crucial is not 
the Indonesia-Singapore agreement as such, but whether investors from Singapore, America, 
Europe and Japan will build factories in Batam because they find harbours, telephones, telexes, 
power and water supplies adequate, and labour, both skilled and unskilled, abundant and 
productive, so that their invesunents are profitable and secured.146 
Batam Island had generated a great deal of public interest and expectations in 
Indonesia. Some in the government were disappointed that the Singapore government 
could not be a direct investor, having expected substantial assistance from Singapore in 
the industrial development of Batam Island. Indonesia wanted the Singapore 
government to be directly involved in Bataln as a solid demonstration of confidence in 
the future of the island's industrialisation. This would in turn generate faith in Batam 
among other investors, like Japan and Germany, who were displaying much enthusiasm 
for projects there. Others believed that Singapore wanted a clearer picture of 
regulations governing investments in the island before committing itself to projects. 
While government circles generally welcomed investments from Singapore, others, 
including the influential nationalist groups, were against any form of Singaporean 
"management" .147 
However, despite the fact that nationalist circles continued to accuse Singapore of 
trying either to block the development of Batam because it might become a successful 
144straits Tunes, 5 July 1980. Another source put it as, "It is important to stress that Batam is not a project for 
which we compete, but where we share complementary roles." New Nation, 4 July 1980. 
145 Straits Times, 1 July 1980. 
146 Sin&apore F&onomic Bulletin- September 1980, p 24. 
147 New Nation, 4 July 1980. Straits Times, 5 July 1980. 
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rival, or alternatively of trying to take over the project, Singapore's apparent sensitivity 
to Indonesian nationalist feelings, expressed through Lee's clarifications, defused 
Batam as an issue in Indonesian domestic politics.148 Whilst the view in an earlier 
Kompas editorial was that it would be difficult to accept technical and financial aid 
from Singapore without Batam Island being turned into a satellite of another country, 
the revised view was that, 
Indonesia-Singapore cooperation benefits both parties. For Indonesia. which has such a big land 
area, its readiness to provide Batam for cooperation indicates its strong desire for regional 
cooperation. For Singapore, which has more experience and is higher skilled, cooperation with 
Indonesia also has its advantages.149 
On 30 October 1980, Indonesia and Singapore signed a five-year "Batam Cooperation 
Agreement", which allowed for the free movement of goods, individuals and services 
between Singapore and Batam Island. (See Appendix A) The agreement was signed by 
Goh Chok Tong, Minister for Trade and Industry, who was in charge of Batam 
negotiations, and Sujatmiko, Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore.150 
Based very closely on the draft prepared by Indonesia, the Batam Cooperation 
Agreement was considered a general umbrella agreement, with the overall aim of 
simplifying procedures covering the flow of goods and services, the movements of 
people, as well as easing the fl.ow of capital used for the development of Batam, with 
the overall aim of speeding up the development of Batam whilst leaving it to both sides 
to take the necessary steps to assist in developing the island. 151 Essentially the 
agreement was a commitment by Singapore to support Batam's development, and by 
Batam to use Singapore's facilities.152 The agreement, however, avoided the issues of 
Singaporean management or assistance with infrastructure development. 
Whilst it was hoped that the agreement would act as catalyst to encourage more 
investors to Batam, most importantly it was seen as a further manifestation of the 
excellent relationship between the two countries.153 The agreement was seen as an 
important step towards greater economic cooperation, representing a sign of the fresh 
148par Eastern Economic Reyiew, 11 July 1980. Leo Suryadinata; "Indonesia in 1980: Continuity rather than 
change" Southeast Asian Affairs 1981 (ISEAS 1981), p 143. 
149 K.ompas, quoted in New Natiop, 14 July 1980; and Straits Times, 18 July 1980. See also an Indonesian editorial 
after the announcement of the agreement Derita Buana. 3 November 1980. 
l50s1raits Times, 31October1980. Indonesian Observer, 1 November 1980. The agreement was formalised by 
Ke.putusan Presiden No 64 1980 (21 November 1980). 
151 Interview with Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. Lim Joo-Jock ; "Singapore in 1980 : Management of foreign 
relations and industrial progress" Southeast Asian Affairs 1981 (!SEAS 1981), p 276. An outline and analysis of the 
agreement can be found in Straits Times. 31 October 1980. 
152Interview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
153 Singapore Economic Bulletin, December 1980, pp 26-27. 
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approach of complementary development rather than that of competition and rivalry. 
Sujatmiko believed that, 
The signing of the agreement is a significant event in our bilateral relations because it means we 
are moving forward and that we are dynamic in fostering cooperation between the two 
nations .. .Indonesia could benefit from Singapore's skills and experience with technology, while 
Singapore would be able to use existing facilities in Batam to expand its industrial and commercial 
activities. Since the development of Batam is focused on labour-intensive industries in its initial 
stages, it will not compete with the capital-intensive industries that characterise the future 
development of Singapore's economy.154 
Singapore Minister for Trade and Industry, Goh Chok Tong, said at signing ceremony, 
Batam has potential for development as it has a strategic location. It is, moreover, not cluttered by 
industries, settlements and other unplanned physical structures. It is better than what Singapore's 
Jurong industrial estate was in the sb:ties. Its development hinges only on the vision and boldness 
of its planners and the zeal and ability of its administrators. We shall try to assist its development. 
We view the development of Batam as mutually beneficial. We believe that Batam will 
complement Singapore's economic development. There will be some competition in some areas 
but competition is good for the soul of development when carried out within the market 
framework.155 
A Straits Times editorial gave a sobering analysis : 
By itself, the document may be regarded as no more than an expression of intent by the two 
governments to work together ... But it can also be seen as a political commitment by the two sides 
to Batam's development and that should remove some of the reservations shown in the past by 
would-be investors ... This is not to say that the agreement has removed all obstacles or solved all 
problems .. .It is up to the promoters of Batam development to ensure that the red tape which now 
inhibits many investors is quickly removed. More important, much more needs to be done to 
develop the limited infrastructure on Batam. Industry cannot properly operate without assured 
supplies of power and water. Nor can it do without an adequate network of roads, ports and other 
communications facilities. All these will take years to develop and it will no doubt be some time 
before Batam takes off. How soon or how late this will happen depends a great deal on political 
will of the promoters. The agreement signed yesterday was a useful beginning. But it was only 
the first step of a long journey, and those who want Batam to succeed should ensure that what has 
been achieved so far is not bogged down by complacency or bureaucratic inertia 156 
154 Straits Times, 1 November 1980. Asiaweek, 14 November 1980. Sini:apore Economic Bulletin, December 1980, 
p26. 
155 Straits Tiroes. 1 November 1980. New Nation, 31 October 1980. Text of the speech by Gob Chok Tong at the 
signing of the Batam Agreement on 31 October 1980, in Sini:gpore Economic Bulletin, December 1980, p 10. 
156Editorial. Straits Times, 1November1980. 
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Under the guidance of Sumarlin and the technocrats, the development of Batam Island 
had been totally reoriented from an industrial area focused on oil activities to a broader 
vision of an integrated industrial, manufacturing and tourist area focused on exports. 
Despite the passing of the Batam mantle to Habibie, the technocrats' vision of 
complementary activity with Singapore continued to be pursued, culminating in the 
conclusion of the Batam Agreement. It appeared that Batam Island was on the verge of 
an investment boom. 
With the conclusion of the Batam agreement, the Indonesian government hoped that . 
much new investment on Batam Island would come from Singapore-based labour-
intensive industries which were being phased out as Singapore set its sights on a high-
technology based industrial sector. Indeed, the Batam Agreement did boost investor 
interest in Batam Island, particularly in the period immediately following its signing. 
According to the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, some 130 businessmen visited 
Batam in November and December 1980, and in early 1981 approximately 30 
Singapore businessmen were observing Batam every week.157 
However, despite the hopes generated by the Batam Agreement, it was hard to see how 
Jakarta would be able to breathe much life into the Batam venture, and it was difficult 
to see how Singapore could make a firm commitment on Batam even if it was inclined 
to do so, particularly as the Singapore government had been excluded from any direct 
participation in the development of the island. Whilst investors' general impressions of 
Batam Island were positive, Batam was hampered by inadequate infrastructure and red-
tape. 158 More importantly, two key pieces of information remained to be announced -
details of further regulatory reforms to be introduced, and what types of industries were 
allowed. Those details no longer remained in technocratic hands, and when Habibie 
finally made them available, Batam was no longer the investment location envisaged by 
the technocrats. 
Policy-making 
The policy-making processes for Batam Island during the period 1976-1980 displayed 
most of the prevailing features of Indonesian political economy. Decision-making was 
highly centralised, dominated by the President, Patrimonialism and Intra-elite 
Politicking, but other features also came into play, both pluralist and external. 
157 Sinar HarllPM. 11January1981. 
1581ndonesia Dmes, 4 November 1980. Kedutaan Indonesia di Singapura; Peninekatan Peneembanean Pulau 
Batam Dilihat dari Seei Hubun&an Bilateral Indonesia-Sineapura, (Singapore 1980), pp 6, 8. 
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Soeharto, at the apex of the Indonesian political structure, continued to be the key 
player in the policy-making processes for Batam Island. With the removal of Ibnu 
Sutowo, Soeharto became the figure most closely identified with the Batam project, and 
was to become its strongest advocate. The project was headed by his appointees, and 
they remained in those positions for only as long as he desired. Initially Sumarlin was 
appointed to assess and revitalise the project, and when Soeharto was satisfied that his 
duty had been fulfilled, he appointed Habibie as BIDA Chairman. Soeharto 
demonstrated his power most clearly where there was conflict among his ministers, 
such as over the granting of duty-free status to Batam, a conflict into which he 
forcefully intervened. 
With room to manoeuvre, Sumarlin and the technocrats stamped their influence heavily 
on.the Batam project. This was obvious in the types of changes enacted for Batam -
regulatory reform, a new Masterplan and a new course of development focused on 
exports and complementarity with Singapore.159 The development strategy was 
explained by technocrat and BKPM Chairman, Barli Halim, who called for labour-
intensive investments to move to Batam Island from Singapore and a greater role for the 
private sector.160 
... [W]e prefer labour-intensive industries which are export-oriented ... We encourage private 
enterprise from abroad as we know from experience that progress can be made faster by 
experienced private enterprise than by most Government-coottolled industries.161 
Interestingly, and in a neat twist to prevailing views of intra-elite politicking, the policy 
debates for Batam Island illustrated that the situation at the planning stages was far 
more fluid than the categories 'technocrats' and 'nationalists' would imply, for division 
in the technocrats' ranks were evident. This was demonstrated by the conflict between 
Ali.Wardhana and other technocrats over the issue of Batam's duty-free status. 
One feature of Indonesian politics clearly missing from Batam Island during this period 
was the kind of clientelistic alliances and forms of patronage that had so clearly 
dominated the landscape under Ibnu Sutowo and Pertamina. There were perhaps 
several reasons for this. Firstly, there was little new investment on Batam because of 
the downturn in oil industry activity, thus removing a source of patronage for possible 
patron-client relationships. Secondly, the budget for Batam was so limited that there 
was little available funds for distribution as patronage. Lastly, the technocrats were not 
known for distributing patronage or developing their own alliances with domestic or 
1591nterview with Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, 4 August 1994. Interview with Emil Salim, 18 August 1994. 
160StraitsTimes, to June 1983. 
161 BIDA ; The Batam Deve!.Qgment Pmeram (Jakarta, July 1980), p7. 
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foreign businessmen. Clientelistic alliances were, however, to reappear on Batam 
Island under the guidance of state-led nationalist development policies. 
It was the technocrat's focus on Singapore, however, which was to most influence 
Soeharto. He became convinced not only of the economic benefits for Batam through a 
complementary approach but of the benefits to Indonesia-Singapore relations as a 
whole. That this was the case became clear after the appointment of Habibie who, 
despite his nationalist credentials, pursued the completion of an agreement on Batam 
with Singapore upon Soeharto's insistence. 
A relative newcomer to the Indonesian political scene, Habibie was quick to 
demonstrate his influence with Soeharto. This was most clearly illustrated by the way 
in which he lobbied for the removal of Sujatmiko and Hernomo from BIDA in order to 
make the positions available for his own appointees, something that Sumarlin did not 
have either the inclination or influence to do. 
Habibie's own position and stance on economic development was still evolving. With 
hindsight, however, it is clear that he held economic nationalist views at the time. It is 
certainly doubtful whether he viewed Singapore in the same light as the technocrats. It 
seems, therefore, that in negotiating the Batam Agreement, he was carrying out 
Soeharto 's orders. Habibie was soon to cast aside the logic of complementarity with 
Singapore, and to pursue a nationalist agenda. By 1983, numerous restrictions had been 
placed on foreign investors and the technocrats' framework for development had been 
overturned. 
The period witnessed the first real attempt by the Riau provincial government to exert 
influence over central government policies, something it had not done in the past, even 
when the entire island of Batam had been taken over by Pertamina in 1973. The Riau 
Governor's attempts to exert control over what he considered to be the preserve of local 
government authority - the income generated from the selling of sand to Singapore -
were, however, quickly over-ruled by Soeharto. Whilst Pemda Riau's influence proved 
to be weak on this occasion, it was to gradually strengthen during the 1980s. 
The most remarkable influence on the policy-making processes during this period was 
the pressure brought to bear by the media and nationalist elements upon the signing of 
the Batam Agreement with Singapore; remarkable because it was the exception and not 
the rule. Nationalist groups still held the view that Singapore unfairly benefited from 
Indonesian economic development and viewed any cooperation with Singapore on 
Batam with suspicion, particularly when a decade earlier Batam was hailed as an 
economic weapon against Singapore. It seemed that these views also found support 
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within the government, particularly from Habibie and Ali Murtopo. The inflammatory, 
and often ill-informed views of the nationalists were widely carried in the Indonesian 
press, and led Indonesian and Singaporean leaders to take several measures to placate 
them. 
Most importantly, however, the media and nationalist elements forced the Indonesian 
government to reassess the domestic political implications of cooperating with 
Singapore on Batam. With widespread condemnation of even suggestions that 
cooperation on Batam would involve Singaporean management and infrastructure 
assistance, the final agreement was toned down to simply an Agreement for the 
facilitation of goods, people and services. So influential were the opinions of 
nationalist groups, and the media that carried their views, that the Indonesian 
government even blocked both the release of indications that an agreement would be 
signed, and the details of that agreement to the Indonesian media. An Indonesian 
Observer editorial, entitled "At What Price?", angrily attacked the government on this 
point 
It is rather odd that this agreement had to be signed in Singapore, and not in Jakarta. And not less 
deplorable is the fact that government agencies in Jakarta, involved in the materialisation of this 
agreement proved to have toned down - if not attempted to black out - the general release of that 
document for a nation-wide publication. A major agreement involving the future cooperation 
between Indonesia and Singapore should have been simultaneously released by all the medias (sic) 
of both countries ... This is a deplorable treatment which the Indonesia press and the other medias 
did not expect to deserve from those Indonesian government agencies involved in the Batam 
project.162 
External factors remained important to the policy-making processes for Batam Island. 
Most importantly, the international economic system was still recovering from the 
downturn in the oil market, and oil industry activity and exports remained well down 
during the late 1970s. This continued to affect Batam Island, and forced the re-thinking 
and re-orientation of development away from the oil sector towards export-oriented 
manufacturing. 
Foreign governments were especially important to Batam. For example, Kuwait kept 
alive the idea of an oil refinery on Batam for several years but the stringent conditions it 
had placed on its investment led the Indonesian government to reject the oil refinery 
altogether. However, Singapore was to remain the most important external policy 
consideration. It was perhaps sheer geographical proximity to Batam Island that 
162 "At What Price?". Indonesian Observer. 3 November 1980. 
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weighed most heavily on Indonesian policy-makers. For the technocrats it meant 
cooperation, and for the nationalists it meant competition. 
The technocrats won the day and, with the strong support of Soeharto, the Batam 
Agreement was signed. The focus on Singapore marked a turning-point in Batam 
Island's development, as did Singapore's apparent willingness to cooperate. However, 
the Singapore government was not able to achieve its main objective which was to help 
develop and manage the Batam industrial area for relocating Singapore companies. 
Despite Singaporean efforts, domestic nationalist fervour in Indonesia made it nearly 
impossible for the Indonesian government to agree to direct Singaporean government 
involvement in the Batam project. In the end, Singapore had to be content with the 
Batam Agreement and hope that Indonesia would move quickly to develop 
infrastructure and continue making the regulatory environment attractive to Singapore 
investors. 
The legacy of the Technocrat period remains today. In fact, the types of changes 
introduced for Batam, particularly the regulatory and administrative reforms, foresaw 
what the technocrats would do to the Indonesian economy when their power and 
influence increased in the mid-1980s. Whilst the changes initiated by the technocrats 
were to be severely distorted by economic nationalist restrictions introduced by Habibie 
during the 1980s, when Batam began to be opened up again in 1989 they were to serve 
as an important basis for the attractiveness of Batam as a location for foreign 
investment 
139 
5 
The Habibie Period 
When Habibie took control of the reins of BIDA and responsibility for the development 
of Batam Island in late 1978, he inherited an economic agenda determined by the 
technocrats. The technocrats had created a framework for development based on a 
relatively open regulatory environment, complementarity with Singapore and a broad-
based industrial make-up. Initially Habibie, most likely guided by Soeharto, pursued 
cooperation with Singapore, as shown by the signing of the Batam Cooperation 
Agreement in 1980. However, Habibie quickly changed the focus of development 
away from broad-based industrialisation to intermediate, high-technology and capital 
intensive industries, most notably by banning labour-intensive industries. 
With the conclusion of the Batam Agreement with Singapore much hope was placed on 
Batam Island becoming an important industrial area for Indonesia. That hope, however, 
was short-lived. Not only was the international economy entering a period of recession 
but the early 1980s witnessed the introduction of economic nationalist policies on 
Batam, laid out in a restrictive investment climate. Despite having negotiated the 
agreement with Singapore, Habibie was to almost shun new investment in favour of 
building up Batam's infrastructure, and where new investment was encouraged it was to 
be confined to technology-based industries. Apart from a short-lived boom generated 
by the relocation of oil-servicing companies, economic activity remained limited for the 
decade ending 1988. 
Habibie and the Rise of the Nationalist Economic Agenda 
The late 1970s had seen a resurgence of the nationalist economic agenda in Indonesia, 
of which Habibie had become a major proponent. Despite the Pertamina crisis, the 
availability of large amounts of oil money had permitted the dominance of nationalist 
economic policies and resulted in a decline in the technocrats' influence. Massive oil 
income made it less necessary to create an efficient non-oil sector capable of competing 
internationally and undermined the efforts of the technocrats to create an environment 
favourable for spontaneous business development While the technocrats were strongly 
committed to markets and competition, the nationalists had reservations about free-
market ideology and pressed for active government intervention in and regulation of 
market behaviour. 
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In contrast to the cautious approach of the technocrats, Minister for Research and 
Technology, B.J.Habibie, was seen by many as 'action-oriented' and 'an achiever'. 
Emerging as one of the most prominent figures on the 'economic nationalist' side of 
policy debates, Habibie consistently argued that the capacity to develop and produce 
technology was essential for successful industrialisation, and pushed the case for 
promoting domestic production using high technology, in order to promote the training 
and discipline of a modem labour force. For Habibie, an effective transfer of 
technology to improve the quality of labour and its productivity was also vital for 
nation-building. 1 
Habibie has since been the main architect of Indonesia's plan to master complex 
technologies and with them leapfrog into the ranks of developed countries through the 
medium-term generation of a self-sustaining high-tech manufacturing base. Habibie's 
economic concept is that high value-added technology is the key to future economic 
success. He believes that Indonesia must focus on the 'competitive advantages' that 
only technology could provide, rather than relying on Indonesia's traditional and 
'comparative advantages' of abundant land and labour. 
According to Habibie, the Indonesian economy would remain dominated by low-skill, 
labour-intensive, and resource-based industries if its direction were left to be 
determined by market forces and comparative advantage, but a focus on technology 
would add value to domestic production and increase the productivity of Indonesian 
workers. Habibie believes that private companies will not on their own invest 
sufficiently in research and development or obtain transfers of technology from foreign 
firms, so the government must play a leading role in these areas. He has therefore 
advocated government initiatives to establish high-technology industries and to train a 
highly-skilled workforce. 2 
Whilst the government has traditionally concentrated on basic infrastructure such as 
roads, bridges and utilities, Habibie says technology should be regarded as a crucial 
component of 'infrastructure' and should be invested as such. Habibie particularly 
dislikes labour-intensive and assembly operations, and believes that Indonesia should 
not seek investment in labour-intensive industries such as garments, footwear and toys, 
1 Habibie himself associates his 'value-added' strategy with the new generation of intellectuals and the engineering 
profession, and the comparative advantage approach with the economics profession, foreign lenders and international 
financial institutions. Ross McLeod ; "Survey of Recent Developments" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. 
Vol.29 No.2 (August 1993), p4. 
2Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 18 August 1983, pp 55-57. Bruce Glassburner & Mark Poffenberger; 'Survey of 
Recent Developments', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.XIX No.3 (December 1983), pp 19-20. 
Richard Robison ; "After the Goldrush : The politics of economic restraints in Indonesia in the 1980s" in Richard 
Robison et.al. (eds) Southeast Asia in the 1980s : The Politics of Economic Crisis (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1987), 
pp29-30. 
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but rather should pursue high-tech manufacturing such as aircraft and ship production. 3 
Habibie practised what he preached during the 1980s by promoting national aircraft and 
ship-building industries, both of which required heavy government subsidisation, and 
the imposition of restrictive investment regulations discouraging labour-intensive 
industries on Batam Island. 
Whilst parallels have been drawn between Habibie and lbnu Sutowo, the comparison is 
not entirely appropriate. Habibie's operations were on a much more modest scale than 
Pertamina's, funding went through the Minister of Finance who was at least able to 
monitor resource flows and external borrowings, and Habibie was known to place 
greater emphasis on economic viability in project evaluation.4 With an understanding 
of technology, and increasingly aware of the commercial and economic aspects of his 
industrial ventures, Habibie's challenges perhaps lay more in the field of management 
and in being able to follow through his policy objectives with actual and concrete 
progress and achievements. 
The major arguments against Habibie's ventures concern their limited effects on the 
economy as a whole. The technocrats, taking comparative advantage as their starting 
point, question the economic validity of high-technology production in a labour surplus 
economy. They point to the need to establish industries which provide jobs for a large 
labour force - there are 2-3 million new entrants to the job market annually - and the 
need to acquire skills step-by-step. Fearing the creation of economic enclaves, the 
technocrats argue that industries which used sophisticated technology have limited 
linkages with an Indonesian domestic economy whose industrial capacity is very 
limited.5 
Other critics argued that Habibie's approach was costly for the economy, that Indonesia 
had little capital to invest in expensive projects, and that it drained money that could be 
used for more productive purposes. They also argued that the projects were aimed 
more at instilling national pride than advancing Indonesia's economy. In response to 
the nationalist economic agenda of the 1980s, the World Bank called for a reduction in 
state investment in large industrial projects, with the intention of correcting what it 
regarded as an irrational pattern of investment and an inappropriate industrial strategy, 
and continued to press for an Indonesian economy which operated according to the 
3Far Eastern Bconomic Reyiew, 29 July 1993, pp 58-60. Adam Schwarz; A Nation in Waitin&: Indonesia in the 
122!>1 (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1994),p 86. 
4Hat Hill ; "Survey of Recent Developments" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol.XX No.2 (August 
1984), p 19. 
5rar Eastern Economic Review, 18August1983, pp 55-57. 
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principle of comparative advantage and would be responsive to the free operation of the 
international division of labour. 6 
Both the economic nationalists and the technocrats recognised that the debate was part 
of an ongoing argument and that the positions of either side were not immovable. In 
the end, the decisive element in policy-making and policy formulation was Soeharto. 
Each side of the economic debate had to convince the President on an ad hoc, case-by-
case basis. The President could be expected to listen to both sides of the argument and 
seek compromises but, in the end, he called the shots after the options had been 
presented to him. 7 More than any other minister, however, Habibie was untroubled by 
critics for he had the best protection available - Soeharto - and in most ways Habibie's 
influence was derived from the President. 8 As Hill noted, 
Habibie appears to be able to operate a personal fiefdom, immune to financial consttaints and 
accountable only and directly to the President9 
Against the national backdrop, the debates surrounding the development of Batam were 
in no way unusual, but they illustrate how different economic policies as well as 
seemingly opposing development aims and objectives are formulated and applied in 
Indonesia. Whilst Batam Island was one of the few projects to be in technocratic hands 
in the late 1970s, their efforts at regulatory reform for the island were to be replaced by 
interventionist policies and economic nationalism under Habibie during the 1980s. 
The Investment Climate on Batam Island during the 1980s 
Despite Indonesian hopes for a second boom of foreign investment following the 
signing of the Batam Cooperation Agreement, Batam Island suffered from a number of 
problems, all of which led investors to hold back. Habibie boasted to Singaporean 
businessmen in 1979, 
We have created a free trade zone. We are bringing all the rules and regulations into line with 
Singapore. I will leave the development of the island to the genius of the enttepreneur; the 
creation of new industties depends on the initiative of the private sector. If people feel they can 
establish a profitable business on Batam, they will.10 
6Richard Robison ; 'After the Goldrush : The politics of economic restraints in Indonesia in the 1980s' in Richard 
Robison etal. (eds) Soutbeast Asia in the 1980s: The golitics of Economic Crisis (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1987), 
pp29-30. 
?par Eastern Economic Review, 18 August 1983, pp 39-41. Bruce Glassburner & Mark Poffenberger; 'Survey of 
Recent Developments' BuUetin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.XIX No.3 (December 1983), pp 19-20. 
81nterview with former Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, 4 August 1994. 
9Hal Hill ; "The Economy" in Hal Hill (ed) Indonesia's New Order : The Dynamics of Socio-Economic 
Transformation (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1994). 
lOrar Eastern Economic Reyiew, 20 April 1979. 
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Yet, by 1983 not one of the 50-70 Singaporean investment applications lodged with 
BIDA in 1979 had been realised let alone begun operation, others were still awaiting 
approval of investment applications, and it appeared that the majority of those who had 
received approval to set up operations were waiting for further information before 
starting construction.11 
There were several reasons for the lack of investment. Firstly, an unfavourable 
regulatory environment which discouraged certain industries, particularly labour-
intensive manufacturing. Secondly, infrastructure inadequacies which forced investors 
to provide their own facilities, including electricity and water supply. Thirdly, poor 
promotion of the industrial area. 
The Policy Environment 
During the initial years of his Chairmanship of BIDA, particularly during the 
negotiation of the Batam Agreement, Habibie had given the impression that he would 
continue development along the lines envisaged by the technocrats. Habibie's "balloon 
theory" was seemingly premised upon free market thinking. 
If you have a balloon, and you put air into it, then the balloon will grow to it.s optimum size. After 
the maximum pressure is reached, the balloon will explode. As an engineer, what I am going to do 
is make a valve to give the air to another balloon. The air in this balloon is economic development 
of Asia. Look at my balloon Singapore. It has limited land, limited human resources. If the 
whole development comes in they get problems. To prevent that, I make my valve. I make the 
next balloon with Batam. And if Batam is saturated, then I make the next island. 12 
Habibie often spoke in terms usually attributed to economists. Habibie told 
Singaporean businessmen, 
Some businesses find it more economical to stay in Singapore while others may find it makes 
more sense to relocate in Batam while continuing to have easy access to Singapore's efficient 
services. Yet some others may find it useful to stay in Singapore, but establish a second plant or 
facility on Batam. An economically rational division of labour will arise.13 
llBIDA; Reocana Keran&ka Dasar Tata Ruan& fen&emhan&an Daerab lndustri Pulau Batam (April, 1979), p 12. 
Various media reports. 
12Far Eastern F&onomic Reyiew. 7 February 1985. 
13sin&gpc>re Economic Bulletin, December 1982, p 28. 
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By the early 1980s, however, Habibie began going to great lengths to impart that his 
scenario for the future of Batam was very different from that of Sutowo and Sumarlin. 
In a 1983 interview, Habibie said, 
When I took control of Batam in 1978, there wasn't electricity, there wasn't drinking water, there 
wasn't an airfield .. .it was still jungle. The initial pattern of development is different with the 
scenario which is put forward by [me] ... 14 
It soon became clear that the valve linking the balloons of Singapore and Batam was to 
be tightly controlled. Despite the fact that it needed large amounts of investment, 
Batam Island was not to be geared to creating an economy responsive to capital 
investment flows and an international division of labour. Whilst there was no real 
consideration of high-technology when Habibie initially took over, by the early 1980s, 
and in line with his overall aims for Indonesia, Habibie wanted Batam Island to become 
a high-tech centre. 15 
Habibie argued that real development could take place only on a firm basis of 
investment in capital, intermediate and high-tech manufactures, which could be 
generated only by deliberate state intervention and would not be produced by free 
operation of an international market.16 Minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita, one of 
Habibie's supporters, argued that Indonesian technical capability would be improved by 
investment on Batam Island, for whereas Indonesia's other industrial zones were 
connected to raw materials abundant in the areas where they were situated, Batam 
Island was to be connected to international markets. According to Ginandjar, 
In Batam we want to develop high technology, industries and machinery which hopefully will 
eventually serve other areas as well as a staging point for export This is its major purpose. We 
want investors to invest there in an as uninhibited environment as possible. This is why the entire 
zone is extraterritorial and outside Indonesian customs areas. 17 
One of the main implications of this focus on high-technology was that particular 
industries, notably those at the lower end of the technological scale would be 
discouraged from Batam Island. The first indications that this would be the case, was 
when Habibie began calling for capital-intensive investment on Batam Island, and 
14.Eksekutif, December 1983. 
151nterview with former BIDA Vice-Chairman, Hemomo, 22 August 1994. It is arguable just who first placed 
priority on technology for the development of Batam Island. It could be argued that technology was a priority in 
lbnu Sutowo's plan. It could also be argued that it was Sumarlin who recommended that technology be added to 
development aims. Interview with Hasnan Habib, 1 August 1994. One of BIDA's versions is that Habibie had 
requested land on neighbouring Bulan Island to establish a research centre in 1978, but Soeharto instead gave him the 
assignment to develop Batam Island. Interview with BIDA Executive, Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
16Richard Robison; 'After the Goldrush: The politics of economic restraints in Indonesia in the 1980s' in Richard 
Robison etal. (eds) Southeast Asia in the 1980s ·The politics of &onomic Crisis (Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1987), 
p30fn30. 
17Kaleidoscgpe International, Vol.IX No.l (1984), p 97. 
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telling labour-intensive investment to go to Java.18 The restrictive investment climate, 
however, became most apparent when BKPM Chainnan Suhartoyo, in cooperation with 
BIDA, issued a DSP (Daftar Skala Prioritas or Investment Priority List) for Batam 
Island in 1982. 19 
The DSP essentially restricted foreign investors to sectors requiring special 
technologies or skills, or in sectors with export earning potential, and identified 
approximately 40 manufacturing and service industries as priority areas for investment 
on Batam. Included on the DSP were food preservation, building 
components/materials, tools, electrical components, optical/photographic equipment, 
applied electronics, and any oil industry activity. Most significantly, the DSP openly 
discouraged labour-intensive operations. 20 
One key restriction of the DSP was the discouragement of businesses which required 
large areas of land or a lot of water. 21 The DSP also discouraged polluting industries 
on Batam Island, a decision strongly supported by Minister for Population and 
Environment, Emil Salim who warned BIDA to be wary of polluting industries being 
moved to Batam from other countries. 22 These restrictions were perhaps logical 
considering the limited land and fresh water supplies available on Batam, as was the 
ban on polluting industries, but to restrict labour-intensive operations could only been 
seen as over-zealousness on Habibie's part. 
The restriction on labour-intensive industries severely damaged Batam's chances for 
attracting investment. During 1980, 12 Singapore companies had received approval for 
joint-ventures and another 25 had made applications to invest on Batam Island, mainly 
in such areas as food processing, wood processing, brick making, garment making, 
biscuit making and warehousing. 23 None of these investments was ever to be realised. 
For instance, textile manufacturers planning operations on Batam Island withdrew their 
applications to invest because of the restrictions laid down by the DSP. Their decision 
was also affected by a policy that Indonesia's largely unfilled quota, entitling export of 
Indonesian-made textile goods to the West, would not apply to clothes made on Batam. 
18~, 21May1979. 
19smar Hanapan, 13 May 1982. 
20iJKPM ; Business Line List for capital investment in Batam Island. 1982183 (Jakarta, 1982). Surat Keputusan 
Ketua BKPM No.22/SK/1982 (27 July 1982). Business News, 2 August 1982. Busioess News. 2 July 1982. Am 
Research Bulletin. 31January1983, pp 1002-3. 
21BKPM; Business Line List for cAPital investment in Batam. Island. 1982183 (Jakarta, 1982). Surat Keputusan 
Ketua BKPM No.22/SK/1982 (27 July 1982). Business NeWS, 2 August 1982. Business News. 2 July 1982. Am 
Research Bulletin. 31January1983, pp 1002-3. 
22ADtm. 25February1988. 
23New Nation, 4July1980. See also Straits TtnJes, 26November1979. Straits Times, 6December1979. 
146 
This meant that relocated Singapore factories on Batam Island would have to use 
Singapore's quota which was already fully tapped. 24 
The log-processing industry was another to suffer from the DSP. BIDA ruled that 
industries using unprocessed logs were not welcome but activities such as furniture 
production were encouraged. All plans and investment applications for log-processing 
industries on Batam Island were shelved towards the end of 1980.25 This was 
reinforced by national policy on logging in general. A BKPM ruling encouraged 
sawmillers to set up in logging areas instead, while steps were taken to discourage the 
export of unprocessed logs in the rest of Indonesia. Minister for the Environment, Emil 
Salim, explained the policy during a discussion in Singapore. 
We want the timber-based industry in the places where timber as a raw material is available. 
Batam has no timber resources. If Batam developed timber-based industries, then the resources 
from Kalimantan and Sumatra will necessarily go to Batam. This is not our intention. The log-
processing industry must go to where the resources are. 26 
The restrictions on particular industries and labour-intensive operations were viewed 
with disdain in Singapore, for they were the antithesis of how the Singaporean 
government saw a role for Batam Island. Prime Minister Lee's view was that attempts 
to leap-frog over what should be a gradual industrialisation process would not be 
successful. 
There must be a gradual transformation - first labour-intensive, then gradually, skill-intensive. It 
is a process which cannot be short-circuited .. .lf Batam is to succeed, it must start off with labour 
intensive-industries. These are investments which will provide you with an opportunity to 
develop your core of skilled workers. 27 
A further problem for prospective investors was that terms and conditions for investing 
in Batam were almost identical with those for Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia. This 
meant that Jakarta and West Java were more attractive to investors because industries 
could utilise good infrastructure as well as tap into the domestic Indonesian market, 
whereas on Batam Island they would have to depend on the export market. Some 
attempt, however, was made to ease regulations for investors. Habibie promised 
Singaporean businessmen, 
In order to lighten the burden of foreign investors, BIDA will continue to make regulations for 
Batam as minimal as Singapore. 28 
24s1raits Times, 9 April 1981. 
25singapore Economic Bulletin, September 1980, p 23. Straits Times, 9 April 1981. 
26Quoted in Leo Suryadinata & Sharon Siddique (eds); Trends in Indonesia II (ISEAS, Singapore 1981), p 153. 
27straits Times, 5 July 1980. 
28sinar Harapan, 22 February 1983. Suara Kacya, 22February1983. 
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One such regulatory change was that from February 1983 the Indonesian government 
exempted Batam residents and those working on Batam from paying the fiscal 
(overseas travel) tax when travelling to Singapore. 29 Habibie explained that, 
Facilities in the area of immigration constitute an incentive for foreign investors who will build 
businesses or invest capital on Batam.30 
Such efforts were, however, too minimal to provide an incentive for foreign investors. 
Foreign investors were looking for regulatory certainties. BIDA Chief Executive, 
Soedarsono, insisted that Batam did not have a complicated bureaucracy, personally 
guaranteeing that any interested investor who applied in the morning would by 
afternoon have already been given the green light.31 However, when he told a group of 
visiting Ambassadors and foreign businessmen inquiring about the regulatory 
environment on Batam not to worry about such details because, "Dr Habibie is very 
powerful and goes right to the top", he failed to provide confidence of regulatory 
certainties on Batam. 32 
One main reason for the lack of regulatory change was that interdepartmental 
coordination was poor, despite the fact that five government agencies had offices on 
Batam by 1983.33 One crucial agency in particular continued to be poorly represented 
on Batam Island - the BKPM. This was clearly illustrated by the fact that at the same 
time as the Indonesian government was threatening to revoke the licenses of those who 
had received the green light to invest but were considered to be moving too slowly34, 
investors were complaining about the lengthy wait needed to obtain permission to 
invest - from the time of submitting an application, a green light could take more than 
one year. 35 This was in spite of Habibie's promise that, 
I will approve a new venture in just one day. All I require is a guarantee that the company will 
begin work within 4 months. 36 
~erdeka, 19 February 1983. Sinar Harapan, 22 February 1983. Antara, 22 February 1983. Jurnal Ekuin, 23 
February 1983. Asia Research Bu!letjn, 31March1983, p 1024. Employees on Batam Island were already eligible 
for multiple entry visas to permit them to commute daily from Singapore because of a lack of facilities to house 
workers on Batam. Straits Tunes. 2 August 1980. 
30 .Amm, 22 February 1983. 
31suara Katya, 9 July 1987. 
32Interview with former Indonesian diplomat, 21November1994. 
33Jurnal Ekuin, 20 September 1982. AlU.illl, 26 October 1983. The only change and coordination was that BIDA 
was given authority over trade and cooperatives on the island. Surat Ke.putusan Menteri Riset dan Ieknoloi:i selaku 
Ketua OPPIPB No.026/ICA-KPIS/10/83 (25 February 1983). Surat Keputusan Menteri Perdanni:an dan Koperasi 
No.70/KP/I/83 (19 January 1983). 
34Departemen Penerangan ; Pulau Batani : Sarana Perhubuni:an Sekarani: dan Masa Datani: (Jakarta 1982), pp 40-
41. 
35Jurnal Ekuin, 20 September 1982. ~. 12November1982. 
36Far Eastern Economic Revjew, 20 April 1979. 
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Infrastructure Development 
In addition to an unfavourable regulatory environment, lack of enthusiasm on the part 
of investors was also due to Batam Island's inadequate infrastructure, particularly in 
communications, power and water. According to State Secretary Sudharmono, the 
question was not only how Indonesia could motivate Singapore investors to join in 
Batam's development but how the Indonesian government could speed up the 
development of the infrastructure of the island. 37 Habibie, however, contended that in 
developing infrastructure, one could not just say 11 simsalabim11 (abracadabra). 38 
According to former minister, Mohammad Sadli, whilst the Indonesian government 
wanted to promote Batam as a site for new foreign capital investments, it was initially 
not willing to spend money on the construction of infrastructure mainly because 
government money for infrastructure was scarce. As a result, incoming investors were 
discouraged by the burden of extra financial requirements needed to create their own 
power systems, housing, roads and water systems. 39 
Those prospective investors who did inspect Batam during the early 1980s complained 
that Indonesia was moving too slowly on the provision of basic facilities. 40 Members 
of the Singapore International Chamber of Commerce who inspected Batam Island in 
March 1981, reported that they had been favourably impressed by existing 
developments and the long-term plans for Batam, but that prospective investors would 
want to see basic infrastructure completed before making any decision to invest.41 
Members of the SMA (Singapore Manufacturers Association), who visited in April 
1983, also saw potential for Batam, but would wait for infrastructure to be completed 
before making any investment decisions.42 
The key to Batam Island's development was adequate infrastructure, but Indonesia 
faced a chicken-and-egg dilemma; whether to pour huge investments into massive 
infrastructure development in order to attract investors or to wait for more investment 
projects before going ahead with the infrastructure build-up. Habibie was particularly 
37There was talk of joint tourism promotion and joint investment cooperation on Batam Island. Straits Times, 9 
September 1982. Straits Tunes, 10 September 1982. Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 September 1982. All1m., 10 
November 1982. Suara Kazya, 11 November 1982. ~. 12 November 1982. 
38suara Kazya, 27 August 1982. 
39comments made in Leo Suryadinata & Sharon Siddique (eds); Trends in Indonesia II (ISEAS, Singapore 1981), 
pp 152-3. 
40 Asiaweek, 14 November 1980. Interview with former Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore, Sujatmiko, 24 
August 1994. 
41 Members also found the infrastructure time-table a bit optimistic, although admitted that considerable progress had 
been achieved. They were also 'taken aback' by the relatively high cost of land, although prices were not mentioned. 
Straits Ttnles, 9 April 1981. Sin~apore Economic Bulletin, April 1981, p 47. 
42Interestingly, they considered land prices to be cheap, but noted the lack of skilled labour and housing. Anm. 6 
April 1983. 
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wary of premature investment in infrastructure development, mainly because of the 
experiences at Krakatau Steel where excellent harbours, infrastructure and electricity 
supply were not fully utilised. 43 
Rising oil revenues in the early 1980s following the Iran-Iraq War, however, meant that 
the government had budgetary monies to create infrastructure to promote incoming 
industries. 44 A decision for Batam was then made - develop infrastructure first, and 
then attract investment. 45 The focus was to be on heavy state investment, particularly 
in infrastructure development. Habibie was to call the first phase of development under 
his leadership between 1978 and 1983 the 'The Main Infrastructure Development 
Period', and from 1983 onwards, 'The Capital Investment and Continuation of 
Infrastructure Development Period'.46 According to Habibie, 
When I took over I stopped all promotion of the island. We didn't have anything to promote. You 
need some concrete evidence of what you are talking about before people will listen. We are 
starting with the infrastructure. Roads, port and airport. 47 
On 27 December 1983, President Soeharto, accompanied by half the Indonesian 
cabinet, officiated at the completion of main infrastructure on Batam Island, including 
six major projects - airport, seaport, highways, water reservoirs, telecommunications 
facilities and a power station - which were seen as the main conditions for take-off. 48 
President Soeharto described Batam Island's future role, 
We have strong reasons for making Batam an industrial and development area because the 
island's main asset is not because of abundant natural resources or workforce but because of its 
very strategic position beside air and sea traffic routes ... We want to make this strategically 
located island, connecting with the Indian and Pacific Oceans, one of the main gateways of our 
relations with the outside world, relations that will undoubtedly be even busier in the years to 
come. In the overall development activities of Indonesia, we are aware that first and foremost the 
strength and endeavour must come from ourselves. But we still consider possible the 
participation of foreign capital, technology and skill in our development efforts, while preserving 
the direction of development in our hands. From the many attracti:ve opportunities for foreign 
43See bis comments in .K!muml. 10 November 1978. 
44See Mohammad Sadli's comments in Leo Suryadinata & Sharon Siddique (eds); Trends in Indonesia II (ISEAS, 
Singapore 1981), pp 152-3. 
451nterview with BIDA Executive, Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. It is most likely that the decision was 
fully supported by the technocrats. In 1991, Sumarlin was quoted as saying, "The key to developing the outer 
regions is for the government to build up infrastructure. Then the private investors will go in." Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 18 April 1991, p44. 
46i3IDA ; Barelan& : Development Data up to December 1993 (Jakarta, 1994). 
47Ka1eidoscope lntemationa}, Vol.IX No.1(1984),p284. 
48Straits Times, 28December1983. Details of the projects can be found in Amari, 2 January 1984. 
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invesunent in Indonesia ... the Batam Island industrial area constitutes one of the most attractive of 
these opportunities. 49 
The most important infrastructure development was to be the completion of an airport 
capable of talcing Airbus A-300.5° From April 1983, Garuda began twice-weekly 
commercial F-28 flights to Batara from Jakarta, and by December flights from Jakarta, 
Medan and Palembang had reached 13 times a week.51 For the first time, visitors to 
Batara Island from within Indonesia did not have to go through Singapore. This meant 
that the travel time to Batara Island was a lot shorter and more convenient, 
communication was sped up, and those leaving Batara on internal flights were free from 
paying the exit fiscal tax necessary if they returned via Singapore.52 By 1988, the 
airport runway was being expanded to handle Boeing 747s and Airbuses, with plans for 
a modern terminal and other supporting facilities. 53 
The Indonesian state was able to provide the engine of growth through huge investment 
despite disappointing inflows of foreign capital investment in the non-oil sector since 
the mid-1970s. On Batara Island the state remained the main investor and regulator, 
accounting for slightly more than 50% of total investment on the island in 1983, a 
figure which remained largely unchanged throughout the 1980s.54 
However, in 1983, severe financial constraints, caused by an international recession and 
a collapse of the international oil market, enlarged Indonesia's current account deficit to 
unsustainable levels and led to austerity measures. One of the major measures taken as 
a result was a re-phasing of many public sector projects across Indonesia, and in 
particular a slowdown of some of the more costly industrial projects. 55 Yet the 
development of Batara Island, and other 'high-tech' industries under Habibie, were 
largely unaffected by the re-phasing and cancellation of projects. 56 
49newan MasYarakat. 6 May 1990. Francois Raillon; Indonesia 2000: The Industrial and Technoloeical ChaJlenee 
(CNPF and Cipta Kreatif, Jakarta 1990), p 174. 
5~e airport cost Rp17.5billion. Asia Research Bulletin, 30 April 1983, p 1035. In 1979 the airport could only 
handle 20-passenger short take-off and landing planes. Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 April 1979. They were 
Fokker f-28. filitl, 16 February 1983. 
51suara Karya, 4 January 1983. Suara Karya, 22 February 1983. Sinar Harapan. 22 February 1983. Antar!b 6 June 
1983 . .K.2Jm2as., 28 December 1983. 
52 At the same time, however, all goods coming from Batam on the air flights would be hit by customs/import taxes 
from April 1983. .K.2Jm2as., 9 April 1983. The airport was also part of a Hankamnas strategy. Departemen 
Penerangan ; Pulau Batam : Sarana Perhubunean Sek:arane dan Masa Patane (Jakarta 1982), p 32. 
53The expansion was to be at a cost of US$47m, half of which was to come from a Japanese loan. To support the 
airport expansion, Soeharto agreed to fix aviation gas prices at the same level as Singapore to encourage Garuda and 
other aircraft serving international routes to refuel on Batam rather than in Singapore. Aviation fuel prices were 
currently set higher than Singapore in Indonesia. The Jak;arta Post, 23 November 1988. 
54BIDA; Barelane · Development Data up to June 1994 (Jakarta 1994). 
55par Eastern Economic Review, 26 May 1983, pp 82-3. Far Eastern Economic Review. 18 August 1983, pp 39-41 
&51. 
56ttal Hill; "Survey of Recent Developments" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.XX No.2 (August 
1984), p 19. 
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On Batam Island, development continued despite the state's declining capacity to 
invest. The budget was reduced, although only marginally, and perhaps also due to the 
fact that the main infrastructure projects had been completed by the end of 1983. 
Significantly, however, three huge projects that were being mooted at the time - a coal 
storage centre57, a gas pipeline project58, and a giant port complex - were put on the 
backbumer. The first two were perhaps considered not financially feasible by the 
foreign partners, but the port complex appeared to have been directly affected by the 
recession. 59 
It had long been predicted that Batam Island would eventually carve out for itself a 
share of the entrepot trade on which Singapore flourished. One of the first steps 
towards by-passing Singapore was announced in February 1981 by the BIDA 
Chairman's brother and Director-General of Sea Communications, Fanny Habibie, 
when Batam was designated the focal point of the inter-island Lighter Aboard Ship 
(LASH) lighter network. 60 
The second, and most important step, was the idea for a huge container port complex. 
In 1982, a feasibility study for the building of the Asia Port complex was carried out by 
experts from Rotterdam and Indonesia.61 With Rotterdam as the role model/prototype, 
the idea was to "Meng-Rotterdam-kan Batam" (Rotterdam-ise Batam).62 Announcing 
571n 1982, Australian company BHP joined Indonesia in a A$1.lm study into the feasibility of constructing a 
regional coal handling port on Batam Island, to be located at the southern end of the Asia Port complex. Announced 
by Habibie in September 1982, the coal depot would have a storage capacity of 2 to 5 million tons of Australian and 
Indonesian coal. The plan also called for the building of a coal-fired electricity power plant with a 4()()..600 megawatt 
capacity for use on Batam and for possible transmission to Singapore. Konstrµksi, Desember 1982 . .An.tiwl, 22 
September 1982. Asia Research Bulletin, 31October1982, p 976. Sin&ap<>re Economic Bulletin. October 1982, p 
31. SinuJX>re Economic Bulletin, December 1982, p 28. BeritaBuaoa, 22February1983. Kaleidoscope, Vol.IX 
No.I (1984), p 301. 
581n consideration was the construction of a gas pipeline to Batam Island. One proposal put forward to Pertamina 
and the Ministry of Mines and Energy by Gasuni Amro, comprising the Dutch gas company Gasuni and Amsterdam . 
Rotterdam Bank, was to build a pipeline connecting the gas fields in Aron, North Sumatra as well as the East Natuna 
islands, to Batam Island and then Singapore. The preliminary study showed the project to be feasible and self-
financing at US$7.5b. Another second proposal, based on a preliminary feasibility study by the Marubeni 
Corporation and the Bechtel Corporation, was to bring gas from the South-west Natuna fields leased by Conoco. It 
found the Conoco Natunas-Batam gas pipeline connection and the Singapore link to be both economically viable, at 
an estimated US$200m, and technically feasible. Conoco was making its own preliminary study. This second 
proposal was discussed between Lee and Soeharto in September 1982. Singapore PM Lee Kuan Yew mentioned 
Singapore's interest in buying natural gas from Indonesia, sourced from the Natuna Islands and piped to Batam if 
there was enough gas, suitable technology and the project was economically viable. An agreement in principle was 
reached for the purchase of gas by Singapore, but a firm commitment and long-term purchase agreement would only 
be made provided the pipeline was laid to Batam Island and Singapore tap it from there. Lee said, "We have 
expressed a willingness to enter into a firm commitment provided the pipeline is laid to Batam and we can make the 
connection from there." KonstI'Uksi. Desember 1982. Straits Dmes, 10 September 1982. Straits Tjmes, 16 October 
1982. Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 17 September 1982. AJllw, 22 September 1982. Malaysian Business. 
September 1983. Straits Tlllles, 6 October 1983. 
59straits Tjmes, 10 June 1983. 
~ No.142 (Maret 1981). John Bunton; Buildin& Indonesia: A Market Survey (Construction Press, London 
1983), pp 164, 171. 
61.Antm. 22 February 1983. Sinar Har!Wan, 13 May 1983. 
62Jurnal Ekuin, 29 October 1982. 
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plans to build the port complex, with a seven kilometre long frontage and capable of 
handling 150,000 ton ships, Habibie described the role of Asia Port. 
It is hoped that Batam will fimction as Asia's Rotterdam. 63 
There was a strong logic behind the scheme for the container transit port. In particular, 
the Asia Port complex would relieve pressure on Indonesia's busiest port of Tanjung 
Priok, and would also avoid the cost of double-handling. It made sense for ships to 
discharge Indonesia-bound containers at Batam for onward shipment, rather than 
discharge them at Singapore for shipment to Tanjung Priok and then for onward 
shipment to their final destination. However, although it was centrally located and in a 
perfect position to profit from the container trade generated by Singapore, Batam would 
be an artificial terminal created out of political will and not by commercial need. Yet it 
did make some sense, particularly if viewed in the light of bottlenecks at Tanjung Priok 
and the Indonesian government's desire to persuade industry and people away from 
Jakarta and Java. 64 Of course the long-term hope was to entice a significant percentage 
of trade away from Singapore. Coordinating Minister for Economic, Financial and 
Industrial Affairs, Widjojo Nitisastro, did not try to disguise that fact, indicating that the 
technocrats were not completely averse to competing with Singapore. 
We should make an effort to bypass Singapore in our exports.65 
Plans for the Asia Port complex continued to surface in subsequent years. After further 
studies, the complex was revived in the late-1980s as a general cargo and bulk crude oil 
terminal. As a port for export, other terminals were also planned for timber, rubber, 
copra, fertiliser, mineral ores and liquefied natural gas.66 
The 1972 Masterplan had predicted that if private companies had to finance the 
infrastructure then Batam would have difficulty attracting investors. The warning rang 
true in the context of the 1980s. Foreign companies on Batam were already financing 
their infrastructure and utility needs, and some were being encouraged to do more. For 
example, PT McDermott was pushed into financing a US$300,000 microwave relay 
station to improve the area's dismal telephone link to the outside world. 67 
Whilst the international airport and Asia Port projects served as symbolic of Indonesian 
technical prowess and national achievement, the appropriateness of these projects in the 
context of existing developments on Batam Island was doubtful, particularly when lack 
63 .Amm. 22 February 1983. Sinar Harapan. 13 May 1983. Kaleidoscooe, Vol.IX No.I (1984), p 299. 
64John Bunton; Buildin& Indonesia: A Market Swyey (Construction Press, London 1983), p 170. 
65Yong Mun Cheong; "Bypassing Singapore", Solidarity No.101, 1984. 
66it was to be financed by a US$50m loan from the Netherlands. The Jakarta Post, 23 November 1988. See also 
Suara Kar,ya, 12 December 1985. 
67Far Eastern f&onomic Reyiew, 7 February 1985. 
153 
of investor interest was due to more immediate infrastructure needs such as electricity 
and water supplies. 
Promotion 
Limited progress on Batam Island was also due to both a lack of, and poor, promotion. 
Whilst Habibie had been urging Singaporean businessmen to be more active on Batam 
Island68, he was also adamant that there would be no large promotional effort because 
facilities on the island had not been completed, and that this was the reason for such 
little interest 69 This low-key marketing strategy was however a problem, particularly 
because it resulted in a vacuum of information for prospective investors. Singapore 
Prime Minister Lee's opinion was that, 
Whoever wants to promote investments in Batatn should maintain contact with the 
entrepreneurs. 70 
The role of promoting Batam Island in Singapore had initially been handled by BIDA's 
own representative. However the BIDA Liaison Officer was recalled in 1982, 
apparently because of changing needs and a national austerity drive, but also due to 
"high expenditures". 71 Matters to do with Batam Island were then handled by the 
Embassy, particularly the Indonesian Ambassador. Newly-appointed Ambassadors to 
Singapore were told by Soeharto that their main tasks were to represent Indonesia and 
"bantu Batam" (help Batam). Bantu Batam came to mean help Batam on both the 
domestic and foreign fronts - counter moves to discredit Batam and support moves to 
assist Batam. 72 
The Batam Island radio station, Zoo Radio, perhaps did as much as anything to expose 
Singaporeans to Batam. Beginning broadcasts in an FM music-only format in 
September 1988, Zoo Radio captured at least 14% of the listening audience in 
Singapore. 73 Combined with cheap seafood and duty-free goods, Zoo Radio became a 
major attraction for tourists wanting to meet the hip deejays. In fact, tourism was the 
one economic activity to achieve success in the 1980s. 
The government's decision to grant Batam Island duty free status in 1978 had generally 
failed to lure manufacturers, but it did draw tourists. An increase in tourism was 
68smupore Economic Bulletin. December 1982, p 28. 
69smar Hargpan, 22 February 1983. 
70 Asia Research Bulletin, 31 October 1982, p 976. 
71smar Harapan, 21April1982. Straits Times, 21April1982. Singaoore Economic Bulletin, May 1982, p 47. 
72Interview with former Indonesian diplomat, 20 November 1994. 
73nroadcast by Radio Ramako Batam, Zoo Radio had an estimated 700,000 listeners a day during its early months of 
operation, prompting the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation to respond with a new station with a similar format in 
January 1989. Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 March 1990. Warta Ekonomi, 11 June 1990. 
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particularly marked from 1983 when Batam Island was designated as a tourist entry 
point to Indonesia, within the framework of encouraging the growth of tourism in 
Indonesia. 74 Attractions grew beyond cheap seafood and duty-free goods as facilities 
for various outdoor activities and overnight accommodation began to meet demand.75 
Tourism numbers increased rapidly through the 1980s from 9,670 in 1983, to 84,475 in 
1986 and 227,981in1988, of whom 84% were from Singapore.76 
It was clear that more active cultivation of investors by Indonesia, the speedy provision 
of infrastructure as well as greater incentives, were needed in order to attract investment 
to Batam Island. But as long the economic nationalist structure remained in place, 
Batam Island would not be an attractive investment location. As one BIDA official 
admitted, in an era of high competition for foreign capital between countries, the 
attraction of Batam Island was low, "except for investors with the spirit of 
Columbus. "77 
The Second Pertamina Boom 
Success in attracting new investment to Batam Island in the early to mid-1980s was 
limited and, as has been explained above, the reasons lay in an unattractive regulatory 
environment and inadequate infrastructure. However, a short-lived boom in economic 
activity on Batam Island occurred in the mid-1980s. The initiative was to come from 
the bastion of economic nationalism, Pertamina, and was caused by further economic 
nationalist measures and government intervention. The boom, however, was limited 
solely to the oil sector. 78 
74Keputusap Presi<fen No.15 1983, (9 March 1983). Betita Buapa. 22 February 1983. Jurna} Ekuin, 23 February 
1983. In addition Singaporeans, unlike other foreigners, were granted visa-free entry to Batam. Suara Kazya, 11 
November 1982. The Justice minister declared Batam as an immigration area with special status in 1983 . .&mil 
Keputusap Menteri Kehalcimap No-M-Ol-PW-10.0W983, (8 January 1983). Bisnis Indonesia, 27 October 1993. 
Immigration facilities were important as an incentive for both tourists and foreign investors interested in Batam. For 
that reason, in December 1988, the Indonesian government began issuing special passes for Singaporeans which 
would enable them to commute to Batam anytime and make 4 multiple visits or stay for as long as two months. lZ 
Jakarta Post. 30 November 1987. The Jakarta Post, 6 February 1988. There was also a relaxation of rules for 
vessels plying the Singapore-Batam route, with the freer movement of vessels designed to encourage more trade and 
tourist traffic. Straits TIDJ.eS, 19 December 1984. By the middle of 1983, ferries between Singapore and Batam 
Island were running ten times a day. Straits Times, 10 June 1983. By the end of 1984 there were 6 ferries running 3 
times a day. The Jakarta Post, 9 January 1985. 
751t was reported that so cheap were duty free goods on Batam Island, the savings made covered the return fare from 
Singapore. Straits Times, 27 May 1988. 
76aatam Tourist Promotion Board; Visitor Arrivals to Batam 1991 (Batam, 1992). There was a downside. The 
number of cases of Singaporeans hit by malaria resulting from trips to Batam rose from 3 in 1986, to 16 in 1987 and 
20 in the first four months of 1988. Straits Times, 11 May 1988. 
77 AWarl, 5 November 1982. 
78In addition to Pertamina, PT Tambang Timah, the state-run tin company reported that it was also planning to use 
Batam Island as a Logistic Base. The President of the company, Sujatmiko, previously Batam CEO and Ambassador 
to Singapore, also announced it would use Batam Island as a maintenance base, with a processing facility in a joint 
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Despite some important infrastructure projects, and several new investments, Batam 
Island had only moderately changed since the mid-1970s. Moreover, oil-related 
activities continued to dominate industries and developments on Batam Island well into 
the 1980s. To a large extent, the idea that Batam Island could take over economic 
activities in Singapore continued, particularly with regards to oil-related activities. 
Essentially the promotion of Batam Island rested on the continued expansion of the 
petroleum industry, which was not only the main source of revenue for the Riau 
region, 79 but by 1985 was providing nearly two-thirds of government revenue and 
nearly 70% of export revenue. 80 However, the idea of a major oil industry supply and 
logistics base on Batam Island had largely not been achieved. 
In the latter half of the 1970s most companies curtailed operations in Indonesia because 
of the contraction of the Indonesian oil services market, but in the early 1980s the oil 
services market entered another period of expansion. In this re-invigorated climate, the 
Indonesian Government and Pertamina began, in stages, to encourage foreign oil 
companies and contractors to utilise Batam Island, particularly after the completion of 
the airport in 1983 and continued expansion of the harbours. 81 
In 1979, having recovered from its financial crisis, Pertamina again proposed to its 
foreign contractors to use Batam Island as their Supply and Logistics Base. 82 In 1982, 
the Indonesian government began giving priority and relief to businesses and 
contractors which moved to operate fully in Indonesia, whilst the President requested 
that all overseas storage of tools and equipment needed for oil and gas operations be 
moved to Batam Island. 83 In 1983, Pertamina proposed that all contractors with 
representative offices in Singapore move to Batam Island, and that transhipment of oil-
industry related goods no longer be done through Singapore, but go directly to Batam 
lsland.84 
venture with Western capital to produce finished tin products, including tin plate, on BataJn Island. Neither plan was 
to eventuate. Sinar HarQPan, 14 August 1984. Kompas, 5 November 1984. Sin&apore Econom.ic Bulletin, 
November 1986, p 23. Interview with Sujatmiko, 24 August 1994. See also Jakarta Post, 4 November 1988. 
791n 1983 97.6% of Riau's total exports were energy products, which together made up 33.9% of Indonesia's total 
exports. Iwan J.Aziz; "Key issues in Indonesian regional development" in Hal Hill (ed) Unity and Diversity: 
Reeiooal economic <fevelQpmept in Indonesia since 1970, p57. 
8<>rat Eastern Ecopomic Review. 14 November 1985, p67. In 1985 Riau's total exports were worth $4,817 million 
of which crude oil and residual fuel oil made up 96.1 % of the total. Resource rich provinces dominated Indonesia's 
exports, for in 1985 Riau, Aceh and East Kalimantan generated 61 % of total Indonesian exports. Hal Hill & Anne 
Weidemann ; "Regional development in Indonesia : Patterns and Issues" in Hal Hill (ed) Unity and Diversity: 
Re&ional economic <feyelQpmept in Indonesia since 1970, pp 37-38. · 
81Berita Buana. 4November1985. 
82Berita Buana. 4 November 1985. 
83Busipess News, 11 June 1982. 
84.Kwm2lll, 5 November 1984. 
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In 1984, Pertamina initiated a policy requiring all of its foreign oil contractors and sub-
contractors to relocate their supply and logistics bases from Singapore to Batara Island. 
It was expected that all contractors who still used a supply base abroad would transfer 
their central supply base and activities to Batam Island, or elsewhere in Indonesia, by 
June 1985. The aim was not only to provide support of the Indonesian oil industry, as 
well as to step up the role of Batam Island as a central supply base for the oil industry in 
Indonesia, but to stimulate economic activity and employment on Batam Island. 85 
In 1984-85 the Indonesian government and Pertamina tried to further speed the pace of 
development by adopting shipping and accounting practices that, in effect, forced many 
foreign oil and related concerns to use Batam Island as a base instead of Singapore, by 
ruling that all foreign oil companies with production sharing contracts in Indonesia had 
to import their supplies through Batara.Island. In mid-1984, it was announced that all 
tubular goods imports should be shipped on the basis of 'Cost and Freight Batam Island' 
or 'Cost and Freight final destination port in Indonesia'. The ruling essentially 
determined that foreign contractors could not charge their logistics costs as part of their 
cost calculations in production-sharing contracts unless they used Batam. Pertamina 
further directed in September 1984 that with effect from January 1985, imports of bulk 
goods must be made through Batam or other Indonesian ports, and beginning July 1985 
other small goods be imported accordingly. 86 
All these rulings aimed to promote the growth of an Indonesian service sector for oil 
and related industries that had previously been located in Singapore, as well as to 
stimulate economic activity and employment in general on Batam Island. Whilst 
Pertamina President-Director, Abdul Rachman Ramly, had lamented the fact that Batam 
Island's facilities were not as good as Singapore's - in terms of offices, communications, 
warehousing - it was determined that activities such as repairs and maintenance could 
be successfully relocated. 87 According to Minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita, 
If [foreign oil contractors] needs are able to be met, at least in part, it would certainly have a 
positive effect Apart from foreign exchange earnings, it will absorb workers and provide value-
adding ... 88. 
The rulings had the effect of causing a minor boom in economic activity on Batam 
Island, and probably had an adverse effect on Singapore's offshore base. The effect of 
85suara Kuya, 8 January 1985. Mer<leka, 9 January 1985. Business News. 18 January 1985. Pertamina Bulletin. 
January 1985. Asia Research Bulletin. 31 March 1985, p 1264. Indonesia Development News, Vol.10 No.1 
(September/October 1986). 
86Pertamina Bulletin, January 1985. Sineapore Economic Bulletin. January 1985, p 45. Wart• Pertamina. Vol.XX, 
No.5, 1985. Asia Researcb Bulletin, 31 March 1985, p 1264. Far Eastern F&onomic Reyiew, 30 November 1989. 
87sinar Hmpan, 11October1985. 
88Merdelca, 23December1985. 
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Pertamina's initiatives was telling. By late 1986, 33 of the 60 firms holding production-
sharing agreements with Pertamina had complied and relocated their operations to 
Indonesia. The impact on Batam was seen in half a dozen new manufacturing 
investments by foreign oil servicing companies which began operations in 1986. 89 As a 
result of the relocations, ten Indonesian companies were also established on Batam 
Island to service foreign oil contractors, in areas such as warehousing, catering services 
and equipment repair. 90 
Declining oil prices, however, which in 1982-1983 had been quite gradual and 
manageable, dropped sharply in 1985-86. This not only caused another severe revenue 
crisis for the government, necessitating a shift in economic policies towards progressive 
deregulation of the economy and much greater reliance on the private sector, but also 
torpedoed Indonesia's bid to build Batam Island into a big oil-services base. As a result, 
the Pertamina boom was short-lived. 
The Establishment of Local Government 
BIDA's mission on Batam Island was to plan and supervise development as well as 
build crucial infrastructure. Because the Batam Island project was seen nationally as 
economically important, and obviously politically important, BIDA was attached to the 
President, and as a result was given almost a free hand to steer industrial development. 
Being a single administration, with the aim of avoiding the lack of inter-agency 
coordination commonplace in Indonesia, and as an independent authority, BIDA 
became very powerful in its own right.91 
BIDA's presence had preceded the establishment of local government, and thus escaped 
to a large extent interference by provincial Riau and local Batam officialdom in the 
island's administration. With its office on an adjacent island, local government for 
Batam Island was poorly equipped, and unable to be responsive to new developments -
not just catering to the needs of investors but also in managing the political, social and 
cultural needs of an ever-increasing population, which grew from 17,000 in 1979 to 
90,500 in 1989.92 
89Jakarta Post, 22 July 1986. ~. 21 July 1986. 
90xndonesia Development News, Vol.10 No.1 (September/October 1986), pll. Exact figures vary. According to 
another source, by 1987 31 foreign oil companies used Batam as their supply and logistic base. The Jakarta Post, 30 
November 1987. It was estimated that Pertamina brought in about 17-18 additional companies from Singapore 
between 1984-86. Interview with Soedarsono, 6 October 1994. 
911nterview with former Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, 4 August 1994. 
92BIDA; Various Sources. 
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Left out from the beginning, the Riau government continued to protest at the centre, and 
the Governor of Riau, Maj-Gen Haji Imam Munandar, continued to express concern 
about the role of BIDA on the island.93 Support for his cause was to come from the 
Department of Internal Affairs, which was indignant at being left out of Batam's 
development, and wanted to have a bigger say on developments on the island.94 
However, it was not until it became clear that existing local government structures were 
unsuited to the emerging industrial conditions and needs of the community on the island 
that BIDA also realised it needed upgraded local government for the provision of 
government services, basic administration and security. 
The Regional Autonomy Review Board (Dewan Pertimbangan Otonomi Daerah) 
examined the local government structure of Batam in its first ever meeting in 1983.95 
The Board discussed various suggestions for local government in Batam - Kota 
Administratif (City Administration - first tier local government), Kotamadya 
Administratif (Administrative Mayoralty - first tier), Kotamadya Tingkat II (Mayoralty 
- second tier) and Kabupaten Tingkat II (Regency - second tier) - finally deciding upon · 
the recommendations of the Tim Persiapan Pembentukan Wilayah Administrasi Pulau 
Batam dan Sekitamya (Team for Establishing the Administrative Area of Batam Island 
and Surrounds) that Batam's administrative status be upgraded from being a Kecamatan 
(Sub-District) in the Daerah Tingkat II Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau (Riau Islands 
Regency - second tier local government), to become a Daerah Tingkat I Kotamadya 
Administratif (Administrative Mayoralty - first tier local government) with three 
Kecamatan (Sub-districts), the first such Administrative structure in Indonesia.96 The 
Kotamadya Administratif Pulau Batam was inaugurated by Government Regulation on 
7 December 1983.97 
The new administrative structure on Batam Island meant that Pemda Riau (Pemerintah 
Daerah Riau or Riau Local Government) was represented on Batam Island by a 
Walikota (Mayor) who was directly responsible to the Riau Governor, and not as 
previously by a Camat (Sub-District Head) who was indirectly responsible to the 
93 .Amm, 23 November 1982. 
941nterview with former Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, 4 August 1994. 
95Based on Keputusag Presic1eo No.250/1983, the Board's members included the Minister for Internal Affairs, 
Minister of Defence and Security, Minister of Finance, Minister for Public Works, Menteri/Ketua Bappenas, 
Menmud Sekkab, Menpan and Panglima ABRI. 
96Early discussion and the debates on the form of Batam's local government, and the processes involved can be 
found in Amill!, 28 June 1983. Sinar Harapan, 7 September 1983. Suara Katya. 26 September 1983. KmlwM. 26 
September 1983 . .Aow:i, 19 November 1988. Sinar Hi!JAP3Q, 21 November 1983 . .Kwmml, 22 November 1983. 
AD1llu. 20 December 1983. Suara Katya, 21 December 1983 . .Kwm2Bl, 22 December 1983. 
97reraturap Pemeriptah No.34/1983, (7 December 1983). For details of organisation and guidelines of the new local 
government structure see Ke.putusag Meoteri Dajani Neeeri No.68 1983, (6 December 1983). Interestingly, the 
governor caaie out well before a decision had been made to say that Batam would become a K.otamadya 
Administratif, and although this was refuted by the Dir-Jen Pemerintahan Umum dan Otonomi Daerah (Director-
General of Local Government and Regional Autonomy) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in front of the DPR 
K.omisi Il, this was to be the case • .Amm, 27September1983. Kwmzg, 26 September 1983. 
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Governor through the Bupati (Regent). However, unlike other Kotamadya or 
Kabupaten, Batam Island did not get a DPRD (Regional Legislative Assembly). 98 
Because of its small population, it was clear that Batam Island did not fulfil the 
conditions necessary to become a full-fledged Kotamadya, but that the decision to 
change the local government structure was made in accordance with the level of 
industrial development and community lifestyle on the island, and in anticipation of 
future needs. Essentially the Kotamadya would provide government services, take over 
time-consuming activities such as processing identity cards, and look after social and 
cultural aspects of development, whilst at the same time providing BIDA with direct 
access to the Governor. 99 
Despite the changes to local government structures, new problems were to arise, 
essentially regarding the separation of powers and responsibilities between the two 
administrative bodies on Batam Island - BIDA and Pemda Riau. It was always to be 
difficult relationship because both thought that they were the administrator of the 
island.100 Whilst the new Batam Kotamadya covered 186 islands, of which Batam was 
just one, BID A's area of responsibility covered only the area of Batam Island and not all 
of the Kotamadya. Yet, as pointed out by the Riau Governor, the Presidential Decree 
(No.4111973) which created BIDA, gave it responsibility for daerah industri Pulau 
Batam (Batam Island industrial area), wilayah Pulau Batam (Batam Island area) and 
areal terletak di Pulau Batam (land on Batam Island).101 All three terms had quite 
different meanings and required clarification, as did the mandates of both BIDA and the 
Walikota. 
A follow-up decree was therefore issued to define the tasks, powers and responsibilities 
of both BIDA and the local government. It declared Kotamadya Batam as the single 
government authority on Batam, with the main task of supporting the development of 
Batam Island, concentrating particularly on social, cultural and political aspects. The 
development of the Batam Island· industrial area was the responsibility of BIDA, and 
carried out according to the Masterplan. The decree was intended to increase 
cooperation between BIDA and the Batam local government, and to remove barriers or 
obstacles in coordinating and implementing their tasks and responsibilities. 102 Whilst 
the law on local government (Undang-Undang No.5 1974) stated that the Mayor was 
the single government authority for government administration, economic development, 
98sinar Harapan, 7 September 1983. Suara Kazya, 26September1983. 
~. 13 August 1985. Interview with former BIDA Chief Executive, Soedarsono, 6 October 1994. 
lOOinterview with Soedarsono, 6 October 1994. 
101 Spara Katya, 28 March 1983. 
102KQPutusan fresiden No.7 1984, (23 January 1984). See also Suara Kar.ya, 9 February 1984. Merdeka, 31 
January 1984. ADW:ll, 8 February 1984. Business News, 10 February 1984. 
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and socio-political development, on Batara Island the responsibility for economic 
development was to be BIDA's.103 
Late in 1984, the President placed five more islands around Batara - Pulau Janda 
Berhias, Pulau Tanjung Sauh, Pulau Ngenang, Pulau Kasem and Pulau Moimoi - into 
BIDA's working area and into the bonded zone. BIDA already had the right of 
management over land on these islands under previous regulations. In announcing the 
decision, the President said that it was deemed necessary to increase BIDA's working 
area in order to facilitate the development of the Batara industrial area.104 It also aimed 
to consolidate BIDA's authority. 
Despite the new definition of responsibilities, it was clear that BIDA was the more 
authoritative institution, simply because it was both a central government instrument 
and, as an institution on Batara, it had been there longer. Furthermore, BIDA had 
special powers, such as over land - Pemda had to request land locations from BIDA to 
build offices and schools while at the same time have BIDA build these facilities.105 
Such was the lack of power of the local government, that the first Mayor on Batam 
Island was often teased that his only job was to go back and forth to the airport to meet 
officials from Jakarta, and to arrange identity cards.106 A survey conducted in 1986 
found that 30% of respondents knew the name of the BIDA Chief Executive, whilst 
only 7% knew the name of the Mayor.107 
One glaring example of the poor coordination that existed between BIDA and the 
Kotamadya was the inaction taken 'by both sides after a fire destroyed over 300 houses 
in Sungai Jodoh village in June 1985. The immediate response from BIDA was the 
announcement that no-one could repair or re-build houses in the same area. Some two 
months later there was still no word as to where those affected should move, apparently 
because BIDA and the Kotamadya were still conferring. Reasons given for the delay 
included that the Kotamadya did not have the power to face up to BIDA, and that BIDA 
and its officials were arrogant.108 However, quite clearly the problem was one of poor 
coordination. 100 
1031nterview with BIDA Executive, Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
104JW>utusao Presi<1en No 56/1984, (18 September 1984). ADW:A. 21 September 1984 . .Kwm211a. 21 September 
1984. MersJ .. kn, 22 September 1984. 
105Merdeka. 13 August 1985. 
106~ 22 May 1983. 
107 UPI; Apt Sosial Budaya Pen&emban&an Pulau Batam , (UPI 1986), p 33. 
108Mer<leka, 13 August 1985. According to another source, the number of houses was 3,000. Suara Karya, 3 March 
1986. 
lOOFor continuing debate about Dualism, Autonomy, Coordination, etc. see Betita Buaoa, 19 July 1985. Ms'd .. ka, 
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Royalties from the sale of sand to Singapore - Batara had been exporting sand to 
Singapore for land reclamation purposes for many years - continued to be a contentious 
issue in relations between the Governor's office and BIDA. There was a local joke on 
Batam Island - 'Indonesia menjual tanahnya, yang tinggal airnya' (Indonesia sells its 
land, what remains is its water) in reference to the Indonesia expression for the 
motherland, 'tanah air kita' (Our land and water).110 
By 1984, sand was Batam Island's second highest export earner - worth US$681,800 in 
the first 9 months of the year. 111 The income collected as royalties from the export of 
sand from Batam and surrounds was only to be used for the Riau community, yet the 
royalties for the sand mined were not handed straight over to the local government but 
were stored in a bank account by BIDA. On being questioned over its use, Habibie 
denied that BIDA had used any of the money from sand royalties because BIDA was 
funded by central government funds.112 
The ongoing conflict between the Riau Governor and BIDA over who should receive 
the proceeds from the sale of sand from Batam to Singapore became less of a problem 
after an agreement was reached that royalties from sand from around Batam would go 
to BIDA and sand from around other islands would go to the Riau Government.113 
However, transfers to the Riau government were only made on the specific orders of the 
President, and only for the purpose of being used for large and often politically 
important projects.114 For instance, in 1983 Habibie handed over Rpl.023 billion to the 
Riau Governor for the building of the Hangtuah Stadium in Pekanbaru 115, and a further 
Rp 692.749.000 for the building of the Lancang Kuning University campus in 
Pekanbaru. 116 
The settlement, however, was short-lived. Beginning 1985, BIDA began to use the 
sand royalties for its own purposes, and between 1986 and 1990 they made up the bulk 
of BIDA's budget, leading Soedarsono to claim that BIDA was able to be financially 
autonomous and could support itself with only the royalties from the export of sand to 
Singapore and without help from the central government117 
llOsinarHaraoan, 26November1981. 
111 ADm, 21 November 1984. Income from sand royalties was more than Rp800 million in 1981. Sinar Hampan, 
26 November 1981. 
112Merdeka, 19 February 1983. 
113 Sinar Harapau, 21 April 1981. The DPR Komisi X expressed concern that royalties received by BIDA be 
carefully controlled, and that the sale of land sand, as opposed to sea sand, was closed. Sinar Haraoan, 1 July 1981. 
114sinar Harapan, 18 February 1983. Mer<leka, 19 February 1983. 
115 Sinar Harnpan, 18 February 1983. Mex<leka, 19 February 1983. 
116 AD1ar1. 6 May 1983. 
117 Suara Kar.ya. 9 July 1987. For budget details see BIDA; Data KemvJuan Pembani:unan Daerab lndustri Pulau 
Batam sampaUdeni:an Bulan Amil 1991 (Jakarta 1991). 
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The administrative set-up on Batam Island whereby two bodies - BIDA and the 
Kotamadya Batam - had administrative roles was unique in Indonesia. However, 
whilst legislation was clear about the jurisdiction of the two authorities, serious 
problems arose at the operational level. There is no doubt that BIDA was the more 
authoritative, and whilst retaining social and administrative functions, the Kotamadya 
was not considered in overall planning. Quite clearly, local and regional interests took 
second priority in the development of Batam Island. This fact was stressed by Habibie. 
Batam is for the whole Indonesian development 118 
Singapore and Batam Island in the 1980s 
Batam Island was the one constant item on the agenda of Singapore-Indonesia relations 
throughout the 1980s. Despite the restrictive investment climate and infrastructure 
inadequacies of Batam Island, the Singapore government continued to express a keen 
interest in Batam's future development, and continued to encourage the Indonesian 
government to address those problems. As one Singapore businessman said, 
Singapore ... often pushes the Indonesian government about when Batam Island will be ready.119 
During talks in December 1983, and again in December 1984, Singapore Prime 
Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, re-emphasised Singapore's support for the concept of 
complementary development between Batam Island and Singapore, and called for the 
speedy completion of infrastructure as well as greater incentives in order to attract 
investment. President Soeharto told him that Indonesia's plans to industrialise Batam 
Island could not be separated from Singapore's growth as one of the foremost trading 
and financial centres in Asia, stressing that Indonesia would support and benefit from 
the transformation of Singapore to an advanced modern industrial and service 
economy.120 Soeharto said, 
We sincerely expect Singapore to expand further as an outstanding financial centre in the world, 
because such progress will also be beneficial for economic cooperation between Singapore and 
Indonesia, particularly for the development of Batam. 121 
The main point of discussions throughout the mid to late-1980s was about the slow rate 
of investment on Batam Island, in particular that Singapore's participation in the 
development of the island had not been as rapid as anticipated. Lee often reiterated his 
government's support for the development of the island in the face of Indonesian calls 
118Far Eastern F&ooomic Review, 7 February 1985. 
119Jwnal Ekuin. 21July1981. 
120Kww;m, 28 December 1983. Straits Times 28 December 1983. Indonesia DeyelQguumt News. Vol.7 No.5 
(January 1984). 
121 Straits Times, 27 December 1983. 
163 
for more assistance because of the continued failure to achieve economic growth on 
Batam.122 Yet there was considerable doubt in Indonesia about Singapore's 
commitment to participating in Batam Island's development. Certain circles in Jakarta 
believed that Singapore had not lived up to the expectations of the 1980 agreement, and 
should do more to speed up the development of the island.123 
One reason for this doubt was that Singapore government officials remained cagey 
about their commitment. Singapore officials denied allegations that Singapore had not 
been helpful enough in the development of Batam, saying that Singapore's policy had 
always been to leave it to the private sector to make decisions regarding investing on 
Batam. Lee often clarified that the Singaporean government would not invest on Batam 
Island, and that the private sector should make their own commitments, but also adding 
that Singapore would help woo private investors to invest in Batam Island.124 
However, Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, was of the view that the Singapore 
government was not able to direct private businessmen or industries to invest on Batam 
Island, because the decision rested solely on the private sector itself. 125 
In June 1986, Goh Chok Tong was forced to deny allegations that Singapore saw the 
development of the island as a threat to Singapore's pre-eminent position as the regional 
trade and commercial centre, saying that the Singapore government viewed Batam's 
development with favour and believed it would be to the benefit of Singapore. Goh told 
critics in Indonesia that it was wrong to complain about slow progress because a 
recession was on, and that it was unfair to compare Singapore with Batam because 
Singapore took 150 years to develop and Batam had only just started. 126 Indonesian 
diplomats were understanding. At the end of a six-year term in Singapore, Indonesian 
Ambassador Sujatmiko commented that, 
I did not see any competition, because Singapore and Batam cannot be comparoo.127 
Lee was also of the opinion that the world recession had caused a drop in investment in 
Singapore and the region, and that this in tum had affected both Singapore's investment 
on Batam Island, and slowed Batam Island's take-off.128 Lee told a press conference in 
1983, 
1221ndonesia Development News, Vol.7 No.5 (January 1984), p8. 
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As President Soeharto says, it is long-term development. There is a recession on at the moment, 
so investments both in Singapore and even in the region have slowed down. 129 
Whilst this disappointed some Indonesians, official circles were believed to be more 
understanding, and it appeared that Jakarta believed that the Singapore government was 
doing as much as it could. Soeharto did not voice the idea that Singapore was in a sense 
'morally obliged' to participate in the development of the island but, as the 1980s 
progressed and the technocrats began their series of regulatory reforms, instead gave 
precedence to private sector initiatives in conformity with the beginning of a more 
general liberalisation in Indonesia of administrative and economic mechanisms.130 
When asked if Singapore should be more committed, State Secretary, Sudharmono 
replied, 
No need. Batam is open for anybody to invest. Even if there are no investors interested, no 
problem. 131 
For the most part, however, the Indonesian press and officials were pushing the line that 
Singapore had a special obligation to help develop Batam, because Singapore had long 
prospered because of trade with and its proximity to Indonesia. l32 One exception was a 
Jakarta Post editorial which, whilst still saying that Singapore should help, also 
conceded that Batam had to help itself. 
The idea, at least in theory, is that Batam, a mere 20 km from Singapore, is in a prime 
position ... But what seemed great on the drawing board a decade ago has run into a number of 
snags (many of which have plagued other Indonesian development projects). And Singapore has 
done little more than give its 'support in principle' to the ambitious plans for Batam ... But there are 
some reasons why Singapore has been sitting on its hands when it comes to Batam Island's 
development - immigration, customs and shipping. Batam's ports are still woefully undeveloped 
and that old bugaboo, red-tape and corruption, haunts the customs officers in the sea and 
airports.133 
Not only had the Batam Cooperation Agreement made little impact on the free 
movement of people, goods and services between Singapore and Batam Island - the 
success of Batam depended largely on free traffic between Singapore and Batam, and 
between Batam and other Indonesian ports, yet the three biggest obstacles to 
Indonesia's competitiveness in trade and manufacturing were immigration, customs and 
129 Straits Times, 28 December 1983. 
130straits Tunes. 5 April 1985. 
131 Straits Tunes, 4 April 1985. 
132Straits Times, 6 April 1985. 
133 Jakat1a Post 2 April 1985. Straits Times, 3 April 1985. 
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shipping - but Batam was beset with a poor regulatory environment and inadequate 
infrastructure. 
Batam Island had to help itself first, by improving facilities, cutting red tape and 
combating corruption. It was already a very real problem that Batam Island did not 
satisfy most of the preconditions for becoming an industrial and commercial centre, in 
particular in transport, infrastructure and labour. However, the biggest threat did not 
just come from inadequate infrastructure and public facilities but from bureaucratic red 
tape. Being devoid of natural resources, Batam Island could only capitalise on 
efficiency, attractive regulations and an adequate supply of skilled and relatively low-
cost labour. 
It was also becoming clear to Jakarta that investment was a matter between the private 
sector and BIDA.134 This was being stressed by Singapore all along. Lee's view was 
that it was not true that Singapore did not want to participate in development projects on 
Batam, but that Batam Island itself had to further develop infrastructure to attract 
Singapore investors. 135 Lee told Soeharto, 
We have made every effort to facilitate the wooing of investors. But the wooing must be done by 
the Batam Authority itself. They have to deal with the nitty-gritty, the nuts and bolts of incentives 
and facilities. 136 
The Indonesian government and Habibie were aware of the importance of Singaporean 
involvement on Batam, and had recognised Singapore's two major restraints, land and 
labour, but they had failed to come to terms with how to attract industries facing those 
constraints and staying competitive in Singapore. Because of its proximity, Singapore 
could be the only major foreign contributor to a rapid development of Batam Island. 
Singaporean investment had already made an impact on other neighbouring regions -
Johor, Sarawak and Brunei - but continued to by-pass Batam Island. 
The Indonesian government may well have been convinced of the need for close 
cooperation with Singapore, but the type of nationalist reaction which had greeted the 
signing of the Batam Cooperation Agreement in 1980 would have been firmly in the 
front of their minds. There is no doubt that any massive inflow of foreign investment to 
Batam from Singapore, which in the nature of the case would be predominantly 
Chinese, could give rise to concern in certain political circles in Indonesia, and could 
further exacerbate Chinese-pribumi political tensions in Indonesia.137 
134straits Times, 6 April 1985. 
135Berita Buana. 4 April 1985. 
136 Strajts Times, 27 December 1983. 
137 Asian Fjnance, 15 June 1988, p 75. 
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There was one further hiccup to overcome before Singapore would actively invest on 
Batam. Lee had agreed to support Batam on the condition that gambling should never 
be allowed as part of the island's tourism development. This had been settled and 
agreed upon by Indonesia in 1979. However, Singapore's concerns resurfaced with the 
March 1988 opening of the Hill Top Hotel, whose "members-only club" was running 
jackpot machines, keno, mahjong, blackjack, roulette and baccarat. A month after its 
opening, in reportedly the biggest ever police action on Batam, the Hill Top Hotel was 
raided by a special military and police task force flown in from Jakarta.138 
The hotel's operations were no secret - media reports preceding the raid abounded with 
stories about the casino at the Hill Top Hotel, leading to accusations that Batam Island 
had become an enclave with special status because gambling had been banned in 
Indonesia in April 1981.139 Following.media criticism that Batam Island had become 
an unofficial gambling haven for rich Indonesians, Habibie said that the Indonesian 
government had received several offers to start legalised gambling on Batam, but that 
all had been rejected because gambling had been disallowed throughout Indonesia, and 
Batam Island would be no exception.140 
Major-General (ret) Ibnu Hartomo, the brother of the President's wife, Tien, came out to 
say that a gambling operation he once started on Batam Island was forced to shut down 
following talks between Indonesia and Singapore. He said that the operation was 
stopped because of the disagreeable reaction in Singapore, and had led to an agreement 
being made with the Singapore government not to allow gambling on the island.141 The 
quick action taken against the casino, however, allayed Singapore's fear that gambling 
would be permitted on Batam Island. 
When Lee Kuan Yew and Soeharto met in Singapore in December 1988142, the rhetoric 
of the previous decade of discussions on Batam Island continued to be repeated. The 
positions of both governments had changed little over the years. In fact, meetings and 
bilateral consultations between Singapore and Indonesia had become so frequent as to 
be unremarkable, and discussions about Batam Island equally so. 
138straits TlQles. 7 April 1988. ~. 16 April 1988. Straits Times. 23 April 1988. ~ 30 April 1988. For 
details of the court trial see ImJ.gQ. 21 January 1989. 
139stcaits Tunes, 7 April 1988. Merdeka, 27 April 1988. 
140Mer<leka, 18 June 1988. Suara Pembaruan. 18 June 1988. Straits Tunes. 19 June 1988. 
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1988. 
142The Jakarta Post 28 December 1988. 
167 
The results of the decade of development to 1988 were surprisingly poor. In particular, 
BIDA made little headway in attracting new foreign investment. In the period 1978-
1988, little more than half-a-dozen new foreign investments had been realised - one was 
a hotel first planned in the early 1970s and the rest were related to the oil-industry, the 
result of Pertamina policy initiatives. By the end of 1988 only thirteen foreign 
companies were operating on Batam, while export earnings amounted to only 
US$44.2m. The only new economic activity to make an impact was tourism, which 
earned US$30.5m in 1988, making up 41 % of total foreign exchange earnings. At a 
regional level, Batam's GDP was only 3.5% of the Riau economy, its growth only 
slightly higher than Riau province, and its share of Riau's manufacturing sector only 
16% in 1988, up from 5% in 1983.143 
Potential investors continued to express reservations about the level of infrastructure, 
the regulatory environment as well as existing incentives. BIDA appeared to be 
responsive to existing investor's infrastructure needs, for government investment 
accounted for around 40% of total investment on the island, yet was still unable to 
supply enough electricity and water. As far as the regulatory system was concerned 
BIDA showed a complete lack of insight. The government did occasionally respond to 
the needs of existing investors, such as providing relaxed immigration procedures and 
labour conditions 144, however no attempt was made at policy changes or initiatives to 
make Batam Island a more attractive location for new investment. BIDA and Batam 
Island enjoyed special status. Neither the various sectoral ministries in Jakarta or 
provincial authorities in Riau were willing or able to interfere.145 As a result, Batam 
Island remained a virtual enclave, unresponsive to outside influence, either from 
government or business. A Jakarta Post editorial quite succinctly described the overall 
situation on Batam Island in the late 1980s: 
Soedarsono Darmosoewito likes to apply B. J. Habibie's balloon theory in stressing the rationale 
for the development of Batam island, 20 kilometres southeast of Singapore, as a commercial and 
industrial centre. The balloon theory says that as Singapore (the first balloon) will grow to its 
optimal size, the island republic will need a valve (another balloon) - the role expected to be 
played by the 415-square kilometre Batam island. But there are many factors which will determine 
whether Batam can supplant other countries close to Singapore as the second balloon for the city 
143 Mubariq Ahmad ; "Economic cooperation in the Southern Growth Triangle : An Indonesian perspective" in Toh 
Mun Heng & Linda Low (eds) Ree;iona} Cooperation and Growth Triane;les ip ASEAN (Times Academic Press, 
Singapore 1993), pp 96-97. 
144Two recent Ministerial decrees had slightly loosened labour conditions on Batam Island. The first gave the 
Batam Manpower office authority to issue interim permits for foreign workers. Surat Keputusan Mepteri Tenaea 
Keija No,Kep-165/MEN/87 (7 February 1987). The second set a minimum wage for workers on Batam Island. 
Surat Ke.putusau Meoteri Teonea Keija No.Kep-117/MEl/88 (22 January 1988). 
145 Asian Finance, 15 June 1988, p 75. 
168 
state. Soedarsono and Habibie, as the executive director and chairman respectively of the Batam 
Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), are responsible for ensuring that Batam assumes that 
role. 
Batam, like Singapore over one hundred years ago, has no natural resources, but is in a strategic 
location - near key international shipping lanes. Industrial enterprises on this island must bring all 
basic materials from outside (other Indonesian islands or foreign countries) and they must also 
depend entirely on outside markets. Therefore, Batam has to provide the type and quality of 
service and facilities which have so far attracted industrial enterprises to Singapore. 
The Indonesian government is fully aware of these fundamental requirements, as can be seen in 
the establishment of BIDA as the sole authority in charge of development on that island and the 
designation of the entire island as a bonded zone. The government, through BIDA, has invested 
over US$280 million in the island's development and many firms have established operations 
there. But the pace of Batam's development has not been as fast as expected and most of the 
businesses on the island are still oriented to the domestic market, notably the oil and natural gas 
industry. Obviously, the weakening economic condition has been a major factor in this slowdown. 
Moreover, the severely limited government budget has resulted in a sharp deaease in the building 
of basic infrastructures, public facilities and utilities. 
Consequently Batam still doesn't satisfy most of the preconditions for becoming an industrial and 
commercial centre. Its transhipment facilities, power capacity, supply of trained and skilled labour 
and telecommunication networks are still inadequate. Labor costs on the island are much higher 
than in the rest of the country because the cost of living there is also much more expensive. · 
Investment licensing has indeed been expedited after the full delegation of authority from the 
Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) to BIDA. But other procedures such as customs, 
immigration and other regulatory requirements which are outside BIDA's power are not as 
efficient as they should be to attract investors. In fact, the biggest threat to Batam's development 
will not come from inadequate infrastructure and public facilities but from bureaucratic red tape. 
Batam should be able to develop a working environment on a par with international efficiency 
levels. All government agencies on the island should be strikingly different from those in other 
parts of the country in terms of efficiency otherwise Batam will not be much different from other 
Indonesian island. Batam, being devoid of natural resources, can capitalise only on efficiency, 
good infrastructure and adequate supply of skilled and relatively low-cost labour. Efforts to 
develop Batam should therefore be concentrated on these factors.146 
146The Jakarta Post 16 February 1987. For a more in-depth and broad assessment of Batam Island at the end of 
1988, see the various articles which appeared in .Kwmzu, 2November1988. 
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Perhaps the major problem for Batam Island was its record. It had been presented so 
often as on the verge of booming that it had fallen into a credibility gap. Batam Island 
needed something new, or something to change, in order to get its development off the 
ground. An Indonesian newspaper editorial had warned as early as 1983 that, 
There is a danger that the concept of developing Batam Island could suffer what is called 'oversell' 
by public relations people.147 
Policy-making 
During the 1980s, the policy-making processes on Batam were highly centralised and 
generally insulated from non-state pressures, and only one ·feature consistently 
influenced the policy processes - Presidential Domination. Clientelism was apparent, as 
was Intra-elite conflict, but neither played a consistent or significant part in the policy-
making processes, while non-state pressures, societal and external, were virtually non-
existent. 
Dominating the policy-making structure for Batam Island was President Soeharto, and 
he became its strongest advocate. Whilst his influence was not obvious on a daily basis, 
Soeharto was the key player in the policy-making processes, leaving the major daily 
decision-making to Habibie. At the same time, Soeharto encouraged Habibie's 
emphasis on capital-intensive and technology-driven investment and supported the huge 
government expenditures on infrastructure development. Soeharto made this clear 
when he took half of the new Indonesian cabinet to Batam in late 1983 as a show of 
support for Habibie's policies and to cut off possible dissent within government ranks. 
Unlike in previous periods, key features of Indonesian political economy such as 
Clientelism and Intra-Elite Politicking were virtually absent during this phase of 
Batam's development. The reason for this situation was that Batam was politically and 
economically unimportant in relation to overall developments in Indonesia. 
Habibie had complete control over developments on Batam, and was largely unaffected 
by interference from the technocrats. This was clear by the way in which Habibie 
quickly changed the focus of development away from the technocrats' target of broad-
based industrialisation towards intermediate, high-technology and capital-intensive 
industries. Under Habibie, the state monopolised economic policy and activity on 
Batam - it was the main investor and it tightly controlled the activities of the private 
sector through restrictive economic nationalist policies such as the DSP. For example, 
147 Editorial. Sinar Harapao, 13 May 1983. 
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the boom period of 1984-85, which was limited solely to the oil sector, was closely 
related to a decision/policy from the central government 
If the technocrats had wanted to make regulatory reforms for Batam Island, they did not 
have much success - Habibie was in firm control and apparently not to be budged from 
his policy of regulating investment behaviour on Batam. However, considering the 
enormous changes taking place at the macro-economic level where the technocrats had 
greatest influence, it is likely that Batam was of little interest to them. In the mid-
1980s, declining world oil prices necessitated a shift in economic policies towards 
progressive deregulation of the Indonesian economy, and it was at this level that the 
technocrats were most focused for a good part of the decade. 
Clientelism was not an obvious feature of the policy-making processes during the 
1980s. This was mainly due to the fact that limited economic activity had removed a 
source of patronage for possible patron-client relationships to develop. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, Batam was not a particularly attractive location for domestic 
investors who were still commercially timid, and more interested in domestic markets 
that in an industrial zone catering to export-oriented manufacturers. 
Pluralist pressures, particularly non-state societal influences, on the Batam project were 
very weak. The reason for this lay in the fact that the local population was small in 
number - around 50,000 - and thus politically marginal. Despite the creation of the 
Batam Mayoralty in 1983, thanks to strong support from the Department of Internal 
Affairs, the Riau provincial government remained weak vis-a-vis BIDA and the national 
government Both the DPR and the Mass Media were outspoken on issues such as land 
acquisition and compensation, and the role of local government, but neither had any 
substantial influence on the policy-making processes. 
The international economic system had an impact on the policy choices facing Batam 
Island. In particular, reliance on the oil industry meant that the fortunes of Batam were 
strongly tied to those of international oil markets. As a result, the downturn in the 
international oil sector during the mid-1980s adversely affected the Batam Island 
economy. 
However, the influence of external variables was less apparent than in the past. 
International capital had minimal impact on the policy-making processes, perhaps due 
solely to the fact that there were only thirteen foreign companies in operation by 1988, 
half of which had been forced to relocate to Batam from overseas by nationalist 
measures implemented by Pertamina. 
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As for foreign governments, Singapore was still an important external consideration in 
the minds of Indonesia's policy makers, and Batam remained a topic on the agenda of 
talks between Soeharto and Lee. However, despite the signing of the Batam 
Cooperation Agreement in 1980, the Singapore government was unable to achieve its 
main objective - the development of the Batam industrial area for relocating Singapore 
companies. Nonetheless, the Singapore government continued to be a policy 
consideration simply by virtue of its geographical proximity. 
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6 
Batam Island in the 1990s 
Two crucial events in 1989 made Batam Island a more attractive investment location. 
The first was an agreement between Indonesia and Singapore to closely cooperate in the 
development of Batam. The second was a regulatory change which allowed 100% 
foreign ownership of enterprises on Batam. Those two events led to an economic boom 
on Batam in the early 1990s, one that appears sustainable for the rest of the decade. 
After more than two decades of promise, Batam Island looks set to reach its long-
awaited fulfilment as an industrial, transhipment and tourist area. However, Batam still 
faces numerous problems. Infrastructure development remains inadequate, the 
regulatory environment is stifling, government coordination is poor, and economic 
nationalist structures remain in place. 
The Second Indonesia-Singapore Agreement on Batam 
In 1989, Indonesian and Singaporean aims for Batam Island finally converged. Whilst 
earlier attempts at cooperation received little attention in Singapore and Indonesia, 
mainly because each had other goals and priorities - the 1980 Batam Cooperation 
Agreement, in particular, had achieved little in terms of cross-border movements of 
capital and goods - in 1989, it became clear that leaders in both countries wanted to 
cooperate in Batam's development. 
Singapore had its own reasons for encouraging cooperation, and like Indonesia they 
were purely self-interested. Singapore had land and labour constraints which could 
only be overcome by the relocation of Singaporean and multinational companies, 
especially labour-intensive and electronics operations. Private Singaporean interest in 
Batam Island had already picked up considerably, and throughout 1988 and 1989, study 
missions, business forums and invitations to invest in the island had raised the attention 
of Singaporean businessmen, developers, manufacturers and the public. Yet, despite 
increased interest, the feedback from missions such as that of the SMA (Singapore 
Manufacturers Association) which inspected Batam in July 1989 could generally be 
summed up with one word - caution. I 
The reservations held by potential investors concerned the level of infrastructure and 
existing investment incentives on Batam Island. Indeed, according to then Junior 
1 Business Tunes, 20 July 1989. 
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Minister for Industry, Tungky Ariwibowo, several major problems, especially shortages 
of electricity and water, still needed to be overcome on Batam.2 However, despite the 
fact that its facilities may have been relatively basic, Batam had become an attractive 
option because the neighbouring Malaysian state of Johor, which had long been a 
popular place for relocation of companies in Singapore, was becoming expensive and 
experiencing bottlenecks. After years of hesitation, developments indicated that Batam 
might become an alternative to Johor for the relocation of some of Singapore's labour-
intensive manufacturing industries. Essentially the change in attitude was a defensive 
action on Singapore's part.3 
At the beginning of 1989, Singaporean officials believed that it was time to take another 
look at Batam Island. Two independent but convergent routes were taken. In late 1988, 
the Singapore government was becoming increasingly concerned with the growing 
number of MNCs based in Singapore relocating to elsewhere in the region, and began 
looking at ways in which Singapore could both maintain MNCs as well as remain a 
competitive and attractive investment location. 4 An important study, supervised by the 
Head of the MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore), Goh Keng Swee, concluded that 
an industrial estate on Batam Island would assist in maintaining Singapore as a 
beachhead for direct investments in the region. A proposal about ways Singapore and 
Indonesia could cooperate on this was made to the EDB (Economic Development 
Board).5 
EDB Chairman, Philip Yeo, also visited Batam Island, following an invitation by 
Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore, Tuk Setyohadi, and came to the conclusion that 
an industrial estate on Batam Island would not only help maintain Singapore's growth 
but would create significant investment and employment opportunities for Indonesia. 6 
Considering the infrastructure inadequacies of Batam, the EDB concluded that major 
Singaporean companies should take the lead and pave the way for smaller companies to 
follow by developing infrastructure and providing confidence. 7 This attitude was 
widely supported in Singapore where businessmen closely followed the series of 
Singapore and Indonesian government talks which followed with much interest, 
2s1raits Times, 15November1989. J@kartA Post, 14 November 1989. 
3Interview with former Singapore Ambassador to Indonesia, Barry Desker, 23 September 1994. 
4Interview with former minister and bead of the MAS, Goh Keng Swee, 29 September 1994. See also Gob Keng 
Swee ; "The Technology Ladder in Development : the Singapore case" Asia-Pacific Economic Literature Vol.10 
No.1 (May 1996), pp 1-12. 
5s1raits Twes, 2August1991. 
6Sin&ggore Business, August 1991. Straits Ibnes, 2 August 1991. As Head of the MAS (Monetary Authority of 
Singapore) in the 1980s, Gob bad commissioned studies to monitor MNCs based in Singapore and determine bow 
they could be maintained in Singapore, in response to a trend of MNCs re-locating to Malaysia and Thailand. 
Interview with Gob Keng Swee, 29 September 1994. 
7 Business Times, 20 July 1989. Business Times, 5-6 August 1989. S!raits Times, 6 September 1989. 
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reportedly exerting considerable pressure on Singapore to encourage Indonesia to make 
regulatory changes. 8 According to one businessman, 
I think you need some leaders to provide the confidence. If a really big business set up operations 
[on Batam], then the rest will be encouraged.9 
The EDB's proposal was taken up by Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and 
during discussions with President Soeharto in Brunei on 2 August, Lee raised the 
possibility of multinational companies, particularly those in electronics, getting terms 
and conditions for investments in Batam similar to those in Singapore, so that they 
could consider Batam when expanding.10 Lee's idea was well received in Jakarta, for 
the initiative coincided with Indonesia's push for a more open and less regulated 
economy, in part to attract foreign investment 
Despite the fact that Indonesia had long concentrated on developing its resources, 
including Batam Island, in a nationalistic manner, several factors led to a dramatic 
change in attitude towards cooperation with Singapore. In particular, there was a strong 
feeling that the government was 'running against time' in its efforts to attract 
investments to Batam Island and elsewhere in Indonesia, and that changes had to be 
made - both regulatory and in attitude. Furthermore, the Indonesian government, 
having long experienced barriers in Batam's development such as limited funds and 
poor investor interest, realised that great potential lay in cooperation with Singapore. 
At the same time, Singapore provided extra pressure on Soeharto and Habibie to make 
the regulatory changes the technocrats had long been pushing. The extent to which 
Singapore's wishes were accommodated was indicative of the close relationship 
between Soeharto and Lee. It may also have been indicative of Singaporean financial 
assistance - the injection of over US$100m. of foreign aid into BIDA's budget for the 
financial year 1989/1990 may have been more than simply coincidence.n 
Habibie had long been interested in attracting electronics MNCs to Batam Island, even 
if simply to supply parts and components for assembly in Singapore, for they 
conformed with his aims for technology-based industries on Batam Island. In fact, 
already one MNC, French electronics company Thomson S.A., had established an 
Spar Eastern Economic Review, 30November1989. 
9Business Tunes, 5-6 August 1989. 
lOStraits Times, 3 August 1989. Business Times, 5-6 August 1989. According to State Secretary Murdiono, 
questions of greater cooperation over the development of Batam were first raised when they m~t in Brunei. &rm 
Iiula. 8 October 1989. S1raits Times, 2 August 1991. 
l loPDIPB ; Data Kemaiuan J>embanr:upap Daerah mdustri Pulau Batam samgai/deor:an bulan Agril 1991 (Jakarta, 
1991). 
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assembly plant on Batam because of worker shortages and costs in Singapore.12 The 
question for Habibie, however, was what kind of technology would be utilised by 
relocating companies and what kind of incentives were needed. 
On 5 September, Habibie visited Singapore to meet First Deputy Prime Minister, Goh 
Chok Tong, and the EDB's Philip Yeo, to discuss Singapore's experiences with MNCs 
as well as to visit the operations of several electronics MNCs. Convinced of the 
possibilities, Habibie immediately announced that he was open to labour-intensive high-
technology industries, particularly electronics operations, on Batam Island.13 Habibie 
also suggested the formation of a government-level working committee to find ways to 
discuss, evaluate and suggest areas for cooperation in order to boost economic 
development on Batam.14 
On 24 October 1989, the Indonesian government announced policy changes which 
provided for 100% foreign ownership on Batam Island, the only condition being a 5% 
divestment to an Indonesian partner within five years.15 The policy differed radically 
from the rest of Indonesia where domestic ownership had to reach 51 % within 15 years, 
and essentially made Batam Island a special economic zone, allowing foreign investors 
to set up companies without a local partner.16 The insistence that Indonesians hold at 
least 5% equity was a matter of contention, especially for electronics companies 
concerned about losing sensitive technology to their partners. However, the ruling 
appeared to be a compromise, catering to both Indonesian nationalist sentiments by 
maintaining an element of domestic ownership in foreign investment projects, and at the 
same time being designed to guard technology as demanded by electronics firms. 
One view is that a hefty diplomatic push from Singapore, in addition to Lee's personal 
urging to Soeharto during discussions held in Jakarta on 6 October, persuaded Jakarta.to 
make changes to foreign ownership of enterprises on Batam Island.17 The validity of 
that view is not clear, but it certainly does hold some merit.18 Nevertheless, it is clear 
12They had subcontracted to CV New Paris Group, a PMDN company. Despite additional shipping costs they 
claimed to save 8$1 million in the first year alone. Construction Industry Development Board; Batam Outlook 1990. 
(Singapore, October June 1989), p 5. 
13Sttaits Times, 6 September 1989. Straits Times, 7 September 1989. 
14Business Times. 7September1989. Straits Tmws, 7September1989. 
15If a company exported 100% of its products no further divestment would be necessary. Surat Ke,put11san Ketua 
BKJ>M No.16 (24 October 1989). 
16Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 March 90, p37. 
171.ee also called for tax concessions. far Eastern Economic Review, 19 October 1989. The Jakarta Post 3 
November 1989. 
18Lee's comments infer that no decision had been made at the time of his meeting with Soeharto. Indeed, it was only 
following those discussions that the Indonesian cabinet decided to relax the rules governing foreign investment on 
Batam Island. However, according to both Lee and Soeharto at the time, the decision had been made at a cabinet 
meeting prior to their meeting (a week before). Straits Tunes, 7 October 1989. ~. 14 October 1989. 
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that Singapore provided a persuasive argument Lee was adamant that regulatory 
changes were necessary. 
If the rules are changed, industrial development in Batam will be very fast; but if you don't change 
the rules, the majority of investments will continue to go to Johor.19 
A further policy change in late 1989, allowing both private foreign and domestic 
companies to set up industrial estates in Indonesia, was to be decisive for Batam Island. 
The decision was aimed firstly at circumventing infrastructure problems faced by 
investors, for industrial estates would provide electricity, water, telecommunications, 
housing and factory space for investors. 20 It also paved the way for a Singaporean-led 
industrial park on Batam. 
The advantage of making changes for ~atam Island was clear - Batam Island's special 
status and BIDA's control mechanisms, meant that changes to regulations could be 
implemented with minimal objections. Despite concerns raised in nationalist circles in 
Indonesia, Batam Island was a long way from Jakarta and thus was of relatively minor 
political importance. In response to concern in Indonesia about the role of Singapore in 
Batam's development, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas stated that he did not see Singapore's 
move to boost cooperation on Batam as being motivated by other than "purely 
economic calculations of comparative advantage."21 According to Habibie, the 
relaxation of investment rules on Batam was, 
For all countries, not just Singapore. 22 
Specific details of joint cooperation on Batam Island were discussed by a joint working 
committee comprising of five high-level officials from both Indonesia and Singapore.23 
According to Habibie, the main goal of the committee was to "increase co-operation 
and accelerate activities in areas which are mutually beneficial to both countries, 
especially with respect to the development of Batam", with top priority on evaluating 
and suggesting means to improve the basic infrastructure of Batam, in particular water, 
electricity and telecommunications.24 At the first meeting held in Jakarta on 5-6 
19par Eastern Economic Review, 30 November 1989. 
20K.cputusan fresiden No 53 1989. Another favourable regulatory change provided investors with access to 
Indonesia's domestic market, deciding that processing industries exporting to the rest of Indonesia were subject to 
customs duties only on imported raw materials and not the finished product. Far Eastern F&onomic Reyiew, 8 March 
1990,p37. 
21strajts Times, 24November1989. 
22.1.Gmm, 14 October 1989. 
23singapore was represented by EDB Chairman Philip Yeo, Dr Goh Keng Swee, Singapore Ambassador to 
Indonesia, Barry Desker, and representatives from JTC (Jurong Town Corporation) and other government bodies. 
Indonesia was represented by BIDA Chief Executive Soepandi, Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore, Tuk 
Setyohadi, BKPM Chairman, Sanyoto, Assistant to the Coordinating Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry, 
Professor Billy Yudono, and Mr Gunawan, Deputy Head of Bappenas. Straits Times, 27 December 1989. 
Construction Industry Development Board ; Batam Outlook 1990. 2nd Edition, (Singapore, June 1990), p 12. 
24ne Straits Tunes, 27 December 1989. 
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December, discussions about the EDB's proposal for an industrial park on Batam Island 
only confirmed behind-the-scenes negotiations during the previous months. Having 
gained an investment waiver for electronics companies worried about intellectual 
property rights and 'piracy' in any relocation to Batam Island, and having found a 
suitable land site and an Indonesian partner, all that was needed was a formalisation of 
existing agreements. 25 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), a joint venture between Indonesian and Singaporean 
companies, was formalised by a Memorandum of Understanding and Joint Venture 
Agreement on 11 January 1990. The coming together of BIP marked a turning point in 
Indonesian-Singaporean cooperation on Batam Island and perhaps did more than 
anything to change Singaporean awareness of Batam. 26 According to Singapore Trade 
and Industry Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, 
Combining the resources, experience and expertise of Indonesia and Singapore will create a good 
investment environment for both countries, and facilitate efforts to attract large multinational 
corporations for their mutual benefit. 27 
The success of BIP, both in terms of an example of what could be achieved by joint 
Singapore-Indonesia cooperation, and in terms of attracting investment, led Indonesia to 
become interested in the Growth Triangle concept put forward by Singapore. The 
adoption of the Growth Triangle, and the creation of new joint projects significantly 
expanded cooperation between the two nations, economically and geographically. (See 
Chapter Seven). 
The major policy changes implemented by the Indonesian government, together with 
the interest and strong support of the Singapore government, were instrumental in 
overcoming the earlier reluctance of Singaporean and foreign investors, and led to a 
surge of investment into Batam. Batam Island became both a privileged and attractive 
investment location in Indonesia, and for the first time attracted serious investor 
attention from Singapore and elsewhere. 
Economic Activity, 1989-1995 
Batam Island experienced a boom in economic activity in the 1990s, particularly in the 
period 1990-1992. Encouraged by changes to Batam's investment regime which 
allowed for 100% foreign ownership, foreign investors rushed into Batam in 1990. 
Approved foreign investment in 1990 was double that of 1989, and almost five times 
25Straits Times, 24 November 1989. Interview with Barry Desker, 23 September 1994. 
26interview with Barry Desker, 23 September 1994. 
271ndonegja Deve}Qgment News, Vol.13 No.4 (March/April 1990). 
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that of 1988. Foreign investment has remained strong since - total cumulative foreign 
investment increased from US$428m. in 1989 to US$1,873m. at the end of 1994.28 
(See Table 6.1). 
A major factor behind the boom was the role played by Singapore in encouraging 
foreign companies in Singapore to relocate to Batam, and providing various incentives 
to do so. 29 More than one company has claimed that encouragement from the 
Singapore government was a key factor in the decision to establish business on Batam. 
According to a Japanese company executive, his company had decided to invest on 
Batam, 
... because it is strongly supported by the governments of both Indonesia and Singapore. 30 
Foreign investors have given other reasons for investing in Batam - because of Batam's 
bonded zone status; to take advantage of abundant and low-cost labour; to take 
advantage of proximity to Singapore and its modem commercial, banking and transport 
facilities; to cater for the Singapore market, particularly in tourism; and to a lesser 
extent to service the logistics-base nature of Batam, especially in steel, iron and oil 
mining equipment 
Table 6.1 
Approved Foreign Investment (Cumulative) on Batam Island, 1980-199431 
Year US$million 
1980 41 
1981 49 
1982 58 
1983 206 
1984 215 
1985 222 
1986 223 
1987 223 
1988 289 
1989 428 
1990 684 
1991 1,055 
1992 
1993 1,648 
1994 1.873 
28Figures for total cumulative private investment, foreign and domestic, show an increase from US$2,199m. in 1990 
to US$4,169m. in 1994. BIDA; Various sources. 
29For instance, companies relocating their industrial plants to Batam are freed from paying Singapore income tax. 
The JaJcarta Post, 11January1991. 
30ausiness TlPles, 15 October 1992. Reuters Textline 150ct92. See also comments made by the President Director 
of PT Singatronics Batam that his company chose Batam simply because Singapore was behind it Business Twes, 
15 April 1992. 
31BIDA; Various sources. 
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Singapore companies led the way on Batam, overtaking the USA as the largest foreign 
investor on Batam in the first quarter of 1990.32 The number of Singaporean companies 
increased from five in 1989, with an investment of US$36.3m, to 38 by the end of 1994, 
with an investment of over US$1,000m.33 Singaporean investments remain the major 
source of FDI on Batam, accounting for almost fifty per cent of total foreign investment 
and a third of all foreign companies. However, whilst Singapore is the leading foreign 
investor on Batam, it is clear that its investments are dominated by Japanese, American 
and European MNCs based in Singapore and by Singapore state enterprises. The 
Director of General Affairs of JETRO (Japan External Trade Organisation) described 
foreign investment on Batam as a "billiards business", because while the nationality of 
many companies on Batam was Singaporean, the money was in fact from elsewhere. 34 
Table 6.2 
Foreign Companies on Batam Island, 1969-199535 
Sin!l. USA Janan Neth. H.K. Taiw. Aust Other Total 
1969 
-
1 
- - - - - -
1 
1970 
-
1 
- - - - - -
1 
1971 2 2 
- - - - - -
4 
1972 2 2 - - - - - - 4 
1973 2 3 1 
- - - - -
7 
1974 2 4 2 
- - -
1 2 11 
1975 2 4 2 
- - -
1 2 11 
1976 - 4 2 - - - 1 1 8 
1977 - 4 2 - - - 1 1 8 
1978 - 4 2 - - - 1 2 9 
1979 
-
4 2 
- - -
1 2 9 
1980 
-
4 2 
- - -
1 2 9 
1981 
-
4 1 
- - -
1 2 8 
1982 
-
4 1 
- - -
1 2 8 
1983 4 1 
- -
1 2 8 
1984 
- -
1985 - -
1986 
- -
13 
1987 
- -
1988 
- -
1989 
- -
1990 3 6 2 1 
- - -
3 15 
1991 17 8 5 2 
- - -
6 38 
1992 
-
1993 33 15 14 3 4 1 - 13 84 
1994 38 16 24 3 4 2 - 20 107 
32par Eastern Economic Reyiew, 5 March 1990, p36. 
33nusiness Times, 20 July 1989. Business Times, 5-6 August 1989. BIDA; Barelan&: DeyelQpmept Data up to 
June 1993. 
34Indonesia Business Weekly, Vol.Il No.6, 21 January 1994. 
35BIDA; Various sources. 
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Singaporean investors are dominated by GLCs and large companies. A business survey 
conducted in September 1992 by the Singapore Manufacturers Association (SMA), a 
grouping of mainly small and medium-sired manufacturers, found that only 4.5% of 
respondents had invested on Batam. The survey revealed that investors were 
predominantly larger companies because they are more likely to possess the financial 
strength and management expertise for operating across national boundaries and that 
most were from the electronics and electrical industry.36 Next to Singapore, the two 
biggest investors in terms of total investment and number of companies.operating, are 
Japan and the USA. Other major investors include the Netherlands, Hong Kong and 
France. (See Table 6.2). 
Equally important on Batam is that not only did the volume of economic activity 
change after 1989 - the value of exports increased from US$53m. in 1989 to 
US$1,389m. in 1994 (See Table 6.3) - but the nature of that economic activity changed 
the face of development. This is clear from the composition of exports. In 1988 the 
main exports were oil equipment worth US$23m, steel pipes worth US$4m and clothing 
worth US$4m. In 1992, the main export item was electronics components worth 
US$247m.,jewellery worth US$120m. and oil equipment worth US$119m.37 
Table 6.3 
Export Value from Batmn Island, 1986-1994 (in US$m)38 
Year US$million 
1986 21 
1987 27 
1988 44 
1989 53 
1990 152 
1991 242 
1992 565 
1993 926 
1994 1.389 
36The details of nature of industry operating were : Electronics and Electrical - 30%, Metal and Machinery - 12.3%, 
Rubber and Plastics - 8.6%, Food and Beverage - 6.2%, Other Manufacturing - 36.9%, Non-manufacturing - 6.2%. 
Singapore Manufacturers Association ; SMA Survey Reoort on the Johor-Sinnoore-Riau Growth Triapgle 
(Singapore, September 1992). The SMA has been essentially shut out of Batam because of its negative list and is 
currently more interested in Bintan Island because of its less restrictive conditions. In contrast to the SMA, 
Singaporean companies grouped under the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) and Real Estate 
Developers Association (Redas) have been able to take more of the opportunities offered on Batam, such as 
developing homes, industrial facilities, warehouses and condominiums. 
37BIDA ; Realisasi Nilai Ekspor Pulau Batam. 1986-Qkt 1993. 
38BIDA; Various sources. 
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According to BIDA, private investment on Batam in 1994 was targeted at Industry 
(52.2% ), Tourism (17 .8% ), Real Estate ( 16.1 % ), Agribusiness (2.4% ), Trade and 
Services (11.5%).39 (See Chart 6.1). Quite clearly, the three most important sectors of 
economic activity on Batam in the 1990s have been industry, tourism and real estate. In 
particular, the industrial sector, spurred by the growth of BIP, and tourism have 
experienced strongest growth. 
Despite the fact that tourism was virtually unplanned on Batam Island, as a side-product 
of industrial development and a spin-off from other economic activity, it has become 
important in its own right, and has been one of the biggest successes on Batam Island.40 
Since 1989, when Batam Island was designated a visa-free entry-point for foreign 
visitors, Batam has become one of the main points of entry into Indonesia. 41 Tourist 
numbers increased rapidly from 228,000 visitors in 1988 to 872,000 in 1994.42 
Tourism revenue increased from US$30.5m. in 1988 to US$250m. in 1993.43 (See 
Table 6.4) Batam is now confirmed as Indonesia's third largest tourist destination, and 
it appears that it may well take over from Bali as the second most important port of 
entry into Indonesia after Jakarta. 44 
Chart 6.1 
Private Investment on Batam Island, 1994 
(Based on Type of Business)45 
18% 
•Industry 
•Tourism 
•Real Estate 
llTrade & 
Services 
•Agribusines 
s 
39IJIDA; Barelan& : Develogment Data up to December 1994 (Jakarta 1995). In 1990, it was Industry (47%), 
Tourism (19.7%), Real Estate (18.9%), Agribusiness (3.6%), Trade and Services (10.8%). BIDA ; Batam: 
Develqgment Data UP to December 1990 (Jakarta 1991). 
4-0rnterview with Senior Official of PHRI, 11 August 1994. 
41The Ja1carta Post, 7 February 1989. 
42BIDA; Barelan& · Develogment Data UP to December 1994 (Jakarta 1995). 
43»IDA; Barelan& : Deve}ogment Data UP to December 1994 (Jakarta 1995). 
44 A popular acronym for Batam Island is Banyalc Tamu (Many visitors). Merdeka, 12 October 1991. ,Syw 
Pembaruan. 3 February 1994. 
45»IDA ; Barelan& · Deye}opment Data UP to December 1994 (Jakarta 1995). 
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While marketing brochures describe Batam as, "a delightful tropical island ... an idyllic 
and natural holiday getaway blessed with kilometres of sandy beaches, fresh seafood, 
picturesque fishing villages - and duty free shopping", the key factor in the success of 
tourism on Batam Island has been proximity to Singapore.46 With over 25 ferry trips 
daily between Singapore and Batam, Singaporeans account for the majority of 
tourists.47 In 1990, Singaporeans made up 71 % of all tourist arrivals on Batam Island, 
and whilst the Singaporean proportion of all tourists has been declining - to 56% of all 
arrivals in 1993 - their numbers remain significant.48 It also appears that many of them 
continue to return to Batam. Whilst only 53% of Singaporean visitors in 1989 were on 
a repeat visit, this proportion was 84% in 1991.49 
The majority of all visits to Batam are for holiday and recreation. 50 However, currently 
the only attractions on Batam Island are golf and beaches.51 With little to offer by way 
of cultural, historical or natural attractions, resort developers have created their own 
attractions. One such resort is Waterfront City, a S$2 billion project on 2,000 ha., 
integrating hotels, condominiums, shopping complexes, golf course, marina, leisure and 
cultural parks, and even a ski run, complete with snow.52 Another is Nongsa Point 
Marina, a modem marina resort offering holiday residences, watersport activities and a 
harbour of destination for the region's recreational boaters and local cruise vessels. 53 
There is a real need to motivate visitors to Batam Island to stay longer. With an average 
length of stay of 1.8 days, Batam Island falls well behind the average visits of 2.6 days 
for Jakarta and 4 days for Bali.54 In fact, of the 680,000 visitors in 1993, the clear 
46BmA; BATAM; Official Guide, pl7. 
47ne Sunday Times, 14 August 1994. Singaporeans account for 25% of all tourists visiting Indonesia, the majority 
of which are visiting Batam. Far Eastern Economic Review. 28 April 1994. The figures for Singaporean visits to 
Batam compare to 4.4 million visits to Johor in 1994, three quarters of which are estimated to be commuters and not 
tourists. Straits Times, 17 October 1995. Business World. 7November1995. Reuters Textline 7Nov95. 
48Jakarta Po&L 24 February 1995. 
49»atam Tourist Promotion Board; Statistical Report· visitor Arrivals to Batam 1991 (Batam, July 1992). 
50of all visitors in 1991, 99% were on holiday, the remainder for business. Singaporeans are predominant among 
those making business trips to Batam, accounting for 67% of all business visits in 1991. The next largest were 
Malaysia 8%, Japan and Taiwan 4%. Batam Tourist Promotion Board ; Statistical Report : visitor Arrivals to Batam 
.l22l (Batam, July 1992). 
51There are real questions whether the supply of golf courses will reach saturation since the Growth Triangle area 
could eventually host one of the largest concentrations of golf courses in the world - in April 1991 there were plans 
for the equivalent of over 25 eighteen-hole courses. Straits Times, 20 April 1991. 
52Business Times, 15 April 1992. South China Morning Post. 17August1993. Reuters Textline 17Aug93. See also 
The Jakarta Post, 7 June 1990. The Straits Times, 8 August 1990. For details about the Snowcentre see Business 
Times. 24 July 1993. The Ttmes, 12 August 1993. Reuters Textline 12Aug93. 
53Regulatoa News Service, 1July1992. Reuters Textline 01Jul92. Business Tun.es. 21February1994. Nongsa 
Point Marina has been appointed by the Indonesian government as the sole agent for issuing sailing permits to all 
sailing and pleasure craft entering the Riau islands for recreational and water sport activities. On January 1st 1994 
the Indonesian government relaxed sailing restrictions in the Riau waters to include the waters around Batam, Bintan 
and several other islands. Previously, a large part of the area was reserved for the use of the Indonesian navy for 
training exercises. Upon entering and leaving the waters, all vessels must report to the Customs, Immigration and 
Quarantine Post at Nongsa Point Marina for clearance. The Sunday Tunes, 5 December 1993. 
54rbe Jakarta Post. 4 May 1993. 
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majority were day trippers. 55 PHRI (Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restoran Indonesia or 
Indonesian Hotel and Restaurant Association) estimated that approximately only 20% 
of visitors in 1993 used hotel industry facilities, of which only a tenth used 3-5 star 
facilities.56 This resulted in a downturn in the hotel business; an oversupply of rooms 
led to average hotel occupancy rates at only 50% in 1993. The outcome was a 
damaging price war amongst Batam hotels in June 1994, with room rate tariffs in star-
rated hotels down as much as 40%.57 
With 46 star-rated hotels offering 12,400 rooms planned by the end of the decade, the 
hopes of many in the industry rest on the completion of Hang Nadim international 
airport to boost tourism on Batam.58 However, the tourist industry on Batam now faces 
strong competition from neighbouring Bintan Island.59 How tourism on Batam will 
fare in what will be a more competitive environment is unclear. PHRI see tourism on 
Batam eventually developing along similar lines to the Kuta-Sanur-Nusa Dua set-up on 
Table 6.4 
Tourism on Batam Island, 1985-199460 
Year Tourist Numbers 
1985 60,161 
1986 84,475 
1987 145,627 
1988 227,981 
1989 359,497 
1990 579,305 
1991 008,837 
1992 648,281 
1993 680,373 
1994 871625 
55i:nterview with Senior Official of PHRI, 11 August 1994. 
56interview with Senior Official of PHRI, 11 August 1994. 
Tourist Revenue 
<US$million) 
8 
11 
20 
31 
49 
79 
175 
238 
250 
320 
57some blamed the price war on the fact that there were too many hotels - in June 1994 there were 22 star-rated 
hotels offering a total of 3,000 rooms - and others on an abnormally low number of tourist arrivals. According to 
PHRI, three hotel projects even postponed construction, and many established hotels underwent changes in 
management. Because of the damaging nature of rate cuts to the hotel industry, PHRI moved to end the price wars 
by getting hotels to agree to setting the maximum discount at 20% of published price, with the local branch 
empowering BIDA to impose sanctions on hotels granting discounts of more than 20%. Interview with Senior 
Official of PHRI, 11 August 1994 . .KQ.mmi!, 8 June 1994. Jakarta Post. 17 June 1994. Economic and Business 
Review Indonesia, No.114, 18 June 1994. ~. 29 June 1994. Straits Times, 11July1994. 
58 As of December 1992, Batam had 16 hotels offering 1,800 rooms. The Jakarta Post. 4 May 1993. 
59Ihis was one of the reasons for the creation of Barelang, an expansion of the Batam industrial zone - the tourist 
potential of adjacent islands was considered better than Batam. According to one BIDA official in October 1992, a 
Taiwanese investor had already booked 200 ha. for a golf-course in the Barelang area. TuJwiQ., 17 October 1992. 
~IDA; Various sources. 
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Bali, with Nagoya attracting the budget-conscious visitor, Nongsa attracting the 
business and middle-to-upper range market and neighbouring Bintan island, the 
exclusive end of the scale. 61 However, this situation still leaves the tourism sector on 
Batam well-placed to grow in the future, particularly if industrial activities continue to 
expand. 
More than fifty per cent of private investment, and more than two thirds of all foreign 
investment, on Batam has been poured into industry. The industrial areas in Sekupang, 
Batu Ampar, Tanjung Uncang and Kabil have received their fair share of this 
investment, which has been dominated by machinery, basic metals and the oil services 
industry, and the oil industry equipment remains important to Batam as the third biggest 
export item. 62 However, since 1989 the majority of new investment in industry has 
been in electronics, and primarily located in Batamindo Industrial Park. 
Batamindo Industrial Park 
The keystone of Indonesia-Singapore cooperation on Batam, Batamindo Industrial Park 
(BIP) dominates the Batam landscape to the extent that it is the most economically and 
politically important commercial venture on Batam. In fact, the transformation of 
Batam during the early 1990s has been significantly due to BIP. 
BIP is a S$600 million, 500ha. industrial estate owned by PT Batamindo Investment 
Corporation (BIC), a joint venture between PT Herwindo Rintis (60%), whose majority 
shareholders are the Salim and Bimantara Groups, with a smaller stake held by Timmy 
Habibie, Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (30%) and Jurong 
Environmental Engineering (10%), both Singapore government-owned companies. 
BIC is the holding company and developer of BIP, investing in logistics, 
communications and other services to support the park's operations. BIP is managed by 
a second company, Batamindo Industrial Management Pte Ltd (BIM), a joint venture 
between PT Herwindo Rintis (50% ), Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation 
(30%) and Jurong Environmental Engineering (20% ). BIM is responsible for planning, 
design, construction, marketing and leasing. 63 
61 Interview with Senior Official of PHRI, 11 August 1994. 
62For PT Caltex Pacific Indonesia, the largest oil company in Indonesia, Batam is a port of call for its traffic of 
materials and as a base for suppliers. BIDA ; Business Directoty : 22 years Batam Industrial Deve!Qpment Authoritv 
, (November 1993), p36. 
63Jbe Straits Times. 12 January 1990. The Jakarta Post, 12 January 1990. The total figure for the project, originally 
S$400 million, has been re-estimated to run to S$550 million (Business Tunes, 24 October 1992), and again to S$600 
million because of additional investment in factories and utilities <Business Tunes, 14 September 1993). 
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Essentially the partnership involves a division of labour, using the individual and 
overall strengths of the three_ partners - JEE, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Jurong Town 
Corporation (ITC), brought with it skills and experience in developing industrial 
estates; STIC, a technology-related company with subsidiaries in electronics, 
information technology, precision engineering and industrial services, brought with it a 
strong capital base and construction knowledge; the Salim Group provides capital, land 
and logistics. 64 
A self-sufficient, self-contained and integrated industrial park, BIP offers one-stop 
service and facilities - accommodation, recreational facilities, transport and security 
services, immigration, recruitment, administrative support, estate management, 
factories, power supply, water supply, telecommunications facilities, commercial 
facilities, polyclinic, banking, training, restaurants, market, church, mosque, post office, 
social and recreational facilities - all of which are aimed at shielding investors from 
infrastructure inadequacies and bureaucratic inefficiencies on Batam Island. 65 The aim 
is to offer a Singapore-type environment with cheap labour and land costs in order to 
make investors feel at home; to feel just if they would if they were doing business in 
Singapore. 
On 30 April 1990, three months after the signing of the joint-venture agreement, 
Sumitomo Wiring Systems Batam Indonesia signed up as the first tenant in what was 
seen as a prestigious catch and powerful influence in persuading others to follow. Maw 
Bow Tan, Singapore Minister for Trade and Industry, remarked at the time that, 
Attracting a major Japanese MNC in such a short time augurs well. 66 
PT Sumitomo Wiring Systems Batam Indonesia first became interested in investing in 
BIP following a direct approach from the Singapore government in December 1989. 
According to the Managing Director of Sumitomo, advice and support from the 
Singapore government was the key factor in its decision to invest in 1990.67 Sumitomo 
has given several further reasons for taking the decision to invest in BIP, a decision 
which took less than three months. These included: 100% ownership, bonded zone 
status because inputs from Japan, a desire to move production from Japan because of 
labour constraints with the offer of cheaper and more available manpower, a desire to 
get a manufacturing foothold in the ASEAN area, proximity to Singapore, strong 
641nterview with Barry Desker, 23 September 1994. Batamindo Industrial Management; Batam Industrial Park: 
Intemationa} Manufacturing Adyantue. The Straits Twes, 12 January 1990. The JaJcarta Post, 12 January 1990. 
65iJatamindo Industrial Management; Batam Industrial Park: International Manufacturing Advantage. The set-up is 
a modified version of JTC's operations in Singapore, where it manages 30 industrial estates which account for 76% of 
all manufacturing in Singapore and over 6,000 companies. Singiijl<>re : facts and Figures 1994 (Ministry of 
Information, 1994), pp 46-47. 
66Asiaweek, 29 June 1990. 
67The Asian Wall Street Journal, 5December1990. 
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commitment by both the Indonesian and Singaporean governments, confidence in the 
management, infrastructure, utilities and assistance offered by BIP, and an agreement 
by the Japanese government to allow workers to be trained for six months in Japan. 68 
Sumitomo is typical of most BIP tenants, who cite similar reasons for their investment 
decision. Firstly, Batam Island offered abundant and low cost labour, bonded zone 
status, 100% foreign ownership and proximity to Singapore and its modem commercial, 
banking and transport facilities. Secondly, BIP offered the provision of infrastructure 
and utilities, and shelter from the Indonesian bureaucracy offered by a 'one-stop 
service'. Thirdly, BIP was strongly supported by both the Singaporean and Indonesian 
governments. 69 
For most tenants it was strong government support for the project which was the 
decisive factor. PT Astra Microtronics, was strongly encouraged by EDB Chief, Philip 
Yeo, as well as Habibie. 70 PT Bowater cited government endorsement as a key factor 
in its decision to invest. 71 PT AT&T Consumer Products Indonesia moved to Batam 
Island prompted by, among other things, the strong commitment shown by the EDB, 
BIP and the Singaporean and Indonesian governments. 72 CIBA Vision decided to 
locate to BIP because of assurances of consistency of Indonesian government policy, 
political stability and Singapore government support. 73 
From its inception in January 1990, BIP has grown at a bristling pace. By the end of 
1990, total cumulative foreign investment committed in BIP amounted to US$686 
million, involving 48 projects. Singapore companies were the largest investors with 
commitments of US$344 million, followed by the United States with US$165 million 
681nterview with Sumitomo Executives, 4 October 1994. Lee Tsao Yuan; "Growth Triangles in ASEAN" ElIQ 
Economic Brief, no.10 (June 1992), pp 16-17. Batamindo Industrial Management ; Batw Industrial Park : 
International Manufacturing Adyantage. 
69various Interviews with tenants, 1994. More recent investors are reportedly less concerned about 100% foreign 
ownership and tend to be more interested in such factors as proximity to Singapore and GSP privileges for USA and 
EC. Interview with BIP Executive, John Sulistiawan, 14 September 1994. 
70interview with Astra Executive, 4 October 1994. 
71 Batamindo Industrial Management ; Batam Industrial Park : International Manufacturing Adyantage. Not only has 
BIP been supported by the Singapore government in terms of marketing, the Singapore government has provided 
special facilities for the park operators. BIP received the first ever loan denominated in Singapore-dollars for a 
foreign-based project, and offshore banks lending to the park have been given an exemption from the offshore 
lending limit by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. PT Batamindo Investment Corporation borrowed S$12S 
million in March 1992, S$120 million (S$70m for S-year loan & S$SOm 9-month bridging loan) in September 1992, 
S$100million (S$50m for S-year loan & S$SOm 9-month bridging loan) in September 1993, and S$160million in 
February 1994 which was expected to be its last because it was soon to sell factories to its tenants, revenue which 
would be used to finance further capital needs. Schroder International Merchant Bankers Ltd arranged the loans. 
Business Times. 12 September 1992. Indonesia Deyelownent News, Vol.15 No.3 (Spring 1992). Business Twes. 
23 March 1993. Business Times. 14 September 1993. Reuters Textline 14Sep93. Business Tmies, 8 February 1994. 
72The provision of a one-stop service and proximity to Singapore were also important. Batamindo Industrial 
Management; Batam Industrial Park · International Manufacturing Advantage. 
73other factors included proximity to Singapore, GSP privileges, and familiarity with the area because of existing 
operations in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Interview with CIBA Vision Executive, 4 October 1994. 
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and Hong Kong US$111 million.74 PT Thomson became the first tenant to begin 
operation on 28 January 1991, and by the end of that year all 23 factories in Phase I of 
BIP were completed, occupied and their tenants operating. 75 
BIP was officially inaugurated in April 1992 by President Soeharto and Singapore 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, and has continued to grow in size and stature.76 By 
October 1992 there were 31 tenants operating in the park.77 By July 1993 they 
numbered 38, with a realised investment of US$200m. employing around 16,000 
workers, and exporting electronic products worth US$400 million. 78 By the end of 
1994, BIP had over 60 tenants with US$250 million of investments, employing 35,000 
workers and exporting US$700 million worth of products.79 The make-up of tenants in 
BIP mirrors the situation on Batam. Of the 62 tenants signed in mid-94, - 25 were 
Japanese, 17 Singaporean, seven USA, three German, two French, and one each from 
the Netherlands, Italy, UK, Switzerland, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
It is generally considered that BIP has been the only successful industrial park on 
Batam because there is Singaporean content in both ownership and management, and 
because it is the only industrial estate marketed in Singapore. This is despite it having 
the highest land and factory rents of all industrial estates in Indonesia. 80 In addition to 
Singaporean participation and management, tenants believe that the success of BIP is 
due to the Salim Group's political connections and ability to move government 
machinery, considerably lowering 'unofficial costs' for tenants. 81 Whilst BIP initially 
had to eliminate uncertainties and provide confidence to prospective investors, 
demonstration effect and its record now sells the park. 82 The BIP model of cooperation 
has been extended to other projects in the Riau Islands and has become a model for 
other industrial parks. 
74oary Rodan; "Reconstructing Divisions of Labour: Singapore's new regional emphasis" in R.Higgott, R.Leaver & 
J.Ravenhill (eds) Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s : Coqperation or Conflict? (Allen & Unwin, Sydney 
1993), p242. 
75BIP News. October 1991. Lee Tsao Yuan; "Growth Triangles in ASEAN", PITO Economic Brief, no.10 (June 
1992) ,plO. 
76eatamindo Industrial Management ; Batam Industrial Park ; International Manufacturing Advantage. 
77Business Tunes, 24 October 1992. 
78Business Times, 30 January 1993. Business Times. 16 July 1993. The Straits Times, 28 September 1993. ~ 
Straits Times, 30 August 1993. 
79Media Indonesia. 13 October 1995. South China Morning Post. 17 August 1995. 
80xndonesian Commercial Newsletter. 25 July 1995. 
81various interviews with tenants, 1994. 
821nterview with BIP Executive, Patrick Lee, 28 September 1994. In a further boost to marketing, BIP was awarded 
ISO 9002 certification in 1995, the first and only industrial park in the Asia-Pacific to be awarded. The award was 
given for its service - how it helps MNCs to settle in, for maintenance, security and other facilities. Business Times, 
27 October 1995. The BIP model is now being replicated by the Salim Group and its Batamindo partners in Fujian 
Province, China. .Imum. 12 December 1992. 
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BIP is a strong lobby vis-a-vis the Singapore and Indonesian governments, and it does 
carry clout - the Executive-Director of the Board of Directors is Salim Group Executive, 
Anthony Salim, the President-Commissioner of the Board of Commissioners is 
Soeharto's son, Bambang Trihatmojo, and its Directors included the EDB's Philip Yeo, 
and brother of BIDA Chairman, Timmy Habibie. 83 BIC and BIM have maintained a 
continual lobby direct to the Indonesian Ambassador in Singapore, and various 
Indonesian Ministers, particularly those of Manpower, Housing and Education. 84 
If or when there are difficulties, the EDB becomes the vehicle for sorting out problems. 
In fact, the EDB has essentially acted as a public relations firm, coordinator, facilitator 
and troubleshooter for BIP. 85 BIM and the EDB meet on a regular two-monthly basis, 
and depending on the nature of any problem the EDB approaches the Indonesian 
minister through the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore or through a Singaporean 
Minister. At the same time, EDB Chairman Philip Yeo and Habibie maintain contact 
and monitor developments in BIP. 86 The lobby is generally on behalf of BIP tenants, 
but at the same time out of self-interest. 
Like BIP's operators, tenants are concerned with changes to Indonesian government 
regulations, in particular those pertaining to wages and taxation. For instance, further 
wage increases on Batam could adversely affect the operations of tenants, and at the 
same time threaten the operation and competitiveness of BIP. Most want changes to 
regulations, such as those governing access to the Indonesian domestic market, and are 
concerned with social aspects of development on Batam. 87 
BIC and BIM have lobbied the Indonesian government on several policy issues. These 
have included : land lease periods, minimum wage increases, allowing 35% of 
production to be sold to the Indonesian domestic market, tax holidays, improved 
transportation between Batam and Jakarta, the removal of sales tax on goods coming 
from within Indonesia, and the provision of low-cost housing. 88 There have been 
successes - the Smart Card, an electronic passport, came about after BIM, under 
pressure from MNCs, approached the EDB which in tum elicited support from the 
Indonesian Embassy in Singapore which went to the Indonesian Ministries concerned -
and failures - BIC failed in its attempt to effect changes to immigration procedures for 
those visiting or inspecting from Singapore having to pay a S$13 fiscal. 89 
83Interview with BIP Executive, October 1994. 
841nterview with BIP Executive, September 1994. 
85Economic Development Board; Yearoook 199U1993 (Singapore National Press, 1993). 
86Jnterview with BIP Executive, G.Arumugam, 19 October 1994. 
87various interviews with tenants, 1994. 
881nterview with BIP Executive, John Sulistiawan, 14September1994. 
89Jnterview with G.Arumugam. 19 October 1994. 
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The most significant example of BIP's influence vis-a-vis the Indonesian government 
concerned the October 1993 wage rise. In mid-1993, the Indonesian government 
announced an increase in the daily minimum wage from Rp 5,500 to Rp 6,750, 
beginning October.90 The Indonesian government, however, had difficulty convincing 
investors of the need to increase the minimum wage. The operators of BIP, sympathetic 
to their tenants who already provided labour packages in excess of the minimum wage, 
and desirous of keeping operating costs down in order to retain competitiveness, sought 
to have the decision revoked, or at the very least stalled. BIC approached the EDB 
who, through the Indonesian Embassy, put the case to the relevant Indonesian 
ministries. 91 As a result of the approach the wage rise was delayed by six months to 
April 1994, and the package provided to workers which included housing and meals 
was recognised as equivalent to a wage. 92 
Tenants also have leverage within BIP, through the 'vocal group' centred around a group 
of older tenants which meets with park management every 2-3 months to express any 
concerns with competitiveness and cost-saving. If an issue cannot be resolved, the 
vocal group approaches the EDB directly.93 Tenants appear to be in close contact with 
one another on issues that concern them or are of mutual benefit. The vocal group has 
appealed to park management to reduce costs of utilities such as electricity and water 
supply; there are no problems with telecommunications. Tenants have also expressed 
concern about charges for dormitory accommodation, as well as the labour packages 
offered by recruiter Tunas Karya. Some tenants are of the opinion that lower charges 
are being forsaken for the benefit of quick profits and return on investment for BIP's 
operators, and that management should be looking at longer term objectives rather than 
short-term gains - the criticism is that the park's operators have a 3-4 year short-term 
objective not long-term - and in that way some of the more footloose industries could 
make a longer commitment, and a long-term partnership. 94 
To allay fears over rising costs, BIP management has attempted to cut operating costs. 
In October 1992, freight rates were cut by between 14% and 24%, and again in July 
1993 by 10%.95 In addition, factory rents were froren in October 1992 for a period of 
three years.96 Cuts in utilities charges have been promised in phases as more tenants 
90rbe Jakarta Posl 12 June 1993. 
91various interviews with BIP Executives, September-October 1994. 
92sunday Times, 5December1993. 
93rnterview with G.Arumugam, 19 October 1994. 
94y arious interviews with tenants, 1994. One company has closed its operations, but not because of problems with 
BIP - Typewriter manufacturer, Smith Corona, closed both its Batam and Singapore plants because of decreased 
demand for typewriters worldwide. Business Tunes, 12 May 1995. 
95Business Times. 16 July 1993. Reuters Textline 16Jul93. 
96ausiness Times. 24 October 1992. Reuters Textline 120ct92. Problems with labour recruiter, Tunas Karya, which 
was being poorly managed, have also been addre$sed. Whilst BIC wanted to carry-out labour recruitment and 
training itself, because it is a negative list area, a technical agreement was set up with the Salim Group whereby the 
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sign on - electricity charges were reduced by 6.2% in July 1994.97 &sentially, savings 
are passed on to tenants as better efficiency and economies of scale are reached. 
BIP's overall position and role in Batam Island's development is substantial. In fact, the 
transformation of Batam during the 1990s has been largely due to BIP. With an 
average 40% growth in tenants between 1991-1994, growth has outstripped that of 
Batam as a whole.98 By 1994, just over three years after the first tenant began 
operations, BIP tenants employed around 50% of the total formal workforce on Batam 
Island, and around 70% of those involved in the industrial sector, in addition to 
providing other direct and indirect employment, such as in construction and services, 
and in the informal sector outside the park. Between them, the operators of BIP and 
BIP tenants had invested around US$600 million, accounting for an eighth of total 
private investment on Batam. In addition, BIP tenants provided over 50% of Batam 
Island's total export value - US$600m. of US$lb in 1994.99 It is this economic value, 
combined with good political connections, which gives BIP considerable political clout. 
Domestic Investment 
Domestic business participation in the development of Batam Island is important to 
ensure that Indonesia benefits from economic activity. As with foreign investment, 
domestic investment began to significantly increase after 1989. By the end of 1994, 
private Indonesian companies had invested US$2.3 billion on Batam Island. loo What 
stands out from both the figures, and particular projects on Batam, is that the majority 
of domestic private investment is limited to a number of large Jakarta-based 
conglomerates. This is not to deny the importance of small and medium-sized firms, 
for they are an active and important component of economic growth on Batam, but 
relative to the conglomerates their importance is limited. The activities of business 
groups with strong links to powerful politicians is common in corporate Indonesia. It is 
no less so on Batam Island, where well-connected pribumi and non-pribumi business's 
dominate. 
The Salim Group - Indonesia's largest conglomerate with estimated sales of US$11 
billion and assets of US$18 billion in 1994101 - was the first Indonesian conglomerate to 
name and company remain intact, but jointly owned by BIC and Tunas Karya, and restructuring and management 
changes have taken place. Interview with G.Arumugam, 19 October 1994. 
97BIP News, September/October 1994. 
98ausiness Tunes, 10 November 1995. 
99Thls figure is based on details provided by investors in their BKPM submissions, and the actual value could be 
higher or lower. 
lOOamA ; Barelane : PevelQpmeut Data up to December 1994 (Jakarta 1995). 
101 Australian Financial Review, 2 January 1996. In 1990, it had a turnover of US$8 billion, accounting for about 
5% of Indonesia's GDP. Far Eastern Econom.ic Reyiew, 14 March 1991, p46. 
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invest on Batam in a big way, and has remained heavily committed there. Together 
with the Salim Group, other well-connected Indonesian business groups, including 
relatives of both former and serving senior Indonesian ministers, are predominant 
among domestic investors. Batam could well be one of the most important centres of 
the Liem-Soeharto family business empire. The Bimantara Group, owned by the 
President's son Bambang Trihatmojo, is the second biggest domestic investor on Batam, 
in terms of number and size of projects. The President's foster-brother, Sudwikatmono, 
is also a major investor.102 
Other groups economically or politically connected to the Soeharto family include 
Mohammed 'Bob' Hasan, Ciputra, Hendra Rahardja and Ibrahim Risyad. Individual 
investors include Harry Murdani, the brother of former Minister for Defence and 
Security, Benny Murdani. Other no less significant investors include the Sutowo 
family, and the Citra Group. ABRI yayasans also have a share in developments, in 
particular the Yayasan Angkatan Laut (Naval Welfare Foundation) and the Yayasan Asi 
Upaya (Air Force Officer's Welfare Foundation). (See Table 6.5). 
Recently, attention and debate has begun to focus on the growing involvement of BIDA 
Chairman B. J. Habibie's family in business. Whilst their involvement in business on 
Batam raises conflict-of-interest issues, the attitude of many government officials is that 
family members have a right to venture into the business world. The Habibie family are 
not only prominent in business on Batam Island, family members also dominate social 
activities. 
Habibie's younger brother, Suyatim Abdulrachman (Timmy), is a major pribumi 
investor on Batam Island. His holding company, PT Timsco Indonesia, of which he 
controls 55%, includes other Habibie family members as shareholders - Habibie's son, 
Thareq (25%), and wife of brother, Fanny, Meike Miriam Habibie (20%). On Batam, 
Timmy often operates in partnership with the Salim and Bimantara Groups - PT 
Mitrajaya Wiraniaga, is a joint-venture between Timsco, Salim and Bimantara; PT 
Bimatima Dharma Perkasa, is a joint venture between Timsco and Bimantara Citra; and 
PT Saltim, is a joint-venture between Timsco and Salim. 
Other family members are also involved in business on Batam Island. A major 
investment vehicle is PT Trimitra Upayatama, owned by Habibie's younger sister Sri 
Rahayu Fatima (Yayuk), and Habibie's sons Thareq and Ilham. Ilham and Thareq's 
company, PT Repindo Panca, has begun business, and both hold 10% shares in PT 
Herwindo Rintas, which partners together Salim, Bimantara and Timmy Habibie (10%). 
102He admitted having invested more than US$150 million on Batam in hotels, real estate and theatres by mid-1990. 
Warta Ekonomi. 11 June 1990. 
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In addition, Habibie's older brother, Sato to Moh. (Toto) Duhri, as well as Agus Alwi, 
either Habibie's other older brother or nephew, also have business interests. 
Habibie's younger sister, Sri Rejeki, is an important business, political and social figure 
on Batam Island. She is currently Chairperson of the Yayasan Keluarga Batam (Batam 
Family Foundation) 103, Chairperson of women's organisation, Darmawarti 104, and 
Chairperson of FKKS Batam (Batam Social Welfare and Resource Coordinating 
Council).105 The Yayasan Keluarga Batam is said to practically monopolise the 
construction of hospitals and schools on Batam, whilst FKKS, a government-sponsored 
NGO runs social programs and controls the contracts for them. 
Husband of Sri Rejeki, and BIDA Chief Executive from 1978-1988, Maj-Gen (ret) 
Soedarsono Dharmasoewito is involved in a myriad of business and social activities. 
When BIDA Chief Executive, Soedarsono was virtually a Governor in his own right, 
running a military-style rather than a civil administration. Despite being replaced 
because of several errors of judgement - among other things, he gave a car to the local 
Camat as goodwi11106 - it is said that there is little way of wresting power from him 
without approaching the President directly and incurring the wrath of Habibie. 107 Now 
adviser to the BIDA Chairman, Soedarsono is said to still wield control over certain 
contracts and licenses.108 On the social front, Soedarsono is Chairman of the Batam 
Chapter of Kadin (Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Chairman of Red 
Cross Batam and a senior member of the ABRI community. lO'J On the business front, 
Soedarsono is Director of a number of companies, with activities ranging from 
industrial parks to tourist resorts. 
There are indications that what may well emerge is a regionalisation of the Indonesian 
oligarchy, using Johor-Batam-Singapore as the main hub. Through the Muslim-Malay 
connections of FOKUS (Forum Komunikasi Usaha Serantau) - a forum bringing 
together Habibie-led ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) and 
Muslim-Malay associations in Singapore and Malaysia - business links are being built 
with the Malay bureaucrat/aristocrat business families in Singapore, Johor and Kuala 
Lumpur. 110 
103 .AlWJa, 26 October 1983. 
104suara Kazya, 7 November 1983. 
105 Straits Tjmes, 2 April 1994. 
l061nterview with former Minister for Internal Affairs, Rudini, 9 August 1994. 
107 Interview with former Indonesian diplomat, 21 November 1994. 
l081nterview with former Indonesian diplomat, 21November1994. 
lO'JJbe Sunday Times, 5 December 1993 . .KmnJ;m!, 14 May 1994. 
1 lOJbese include the Association of Muslim Professionals of Singapore, and Pengembang Keuangan Ekonomi 
Negeri Johor (PKENJ) of Malaysia. For details see Business Times, 6 August 1992. See also Jalcarta Post, 5 
September 1994. Re,publika, 5 September 1994. Business Tlil}es, 6 September 1994. 
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Table 6.5 
Major Domestic Investors on Batam Island 
Habibie Family Suyatim Abdulrachman 
"Timmy" Habibie 
Pf Timsco Indonesia 
(55%) 
Pf Timsco Indonesia 
Pf Timsco Indonesia 
Pf Timsco Indonesia 
Pf Herwindo Rintas 
(10%) 
Pf Herwindo Rintas 
Pf Herwindo Rintas 
Pf Herwindo Rintas 
Pf Tamsa Rexina Tubulars 
(35%)111 
Pf Indoterminal Batamindo 
(25%)112 
(?%)113 
Pf Bimatima Dharma 
Perkasa 
(50%) 
Pf Batamindo Invesbnent 
Corporation 
(60%)114 
Pf Batamindo Invesbnent 
Corporation 
(60%)115 
Pf Batamindo Industrial 
Management 
(50%)116 
Pf Batamindo Executive 
Village 
(20%)117 
111 BIDA; D&ftar Perusahaan rMA di Pulau Batani sampai <lenean 11111/1993. Indonesia Deyelo,pment News Vol.13 No.4 (March/April 1990). 
112 Indonesia Deyelq,gment News , Vol.13 No.4 (March/April 1990) , p8. Business Tlilles, 17 September 1992. Reuters Textline l 7Sep92. 
113 J@karta Post, 12 April 1995. 
l 14BIDA ; Paftar Perusahaan PMA di Pulau Batani sampai denean 1111111993. Imlo2, 9 February 1991. 
115 Jakarta Pqst 18 June 1996. 
116BIDA; Dattar Perusabaan rMA di Pulau Batam sampai denun 1111111993. Jmul2, 9 February 1991. 
117 BIDA; D&ftar PerusahaM rMA di Pulau Batam sampai denean 11111/1993. Jmul2, 9 February 1991. BisQis Wdonesia, 30 May 1992. 
Oil Service Industry 
Palm Oil Terminal 
Asiaport Developer 
Batamindo Industrial Park 
Pf Batam Bintan 
Telekomunikasi 
(95%) 
Batamindo Industrial Park 
Batamindo Executive 
Village (Recreational 
Facilities) 
.... 
'° IN 
Thareq Kemal & Ilham 
Akbar Habibie 
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One example of the growing regional connections was the 1994 announcement of a 400 
ha. industrial estate strongly supported by FOKUS and bringing together companies 
from Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia. The estate will be developed by PT 
Bandar Mardi Perkasa, a consortium made up of the Bandar Group, Citra Group, Gema 
Group and Mataram Group, Perkasa Group, Bukaka Group, and JSEDC (Johor State 
Economic Development Corporation) Technopark Sdn Bhd. lTI Habibie has allocated a 
further 160 ha. of land on Batara for projects aimed at regional cooperation.178 
Another example was the container port contract, which was awarded to Habibie's 
brother, Timmy, and YTL Corporation, one of Malaysia's top five building contractors 
whose Managing-Director, Francis Yeoh, is close to Prime Minister Mahathir.179 Other 
recent events, such as the golf tournament for the Madame Tien Soeharto Cup organised 
by the Merah-Putih Foundation, have been explicitly promoted as part of a campaign to 
maintain friendship between Indonesian state officials and entrepreneurs with their 
counterparts in Singapore, Malaysia and other countries.180 
Indonesian business groups differ markedly in their motivations for doing business on 
Batara. In most cases, particularly those with strong political connections, these 
Indonesian conglomerates have been tied to the domestic market because of commercial 
timidity, inexperience and protection from competition, and were able to obtain first 
preference for projects in the tourism sector, in industrial estates and in real estate, 
mostly for speculative purposes. 
Speculators on Batam are dominated by domestic investors looking for quick profits, 
for property development is an easy means of capital accumulation. Many of those who 
make up this group, known as the tanah mafia (land mafia), are closely connected or 
related to BIDA and senior Indonesian officials.181 BIDA has maintained an outwardly 
tough attitude to land speculation, particularly by revoking investment licensees and 
land permits. However, it has so far targeted mainly foreign and small domestic 
investors, and not taken action against the tanah mafia, especially blatantly speculative 
projects such as certain domestically-owned industrial estates which remained empty 
six years after being licensed. 
177Jndustries in the industrial park will reportedly include an electronic-chip factory, cable industry, automobile 
manufacturing and health industries . .K!Jmmi, 21September1994. Bisnis Indonesia, 27 October 1994. 
178Straits Times, 27 March 1996. 
179far Eastern Economic Review, 26 October 1995, p 64. 
180 Ja!carta Post. 12 October 1995. 
181 It is this group which is mostly responsible for current land prices and the illegal sale of land to third parties. For 
instance, land at Mukakuning is being offered for US$150 sq.m., even though the official rate is US$0.34 sq.m. 
Forum Keadilan, 11September1995. See also Tuaw2. 3 April 1993. 
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For others, Batam offered opportunities to do business with Singapore, and to take 
advantage of its international business expertise and geographic proximity, many 
hoping that establishing a beachhead in Singapore would propel them onto the 
international stage, facilitate fund procurement and boost international competitiveness. 
Quite clearly the partnership between Singaporean state capital, and conglomerates 
connected to Indonesia's political elite has characterised much of the current 
developments on Batam, particularly in infrastructure, and has played a crucial role in 
attracting investment. The most prominent is the partnership which created BIP. Other 
projects are just as important. 
Through its investments on Batam, the Salim Group is perhaps now less constrained by 
geographical boundaries than in the past. That Batam is Anthony Salim's pet project, 
and not his father, Liem Sioe Liong's, may indicate an important shift away from the 
use of political connections to further business interests.182 However, the list of 
investments on Batam suggests both the importance of patronage as well as smart 
business decisions. Whilst the Salim Group may be rich and well-connected, it requires 
partners with the necessary expertise in many cases, although it usually insists on being 
the majority shareholder, so that it can call the shots.183 
There has been concern in Indonesia over the concentration of large business groups in 
the economic development of Batam, not only because of the limited number of 
domestic participants in what is seen as the Singapore-Batam project, but also because 
these major domestic investors are mostly limited to a number of big Jakarta-based 
groups. Opposition in Indonesia has focused considerable attention on the dominance 
of domestic political and economic elites in the development of Batam, and there has 
been criticism that only a few will benefit from developments. 
In particular, the dominance of these conglomerates has caused resentment among 
many, mainly pribumi, Indonesian businessmen who have been largely left out of the 
action. Many of the complaints reflect dissatisfaction among some quarters in Jakarta 
who believe that industrial development on Batam was being monopolised by certain 
foreign and national conglomerates.184 For instance, the Chairman of Gapensi 
(Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia), Agus Kartasasmita, called for 
policies to help national contractors compete with foreign contractors on Batam.185 
182 Asiaweek. 18 January 1991, p 48. 
183 Sin&agore Business, December 1990. 
184The Straits Times, 28 September 1990. The Jakarta Post, 28September1990. 
185whilst a number of large national contractors had joined in Riau projects, the largest obstacle was that foreign 
contractors were better prepared to do the larger projects. The ability of national contractors to obtain development 
projects was low compared to foreign contractors, mainly because of high bank interest rates in Indonesia, as well as 
the fact that foreign contractors were able to bring their materials straight from Singapore, duty-free and cheaper. 
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Criticism has also been levelled at non-pribumi businesses who have been called on to 
be more patriotic. 186 
These criticisms are not necessarily specific to Batam but also appear at the national 
level, and attempts have been made to promote "understanding" of development plans 
among these businessmen and senior government officials in order to combat this 
resentment. The government's argument is that initially, because of the need for 
integrated planning, strong partners were needed to get projects going.187 
Operational Aspects of Development 
It is clear that Batam possesses several strengths : a strategic location beside the 
Malacca Straits and Singapore; the full support of the Indonesian, and Singaporean, 
governments; attractive facilities such as bonded zone status and 100% foreign 
ownership; and a relatively low wage workforce compared to neighbouring Singapore 
and Malaysia. However, despite being promoted as an 'oasis' of trade and industry in 
the middle of a generally restrictive economic system, Batam Island suffers from the 
same kinds of operational problems found in the rest of Indonesia - bureaucratic hold-
ups, infrastructure inadequacies, regulatory restrictions and uncertainties, and 
administrative problems. It is these weakness's that threaten continued investor interest 
Infrastructure 
The development of infrastructure on Batam Island is being underwritten by the 
Indonesian government By the end of 1994, US$859m. had been spent on the 
development of Batam, primarily on infrastructure such as arterial and collector roads, 
an airport, and developing public utilities and communications facilities. (See Table 
6.6) However, despite the huge outlay of monies, infrastructure problems remain 
serious, and investors often complain about the slowness of infrastructure development, 
and problems caused by lack of power, water supply, and telecommunications. 
Agus stressed the need to involve Kadin and interested associations, so that right from the beginning Indonesian 
contractors were ready to handle projects in the Riau area. &mwill. 4 June 1993. Media Indonesia. 4 June 1993. 
186fDmJI, May 1991. 
187BusinessTimes, 27September1991. 
Table 6.6 
Government Investment on Batam Island, 1969/70-1990/91188 
Pertamina Pe rum tel Foreign Aid Ciovennnent(PlVIP) Sand Royalties Total Invesunent 
<US$) (US$) (US$) (US$) <US$) Yearlv (US$) Cumulative ll JS$) 
1969no 
- -
191on1 
- -
1911n2 21,459,337.41 21,459,337.41 21,459,337.41 
1972n3 21,459,337.41 21,459,337.41 42,918,674.82 
1913n4 21,459,337 .41 21,459,337.41 64,378,012.23 
1914n5 21,459,337.41 21,459,337.41 85,837,349.64 
1975n6 21,459,337.41 21,459,337.41 107,296,687 .71 
1916n1 2,611,812.14 2,611,812.14 109,908,499.80 
1911n8 2,611,812.14 2,611,812.14 112,520,311.90 
1978n9 2,611,812.14 2,611,812.14 115,132,124.10 
1979/80 11,313,801.18 11,313,801.18 126,445,925.30 
1980/81 15,527,296.83 15,527 ,296.83 141,973,222.10 
1981/82 906,097.76 37,291,036.20 38,197,133.96 180,170,356.10 
1982/83 47,381,748.42 47,381,748.42 227,552,104.50 
1983/84 25,450,641. 78 25,450,641.78 253,002, 746.30 
1984/85 4,733,952.74 19,813,096.38 24,547,049.11 277 .549, 795.40 
1985/86 4,733,952.74 29,152,857.52 1,768,815.78 35,655,626.04 313,205,421.40 
1986/87 4,733,952.74 1,857,719.71 7,454,359.40 29,673,109.29 43,719,141.14 356,924,562.50 
1987/88 4,733,952.74 2,918,205.48 18,928,500.33 26,580,658.55 383,505,221.10 
1988/89 4,733,952.74 6,185,696.66 13,564,545.29 24,484,194.69 407,989,415.70 
1989/90 4,733,952.74 111,930,066.60 10,625, 731.00 3,672,147.96 130,096, 189 .30 538,085,560.50 
1990/91 4,733,952.74 7,432,669 17,818,190.72 16,163,378.69 46,148,191.01 585,099,495.10 
Total 107,296,688 33,137,669.17 122,126,553.00 238, 768,098.00 83, 770,497 .34 585,099,495.10 
1881nvesunent by Pertamina and Perumtel averaged out. BIDA; Pata Kemfliuan Pemb311gun311 Daerah lndustri Pulau Batam sampai/dengan bulan April 1991 (Jakarta 1991). ~ 
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According to a survey conducted by the Singapore Manufacturers Association in 
September 1992, the major complaint of companies operating on Batam Island was 
poor infrastructure.189 Many investors continue to provide their own power generation 
and water supply facilities, and prospective investors remain cautious of infrastructure 
described only as adequate. Whilst John Forgrieve, Senior Adviser (BPPT) to Habibie, 
advocated in 1991 that steps be taken to address power and water shortages on Batam, 
little has been achieved in those areas. 190 
BIDA is still in the process of developing infrastructure in utilities which, as it is 
developed to a certain stage is transferred to relevant government ministries for future 
development and maintenance. For example, both Perumtel, the state-owned 
telecommunications company, and PLN, the state-owned electricity company, have 
taken over their respective facility's from BIDA.191 However, both PLN and Perumtel 
remain unable to fulfil the needs of investors on Batam. 
Whilst telephone density on Batam is the highest in the country, many Batam residents 
have subscribed to mobile cellular telephone networks based in Singapore because of 
inadequate facilities.192 Electricity tariffs on Batam are the highest in Indonesia, and 
despite PLN's guarantee that tariffs will remain cheaper than in Singapore, at only Rp 1-
2 lower than in Singapore the difference is quite unremarkable.193 Water facilities are 
also poor, in terms of both supply and maintenance - BIP handed over three pumps it 
built at a nearby reservoir to the local water authority only to find that within three 
years, two no longer worked and one worked only at fifty percent efficiency because of 
poor maintenance. 194 
The creation of industrial estates was one way of overcoming infrastructure 
inadequacies. Industrial estates would provide basic infrastructure, a major advantage 
considering BIDA, while providing some services, lacks the resources to meet all the 
needs of the industries relocating to Batam. For instance, power generators and 
communications facilities would be installed in the industrial parks. In addition, most 
administrative requirements could be transferred to third parties, and in this way 
189 Singapore Manufacturers Association ; SMA Survey Report on the Johor-Sineapore-Riau Growth Triao&le 
(Singapore, September 1992). 
190us Embassy, Jakarta; Field Trip Report: Batam Island Investment Opportunities (25 February 1991). 
191Ihe Jak;arta Post, 29 October 1992. Business Times. 22 December 1992. Endah Pratiwi ; "Pembiayaan 
Pembangunan Batam dan Masalahnya", in Tim UGM, Pola Dasar Kotamadya Batam, (UGM 1993), p 92. In 1995 
Perumtel banded over its cross-border communications to PI Indosat, the state-owned international 
telecommunications operator. Jakarta Post, 16 August 1995. 
1921n 1991 Batam telephone density was 7.8 telephones per 100 residents, higher than Jakarta's 6.8 and Indonesia's 
O.S. Jak;artaPost, 17May1991. 
193The Jakarta Post, 29October1992. Suara Pembaruan. 5 February 1993. 
1941nterview with BIP Executive, October 1994. 
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investors would be largely insulated from the maze of regulations and procedures which 
existed in the Indonesian administrative system. 
By early 1990, some nine industrial estates covering over 1,800ha. had been approved 
on Batam, accounting for half of all industrial estates outside Java.195 (see Table 6.7) 
However, only BIP has had any real impact on Batam Island. Of the other eight 
approved industrial parks only Kabil Industrial Estate has attracted tenants.196 The 
other seven remain empty, or relatively so.197 
The failure of industrial estates has not been specific to Batam Island. Only 30% of the 
154 companies licensed to develop industrial estates in Indonesia since 1989 had done 
so by mid-1995. According to HKI (Himpunan Kawasan Industri or Industrial Estate 
Association) there were a number of reasons for the low achievement rate - low investor 
demand, inconsistent government policies, inadequate infrastructure and facilities, and 
the fact that many of them were really established for the purpose of land 
speculation. 198 
All of those factors can be applied to the failed industrial estates on Batam Island. For 
instance, PT Astra Microtronics moved to BIP from another industrial estate on Batam 
because of poor infrastructure and utilities.199 Industrial estate developers have also 
been identified as a major culprit of land speculation, mainly because their land plots 
are relatively large and thus more visible. They have included both foreign and 
domestic investors. 
There have also been factors that are specific to Batam. The first is the role of 
Singapore. The main reason for BIP's success has been the strong support it has 
received from the Singapore government and agencies such as the EDB, and this has 
helped to attract investors. There is no Singaporean interest in other industrial estates, 
and they are not marketed or generally known in Singapore. 200 The second factor is the 
discouragement of low-technology industries on Batam Island. Kabil Industrial Estate 
has been keen to attract Singapore garment manufacturers but has been unable to 
convince BIDA to make exceptions. 201 
1951ndonesian Commercial Newsletter. 25 July 1995. 
1960ne of which was a subsidiary of the developer, the Citra Group. PT Citra Tubindo has invested in a US$35m. 
seamless pipe processing plant. Energy Venture of the USA has a US$45m. drill pipe plant The Jakarta Post, 19 
June 1991. Business Ttmes, 15 April 1992. 
197 &mu211l, 15 May 1993. Media Indonesia. 29 May 1993. Forum Keadj!an 11 September 1995. 
198TheJakaJ1aPost 17July1995. 
199Interview with Astra Executive, October 1994. 
200Interview with BIP Executive, September 1994. 
201 Straits Times, 2 September 1993. 
Table 6.7 
Approved Industrial Estates on Batam Island202 
~ 
PT Kabil Indonusa Estate 
PT Citra Agramasinti Nusantara (75%) 
Netherlands Development Finance Co. (25%) 
Kwang Hwa Industrial Park 
PT Sarana Usaha Adhi Rekayasa (25% ), 
Batam International Development Co. Ltd. (75%) 
Komisaris Utama 
Kris Wiluan 
Ir Bambang Tribudiman 
Thomas Technology Parle William James Thomas 
Thomas Engineering Pte Ltd (20%), Ny. Lin Su Lien (80%) 
PT Batamlndo Investment Corporation S.A.Habibie, Anthony Salim 
PT Herwindo Rintis (60%), STIC (30%), JEE (10%) 
PT Seafront Industrial City Abdul Kadir Bakry 
Boonoon (70%), Expogrowth Investment (10%) 
PT Spinindo Mitradaya Batam Soedarsono 
PT Persero Batam (10%), PT Spinindo Mitradaya (10%) 
KADIN businessmen (80%) 
PT Kabil Industrial Estate Sudwikatmono 
PT Putri Selaka Kencana (100%) 
PT Tanjung Uncang Industrial Estate Sudwikatmono 
PT Putri Selaka Kencana (100%) 
PT Trisatya Usaha Raya B.Trisulo 
PTTrisatu 
Investment Type 
PMDN 
PMA (Taiwan) 
PMA (Singapore) 
PMA (Singapore) 
PMA (Singapore, 
Hong Kong) 
PMDN 
PMDN 
PMDN 
PMDN 
License Date 
25/09/1989 
12/05/1989 
30/05/1989 
08/12/1989 
23/10/1989 
20112/1989 
19/12/1989 
19/12/1989 
1110111990 
Location 
Kabil 
Kabil 
Batam Centre 
MukaKuning 
Sagulung 
Tanjung Uncang 
Kabil 
Tanjung Uncang 
Tanjung Uncang 
m 
176 Ha. 
339 Ha. 
31 Ha. 
500 Ha. 
350 Ha. 
100 Ha. 
75 Ha. 
125 Ha. 
20 Ha. 
202oPDIPB; Data Kenuijuan Pembaneunan Daerah lndustri Pulau Batam Sawpai Denean Bulan April 1991 (Jakarta, 1991). Business Times, 2811011991. Construction Industry 
Development Board ; Batam Outlook 1990, 2nd Edition, (Singapore, June 1990). 
~ 
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Habibie has not only told industrial estate developers to study and to emulate BIP, but 
has actually taken certain developers personally to BIP and told them publicly to get 
their act together.203 In the meantime, at least three industrial estates have been reduced 
in acreage by BIDA. 204 The outlook for the majority of industrial estates other than 
BIP does not look bright. According to the Vice-Chairman of DPR Komisi VI, the 
failure of these industrial estates is proof that economic growth and development on 
Batam are not on target. 205 
The case of the Taiwanese-backed Kwang Hwa Industrial Park is an interesting one. 
Set up for Taiwanese investors in late 1989, by 1992 Kwang Hwa was still only 
identifiable by a signboard and a small administration office despite plans for the 
completion of the first phase of the estate by that time, and the fact that some 27 
Taiwanese companies had already booked space. 206 Following a high-level Indonesian 
mission in November 1992, Taiwan again considered investing on Batam Island, 
announcing that state-owned companies such as TDTC, China Steel, China Petroleum, 
and an airline and shipping company were planning to invest US$10b.207 Several 
months later, Taiwanese Premier Lien Chan named Batam a special investment project, 
aimed partly at cooling Taiwanese investment fervour in China. 20s 
However, members of Taiwan Parliament's main opposition party called on the 
government to demand that Jakarta revise its stance in objecting to Taiwan (and Hong 
Kong) attending the upcoming APEC summit, or retract its investment plan on Batam 
Island in retaliation. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas had announced a few days 
earlier that Indonesia would only attend a meeting of leaders of APEC member 
countries if Taiwan and Hong Kong were not invited. 200 
In August 1993, the Indonesian government, upset by the slow progress of the 
development of Kwang Hwa, revoked the developer's licence because very few 
Taiwanese firms had invested on Batam, despite the promises of the Taiwanese 
2031nterview with BIP Executive. October 1994. Media lncionesia. 13 March 1995. 
204They are Kwang Hwa Industrial Estate, PT Thomas Technology Parle and PT Seafront City. Bisnis Indonesia. 16 
March 1995. 
205Medj,a Indonesia. 29 May 1993. 
206 Business Tunes, 28 October 1991. Straits Tunes, 30 March 1992. 
207The plan was put together by Taiwan's World Economics Society, a semi-government think-tank. Straits Trmes. 
21 July 1992. China Economic News Service. 15 June 1993. Reuters Textline 15Jun93. Another source put the 
figure at Us.$100 million. China Economic News Service. 10 August 1993. Reuters Textline 10Aug93. 
208china Economic News Service. 14 August 1993. Reuters Textline 14Aug93. China Economic News Service. 7 
August 1993. Reuters Textline 07Aug93. Taiwanese investment in Indonesia had been falling as Taiwanese 
companies diverted more funds to China, despite the fact that the Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs had 
recommended Indonesia. in early July 1993, as one of six Southeast Asian and Latin American countries as suitable 
investment sites for outbound Taiwan manufacturers. China Economic News Seryjce, 8 July 1993. Reuters Textline 
08Jul93. 
200china Economic News Service. 10August1993. Reuters Textline 10Aug93. 
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government to encourage its manufacturers to invest there. The Taiwanese developers 
reacted by suspending their investment, halting construction work and withdrawing 
personnel from Indonesia, reportedly because of a disagreement with its Indonesian 
partner. 21o Three months later, the Taiwanese developer announced plans to continue 
its industrial estate project after solving its dispute with the Indonesian government. 211 
However, the size of the estate was reduced by BIDA, on the understanding that it could 
be enlarged on the basis of good future performance. 212 
Following another investment promotion visit to Taiwan in January 1994, it was 
reported that Taiwanese businessmen were expected to invest US$370m in the 
industrial estate in 1994. 213 According to Taiwanese press reports, the investment 
aimed to change Indonesia's mind about Taiwan's participation in the upcoming APEC 
meeting in Jakarta. This was denied by BIDA which claimed that the investment plan 
was a serious one. 214 However, Taiwan did not attend the APEC meeting and the 
investment plan had not been realised by the end of 1995. 215 
The plan again received renewed interest in mid-1995, supported by Taiwan's Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. 216 Taiwan's Economic Minister requested that the original size of 
Kwang Hwa industrial park be restored, and asked for facilities from the Indonesian 
government for Taiwan to place a trade representative on Batam. 211 While the 
industrial park was restored to its original size in August 1995, there are no details 
about future Taiwanese investment plans. Meanwhile Taiwanese investment accounts 
for only 4.3% of total foreign investment on Batam.218 
210us$26 million bad reportedly already been spent on the project Reuters News Service. 28 August 1993. 
Reuters Textline 28Aug93. China Economic News Seryice. 28 August 1993. Reuters Textline 28Aug93. Wiuii 
Indonesia, 9November1993. 
211 Bisnjs Indonesia, 9 November 1993. 
2121nterview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
2131ndonesia Business WeekJy. Vol.11 No.6 (21 January 1994). 
214Bisnis Indonesia, 11 January 1994. 
2151nterestingly, it also timed with the awarding of the Asiaport project to an ASEAN consortium. Taiwan's 
Evergreen Group had showed the greatest interest in the project, and for a long time appeared to be the likely 
developer, not only because it began designing and making a feasibility studies at its own expense, but because 
Evergreen Chairman Chang Rung-fa bad held high level talks with Soeharto, and was described as "personal 
Adviser" to Habibie on Batam's general development According to Habibie, Evergreen's boss asked to be special 
adviser for the development of the container port. Despite high-level contacts and being offered the project in 1994, 
either a breakdown occurred in negotiations between Evergreen and Habibie, or Habibie bad a change a heart, and 
the project was awarded to the ASEAN consortium after a presentation of bids in early 1995. For details, see lbR 
Jakarta Post, 21 May 1993. Reuter News Service. 15 June 1993. Reuters Textline 15Jun93. The Jalcarta Post, 16 
June 1993. Uoyd's List 29 July 1993. Reuters Textline 29Ju193. Bisnis Indonesia- 9 December 1993. The Jalcarta 
fgn, 10 December 1993. Bisnis Indonesia, 11 January 1994. Bisnis Indonesia, 15 February 1994. Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 24 February 1994. Far Eastern Economic Review. 10 March 1994. 
216cmna Economic News Seryjce. 1 June 1995. Reuters Textline 1Jun95. 
217Tuas. Thl No.32. 7September1995. 
218There have been reports that Taiwanese companies will invest in an industrial estate in Medan. Reuter NeWS 
~. 29 January 1996. Reuters Textline 29Jan96. 
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Compounding problems on Batatn has been the failure of overall planning, both of 
infrastructure and general development. Whilst there is a masterplan with an integrated 
urban infrastructure development program, for the most part it doesn't work, and in 
practice, the Masterplan has little influence over planning - five-yearly evaluations 
generally only update the Masterplan according to existing developments. 219 In fact, 
planning practices have developed very much on a pragmatic basis. For instance, the 
land use plan does not conform with the actual practice, necessitating the constant 
drawing up of new land use plans. 220 
One example of poor planning concerns that of social infrastructure. As elsewhere in 
Indonesia, rapid economic growth and industrialisation have resulted in a sharp increase 
in social, cultural and political problems. On Batam Island, three major factors - high 
population growth, high unemployment and a high cost of living - are behind these 
problems which, if they remain un-addressed, pose a considerable threat to the future 
success of industrial and economic development. 
Whilst the official population of Batatn at the end of 1994 was put at just over 160,000, 
the true figure is at least twice that because it is based on the number of registered, and 
therefore not actual, citizens.221 According to a BIDA spokesman, the main cause for 
high population growth - at 12.1 % annually, it is five times the national average222 - is 
uncontrolled inward migration, running at around 3,000 newcomers a month. 223 Whilst 
the potential for a massive inflow of population to Batatn is clearly great in such a 
highly-populated and employment-short country, inward labour migration has placed 
enormous pressure on basic resources such as housing and health-care, as well as 
facilities for training and skills-formation. 
Job seekers, essentially economically-driven transmigrants, have flooded into Batara 
Island attracted by rumours and reports of abundant work and good pay, creating a huge 
2191nterview with BIDA Executive, August 1994. The Masterplan is evaluated around every five years, with 
recommendations about the general direction of development in order to maintain a framework for sustainable 
development, optimal use of resources, and infrastructure development up to 2006. Adjustments and alterations are 
made according to both short and long term needs and projections. For example, an evaluation conducted in 1991 by 
the Faculty of Technology of the University of Indonesia and PT Atelier 6, a private consulting firm, added more 
low-cost housing and water supply facilities to the Masterplan. Other reviews have been undertaken in 1983, by 
Planning Research Corporation, USA and PT Atelier 6, in 1985, by Fakultas Teknik, Universitas Indonesia. BIDA & 
Lembaga Teknologi, Fakultas Teknik Universitas Indonesia & PT Atelier 6 ; Eyaluasi Mastex:glan Pulau Batam 
(Final Re.port) 1991, (Jakarta, 1991). Interview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. Interview with 
Halomoan Panjaitan, 1 September 1994. Members of the DPR have expressed concern that such evaluations of 
Batam's development take too long and are not objective. AD1llt&. 7 May 1993. 
220Mubariq Ahmad ; "Economic Cooperation in SIJORI Growth Triangle : An Indonesian Perspective" Ekonomi 
dan Keuangan Indonesia, Vol.40 No.4 (1992), p433. 
221 BIDA; Barelaog: Devek>Jnnent Data up to December 1994 (Jakarta 1995). 
222Tuupg,, 3 April 1993. 
223 Jakarta Post. 18 January 1995. 
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labour pool. 224 However, very few newcomers, the vast majority of which are 
unskilled, are able to find employment. As a result, unemployment currently stands at 
around 60% on Batam. 225 With a ratio of those asking for and offering work of 2:1, the 
only course open to BIDA and the Indonesian government is to discourage newcomers, 
but so far efforts made in this area have been largely unsuccessful. 226 How to control 
the movement of people to Batam remains one of the biggest challenges for the 
Indonesian government. 227 
Unrestrained migration, combined with high unemployment and a high cost of living, 
has also led to a proliferation of ruli (rumah liar or squatter settlements) encroaching on, 
and threatening, the green belt of protected forest and water-catchment areas. 
Researchers from Gadjah Mada University calculated that 27% of Batam's population 
lived in an estimated 6,700 ruli in 1992.228 More recent estimates place between 40-
50% of Batam's population living in around 16,000 ruli at over 59 locations.229 The 
Governor of Riau has acknowledged that the fault for this lies in the government's 
failure to foresee the huge influx of people to Batam.230 The failure of population 
controls, high unemployment and the prediction and provision of associated social 
infrastructure such as low-cost housing threatens the future success of industrial and 
economic development, and the government has no option other than to pay more 
attention to these problems. 
An example of the failure of economic and physical planning is the development of 
Batam Centre, projected to become a modem business district upon completion by 
224 Mgkatan Berseniata. 4December1990. 
225 Suara Pembaruan· 22 April 1995. 
226 Attempts have been made to discourage job-seekers from coming to Batam. Habibie himself is fearful of the 
employment problems emerging on Batam, and has campaigned for tighter efforts to control newcomers. Habibie 
has told those with no skills not to come to Batam (K.ompas, 21 October 1992), has requested all Governors to 
mobilise those with skills in their province and send them to Batam (:llmpg., 3 April 1993), and has proposed that 
local governments assess all intending to migrate to Batam and select only those with skills to be allowed (Siw:A 
.KmA, 21 January 1995). Job seekers, too, have been told to apply through the inter-regional labour service agencies 
to secure a job before arriving on Batam. Others have been told that Batam Island's Manpower Office would only 
serve Batam residents, whilst the Ministry of Manpower and the Riau Governor have issued rulings that priority 
would be given to job seekers from Riau (J@karta Post. 16 March 1992). However, these efforts have for the most 
part been ignored. Most job seekers are generally reluctant to use the services of the Department of Manpower, 
preferring to find work on their own. 
227 New proposals for stemming the flow of newcomers have emerged - Pemda has put forward a proposal to the 
government and the DPR that newcomers pay some sort of guarantee before being allowed entry (K.ompas, 2 June 
1994), and BIDA supports the issuing of special passes as used in the Shenzen Special Economic Zone in China 
<Bisnis Indonesia, 21 November 1994)- however, both in the practical and legal senses, there is no simple solution. 
228 They took the number of houses and multiplied it by five (the average household size) giving a total of 33,500 
people or 27.2% of population in 1992. Putu Sudira; "Pemukiman Penduduk di Pulau Batam dan Masalahnya" in 
Tim UGM Pola Pasar K.otamadya Batam, (UGM 1993), p 25. 
229suara Pembaruao, 10 May 1995. Other estimates include 6,000 ruli in May 1993 <Alllla, 1May1993), 7,620 
ruli at 57 locations in September 1993 (Kompas, 24 September 1993), 35,000 in October 1993 (Suara Kar,ya, 4 
October 1993), 12,000 in March 1994 (Kwmlas,, 31March1994), 16,000 in September 1994 (Suara Pembaruao, 13 
September 1994), and 15,000 in November 1994 (Bisnis Indonesia, 21 November 1994). 
230Business Times, 9 October 1992. 
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1995. The idea received strong interest from investors who took up several dozen land 
parcels for development, and proposed investments worth several hundred million 
dollars in the late 1980s and early 1990s.231 However, apart from BIDA's office 
complex and several completed or near-completed residential housing projects, Batam 
Centre was virtually bereft of activity at the end of 1994, and those living there suffered 
from power failures, and poor water supplies. 232 
According to Habibie, total long-term investment in infrastructure on Batam will 
amount to US$2,000 million, the majority of which would come from the government's 
budget Most of this additional infrastructure investment is earmarked for expansion of 
port facilities (US$1,222 million) and the expansion of the airport (US$132 million).233 
Infrastructure development is dominated by a largely nationalist agenda of large-scale 
infrastructure projects and programs. 
Most of these projects are aimed at replicating, and even replacing, certain facilities in 
Singapore. Batam Island has long been cited as an area of significant potential for 
establishing transhipment operations of the type offered in Singapore, and has been 
targeted as a sea and air cargo and passenger transit centre. According to Habibie and 
BIDA, the air and sea ports pose competition for Singapore, but with the overall aim of 
maximising utilisation of Batam, preventing double-handing in import/export 
operations, and to make facilities for Indonesia's own activities.234 BIDA Chief 
Executive, Djatmiko, put it this way, 
We are in a very strategic location and are trying to take advantage of this, just as Singapore has 
done."235 
The first step taken has been to develop Batam Island as an international air passenger 
and cargo transit centre. Batam's Hang Nadim airport, following in the footsteps of 
Johor's airport in Senai, went international at the end of 1995 as part of Indonesia's 
fiftieth anniversary of independence celebrations. 236 According to Habibie, the airport 
will replace some of Singapore's Changi airport's functions as a flight transit centre to 
and from Indonesia. 237 According to Habibie, 
231 The Straits Times, 28 April 1990. Business Tunes, 19 April 1993. 
232various Interviews and Site Surveillence on Batam, October 1994. Batam Centre Port has never come about, nor 
has the Batam Sheraton which was planned to be completed by mid-1993. Business Tunes, 11 November 1991. 
233 The Jakarta Post, 5 December 1990. 
2341nterview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. Straits Twes, 30 January 1993. 
235 Straits Twes, 11 December 1995. 
236completion was rushed forward to December 1995 from March 1996 . .K!muil.i. 28 May 1994. The US$280m. 
third-phase of the airport expansion project was being carried out by a consortium including Itochu, of Japan, PT Puri 
Bangun Mustika, of Indonesia, and Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co Ltd of South Korea. WI Press 
Newswjre, 20 September 1993. Reuters Textline 20Sep93. 
237.Kwm!al, 28 May 1994. Straits Times, 29 May 1994. See also Business Times, 27 April 1992. Straits Times. 18 
May 1994. Straits Twes. 28 August 1993. Kompas, 16 May 1995. The plan to make the airport serve as a Cargo 
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I hope that in the future ... international flights will transit on Batam and not in Singapore. 238 
An aircraft maintenance and overhaul facility has been set up to support the 
international airport. The facility will service Sempati airline's fleet, as well as be open 
to aircraft of other airlines, with the potential to compete with similar maintenance 
facilities in Singapore. 239 Whilst Garuda has begun using Batam for transit and as a re-
fueling base on several international flights, the airport currently suffers from high fuel 
costs, a moderate volume of air cargo and an absence of international passenger 
traffic. 240 
The container port on Batam Island has been given high priority for development as a 
trans-shipment port for Indonesian exports and imports.241 The US$1billion container 
port will be able to handle up to 20 million containers, general cargo and 
petrochemicals annually. Not only is it hoped that it will serve as a catalyst for the 
development of Batam, as well as end double-handling of cargo, but according to BIDA 
officials, it has the express purpose of competing directly with Singapore. 242 At the 
very least, the port is intended to reduce Indonesia's dependence on Singapore as an 
export channel - in 1992, 1.1 million of a total 1.7 million containers exported from 
Indonesia were transhipped through Singapore. 243 
By far the largest and most prominent infrastructure project is the plan to connect the 
Barelang (Batam-Rempang-Galang) area with a series of bridges. (see Map 6.1) 
Purportedly to speed up development and to facilitate inter-island transportation and 
communication, it has been estimated that the completion of the bridges will require at 
least Rp600 billion. 244 Some, however, see the project as yet another, and the latest, 
Habibie ambition - to unite islands. 245 
Transit Centre has received strong support from INACA (Indonesian National Air Carriers Association). £Illa 
Peinbaruan, 3 August 1993. 
238~, 6May1989. 
239 PT Batam Aircraft Maintenance - a joint-venture between Singapore Aerospace (SAE) (25% ), IPTN (25% ), 
Sempati Air (20%), PT Saltim, a subsidiary of the Salim and Timsco groups (10%), and Yasau (Yayasan Adi Upaya 
or Indonesian Air Force Officers Welfare Foundation) (20%) - aims to start operations by mid-1996, and will carry 
out a full range of maintenance ~ces. The division of labour between the joint venture partners has SAE and 
IPTN providing technical and management expertise, and Y asau providing the land and building the premises for the 
facility which will then be leased to the joint venture. The Straits Ttmes, 12 June 1993. The Jakarta Post, 19 August 
1994. Straits Times, 3 September 1994. The airport itself will be managed by a BUMN (Badan Usaha Milik Negara 
or State Owned Corporation), created by BIDA at a cost of Rp500 billion. Bisnis Indonesia, 8 July 1995. 
2401t has been reported that efforts are being made to reduce costs and attract air traffic. Straits Times, 11 December 
1995. Jakarta Post, 22 August 1996. 
241 Bisnis Indonesia, 22 March 1995. 
242Bisnis Indonesia, 9 December 1993. See also The Suruiay Tunes, 23 May 1993. It has so far, however, failed to 
attract a major shipping line -·both Evergreen and Global Alliance dropped their plans to use Batam. South China 
Momin& Post, 3June1996. Straits Times. 8July1996. 
243uoyd's List, 14 October 1993. Reuters Textline 140ct93. The Jakarta Post, 10 December 1993. 
244.IimL No.32 Tb.I, 7 September 1995. The Barelang masterplan was made by Lemtek of Universitas Indonesia 
and a team made up of Riau Governor's office, Batam Mayor's office, the Ministry of Defence and Security, BIDA 
and National Agency for Land Affairs. Planning of the bridges was done by LAPl-ITB under the Directorate 
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Map6.1 
Barelang (Batain-Rempang-Galang) 
P.Batam 
General of Highway Construction and Maintenance. BIDA : Business Directocy : 22 years Batam. lruJustrial 
Develggmept Autbgrity, (November 1993), p76. The project also involved three state-owned universities : the 
Bandung Institute of Technology, which will handle construction engineering and technical matters, the University of 
Indonesia, which will deal with the master plan and economic matters, and Gadjab Mada University, which will deal 
with the social-political, cultural, economic and environmental impact of the new bridges. Copstructioo News, 24 
September 1992. Reuters Textline 24Sept92. Straits Times, 8 February 1993. BBC Mopitorin& Seryice. 10 
February 1993. Reuters Textline 10Feb93. 
245 Iml,gg, 17 October 1992. 
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Batain Island requires more planning and strategic thinking about what exactly are the 
overall aims of development. It also needs more appropriate planning and infrastructure 
development if it is to continue to attract new investors over the long term, as well as 
retain existing investors in the near future. Currently infrastructure development is 
island-wide and scattered, and in a half-completed state. Despite the huge amounts of 
money being spent on infrastructure, very little of this is being spent on actually 
improving the infrastructure requirements of investors. Many question the merit of 
pouring monies into the development of the international airport and seaport when 
infrastructure development remains rudimentary and behind in the overall schedule. 246 
In line with the national trend towards handing over the infrastructure role to the private 
sector, BIDA expects individual investors and industrial estate operators to provide the 
necessary facilities .247 
Regulations 
Batain suffers from both inconsistencies in policy formulation and implementation, and 
poor coordination with relevant government Ministries and Agencies on Batatn and in 
Jakarta. Whilst it is often claimed that Batatn Island is more attractive to investors than 
other parts of Indonesia, regulations are often not clear, bureaucratic procedures 
complicated, and there is a lack of information about them. 
According to a survey conducted by the Singapore Manufacturers Association in 
September 1992, one of the major complaints of companies operating on Batatn was red 
tape. 248 Indeed, in several areas the level of bureaucratic hold-ups is perceived to be 
very high. For instance, BIP received building permits for Phase I of development 
almost three years after its completion. 249 The processing of investment applications, 
promoted as a one-stop service, is not only unwieldy but the process takes far longer 
than the promised eight weeks. This compares with a two-to-three week processing 
time in Johor and Singapore.250 
In the case of the property and real estate crash on Batatn in 1991, BIDA was clearly at 
fault for not providing accurate information to investors. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, BIDA told REI (Real Estate Indonesia) and property developers on Batam that 
246various Interviews. 
247Interview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
248 Singapore Manufacturers Association ; SMA Survey Report on the Johor-Sini:apore-Riau Growth Triani:le 
(Singapore, September 1992). The whole regulatory set-up is so complicated and unclear that investors have called 
on BIDA to issue a detailed guidebook listing all regulations, processes and requirements, rather than issuing what 
are perceived as general and promotional brochures. Suara Kazya. 1June1991. 
249Jnterviews~ with BIP Executives, September-October 1994. The buildings accorded with Singapore regulations 
and easily met BID A's standards. 
250 After being lodged with BIDA, applications are checked by the BKPM representative on Batam, forwarded to the 
BKPM in Jakarta before awaiting Presidential approval. The Jakarta Post, 16 August 1991. Sini:apore Business. 
April 1992. 
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their primary market was Singapore. 25l By the end of 1990, it was estimated that 
Singaporeans had purchased at least 3,000 commercial and residential properties on 
Batam.252 However, Singaporeans soon found to their dismay that they could not own 
property under Indonesian law - what they had bought was a building but with no right 
of ownership or leasehold of the land on which it was situated. 253 As a result, 
Singaporeans were forced either to resell their properties at a lower price than what they 
paid, seek reimbursement, or to keep their investments by putting them in the names of 
Indonesian friends or relatives. 254 
For developers, property became difficult to sell, and most were forced to drop their 
selling prices by 35-40%, and many were forced out of business or into bankruptcy. 
Moreover, banks on Batam were hit hard by bad credit, reported to have reached Rpl 
trillion for over 7 ,000 properties. 255 Since the crash, property developers have lacked 
funds, and banks on Batam have remained reluctant to provide credit for real estate 
development 256 One developer, perhaps in deference to Habibie's balloon theory 
described the property market as a 'burst balloon'.257 Property developers were not 
without fault, for they miscalculated the rate at which Batam would develop, and 
succumbed to the strong temptations of quick profits.258 However, the fact was that 
land regulations were not clear; the clear majority of developers sold, and Singaporeans 
bought, property in good faith.259 As the economist Mubyarto noted, public posturing 
251 Interview with Senior REI Official, 9 August 1994. 
252Tumm, 8 May 1993. For instance, at the Real Estate 90 Exhibition, held in Singapore in January 1990, $23m 
worth of properties on Batam were sold to Singaporeans for holiday use, as retirement homes and for investment, 
representing more than 70% of all Batam property offered for sale. Business TjmM, 10 January 1990. Straits Times, 
24 March 1990. The Straits Times, 8 August 1990. According to one businessman, developers could sell 30-40 
residential properties a month, the clear majority to Singaporeans. At Happy Garden Estate, 110 of the planned 130 
houses were bought by Singaporeans. ~. 8 May 1993. 
253 Sineiume Business, April 1992. Land rights granted under Indonesian law differ markedly from the concepts of 
freehold and leasehold land applicable in other countries, and do not recognise either the concept of freehold land 
rights, nor property ownership by non-resident foreigners. Foreigners cannot own land in Indonesia, and foreign 
residents can only rent or occupy land for a maximum of 30 years with the possibility for extension. Indonesia's land 
laws are enshrined in the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 which recognises several types of rights on land, including the 
right of exploration, the right of building and the right of use. All rights are granted for fixed initial periods with 
options to extend. Only one, hale milik, offers a concept of freehold ownership but is only able to be held by 
Indonesians. The four land rights relevant to foreign investors are hale guna bangunan (right to build), granted for up 
to 30 years with renewals for another 20 years, where investors may build on the land designated and own the 
buildings constructed on the land; hale sewa untuk bangunan (right to lease); hale pakai (right to use), granted for 
initial 10 year periods for commercial purposes, where the land can only be used for specific activities as designated; 
and hale guna usaha (right of exploitation), granted for an initial 25 or 35 years periods with extensions for another 
25 years, where state land can be used for fishery, agriculture and farming. These land rights are generally granted to 
foreigners for specific approved projects and may be forfeited if conditions attached to those rights are not satisfied. 
Ernst & Young ; Doine Busjness in Riau, (Singapore, May 1992), p 24-25. 
2541t was being circulated that foreigners who bought houses could be thrown in jail. Straits Times, 9 May 1992. 
Straits Tunes, 28 March 1994. The Straits Times, 8 August 1990. 
255Imum, 8 May 1993. 
256Mubyarto ; "Pola Dasar Pembangunan Pulau Batam ", in Tim UGM ; Pola Dasar Kotamadya Bataai. (UGM 
1993), p3. 
257Imum, 8May1993. 
258~, 14 May 1994. Interview with BIDA Executive, Demar Lubis, 12 August 1994. 
259 Agnes Mawarni ; 'Batam dan SDORI', in Mubyarto dkk. Riau Meng Masa De.pan. (P3PK, Universitas Gadjah 
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by BIDA and government officials muddied the situation - at first foreigners could own 
real estate, then not allowed, and later allowed again, and so on. 260 
Graft and corruption are also prevalent, and many investors complain of being forced to 
pay off local authorities on Batam, sometimes under threat 261 Corruption not only 
affects the activities of foreign investors, but is rife in the day-to-day lives of the local 
community - in land acquisition, in controlling squatter settlements, and the issuing of 
identity cards. 262 An owner of an entertainment venue admitted that the security 
apparatus often carried out clean-up operations, but his business managed to continue 
operating by giving money to officials.263 Some Rp500m. of tax.es levied by Pemda 
even went missing, forcing the Governor to send in an investigatory team. 264 
Addressing investor's complaints of corruption and 'unforeseen costs', Habibie insisted 
that he knew nothing about corruption on Batam and that if there was he would deal 
with it 
There is no corruption on Batam Island with regards to the activities of investors who are involved 
in developments there. If there is, give me proof and I'll take action. 265 
One well-publicised, but failed, case of localised corruption occurred when the 
Chairman of Golkar Batam, Bambang Sujagad, attempted to influence the awarding of 
contracts. In a letter to Habibie, Bambang claimed that senior BIDA official, Gunawan 
Hadisusilo, was obstructing pribumi businesses on Batam because he had cancelled the 
awarding of a tender won by a noted Golkar donor, Muchamad Amin. Bambang 
claimed that he had not asked for land or tenders but, considering that Batam did not 
have a DPRD (Regional Parliament), he regarded Golkar as a political organisation 
responsible for putting forward people's complaints to the government. The action, 
however, was considered by other members of the Board of Management as a violation 
of Golkar's rules because the letter was for private use, and there was no link between 
the letter's matter and Golkar. 266 
260Mubyarto; "Pola Dasar Pembangunan Pulau Batam ",in Tim UGM, Pola Dasar Kotamadya Batam. (UGM 
1993), p 3. In fact, BIDA strongly supported the attendance of Batam property developers at the Real Estate 90 
Exhibition, and BIDA officials actually watched as Singaporeans handed over deposits. Straits Ti.mes, 6January 
1990. ~. 8 May 1993. 
261 Various Interviews on Batam, October 1994. 
262See respectively, Mercteka, 2 September 1994. Suara Pembaruan, 10 May 1995. K.TP reportedly cost 
Rp250,000. Bisnis Indonesia, 21 April 1994. 
263~, 13 May 1994. 
264Bisnis Indonesia, 20 July 1993. 
265 Suara Kazya, 31 May 1991. 
266Tbe Board of Management of Golkar Pusat gave authority to Golkar Riau to settle the very public dispute which 
began in December 1993. The composition of the board was changed and Bambang was relegated to deputy 
chairman and an outsider brought in as Chairman. An!lm, 29 January 1994. Kompas, 16 May 1994. Kompas, 13 
June 1994. Jatarta Post, 15 June 1994. 
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There is no doubt that many regulatory areas on Batam are in need of improvement, and 
there have been ongoing efforts to harmonise regulations and procedures. Already new 
procedures and improvements in service have been introduced, and most processes can 
now be completed on Batam. With offices in Jakarta and Batam, BIDA has the 
authority to process all investor applications, is active in promotion, assists with site 
selection and allocation, manpower recruitment and documentation processing. 267 
Several improvements have been made through internal changes and reorganisation 
within BIDA. One regulation strengthened the legal basis of BIDA and the Batam 
Island Industrial Area.268 Reorganisation of BIDA also saw personnel changes. The 
position of BIDA Vice-Chairman, scrapped in 1981, was re-introduced with the 
appointment of Junior Minister of Industry, Tungky Ariwibowo, to the position.269 
BIDA Chief Executive, Soedarsono Dharmasoewito, was replaced in late 1988 by 
Marsekal Pertama Soepandi, who in tum was succeeded by Soeryohadi Djatmiko, both 
former adjutants of President Soeharto, and reportedly stronger administrators. 210 
One example of regulatory and bureaucratic improvements concerns the measures taken 
by BIDA to curb land speculation on Batam. One of the main selling points of Batam 
was that it offered investors abundant and cheap land. However, land was neither cheap 
nor was it easily obtainable, a situation created primarily by land speculation. By 1990, 
already nearly two-thirds of available land parcels on Batam had been taken up by 
investors, and prospective investors began finding land difficult to obtain. 211 By 1995, 
the lack of availability of land was being given as the major cause for low realisation 
rates of foreign investment, for many investors with investment licenses were unable to 
obtain sites for their projects.272 At the same time, however, it was obvious that there 
was still much vacant land on Batam. According to Gunawan Hadisusilo, 
It is difficult to say whether or not there is still land available on Batam. It is said there is, but it 
has already been taken up. It is said there isn't, but there is still much vacant land.273 
267Pannell Kerr Forster ; BAIAM: An investment and tax grofile, (Singapore 1990), p8-9. 
268Ke,putusan fresideo No,58 1989 (24 November 1989) incorporated the changes made by Ke11utusan Presicien 
No,45 1978 to Ke11utusan Presiden No.41 1973. In 1992, BIDA removed several government agencies from Batam, 
including those from the BKPM and the departments of Tourism and Industry, creating its own sub-directorates to 
manage those areas. Bimis Indonesia. 17 July 1992. In 1994, in a further effort to improve services for investors, a 
new division was created within BIDA to manage all matters to do with land, teplacing a system requiring investors 
to seek out several diffetent sections. Bisnis Indonesia. 10 September 1994. Permits, such as those for expatriate 
personnel, can also be obtained ditectly through BIDA. Pannell Kerr Forster ; BAIAM : Ag inyestment and tax 
J2tQfik (Singapore 1990), p26. 
269Kemitusan Presjdep No.59 1989 (24November1989). 
270suara Pembarpap, 18 June 1988. Suara Pembarµap. 24 November 1988. lpdopesia Deyelqgment News, 
January/February 1989, p 12. It should be noted, however, that despite being 1emoved, Soedarsono has remained 
influential on Batam, and is currently senior adviser to Habibie. 
271 Construction Industry Development Board ; Batam OutloQk 1990. (Singapote, June 1989), p 6. 
272Fmum Ks;adilan, 11September1995. 
273Bisnis Indonesia, 11 January 1995. 
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The primary cause for this situation was that many developers and investors, both 
foreign and domestic, were land speculators who had no intention of carrying out their 
proposed projects. Not only have they hindered efforts by serious investors to obtain 
land but they contributed to the sharp increase in the cost of land on Batam, further 
scaring off potential investors. Faced with an estimated 380 stalled projects in 1995, 
BIDA began to take several important measures to prevent land speculation, and to 
guarantee the provision of cheap and easily obtainable land.274 Habibie insisted that 
passive investors who were not truly serious about carrying out their projects must leave 
Batam Island because they were hindering the development process. 275 
There is no room for speculation on Batam. They are the reason for the high cost economy which 
is damaging Batam Island. 276 
An early measure shifted land decisions away from BIDA's Batam office to the Jakarta 
headquarters, thus removing a possible locational source of patronage. 277 Another 
change was the decision to revoke investment licenses and land permits of passive 
investors, albeit on a selective basis - BIDA warned between 100-200 investors and 
revoked 18 licenses in the first half of 1995.278 A recent regulatory change requiring 
investors to provide a bank guarantee to the value of 2.5% of total long-term rent, which 
investors lose if they have not realised their projects within 12 months, should go some 
way to curbing speculation, as well as help to shorten the current waiting list. 279 
A shortage of available land was also one of the motivations for the June 1992 
Presidential Decree which substantially expanded BIDA's working area and the bonded 
zone on Batam Island to adjacent surrounding islands. 280 The area has become known 
274Bisnis Indonesia. 16 March 1995. ~. 21 July 1995. The exact figures vary, but in 1992 at least six 
investors had their licenses revoked. A figure of six is given in Media lruionesia.. 4 January 1994. A figure of seven 
is given in Media Indonesia. 15 December 1993. A figure of nine is given in Media Indonesia, 1 July 1992. See also 
Asiaweek. 31 July 1992, p54. In 1993, BIDA revoked licences for 10 businesses on Batam Island, including for a 
Japanese toy doll factory, Kwang Hwa Industrial Estate and domestic property developers. Media Indonesia, 15 
December 1993. Media Indonesia, 4 January 1994. 
275 ~ 30 June 1992. Men;!eka, 1 July 1992. 
276 ~. 21 July 1995. 
277Mari Pangestu; "An Indonesian Perspective", in Lee Tsao Yuan (ed) Growth Triant:le: The Johor-Sint:apote::. 
Riau Experience , p103. BIDA has also begun enforcing regulations which require investors to report their activities, 
not only to prevent sleeping investors but to get information about exactly how much investment had been realised, 
how many workers were being employed and other market information. In 1994, as many as 157 investors (107 
PMA and 50 PMDN) were reprimanded for neglecting to report their activities, and threatened with license revoke. 
Attempts have also been made to set work schedules and completion dates in order to speed up development and curb 
land speculation. ~. 24 June 1994. ~. 19 July 1994. 
278Bisnis Indonesia. 16 March 1995. K.ompas, 21 July 1995. The exact figures vary, but in 1992 at least six 
investors had their licenses revoked. A figure of six is given in Media Indonesia.. 4 January 1994. A figure of seven 
is given in Media Indonesia.. 15 December 1993. A figure of nine is given in Media lruionesia, 1 July 1992. See also 
Asiaweek. 31 July 1992, p54. In 1993, BIDA revoked licences for 10 businesses on Batam Island, including for a 
Japanese toy doll factory, Kwang Hwa Industrial Estate and domestic property developers. Media Indonesia, 15 
December 1993. Media Indonesia, 4 January 1994. 
279Bisnjs Indonesja, 23 February 1995. 
280 Kemitusan Presiden No.2811992 (19 June 1992.) 
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as Barelang, an acronym for Batam-Rempang-Galang. The official reason given for the 
extension of BIDA's working area, with automatic status as an industrial and bonded 
zone, was that the available industrial area on Batam was limited. 281 According to 
BIDA Chief Executive, Djatmiko, development on Batam had reached almost 40% of 
its total capacity, so that in order to anticipate continued interest in the area, Batam was 
extended to Barelang. 282 
The most apparent difficulty facing the Batam Island project is the lack of inter-
ministerial coordination. It is clear that the government apparatus assigned to develop 
Batam does not have one voice, and that different government agencies and 
departments lack coordination. This is particularly true between BIDA and central 
government agencies. A typical view is that, 
Each government department still thinks and acts [separately] ... They are not yet coordinated. 283 
For instance, in 1991 a misunderstanding between the State Secretariat and the BKPM 
over the amount of foreign ownership required for Batam projects delayed the 
processing of 12 investment applications with a total combined investment of US$15m. 
until a compromise could be reached between the two bodies. The BKPM followed 
regulations requiring foreign companies to divest 5% ownership within five years, 
whilst the State Secretariat felt that foreign companies should own entire projects if 
their investment commitment totalled less than US$ lm. 284 
One reason given for the lack of harmonisation and coordination was that ministers had 
not sat in a session of the Badan Pengawas Pengembangan Daerah Industri Pulau Batam 
(Batam Island Industrial Area Supervisory Board). The Board, headed by the 
Coordinating Minister for Economics and Finance, was created in 1973 to synchronise 
government agency policies linked with the development of Batam Island. 285 However, 
the Board has never met; Radius Prawiro, a minister for more than twenty years, was 
never even approached to sit on the Board. 286 Despite the requirement for policy 
decisions to be coordinated by BIDA and the Batam Supervisory Board, in practice 
most policy decisions are made by Habibie in concert with the relevant minister or 
281 Bisnis Indonesia. 1 July 1992. BIDA ; Business Djrectozy - 22 years B@tam Industrial Deyelogment Authority 
(November 1993), p 19. 
282Media Indonesia. 4 January 1994. 
283 An1il:i. S November 1982. For instance, the setting of taxes required a joint decision from BIDA, Customs, 
Communications, Finance and local government 
284Business Ttmes. 26 July 1991. 
285 Amam. S November 1982. 
2861nterview with Radius Prawiro, 29 July 1994. Interestingly, in 1980 BIDA published three interviews with 
members of the Supervisory Board, including Drs Radius Prawiro, Minister of Trade and Cooperatives, Prof.Dr .Emil 
Salim, Minister of State for Environment and Development Control, Mr Barli Halim S.E., Chairman of BKPM. 
BIDA ; The Batam Develo.mnent Pro&ram (Jakarta. July 1980). 
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ministers on a case-by case basis, purportedly because logistics make it difficult to 
gather together all the senior ministers represented on the Board. 
Policy formulation for Batara Island is essentially carried out in one of two ways. 
Firstly, by way of direct Presidential orders and directives to ministers, but these are 
rare and generally only required when all other routes have failed. Secondly, policy 
changes are initiated by Habibie in concert with the appropriate or relevant minister. 
For major policy initiatives, Habibie's tactic is to take the relevant minister to Batam for 
direct contact. Habibie prefers monthly inspections of work-in-progress held 
concurrently with coordinating meetings with representatives of local government, 
ministers where applicable, representatives from various agencies, as well as visiting 
ambassadors and businessmen. 72.7 This is most successful where changes require the 
input of only one minister, and is done on an ad hoc basis. 288 
A number of improvements and policy changes made in conjunction with relevant 
ministries in Jakarta have resulted from this approach. Together with the Ministry of 
Finance, a four-hour documentation service for customs clearance was introduced in 
1990, cutting the processing time from more than two weeks.289 Cooperation with the 
Singapore government and the Indonesian Minister for Justice resulted in the 
introduction in 1991 of the 'smart card', a computerised immigration process allowing 
frequent travellers to pass through Immigration and Customs counters without stopping, 
thus helping to reduce the hassle of commuting and travelling between Singapore and 
Batam.290 The Manpower Ministry, under pressure from BIDA, changed regulations 
governing the hiring of foreign expatriates on Batara Island in 1992, after companies 
claimed that they needed access to expertise not available in Indonesia. 291 
However, whilst coordination is sometimes very close between Habibie and a particular 
Minister, agreement can sometimes be hard to reach with other Agencies and Ministers. 
The official enactment of the Barelang project in June 1992 came more than twelve 
months after it was first announced in May 1991 because it required negotiation with 
the provincial government and several ministries in Jakarta. The reason was clear -
287 A.Makmur Makka ; BJH : His Life and Career (Cipta Kreatif, Jakarta 1989), p 126. Suara Pembarµan, 13 
September 1994. Interview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. Interview with Oemar Lubis, 12 August 
1994. Interview with Halomoan Panjaitan, 1 September 1994. 
2881nterview with Soedarsono, 6 October 1994. 
289.Kwmu, 2 August 1990. Suara Pembarµan. 2 August 1990. ~. 2 August 1990. Far Eastern Economic 
~ 3 January 1991. Interview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
290The Smart Card System was developed by Singapore Computer Systems, a subsidiary of STIC. Far Eastern 
Economic Reyiew, 3 January 1991. Suara fembaman. 8 October 1991. Kompas, 11 October 1991. It was estimated 
that around 2,000 smart cards bad been issued by mid-1994, and the government was considering extending the smart 
card system to all of Batam's ports and to the neighbouring islands of Bintan and Karimun. Those entitled include : 
KIMS holders, holders of multiple entry visas for Batam and Bintan, members of golf and marine clubs in the 
islands, and local inhabitants ofBatam, Bintan and Karimun. Straits Times, 2 May 1994 . .Kwmu, 3 May 1994. 
291PRNewswire,6 July 1992. Reuters Textline 06Jul92. 
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Pemda Riau disliked losing administrative control over the islands; Rempang Island, 
which had been set aside for game tourism, was under the administration of the 
Ministry of Forestry; and Galang Island, home to over ten thousand Indo-Chinese 
refugees in camps managed by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees), was under the administration of the Ministry of Defence and Security. 292 In 
particular, Habibie's suggestion in April 1992 that the refugees be given Indonesian 
nationality, was met with strong objection, and suggestions that he delay the Barelang 
project until the refugees had been repatriated. 293 It is expected that the last of the 
refugees on Galang, which has been home to an estimated 248,000 boat people since 
1976, will be repatriated by the end of 1996. 
Other regulatory changes have been even harder to elicit from Jakarta. It took more 
than twelve months after Habibie's first request, for the Minister of Finance to grant an 
exemption from PPN Dalam Negeri (value-added tax) for goods entering Batam from 
inside Indonesia (they are exempted from outside Indonesia), despite the fact that relief 
from the tax would increase links to the domestic economy, since most businesses 
bringing in goods from within Indonesia shipped them to Batam via Singapore in order 
to avoid the tax. Habibie's request for tax holidays for companies investing on Batam 
received little, if any, support from the same Ministry.294 
BIDA's success in seeking changes to two areas of land laws on Batam were mixed. 
The first concerned the land lease period offered to investors, and the second to laws 
baring foreign-ownership of property on Batam. Until very recently, investors on 
Batam had been confined to leasing land for a 30 year period, extendable for 20 years 
with the possibility of a further renewal of 30 years. The somewhat tenuous and 
bureaucratic nature of this regulation led not only to complaints from existing investors 
but also made it difficult for Batam to attract new investors who felt that such brief land 
tenure would not provide them with enough time to recoup their investments. 295 
Chairman of the BPN (Badan Pertanahan Nasional or National Land Agency), Soni 
Harsono, the key to any change in land lease periods, however, firmly adhered to 
Indonesia's existing land laws - the Agrarian Law, a nationalistic law based on 
Paragraph 33 of the 1945 Constitution guarantees that all natural riches are for the 
292suara Karya. 31May1991. Suara Pembaruan, 21July1992. Interview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 
1994. 
293Jndonesiao Observer. 21April1994. Jakarta Post, 27April1994. Straits Times, 12May1992. 
294~, 12 July 1994. Kompas, 15 July 1994. Bisnis Indonesia, 27December1994. Surat Keputusan Menteri 
Keuani:an No.548/KMK 04/1994. 
295 Straits Times, 9 May 1992. In addition, many foreign investors found it difficult to obtain loans from banks 
because the lease period was too short and could not be used as a bank guarantee. For instance, bankable projects in 
Singapore must have at least a 60 year land rental period. Kwimill. 25 July 1994. 
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Indonesian people - and steadfastly refused any exceptions to the laws or amendments 
specifically for Batam. 296 
Faced with Soni Harsono's refusal to change existing laws, and under pressure from 
several vocal groups on Batam, especially Kadin Batam, REI, the Batam Mayor and 
Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore, Soedibyo Rahardjo, BIDA was forced to be 
imaginative in its application of land laws. 297 A loophole was found in existing 
regulations whereby investors could pay land rental for 80 years, essentially creating a 
land lease period of 80 years and guaranteeing extension of land permits for that period. 
The regulation applied to all new leases, providing investors with a choice of three lease 
periods - 30, 50 or 80 years - with existing investors required to meet certain conditions 
before obtaining the extension. 298 
The real estate and property sector had been in a depressed state since 1991, and slow 
sales of property continued to hurt developers on Batam - at least 3,000 luxury houses 
priced between Rp150-500m. remained unsold in mid-1994.299 Most resort owners, 
property developers and other groups believed that the decision to provide longer land 
lease periods on Batam needed to be followed up with changes allowing foreigners to 
own property if an end was to brought to the continuing recession of the market, and 
sought to have the regulations banning foreigners from purchasing property changed, at 
least for Batam Island. 300 
The strongest lobby came from the REI, which represents real estate developers in 
Indonesia. 301 REI was of the opinion that the real estate situation on Batam was 
determined by, and dependent on, government policy concerning foreign property 
ownership, and that if the government allowed foreign ownership the real estate and 
property market would pick up.302 Not everyone, however, sympathised with the real 
2961nterview with BIDA Executive, August 1994. 
297For comments by Kadin Batam see Komgas, 27 June 1994 and~. 8 October 1994. On calls from REI see 
Bisnis Indonesia. 15 June 1991. For comments by the Mayor see Suara Kazya, 4 October 1993. On the Indonesian 
Ambassador see &mmlt. 15 July 1994. 
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299&mmlt, 14 May 1994. Kwngu, 27 June 1994. 
3001t is too early to tell if developers will apply for the extension of current leases on behalf of foreign home owners, 
who can only extend leases through original developers since they essentially are sub-leasing from developers. For 
details of the policy see Straits TtnleS, 13 June 1995. Business Times, 13 June 1995. Business Tunes. 14 June 1995. 
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302 Media Indonesia, 8 April 1994. The Chairman of REI, Lukita, argued that allowing foreigners to buy houses in 
Indonesia would not be damaging because the houses could not be carried back to their home countries. Mm 
Inclonesia, 9 July 1993. Besides restrictive land and housing laws, interest in the real estate and property sector on 
Batam was also retarded by stiff competition from overseas property markets, inadequate infrastructure and bad press 
over poor-quality projects. In Singapore, the Batam property business continues to suffer from bad publicity, despite 
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estate developers, and many questioned their motives. For instance, the Chairman of 
REI was criticised for appealing to the government to re-evaluate the principles of the 
Agrarian Law because he was motivated by his own business interests on Batam. 303 
On the changes to foreign property-ownership in Indonesia, Soni Harsono and other 
ministers were more forthcoming, although the policy processes were drawn out. 304 
The President's own attitude was that whilst he agreed that changes needed to be made 
to the law, the immediate national priority was low-cost housing. 305 It was always 
unlikely that any substantial changes would be made to the Agrarian Law and in the 
case of housing, changes to the Agrarian Law were avoided by the issuance of a 
government decision allowing foreign property-ownership for an extendable 25-year 
period nationally. 306 
There is no doubt that attempts have been made to continuously improve policies and 
regulations in order to raise the power of attraction of Batam to foreign investors. 
Despite a propensity to maintain an economic nationalist structure on Batam, Habibie 
has been far more responsive to the needs of foreign investors than during the 1980s, at 
least in certain areas. At times he sounds like a market economist, saying that it was 
best if the government did not get too involved or overly regulate investors on Batam 
Island, and simply allowed the private sector to regulate itself. 
What is most important for business is that the government only acts as a supervisor and as a fair 
referee. 307 
newspapers carried stories of more than 200 buyers refusing to sign legal documents for the completion of sale of 
their new Batain properties, despite having aJready paid 95% of the price, because of defects in the houses in the two 
estates - Rosedale and Citra Batam, both built by a joint venture between Econ Properties of Singapore and PT lgata 
Jaya Perdania of Indonesia. Despite being completed more than 400 days behind schedule, the houses reportedly had 
leaking roofs, poorly-fitting doors, missing or broken roof tiles and window panes, and even termite infestations. 
The Indonesian embassy was forced to hold a special two-day exhibition in Singapore to try to counter negative 
impressions from the complaints. Straits Times. 15 July 1994. The Sunday Times, 17 July 1994. Straits Times. 18 
July 1994. 
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buyers, and thus has not been sold. For instance, Sinar Mas had problems selling its condominiums because of weak 
domestic demand. The Jakarta Post 10 November 1992. 
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306pp No.41/1996 (17 June 1996). That the decision coincided with the launch of a joint Indonesia-Singapore 
project on Bintan Island led to speculation that it was aimed to attract Singaporeans to Batam and Bintan Islands. 
Jak;arta Post, 19 June 1996. Reuter News Service, 23 June 1996. Reuters Textline 23Jun96. Reuter NeWs Service, 
28 June 1996. Reuters Textline 28Jun96. 
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However, the cost of wages on Batam has been a major point of contention between the 
Indonesian government and foreign investors. 308 Despite being promoted as a low-
wage centre, the daily minimum wage on Batam has increased considerably since 1989, 
making wages on Batam the highest in Indonesia. In 1996, the wage was to be raised to 
Rp 8,400, well up from Rp 2,450 in 1989.309 The harshest reaction to the now almost 
annual wage rises came from Singapore Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who warned 
that the development of Batam Island must take into account the increasing 
competitiveness and attractiveness of China and Vietnam, and that any artificial raising 
of wages which ignores regional market forces, could affect Batam's competitiveness. 
If, as a result of misjudgment, they up wages artificially in Bintan or Batam, they will price 
investors out 310 
Perhaps the most outspoken observer in recent years was Indonesian Ambassador to 
Singapore, Soedibjo Rahardjo, who consistently complained that foreign investors were 
hampered by the regulatory environment on Batam, and over the years called for more 
deregulation in almost every sphere of economic activity.311 Many industry 
associations, too, have had their say on regulations and bureaucratic procedures on 
Batam, particularly those of relevance to the industry they represent. 
PHRI has been important in influencing the development and growth of tourism on 
Batam Island, its influence increasing with the importance of tourism to the national 
economy in general. PHRI was successful, through heavy lobbying, in decreasing the 
number of regulations and permits needed from different agencies in the operational 
running of a hotel on Batam Island. Where a three-star hotel once had to meet more 
than 20 regulations, and obtain almost as many permits on a yearly basis from different 
agencies, only one permit issued by the Directorate-General of Tourism's representative 
on the island, is now required.312 However, whilst PHRl's local chapter works closely 
with BIDA in correcting problems, the industry is not involved in overall planning. 
308 The Indonesian government claims that the increases are minimal, that they must be implemented because of 
higher living costs on Batam Island, and were needed to meet minimum daily physical needs. For investor 
complaints see Sunday Times, 5 December 1993. Straits Times, 1 January 1994. 
300The previous level was Rp 7,500. Business Tmws, 6 December 1995. In October 1990, the daily minimum wage 
of an unskilled worker on Batam Island was raised from Rp 2,450 to Rp 5,500, making it the highest rate in the 
country. The Jakarta Post, 2 October 1990. In October 1993 it was raised to Rp 6,750. The Jakarta Post, 12 June 
1993. In fact, recent wage increases have meant that workers receiving the minimum wage are hit by income tax. 
Income tax (PPh - Pajak Penghasilan) must be paid on income over Rpl44,000 a month. Re.publika, 19 August 1995. 
310The Straits Times, 3 December 1993. Kompas, 4 December 1993. The Governor of Riau responded that the 
scheduled increase in the minimum wage for workers on Batam Island was necessary and had been prompted by 
various factors, including the higher cost of living on the island, adding that Singapore had no need to be concerned 
about the increase as it was in keeping with existing 'developments and the environment' on the island. The Straits 
~. 9 December 1993. 
311 See for instance .K.!lwi;2as. 27 May 1994. 
312 Interview with Senior Official of PHRI, 11 August 1994. 
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PHRI believes that this has meant that the development of tourism remains very much 
an unplanned economic activity.313 
REI has been a vocal proponent of changes to Indonesia's land laws, ranging from the 
extension of land lease periods to the allowing of foreign ownership of commercial and 
residential properties. REI has made several submissions to the government about 
changing land regulations on Batam. Its strategy has been to find loopholes in existing 
laws. REI has had some success in influencing land regulations on Batam, and it 
coordinates closely with BIDA on certain issues.314 Other groups, such as the 
Indonesian Managers Association, have called on the government to simplify 
bureaucratic procedures on the island, and to allow foreigners to buy houses on 
Batam.315 KADIN Batam has also been outspoken on similar issues. 
Indonesia has certainly made it a point to highlight the cheap and abundant labour 
supply, the liberal tax and investment policies unique to Batam Island, the abundance of 
cheap land, and the close proximity to Singapore's excellent infrastructure facilities and 
support services network.316 However, despite those advantages, Batam could very 
well be losing ground to its competitors. For instance, manufacturers continue to cite 
expensive rentals, utilities, freight charges and other 'unforeseen costs'. According to 
one business executive, 
Bad management of Batam is one of the main reasons for such an unfortunate situation. 317 
Many manufacturers who have set up on Batam Island lured by cheap operating costs, 
have expressed concern that Batam Island may lose its competitive edge over emerging 
rivals such as Vietnam and China.318 It is reported that Japanese investors are 
discouraged by Indonesia's current investment guidelines and regulations on Batam, and 
there have been claims that Japanese companies are not investing on Batam because 
land rental is too high.319 Most investors stress that Batam Island's costs should not be 
seen in comparison with Singapore, but in the context of other low-cost competing 
manufacturing centres. 
However, in the face of complaints about inadequate infrastructure, restrictive 
regulations and red tape, BIDA blames any problems on inadequate feasibility studies 
3 l3 Interview with Senior Official of PHRI, 11 August 1994. 
3141nterview with senior REI Official, Enggartiasto Luk:ita, 9 August 1994. 
315The Ja!carta Post. 10November1992. 
316 See for example, Investors and Tourists Guide to Batam Island. Indonesia , (BIDA 1991 Jakarta). 
317Nildrei Weekly, 3 April 1995. Reuters Iextline 03Apr95. 
318ausiness Droes, 11 September 1992. Reuters Iextline 11Sep93. 
319Jndopesia Business Weekly, Vol.11 no.6, 21 January 1994. Bisnis Indonesia, 19 January 1995. For instance, a 
newly opened industrial park in Johor has a monthly rent of half of that of Batamindo. Nildrei Weekly, 3 April 1995. 
Reuters Iextline 03Apr95. 
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on the part of foreign investors and the state of the world economy, and tells firms to 
begin operations or lose their licences This comes amid recent reports that many 
foreign companies are pulling out of Batam, cancelling projects or putting them on 
hold.320 
It is clear that the Batam experience demonstrates that boosting economic and industrial 
development is not hurdle-free.321 More than one observer has called for a rethink of 
policies for Batam, especially the high-tech aims and other strict conditions placed on 
investors, such as land policies. With a fall in foreign investment in 1994, the 
government has taken several measures to improve conditions for investors but, as 
pointed out in an editorial in Bisnis Indonesia, "big steps and new policies" are needed 
to make Batam more attractive.322 This will be crucial in order for Indonesia to achieve 
the aim of securing US$17 billion worth of investment commitments in the Barelang 
area by 2006, triple the current level of US$5 billion. 323 
Batam will need major improvements if it is to retain its attractiveness and 
competitiveness. These include infrastructure development, new regulatory changes, as 
well as bureaucratic transparency and consistency. They are the keys to the success of 
development on Batam, for it is industrial growth which will be the catalyst for growth 
in other areas such as construction, services and tourism. These changes, and the 
overall development of Batam, depend on important decisions being made by the 
Indonesian government in Jakarta. 
Whilst intervention from the central government is already fairly large, the problem is 
due more to poor coordination between different government agencies. It is clear that 
the Indonesian government lacks a coordinated approach, a grand design. In fact, 
Batam and the surrounding islands fall under different governing agencies, which has 
led to poor planning and coordination. Quite clearly the development of Batam cannot 
be separated from developments at the national level - economic, political and social. 
Local Government on Batam 
The administrative set-up of Batam Island is unique within Indonesia. Two bodies, 
BIDA and the Kotamadya Batam, both play important roles in the administration of the 
island. The respective roles of BIDA and the Kotamadya Batam are defined under a 
1984 Presidential Decree which states that BIDA is the administrator of development 
320Nik!rei Weekly, 3 April 1995. Reuters Textline 03Apr95. 
321 f.conomjc and Busjness Reyiew Indonesja No.92, 15 January 1994. 
322Bisnis Indonesia, 17 March 1995. 
323Straits Tun.es, 18May1995. 
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and the Kotarnadya oversees social and administrative affairs. Despite the fact that 
legislation is clear about the jurisdiction of the two authorities, the existence of two 
bodies has created a number of problems, most particularly at the implementation 
stages. 
There is no doubt that BIDA is the stronger of the two bodies. Not only does BIDA 
report directly to the President and have independent sources of funds in addition to 
being funded directly from the central government's budget, but BIDA was created at a 
time when government departments and local government on Batarn Island were either 
weak or non-existent. 324 
There is concern that the Kotamadya, while retaining social and administrative 
functions, is not considered in overall planning and that local and regional "interests take 
second priority. Whilst it is said that there are regular coordinating meetings between 
Pemda and BIDA - Habibie insists that all interested parties, including the Riau 
provincial government, are heavily involved in planning Batarn's development - it is 
clear that coordination between the two bodies remains weak, attributable to poor 
communication and power plays. 325 
For the Kotamadya, the problem is not just that its authority and powers are fairly 
ambiguous but that BIDA can override it regardless. BIDA's far-reaching influence into 
seemingly trivial matters provides quite a contrast to the lack of power of the local 
administration. That BIDA often provides contributions to the Kotarnadya when its 
own budget allows, makes it clear that it is the more authoritative. 326 A common view 
is that the mayor's responsibility is no more than to issue KTP (identity cards).327 
According to Batam Mayor, Aziz, the few areas that remain untouched by BIDA's 
authority do not automatically come under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Riau or 
the Mayor of Batarn. 
We are all Wlclear about our authority, so I often use my personal discretion in governing.328 
Whilst there are examples of synchronisation - BIDA and the Kotarnadya agreed to 
jointly build 5,000 units of low-cost housing on Batam329 - those of poor coordination 
are far more common. One glaring example involved the drowning of 43 Indonesian 
324Little comparison can be made with the Asahan Authority, which was established to supervise Japanese 
involvement in the Asahan Hydroelectric Dam project in North Sumatra. Interview with form.er Chairman of the 
Asahan Authority, Soehoed, 29 August 1994. For details see Takeshi Kohno ; The Asahao Hydroelectric and 
Aluminium Deye!.Qgmept Project ip lpdopesia (M.A. Thesis, Ohio University, March 1992). 
325Republik:a, 19 May 1993. 
326 Suara Pembaruan. 13 September 1994. 
327Business Indonesia, 21April1994. 
328Medialndopesia, 11May1993. 
329 An1lm, 20 October 1992. 
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fishermen off the coast of Batam when both BIDA and the Kotamadya failed to act, 
each claiming the responsibility to be the others. 330 On occasion, the Kotamadya is 
even blamed for BIDA decisions - the local community aimed their protests against the 
licensing of a new entertainment venue at the Kotamadya when in fact the decision had 
been made by BIDA.331 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several moves were taken to raise the profile and role 
of Pemda Riau on Batam. Strongest support came from the Ministry of Home Affairs 
which, following long-standing complaints from the Riau provincial government and its 
officials on Batam that their authority and jurisdiction had been marginalised because of 
the presence of BIDA, took several measures to strengthen civil administration on 
Batam. According to then Minister for Home Affairs, Rudini, 
What is the point of having the authority that [the Kotamadya] does if it is not able to perform the 
tasks given to it 332 
In December 1992, following Presidential approval, Rudini set up a ministerial 
committee - the Forum Koordinasi Pengembangan Wilayah Batam or Batam Area 
Development Coordination Forum - to coordinate the activities of BIDA and the 
Kotamadya, and to monitor possible problems arising from the implementation of 
development policies in the Batam industrial zone, such as social problems, labour, 
land, housing, resettlement, government and administration. 333 It was planned that the 
forum would meet every three months, but was soon dissolved when Rudini was not re-
appointed to Cabinet in March 1993. 334 
Despite the removal of Rudini, the Ministry of Home Affairs continued to question the 
role of BIDA on Batam Island. The new Minister for Home Affairs, Y ogie S. Memed, 
sparked a lively debate in mid-1993 when he said that the role of Pemda Riau on Batam 
is guaranteed by law and must be raised accordingly. 
The dual authority must quickly be done away with ... The Mayor should become the one and only 
power in the area. 335 
According to Law No.5 of 1974, concerning the basis of local government, the 
provincial government, in this case represented by the Kotamadya, is the single 
government authority responsible for administration, development and social affairs. 
330Me4ialndonesia, 11May1993. 
331 UPI; Ketiasaroa SDORI dalam perspektifkepentin&ao nasional Indonesia, p 82. 
332 Suara Pembaruan. 13 September 1994. 
333 The first meeting was held on 10 December 1992. The Straits Twes, 11 December 1992. An&katao Berseqjata, 
23 January 1993. 
3341nterview with Rudini, 9 August 1994. 
335Antm:I,7May1993. 
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However, both in practice and on the basis of the 1984 Presidential Decree, the 
Kotamadya is responsible only for administration and social affairs, whilst BIDA is 
responsible for development. 336 Minister Y ogie called on Pemda Riau to take the 
initiative in asserting both itself, as well as its role, as development and administrative 
coordinator on Batam in the spirit of the law. According to Yogie, 
The function of the regional government should be revived to eliminate the impression that there is 
dualism of power on Batam. 337 
Y ogie also called for measures which would help resolve both poor coordination and 
confusion arising from the existence of two authorities operating on Batam, including 
the appointment of a senior official from Pemda Riau to the managing board of BIDA, 
as well as quarterly co-ordination meetings between the Kotamadya and BIDA. The 
Minister did, however, warn Pemda Riau not to act arbitrarily when it eventually 
regained its status as the sole authority.338 
The Governor of Riau, Soeripto, was quick to join the debate initiated by Y ogie, 
complaining that parts of his province were not under his authority or responsibility and 
calling on the Minister to provide a clarification of the role of Pemda Riau. 
Although the government places Barelang in Riau province, my position as single authority does 
not cover that area. In fact, I am a junior member of the BIDA Committee which manages 
Barelang. 339 
Yogie's comments also provoked debate within the DPR, particularly about the legal 
status of BIDA. One member of DPR called for the strengthening of Pemda because it 
had secure legal status - it was created by law, and BIDA only by Presidential 
Decree.340 The Chairman of DPR Komisi X, Marcus Wauran, went further claiming 
there were only two choices - either get rid of BIDA because it's role was not 
recognised by Law No.5/1974, or change that law so as to accommodate BIDA. 341 In 
addition, the Chairman of DPD-Golkar (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah Golongan Karya), 
Bambang Sujagad Susanto, revived calls for the creation of a regional legislative 
assembly for Batam Island in order to accommodate the people's aspirations. 342 
336Interview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
337 Jakarta Post, 10 May 1993. 
338£rli.ti, 8 May 1993. Republika, 8 May 1993. Jakarta Post, 10 May 1993. Suara Pembaruap, 10 May 1993. 
An&katan Bersenjata, 10 May 1993. The Straits Times, 11May1993. ~. 13 May 1993. 
339Medialndonesia. 11May1993. 
340 Media Indonesia. 17 May 1993. 
341 BIDA was created before UU No.5/1974 concerning the basis of local government. Media Indonesia, 19 May 
1993. 
342Merdek,a, 13 December 1993. 
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There were, however, some dissenting voices. Some viewed Minister Yogie's 
comments as an attempt to snatch influence away from Habibie. 343 Others, particularly 
business circles, expressed anxiety that should Pemda be given too much power, then 
even the smallest administrative tasks would be surrounded in red-tape. Their argument 
was a particularly strong one. Decision-making at the national level is perceived as 
more effective than at the provincial level, and therefore better for investors. 
As a unitary state the Indonesian government does not allow provincial governments to 
carry out independent economic relations with foreign countries or investors. Whilst 
the provincial government frets about loss of jurisdiction, loss of revenue and loss of 
control to advance regional interests such as employment and construction contracts and 
procurement fall-outs, it is most likely that provincial governments and business 
communities would not have the necessary experience to handle the type of 
international diplomacy and business dealings which take place in the case of Batam. 
Despite that, strong support within the local community, Pemda Riau and the DPR has 
meant that the issue of dualism of authority on Batam will continue to be an important 
issue on Batam Island. 
Dualism of authority has spread to the Barelang area, the administration set-up of which 
is yet to be settled. Of the 39 islands included in the Barelang area, 14 are 
administratively under the Batam Mayoralty, and the rest part of the Riau Archipelago 
Regency (Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau), whilst BIDA has right of management of land 
on six of those islands under the Batam Mayoralty.344 The Batam Mayoralty desires its 
jurisdiction be expanded to cover all of Barelang, and this has the support of Habibie 
and BIDA, if only to improve coordination.345 However, there is a need to convince the 
current administrator, the Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau (Riau Archipelago Regency), 
which feels that it will loose revenue with the loss of the area. 346 If the reorganisation 
cannot be achieved, BIDA must contend with coordinating development of Barelang 
with both the Kotamadya Batam and the Kabupaten. 347 Overall, the creation of one 
343.Tu!m!2, 22 May 1993. 
344Mer<leka, 09/01/1993. A decree issued by the Chairman of BPN (Baclan Pertanahan Nasional or National Land 
Agency in late 1993 cleared up the situation by giving BIDA the right of management of land for all the Barelang 
area. 
345Bisnis Indonesia, 11 July 1994. Pemerintah K.otamadya Batam ; K.onsep Peni:embaoi:ao Wilayah di Kotamad;ya 
Bmani.(Batam, 20 July 1992, p4) in LIPI ; KeJjuama SIJORI dalam perspecktifkepentini:ao nasional Indonesia. p 
69. BIDA has been in contact with Mendagri and Dirjen Pemerintahan Umum dan Otonomi Daerah (PUOD) to get 
support. Bisnis Indonesia. 20 October 1994. Note that according to DPR member, Zamharir, according to the Law 
on Local Government (UU No.5/1974) an increase of an area must be done with a PP and not a Keppres. BisDil 
Indonesia, 29 December 1992. 
3461nterview with Gunawan Haclisusilo, 10 August 1994. According to BIDA, this revenue was only around Rplm. 
a year. Bisnis Indonesia, 20 October 1994. Another source put the figure at Rp 2 m. from Rempang Island alone. 
Suara J>embaman, 6 September 1994. 
347 Ani:katan Berseuiata. 23 January 1993. 
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administrative area makes sense, particularly if the Barelang area is to be made a new 
province in 2006, as is Habibie's plan. 
However, the question needs to be asked why Batam's area was expanded when in fact 
current development is far from complete? The extension of BIDA's working area 
appears to be an anomaly since BIDA's mandate was to reduce its role and withdraw 
from Batam, not to expand its role or authority - the extension increased BIDA's 
working area from 415 sq.km. to 715 sq.km., extended across 39 islands.348 One reason 
appears to lie in the creation of projects on Bintan and Karimun Islands under the 
authority of a different development body responsible to the Ministry of Industry, 
projects which are in direct competition with Batam Island. (See Chapter Seven). 
Just what type of governing authority will develop on Batam in the future is uncertain. 
Habibie has expressed the notion of giving the Riau Islands the status of a province, and 
the idea does have some support, particularly from the former Ambassador to 
Singapore, Soedibyo Rahardjo. 349 According to Habibie, 
By [2006], we can liquidate the Batam Authority because Batam will be able to run on its own and 
we will propose to the President to proclaim this island a province with special status. 350 
How this will be achieved, and which administrative body will be maintained remains 
unclear. If the idea is to be taken seriously, it may well be that the Indonesian 
government is happy to let the current situation remain until such time. In the 
meantime, government administration on Batam appears set to remain uncoordinated 
and largely ineffective. 
Habibie's Development Program 
The debate between the technologues, led by Habibie, and technocrats has continued 
into the 1990s. During this time, Habibie has refined his argument and approach to 
economic development. What the country needs, says Habibie, is a new comparative 
advantage in high-technology products. Believing that Indonesia's present export 
growth industries, such as textiles, clothing and footwear, have only a limited life span, 
Habibie sees Indonesia's future competitive advantage laying in investment in value-
adding high technology and in upgrading human resource skills. 
348Batam Island, 415 sq.km. (41,500 ha.), is 67% of Singapore's area, but with the addition of Rempang, 165.53 
sq.km. (16,583 ha.), Galang, 80 sq.km. (8,000 ha.), Galang Baru, 32 sq.km. (3,200 ha.), and other smaller islands 
meant that the Barelang area now totalled 715 sq.km. (71,500 ha.), equalling 115% of Singapore's area. BIDA ; 
Barelane -Deyelapment Data up to June 1993 (Jakarta 1993). 
349 Anekatan Berseniata. 23 January 1993. Kompas, 27 May 1994 . .Kww;Hia, 16 July 1994. Mercleka, 18 October 
1994. 
3501be Jakar1a Post, 23 November 1988. 
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Habibie's focus on high technology has earned him plenty of critics at home and abroad. 
The technocrats, and international institutions such as the World Bank, prefer a more 
traditional steady climb up the industrial ladder, with a priority on creating jobs, which 
requires investment in labour-intensive industries, and in raising labour productivity.351 
The technocrats believe it to be a particularly ambitious strategy because Indonesia's 
comparative advantages are labour intensive industries. 
Batam Island is said to be an integral part of Habibie's development policy, although 
just what that entails is poorly defined. It is known that Habibie wants to promote 
technological industries on Batam Island, and so far he has attracted several dozen 
domestic and foreign companies utilising low-middle technology, mainly in electronics, 
but beyond that little is known. Habibie has never clearly outlined his high-tech aims 
for Batam Island. What exists are only vague references to high-technology industries, 
electronics industries and engineering feats. Soeharto has explained that, 
Batam Island will be developed as a high-technology industry centre.352 
In a speech entitled 'Technology and the Singapore-Johor-Riau Growth Triangle', 
Habibie only once made reference to technology and judging by the numerous 
references to infrastructure projects it may have been targeted towards his audience who 
were engineers. Nonetheless, it is one of very few references Habibie has made 
regarding his technological aims for Batam Island. According to Habibie, 
... the technologies relevant to the future of the triangle are those which will help to increase the 
physical integration of the three corners of the SUORI Growth Triangle. They include 
technologies to build economic infrastructure; transportation - tunnels, bridges, harbours, 
airports and roads; communications; clean water and energy. They also include the 
technologies relevant to the development of Batam as an industrial area ... Other than electronic 
components, other downstream industries adding value to raw materials produced nearby could 
be developed ... 353 
Habibie's plan for Batam's development does not envisage the island as a place for 
relocating low value-added and labour intensive industries from Singapore or any other 
areas. The favoured industries are non-polluting light, medium or heavy industries 
oriented towards exports, using skilled labour, low water consumption, medium and 
high technology such as electrical, mechanical, optical and electronics, with the overall 
351The Economist 19 August 1995. For an outline of Habibie's arguments, see B.J.Habibie ; Pemban&unan 
Berdasarkan Nilai Tambah Denean Orientasi Teknolo&i dan lndustri, Working Paper No.I, CIDES (Jakarta 1993), as 
well as the debate which followed in~. specifically the articles by Kwik Gian Gie on 4 March 1993 and by 
both Umar Juoro and Dipo Alam on 11 March 1993. 
352 Reuters News Service. 11 December 1995. Reuters Textline, 11 Dec95. 
353BJ.Habibie; Tecbnolo&Y and the Sineapore-Johor-Riau Growth Iriaoele, speech delivered to Tripartite Meeting 
and Seminar on Economic Development in the Growth Triangle and its Environmental Impact (Batam, 8 May 1992). 
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aim of making Batam a high-tech and high-skilled-labour industrial centre.354 For 
instance, the majority of tenants in BIP are involved in the manufacture or assembly of 
light industrial products such as telecommunications equipment, electronic components 
for audio and video products, printed circuit boards, integrated circuits and disk 
drives.355 
The electronics industry on Batam is a good candidate for investigating how successful 
Indonesia's strategy to move into high-technology industries has been. It has only been 
since deregulation in the late 1980s that exports of electronics have increased rapidly. 
These electronic exports are composed mainly of consumer electronics, components, 
and industrial electronics. 
The electronics industry has been one of the better performing industries on Batam in 
the 1990s. Approximately 30% of total foreign investment on Batam is in electronics, 
ranging from sophisticated high-tech assembly and testing operations to simple low-
tech and labour-intensive assembly operations, as well as skill-based supporting 
industries like precision machinery and contract manufacturing. 356 Led by foreign 
firms, and with the clear majority based in BIP, exports of electronics components 
increased from nil in 1987 to be worth over US$245,000 in 1992, just under fifty per 
cent of total export earnings from Batam Island. (See Table 6.8). 
Table 6.8 
Export of Electronics Components from Batam Island (in US$)357 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Jan-Oct 
1993 
Electronics - 1,613 2,265 16,998 81,245 247,156 435,271 
Component 
Exoorts 
Total Exnorts 26817 44,226 52.967 151457 242.020 564.453 677,995 
354Interview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
355 South China Momine Post, 17 August 1993. Reuters Textline 17 Aug93. 
356Bisnis Indonesia, 27 December 1994. 53% of foreign investment is in industry, 58% of which is in electronics. 
357BIDA; Realisasj Nilaj Ekspor di pu1au batani. 1986-0kt 1993. 
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The impact has been felt nationally. In 1991, exports of electronic components such as 
integrated circuits and electronic parts from Batam Island amounted to more than half 
of Indonesia's total. 358 The impact of these electronics companies has also been felt in 
other areas. PT Bowater Bulk Packaging became the first company on Batam and 
second in Indonesia to achieve internationally recognised ISO 9002 quality certification 
in 1995, closely followed by PT Honfoong Plastic Industries. Both are located in 
BJP.359 
Despite impressive export figures, it is questionable whether the electronics industry 
has or will have a major impact on the Indonesian economy. One important issue is that 
of the development of an indigenous technological capability in the industry. 
According to Indonesian economists, Thee Kian Wie and Mari Pangestu, 
... there is very little connection as yet between building up of indigenous technological 
capability and export growth as in most cases the foreign partner is in control at the pre-
invesunent and project execution stage; they import the majority of their components so that 
there is little domestic linkages; obtain production, engineering and market capabilities through 
their headquarters or contractor; and there is no major change or design capability at the joint 
venture. Technological capability is embodied in the workers trained, minor change capability, 
and maintenance and repair capability. 360 
That conclusion is consistent with the operation of foreign electronics companies on 
Batam Island where, in order to protect proprietary technology, Indonesia had to assure 
investors of 100% foreign ownership and management of operations. Virtually no 
effective linkages have been established by these firms with the science and technology 
infrastructure of the country. In fact, around two-thirds of Indonesian electronics 
exports in 1991 were accounted for by the 'relocation' of majority foreign-owned firms 
located on Java and Batam.361 Equally important is the fact that the majority of these 
electronics companies are second-wave, middle-sized and utilise low-middle 
technology, being high-tech only in the Indonesian context.362 
358Electronic components accounted for 34% of Indonesia's total electronics exports. Thee Kian Wie & Mari 
Pangestu ; "Technological Dynamism in Indonesia's exports of electronic products", in Dialog Telcnologj dan Industrj 
· Pemacuan Jeknologj mepqju terbentuknya lndustri Nasional Yan& Jcuat dan berdaya saing tinggi (BPPT 1993), p 
131. 
359BIP News, April 1995. 
360Thee Kian Wie & Mari Pangestu; "Technological Dynamism in Indonesia's exports of electronic products", in 
Dialog Teknologi dan Indµstri : Pemacuan Te!cnologi menuju terbentuknya lndustri Nasionaj Yan& kµat dan berdaya 
saing tinggi (BPPT 1993), p 133. 
361 Thee Kian Wie & Mari Pangestu ; "Technological Dynamism in Indonesia's exports of electronic products", in 
Dialog teknologj dan industri : Pemacuan Te1cnologi menuju terbentuknya Industri Nasional Yan& kuat dan berdaya 
saing tinggi (BPPT 1993), p 133. 
3621nterview with BIP Executive, September 1994. 
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Typical is PT VIC Electronics, a 100% foreign-owned company which moved to Batam 
because of the tight labour and space situation in Singapore. Electrical components are 
shipped to the Batam factory, made into printed circuit boards and sent back to 
Singapore for final assembly, packaging and export.363 In the case of 100% foreign-
owned contact lens manufacturer, PT CIBA Vision Batam, the choice was to relocate 
existing processes as part of planned obsolescence, or to look at new processes and 
technology. CIBA Vision decided to relocate to a low-wage centre in the Asia-Pacific 
region, the aim being to reduce production costs while waiting for new technology.364 
In the case of joint ventures, foreign partners tend to transfer only enough technology to 
the local company to ensure efficient production operations - design and innovative . 
work is carried out by foreign partners at home base. In the electronics industry on 
Batam, there are few joint ventures. Where there is, the role of the domestic partner is, 
more often than not negligible, and since the June 1994 changes to foreign investment 
laws, no longer required. The owners of BIP, in order to convince prospective investors 
of the requirement for five per cent domestic ownership, offered to that stake. 365 For 
example, PT Mitrajaya Wiraniaga, a joint venture between the Salim, Bimantara and 
Timsco Groups, holds a five percent stake in PT Sumitomo Wiring System Batam, and 
plays little, if any, role in the operation. 
However, in the case of licensing arrangements, there tends to be a higher degree of 
innovation in the local firm - having bought the technology, it must adapt and modify it 
to suit local supply and demand conditions. PT Astra Microtronics Technology, a 
majority Indonesian-owned joint venture, produces semi-conductors for 100% export. 
Astra offers a full range of packaging, assembly and test services and has expanded its 
product lines by purchasing and utilising the latest technology in order to remain 
competitive. 366 Because of the nature of the industry - semi-conductors require a quick 
cycle time - Astra decided to set up on Batam in order to reduce export-import 
processing time from what would have been 2 days in Jakarta to 2 hours on Batam. 
Whilst Astra is currently air freighting out of Changi - they are still competitive because 
the product arrives in Houston 6 days later - they are awaiting the completion of the 
Batam international airport to further cut delivery time.367 
363It should be noted that the plan is eventually for most assembly to be done on Batam, and Singapore used only for 
logistic support and marketing. Economic Bulletin, May 1993. 
364Interview with CIBA Vision Executive, 4 October 1994. 
3651nterview with former Singapore Ambassador to Indonesia, Barry Desker, 23September1994. 
366Busjness Wjre, 9 May 1995. Reuters Textline 9May95. 
367With a US$70m factory on a 30 year lease they aim to be on Batam for the long-term. Operating 24 hours a day, 
7 day~ a w"."k, they produc.e 30 million chips a month, with a mark up of le a chip on imported raw materials. 
Interview with Astra Executive, 4 October 1994. They produce 236 million ICs (integrated circuits) a year, earning 
Astra US$42 million annually. Jakarta Po&t- 17 January 1996. 
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There were about a dozen PMDN, and half a dozen non-facility domestic investments in 
the electronics industry on Batam by the end of 1993.368 But for those domestic 
companies, not having a foreign link is perhaps a source of weakness in being able to 
gain market access, to export in sufficient volumes, and in keeping up with technology. 
This is particularly so for those successful in the domestic market but just beginning to 
export. According to Thee and Pangestu, industries that develop will be competitive as 
they are asked to meet international standards, meet economic scales of production and 
build up backward linkages domestically, and only then will they be an important part 
of the technological capability of Indonesia. 369 
Public research and development institutions and government technology policies play 
a crucial role in developing certain types of technology. This is no less so in Indonesia 
where the private sector has traditionally shunned high-competition and high-risk, and 
tended to stick to safe activities such as building and property development. In 
Indonesia, the role of BPPT (Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi or Agency for 
the Assessment and Application of Technology) is to formulate technology policy; 
coordinate the application of technology; carry out technology research and assessment; 
and provide technology services. Currently its major activities focus on the last two, 
and the first two requiring further work. However Research and Development in 
Indonesia currently accounts for only 0.35% of Government spending37o 
The government has set out to make value-added knowledge and technology-intensive 
industries more attractive, often by providing incentives. BPPT recognises that 
assembly lines/licenses manufacturing is low-tech with little technological transfer, but 
that Batam is attractive because of its low wages, and that added-value high-technology 
industries will require increased knowledge and technical capabilities. However on 
Batam Island, BPPT is yet to develop any significant or direct link with either the 
private sector or the electronics industries, or the overall development of Batam, even 
though the Chairman of BPPT and BIDA is the same person and more than 50% of key 
BIDA personnel have BPPT links. On Batam, BPPT's activities have been confined to 
projects such as remote sensing, transportation and waste treatment systems,-and more 
recently the building of the Barelang bridges. 371 
368BIDA ; Daftar Perus8haan PMDN di Pulau Batam sampai dengan 12/11/1993. BIDA ; Daftar industri Non 
Fasilitas Batam, 21/1011993. 
369Thee Kian Wie & Mari Pangestu ; "Technological Dynamism in Indonesia's exports of electronic products", in 
Dialog Teknologi dao Industri : Pemacuao Ieknologi menuju terbentuknya Industri Nasional yang kuat dan beroaya 
sajng tinggj (BPPf 1993), p 134. 
3701nterview with BPPf Executive, Dr Wendy Aritenang, 25 October 1994. 
371 Interview with Dr Wendy Aritenang, 25 October 1994. 
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Despite the fairly, at least at this stage, less than optimistic view of the development of 
middle and high-technology industries on Batam Island, it must be said that the 
electronics industry is still relatively new to Indonesia, which failed to keep pace with 
other ASEAN countries in the race to develop medium and high-tech exports in the 
1970s and 1980s. Two factors prevented Indonesia from deriving greater technological 
benefit during the same period. Firstly, a policy environment which strictly controlled 
foreign investment in the 1970s and 1980s and prevented the development of 
technological industries. Secondly, the low skill and education levels of Indonesian 
workers. 
Batam Island suffers from the same sorts of shortages of skilled workers as the rest of 
Indonesia. Despite employment growth, a scarcity of skilled-labour and an over-
abundance of unskilled labour, poses a serious problem for Batam Island where 
manufacturing industries require semi-skilled workers and trained technicians. The 
main reason for this has been that human resource development in Riau Province and 
on Batam Island has not kept pace with rapid industrialisation and the needs of 
investors. 372 This lack of skilled workers has necessitated the sourcing of workers from 
other areas of Indonesia by the Ministry of Manpower and private recruiting firms, 
>' 
often in cooperation with investors and industrial park operators, and efforts have been 
made to provide skills training in Singapore through the EDB's Regionalisation 
Training Scheme.373 Current government efforts at basic-skills education and training 
on Batam are largely ineffective. 374 
For labour on Batam to remain competitive, particularly in the light of recent wage 
increases, the Indonesian government will need to tackle human resource development. 
The development of scientific, engineering, technical and managerial manpower at all 
levels will be essential to the success of industrial development on Batam, particularly 
in the long term. For many investors, it is shortages of middle-level managers, rather 
than semi-skilled and skilled labour, that poses more serious problems.375 Human 
372&illll, 5May1993. 
373 The clear majority of workers sourced by the Ministry of Manpower and private recruitment agencies still require 
further skills training. Many companies in BIP provide on-the-job training for Indonesian workers in Singapore 
before being deployed on Batam Island. Under the EDB's Regionalisation Training Scheme, previously the 
International Business Linkage Scheme, companies can bring workers from Batam to Singapore for on-the-job 
training for up to 6 months, with exemption from the foreign workers levy. The policy was later changed to operate 
on a case-by-case basis in order to avoid abuses of the system, after some Singapore employers rotated workers from 
Batam in Singapore for less than six months under the guise of training. Sree Kumar & Sharon Siddique; "Skills 
development in SIJORI and the Singapore experience" , in Adi Sasono, A.Makmur Makka, Moh.Jumhur Hidayat (eds) Pertemuan Serautau (CIDES, Jakarta 1993), p 204. By September 1993, some 31 companies from BIP had 
participated in the scheme, training over 4,000 workers. The foreign workers levy was set at S$300-450 . .&mil§. 
.Iim!a, 6 September 1993. 
374Whilst the government has supported basic-skills education and training on Batam Island, businessmen complain 
that vocational training centres, such as the BLK (Balai Latihan Kerja) are ineffective in terms of content, quality and 
number of graduates. In addition to government training centres, private courses and practical classes have begun to 
spring up on Batam. Media Indonesia, 1February1994. Bisnis Indonesia, 28 December 1994. 
375various Interviews on Batam Island, October 1994. 
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resource development will need to be a clear priority if Batam Island is to continue to 
attract foreign investment. 
It is clear that the labour situation will be important in determining Batam's short and 
long term prospects. Whilst the advantage of Batam was once its cheap and abundant 
labour, Batam now risks becoming uncompetitive because of high labour costs and a 
lack of skilled workers. In fact, many saw the move to increase wages as an attempt by 
Habibie to move Batam up the technology ladder. However, as things stand now, the 
nature of Batam's skills base is more conducive to large-scale unskilled labour-intensive 
production and not service and high-tech industries. 
The appropriateness of Habibie's policy of promoting higher value-added and high-tech 
capital-intensive manufacturing is often questioned. The policy has restricted the 
outflow of lower-value-added manufacturing from Singapore even though these are the 
very industries that can promote Batam and Riau's development at present. It could be 
questioned whether the boom that has occurred on Batam would have been bigger if the 
restriction to high-tech industries was not there. 
Inadvertently, Habibie's restrictive industrial framework, in conjunction with labour 
market tightness, has ensured that wage costs on Batam remain in an upward spiral and 
thereby erode complementarities at a faster pace than previously thought possible. 
Perhaps recognising the restrictions placed on investors on Batam, as well as 
encouraged by early developments and success on Batam, the Indonesian government 
began the development of Bintan Island with a different economic orientation. (see 
Chapter Seven) 
Habibie's aims have raised questions about the merits of challenging the wisdom of 
conventional development theory - that is, countries should initially exploit their 
existing comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactured goods. Yet it can also 
be asked whether there is a pre-ordained role for a country in the international division 
of labour. The question is whether Habibie can promote a particular position in the 
international division of labour, or perhaps how far he can do so. 
Whatever Batam's high-technology future holds, the options will be conditioned by 
regulations set by Habibie and the Indonesian government, and success will rely on the 
continuation of selective resource allocation. The major irony of Batam Island is that 
experience so far suggests that deregulation only freed market forces to steer export-
oriented industries more in the direction of Indonesia's comparative advantage in low-
tech, labour-intensive manufacturing. 
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Batam in the Domestic Political Context 
Batam Island has its critics. They target not only Habibie, but the overall development 
plans for Batam. Distributional issues - between investors and the local community, 
between Batam and the rest of Riau province, between Riau and other provinces, and 
between Indonesia and Singapore - are perhaps the most often raised because the 
political implications of developing Batam Island are equally as important as the 
economic implications. Developments raise questions about who actually benefits from 
development and what if all of Indonesia was made in Batam's image. Many hold the 
opinion that overall there has been little progress and few benefits for Indonesia. 376 A 
typical view was that expressed by economist, K wik Kian Gie, 
The government has to carefully consider how much benefit it will get from foreign investors.377 
Major criticism has come from economists who, in recent years, have closely 
scrutinised the development of Batam Island. Whilst Habibie has tried to woo several 
influential economists, they remain his most vocal critics. 378 The most vocal is Sritua 
Arief, who argues that the net impact of development on Batam is not favourable, and 
that Batam is no different from the "plantation economy" which existed under the 
Dutch. According to Sritua Arief there are several myths that go with the development 
of Batam Island - that the increased participation of Singapore means increased benefits 
for Indonesia; that there are macro-economic benefits, such as foreign-exchange 
earnings, technology-transfer, increased employment and tax revenue; and that it 
promotes regional development. 379 
According to Sritua Arief, net foreign exchange earnings on Batam are relatively small, 
and have actually decreased - from 1986 to 1991, Batam contributed US$510m. to 
Indonesia's foreign income, but during the same period it spent about US$1.5b. to 
import capital and household goods. 380 Sritua Arief also argues that most of the value-
added benefits leave the country and that the only benefits for Indonesia are wages paid 
for labour, land rental, payments for services and utilities, and payment for local raw 
materials. 381 
376various Interviews with former Ministers and senior officials, 1994. 
377 ~. 14 October 1989. 
378 For instance, he invited a group of them on a private visit to explain developments on Batam. Em!Qr, 1 May 
1993. 
379suara Pembaruan. 5 August 1991. Sritua Arief; "SIJORI : Between Myth and Reality ",paper presented at 
discussion on Segitiga Pertumbuhan SDORI/JSR Growth Triangle, (ISEAS, Singapore 12 April 1993). Sritua Arief; 
"SIJORI dan Ekonomi Indonesia" in Adi Sasono, Umar Juoro & A.Makmur Makka (eds); Pembao&unao Re&iona] 
dao Se&itiu Pertumbuhao (CIDES, Jakarta 1993), pp 3-10. 
380 Economic and Business Reyiew Indonesia No.92, 15 January 1994. 
381 Bisnis Indonesia, 17 February 1993. Sritua Arief; "SIJORI : Between Myth and Reality ", paper presented at 
discussion on Segitiga Pertumbuhan SIJORI/JSR Growth Triangle, (ISEAS, Singapore 12 April 1993). 
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Many question the benefits of the enclave-type economic development taking place on 
Batam Island, in particular whether there is sufficient spillover to the rest of the 
provincial and national economic sectors. There is no doubt that the enclave nature of 
an export processing zone in a developing country is attractive for MNCs. For many, it 
is a "country within a country", for the conditions under which they operate and the 
preferential treatment they receive is not usually available for domestic industries. 382 
One economist put it thus : 
Multinational corporations seek out free trade and export processing zones precisely because they 
are enclaves and have little connection to the rest of the economy or society. 383 
Such economic zones are also used as a means for governments to promote exports, 
while at the same time protecting domestic markets and producers. As enclaves, free 
trade and bonded zones cannot be expected to have propulsive influences on their 
surrounding areas. 384 Critics argue that EPZ's generally do not lend themselves to 
transfers of skills or technology, generate comparatively little employment, provide 
limited direct benefit to the local economy, develop few links with rest of the national 
economy, and are a costly public outlay in support of private enterprise. According to 
Sritua Arief, so far this has characterised the development of Batam. 
There is no doubt that Batam's development must remain directed to Singapore and the 
international economy, but it must also develop linkages with the domestic economy, 
especially the Riau hinterland. Up to now that linkage is limited to the supply of 
unskilled labour and to smuggling out of Batam. Yet, given the present level of 
economic development in Riau and Sumatra, it is unlikely the linkages would go 
beyond the supply of raw materials and food. 385 
Whilst Batam's contribution to Riau province was about one-fifth of the province's total 
domestic product in 1993386, as yet there is little evidence t6 suggest that Batam has had 
multiplier effects on the province or the rest of the Indonesian economy, and it is 
382Takeo, T. ; "Free Trade Zones in Southeast Asia", Monthly Reyiew, Vol.29 No.9 (1978), p 29. 
383 Denis Rondinelli : "Export Processing Zones and Economic Development in Asia : A Review and Reassessment 
of a means of Creating Jobs and growth" American Journal of Economics and Sociolo&y, Vol.46 (January 1987), p 
98. 
384Tbere is a wide range of literature on EPZs. The following is a brief selection. For discussion of the role of an 
EPZ in national development strategy, see Michael Webber & Zhu Ying; The Role of Export Processin& Zones in 
Industrial Development, Monash University Development Studies Centre, Working paper 93-2. For a cost and 
benefit analysis of the economic and welfare affects of Zones see Peter Warr ; Expwt Processin& Zones : The 
Ec9nomics of Enclave Manufacturin& (World Bank, 1989). For a political economy model, which hypothesises that 
EPZ performance is affected by three sets of independent variables - international environment, domestic conditions 
and the role of the state - see Jing-dong Yuan & Lorraine Eden ; "Export Processing Zones in Asia : A comparative 
Study" Asian Smyey Vol.XXXII No.11(November1992), pp 1026-1045. 
385Business Times. 22 June 1994. 
386Bisnis Indonesia, 20 October 1993. Batam contributed a fifth of Riau's GDP in the industrial sector in 1992. 
An&katan BersAAjata. 23 January 1993. 
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difficult to see how it can establish linkages with other parts of Indonesia in the near 
future. According to Sritua Arief, the development of agro-industry on Batam and 
surrounding islands would be more useful, because it would bring in foreign exchange 
and domestic income, would be linked to the domestic economy and would create a 
workforce much larger than capital-intensive industries. 387 
Indonesian industrial policy encourages the expansion of growth centres, mostly located 
outside Java, in order to distribute economic development more evenly throughout the 
archipelago, but so far the enclave-type development of Batam has had little effect in 
achieving that purpose. How such enclaves can contribute best to the surrounding 
community, and to the nation, is one of the trickiest tasks of development policy and 
practice. 388 Until such time as it does, calls for Batam to develop linkages with the 
eastern coast of Sumatra so that this area would enjoy a spill-over from the development 
of Batam, will continue to increase. 
A further criticism, and a far more explicitly political one, concerns the role of 
Singapore in the development of Batam. Often raised is the overt dependence of Batam 
on Singapore, not simply for investors and tourists but also for daily necessities. A 
typical view is that of Deliar Noer, who questions whether Indonesia actually benefits 
from the development of Batam.389 A letter to the editor published in the Jakarta Post 
illustrates an often-held attitude in Indonesia. The writer complained, 
As an Indonesian, I am not very proud of what is going on at Batam. The transformation has 
boosted the development of the island, but look at what it bas done to the people there. The so-
called Singaporisation bas made them the second class people catering to the needs of the 'visiting' 
nation.390 
The issue of foreign ownership of Batam residential and commercial properties sparked 
vigorous debate in Indonesia in 1990. Chairman of the National Land Agency, Soni 
Harsono, claimed that foreigners were trying to own land in the country by transferring 
ownership in a "veiled manner" to local citizens. 391 Forced to relinquish properties, 
many Singaporeans tried to secure ownership through other means, and officials 
reported the transferral of land and property to second parties, often Indonesian friends 
or family.392 In veiled reference to Singapore, Regional Military Commander Major-
387 ~. 3 April 1993. 
388 See one of the few studies made of this. Pudji Siswanto ; The Effects of Export Processin& Zones on Re&iona} 
Develogmeut: A Case Study ofBatam Island. Indonesia (M.A. Thesis, Flinders university, February 1993). 
389Forum Keadilao, Th.II No.20, 20 January 1994. 
390Jakarta Post, 31October1994. The response from a Singaporean in the same forum, was also fairly typical, 
claiming that the other side of the coin was that, " ... the standard of living in Batam has improved and that the people 
there are making money." Jakarta Post, 7November1994. 
391 Menieka, 25 September 1990. 
392~. l September 1990. 
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general H.R.Pramono even warned that Batam Island could become a centre of 
subversion. 393 
Habibie disputed allegations that Batam was virtually owned by foreigners during a 
parliamentary hearing in September 1990, denying that foreign investors owned land on 
Batam Island, and insisting that Indonesian laws were enforced on the island. Habibie 
also gave assurances that BIDA would not hesitate to revoke the permits and licences of 
businessmen doing so. 394 Other government officials have also denied that strict laws 
on land ownership, or the protection of strategic resources provided by the constitution, 
would be thrust aside. 395 
Visiting Batam at the beginning of 1994, President Soeharto, in a speech seen as a 
response to criticism about the government's focus on the island's development at the 
expense of other parts of Indonesia, acknowledged the benefits from cooperation with 
Singapore but added that, 
As a big nation, how is it that we still depend on a small nation? This is certainly not in line with 
what we aspire to. Because of that thoughts have arisen as to how Batam can be developed in a 
framework free from that dependence. 396 
Whilst Soeharto did not name the 'small nation', it was taken as an obvious reference to 
Singapore. Indeed, Indonesia has taken several steps to create facilities on Batam to 
relieve its dependence on Singapore, led by the development of Asiaport and the 
international airport. Several steps have been proposed to support the airport, including 
measures to provide cheap aviation fuel and re-route long-haul Garuda Indonesia flights 
from a Singapore to a Batam stop-over.397 According to Habibie, 
This is an opportunity for us to take over the role which [Singapore] plays. 398 
393 He said that if issues there are not handled well, national stability could be disturbed. He warned that 
development should not neglect national defence as well as social or welfare issues, and called on all private 
employees and government employees on Batam Island to take P-4 refresher courses, in order to prevent the entry of 
ideas opposed to Pancasila. Whilst be did not go into details about the threats to national resilience he said that he 
had already reported the measures that should to be taken to ABRI Commander Try Sutrisno and Habibie, and that 
the regional military district would now also be involved in Batam's policies with regards to possible threats. Other 
officials had previously spoken about the dangers of neglecting social issues in developing Batam, but none had been 
so direct as to make the connection with its effect on national resilience and stability. Merdeka, 19 June 1991. 
An&katan Bersenjata. 20 June 1991. The Straits Times, 20 June 1991. 
394The Straits TtnJes, 28 September 1990. The Jak;ana Post, 28 September 1990. 
395Far Eastern Economic Review, 6September1990, p13. 
396 .Ki2uJ,wii, 21 February 1994. Business Times, 22 February 1994. 
397There are other reports that inexpensive fuel is being offered in order to entice international airlines to Batam 
Island for refuelling stops. Caroline Yeoh, Lau Geok Tbeng, Mark Goh & Julie Richardson ; Strate&ic Business 
OPJ!Ortunities in the Growth Trian&le, (Longman, Singapore 1992), p 19. For a short period in the early 1990s, 
Batam's airport handled Garuda Indonesia flights to Vietnam. Imu2!2, 6 May 1989. Sinnpore Business, December 
1990. Garuda and Taiwan's Eva Air are negotiating a Taipei-Batam-Jakarta route. The Sunday Times. 14 August 
1994. See also Straits Times. 28 August 1993. China Economic News Service, 1June1995. 
398~ 14 October 1989. 
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There are many, however, who question the merits of trying to compete with 
Singapore. 399 It is clear that the development of Batam is considerably due to the 
efforts of Habibie, but Batam has required the infrastructure, management and 
marketing support of Singapore, and therein lies the conflict, for it is clear that there are 
and will be limits on how far Singapore authorities will be able to institutionalise their 
model of public administration. Those such as the Indonesian Managers Association, 
support Singaporean involvement and believe that stronger links between Batam and 
Singapore would help develop the island faster.400 Despite the rhetoric and public 
posturing, it is clear that Batam has to exploit Singapore's dynamism and proximity in a 
positive way by playing on complementarity. 
There have been disagreements between Singapore and Indonesia. According to 
Habibie, plans to develop the aircraft maintenance facility were delayed in early 1994 
because Singapore wanted control and management of the project.401 However, what 
could have been a point of contention - Indonesia's desire to gain control of flights over 
its airspace stretching from the Natuna Islands to Bangka Island, South Sumatra which 
was under the jurisdiction of Singapore's Changi airport - was settled fairly amicably 
with the signing of a new air services agreement in September 1995.402 Such examples 
of cooperation stand as testament to the good relations between the two countries, and 
of the desire to reach amicable settlement of any dispute. 
There has also been considerable criticism that the enormous resources used to 
development Batam could have been used for other, and more productive, purposes. 
On at least one occasion Habibie has been forced to defend himself in front of Komisi 
DPR against allegations that development projects on Batam were a waste of funds. 403 
For instance, the Barelang bridges project has meant that government infrastructure 
expenditure under BIDA will increase enormously. According to Habibie, however, it 
will be financed through revenues obtained by BIDA from land leases in the Barelang 
region, supplemented by the minimum possible subsidy from the national budget. 404 
In early 1994, Soeharto responded to on-going criticism about the government's focus 
on the island's development at the expense of other parts of Indonesia, his comments 
outlining his vision for Batam and its relationship with Singapore. According to 
Soeharto, Batam Island's growth and development would spur growth in other parts of 
Indonesia, and obtain much-needed foreign earnings. In addition, Batam would become 
399 Various interviews with former ministers and senior officials, 1994. 
400The Jakarta Post, 10 November 1992. 
401 Straits Times, 26February1994. The Australian, 1March1994. Straits Times, 3 September 1994. 
402Business Times 22September1995. See also Straits Times· 6 September 1994. Business Times, 29 June 1995. 
403 Jakarta Post. 6 February 1993. Straits Times, 8 February 1993. 
4041ndonesia Business Weekly, Vol II No.12, 4 March 1994. 
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a terminal for all Indonesian commodities being exported. Soeharto insisted that 
development must be carried out because Batam Island was the "ujung tombak" 
(spearhead) of Indonesian development. 405 
On this, and other occasions, Soeharto has come to Habibie's defence in the face of 
public criticism. Soeharto's claim that it was his idea to begin the development Batam 
Island in the late 1960s is the most obvious example. Habibie too has often exploited 
his relationship with Soeharto. For instance, in an attempt to deflect criticism from 
himself and his Barelang bridges project, Habibie claimed that the idea came directly 
from the President. 406 
However, the scrutiny of the mass media and observers such as economists, has not 
always been balanced, and is often politicised. For instance, media coverage of Batam 
Island in April 1993, purportedly about the industrial development of Batam, gave 
unnecessary attention to negative aspects of development such as prostitution. 407 Not to 
be deterred by criticism, however, Habibie has announced plans to "mem-Batam-kan" 
(Batamise) other areas of Indonesia. 408 
Policy-Making 
Policy-making on Batam during the 1990s exhibited all the major features of New 
Order political economy. Presidential Domination, Clientelism and Intra-elite 
Politicking remained the most consistent elements of the policy-making processes. 
External influences were clearly important, and for the first time on Batam there were 
signs of pluralist politics, indicating that the policy-making processes were no longer 
insulated from non-state pressures. 
President Soeharto remained pivotal to the policy-making structures for Batam Island. 
It was Soeharto's decision to allow 100% foreign-owned enterprises on Batam. It was 
also Soeharto's decision to actively support Singaporean investment on Batam. In both 
regards he was strongly encouraged by the technocrats and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew. 
405 Suara Pembaruau. 20 February 1994. Straits Times, 22 February 1994. 
406 Media Indonesja, 1 July 1992. Suara Pembarnan. 21 July 1992. BIDA officials maintain that the idea for 
building the Barelang bridges was Habibie's. Interview with Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
407See~, 7April1993. ~. 18April1993. 
4081n January 1993, he announced that Mamberamo in Irian Jaya would be developed into a second Batam, and 
managed by an authority similar to BIDA. It has become a pet project of Habibie, involving a large inland port, 
hydro electric dam and heavy industry. ~. 15 January 1993. Bjsnjs lndonesja, 15 January 1993. Suara Kazya, 
15 January 1993. Australian Financial Reyjew, 24 October 1995. In January 1994, he announced plans to develop 
Madura Island into a larger industrial centre than Batam, leading Singapore, the owners of BIP and BIDA to claim 
that it would not pose a threat to Batam. Unlike Mamberamo, the Madura plan has been put on hold while 
negotiations continue with the local community led by U!amas. ~. 8 January 1994. Straits Times. 10 January 
1994. Straits Tunes. 12 January 1994. 
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Soeharto retained strong faith in BIDA Chairman, Habibie, and actively supported his 
high-technology platform and infrastructure plans. However, it is notable that the 
position of BIDA Chief Executive has been filled by former Presidential adjutants. 
That the formal power to make the appointment was the preserve of Habibie indicates 
that Soeharto felt a need to exert more influence on developments. 
In most regards, Habibie had complete control over developments on Batam, and he 
was largely unaffected by interference from the technocrats. He continued to maintain 
strict control over the types of investment permitted. He pursued heavy government 
investment in large infrastructure projects, such as the international airport and the 
Barelang bridges. He obtained an extension of BIDA's working area to nearly double 
the original size, by adding 33 more islands to form Barelang. 
Intra-elite politicking remained true to its name. The traditional technocrats-versus-
nationalists dichotomy, however, was less obvious than in the past. There were several 
reasons for this. Firstly, Habibie was so firmly entrenched on Batam by 1989 that the 
technocrats were not keen to exert pressure where it had little or no chance of success. 
Secondly, the Singapore government was doing much of the work for them, particularly 
in the case of the relaxation of investment regulations. Thirdly, rather than attempt to 
deregulate Batam, the technocrats simply set up their own projects on neighbouring 
Bintan and Karimun Islands. (See Chapter Seven) Lastly, the 1993 Cabinet saw the 
retirement of many of the longest-serving technocrats, and thus the removal of a long-
time source of antagonism for Habibie. 
Inter-ministerial conflicts did, however, play an important part in the policy-making 
processes. Ministers for Internal Affairs, Rudini and Yogie S. Memed, were often at 
odds with Habibie over the role of BIDA on Batam, seeking to reduce its power and 
elevate the status of the Riau provincial government. Similarly, Chairman of the BPN, 
Soni Harsono, refused to enact changes to the laws governing land on Batam Island, 
forcing Habibie to use loopholes in existing laws to make the changes he desired. 
The quick influx and dominance of Jakarta conglomerates on Batam during the early 
1990s was nothing less than remarkable, and with them came the business culture of 
Jakarta. Business on Batam became heavily reliant on clientelistic connections, 
particularly in the designation of land plots and licenses, and in the awarding of 
contracts and sub-contracts. In this regard, and regardless of business acumen, those 
with strong political connections have benefited considerably. Moreover, whilst many 
domestic and foreign investors have had their land and investment licenses revoked, 
those with good political connections have been noticeably absent from the list. 
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The Salim Group became the largest and most diversified conglomerate on Batam with 
interests ranging from industrial estates to recreational facilities. The growth of the 
business interests of the Habibie family was both rapid and remarkable, the majority of 
their activities in tourism and property development, but assisted by contracts from state 
enterprises. Perhaps the most interesting partnership on Batam was that between the 
Salim, Bimantara and Timsco Groups, who are involved together in no less than six 
joint projects. The operations of other companies owned by ABRI and well-connected 
businessmen were no less important, illustrating the way in which the interests of the 
economic elites follow closely on the heels of political elites. 
In line with the increasing scope and complexity of economic activity, a host of societal 
voices emerged on Batam in the 1990s, both corporatist and pluralist in nature. Those 
in the corporatist camp included Kadin Batam which, because it was headed by 
Habibie's brother-in-law, Soedarsono, and the fact that it is a government-sanctioned 
business association, could not be considered to be an independent voice. Other groups, 
such as social organisations, Yayasan Keluarga Batam and FKKS Batam, headed by 
Habibie's sister, Sri Rejeki, also fell into this category. 
The pluralist camp was led by industry associations, the majority of which were 
headquartered in Jakarta but with branches on Batam. Several industry groups were 
outspoken on issues pertaining to the development of Batam, and at times were 
influential. Among these can be included REI, PHRI and Gapensi. Whilst the majority 
of their activities were spent on liaison with BIDA and government authorities, at times 
they had important policy input, and on occasion initiated policy change. 
Other societal influences were notable. Pemda Riau clearly exerted more influence 
over the Batam project than in the past, although it relied heavily on the support of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs to raise its status and profile. Members of the DPR were 
outspoken in this regard, partly because local government is the preserve of a 
parliament-enacted law whilst BIDA is covered by Presidential decree. DPR members 
also criticised the amount of government expenditure involved in the Batam project. 
Always a consideration, the Media balanced rudimentary reporting with negatively 
weighted coverage of social aspects of development and the role of Singapore. 
The Singapore government continued to be a policy consideration in developments on 
Batam during the early 1990s. It was particularly influential in obtaining new 
regulations on foreign investment and industrial estates. That influence was based 
almost solely on the Soeharto-Lee relationship, which had developed over more than 
twenty years. However, the good relationship was being maintained by the new 
generation of leaders in Singapore and Indonesia. 
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The case of BIP is an interesting one. The developers behind BIP were particularly 
influential in seeking regulatory changes. In many ways their political clout was 
proportionate to their economic importance to the overall Batam economy. However, 
that pressure came from both the Singapore government, through the EDB, and from 
the Salim Group makes it difficult to discern which was the more important factor in 
influencing Indonesian policy-makers. There is no doubt that the EDB's direct channels 
to the Indonesian Ambassador in Singapore and several Indonesian ministers were very 
important in this regard. At the same time, the Salim Group had its own political 
connections within the Indonesian government, including the President. Which was the 
more influential of the two routes is difficult to determine. What is clear is that all 
partners behind BIP desire efficient service for their tenants and that often meant 
pressure for regulatory reform. For BIP's developers it was perhaps less important 
which channels were used, so long as the desired outcome was achieved. 
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7 
The Growth Triangle 
In December 1989, then Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, announced 
that Singapore, together with neighbouring areas of Malaysia and Indonesia could form a 
"triangle of growth" .1 The 'Growth Triangle' - as it came to be known both as a 
geographic unit and as an economic concept - and as conceived by Goh, aimed to take 
advantage of a cross-border spillover of economic activity from Singapore into the 
contiguous Malaysian state of Johor and the Indonesian province of Riau. Developed by 
Singapore, the idea was quickly adopted and supported by Indonesia, and to a lesser 
extent by Malaysia. 
Under the auspices of the Growth Triangle, Indonesia-Singapore economic cooperation 
in Riau province has increased dramatically. Beginning initially on Batam Island 
through the creation of BIP (Batamindo Industrial Park), cooperation has spread to other 
islands and areas of Riau province, with projects totalling over US$10 billion over the 
long term. Not only has this cooperation had an important impact on overall Indonesia-
Singapore relations but it has also had an impact on the Indonesian government's 
development strategies for the area, especially for Batam Island. 
The Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle 
The Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) unites the city-state of 
Singapore with the state of Johor in Malaysia, and the Riau province of Indonesia, which 
together straddle the strategic sea route of the Straits of Malacca between the South 
China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The linkages can in some ways be seen as mirroring 
the fluid nature of political boundaries and economic exchange in pre-colonial Southeast 
Asia - the three areas once formed parts of the Johor-Riau Empire which, with the 
coming of the European powers, declined in importance, and was eventually divided into 
two, and later three separate regions. 2 However, despite historical associations, the 
present situation cannot be seen as a rediscovery or throwback to any historical period, 
except geographically, due to separate political and economic development in the 
colonial and post-colonial periods. 
lStraitslimes, 21December1989. 
2singapore, Johor and Riau were once part of the powerful Kingdom split up in 1824 with the signing of the Treaty 
of London between the Dutch and the British. All territory north of the Straits of Singapore came under British rule 
whilst that south of the straits came under the Dutch. Upon independence the British territory developed into two 
nation-states, Singapore and Malaysia. 
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The IMS Growth Triangle officially began in June 1990, when the concept received the 
endorsement of both Malaysia's and Indonesia's leaders. The basic premise was to 
combine Singaporean capital, management and technical expertise with the cheaper and 
more abundant land and labour of Riau and Johor in order to accelerate regional 
economic development. Its main purpose, as intended by Singapore, was to provide an 
incentive for Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) to consider the region as a whole for 
investment, by maintaining or placing capital and knowledge-intensive operations in 
Singapore, and operating labour-intensive and spatially-driven operations in Johor or in 
Riau. The aim being to lure MNCs seeking a mix of cheap labour, skilled professionals 
and efficient infrastructure to an economic zone which could provide such a business 
environment. 
Based on comparative advantage, more complementary than competitive, the 
hierarchical economic relationship had Riau concentrating on labour-intensive 
industries, Johor on intermediate-level industries and Singapore on capital and 
knowledge-intensive industries and services. This extension of economic activity made 
sound business sense. For example, manufacturing companies could engage in vertical 
specialisation, locating labour-intensive processes in Johor and Riau, and more skill and 
knowledge-intensive activities (such as headquarter operations - finance, marketing, 
distribution, administrative and legal services) as well as newer and more sophisticated 
manufacturing processes in Singapore, all in line with each particular area's comparative 
advantage. See Table 7 .1 for an example of the comparative advantages of land and 
labour costs in 1989. Geographical proximity too, made business sense, as it implied a 
minimisation of transport and communication costs. As an integrated subregion the 
Growth Triangle could be more attractive to investors than its separate parts. 
Table 7.1 
Comparative cost of land and labour in the IMS-GT, 19893 
Batam Johor Singapore 
Land US$2.3 US$4.08 US$4.25 
(per sq.m.) 
Unskilled Labour US$90 US$150 US$350 
(per month) 
Semi-skilled Labour US$140 US$220 US$420 
(per month) 
Skilled Labour US$200 US$400 US$600 
(nermonth) 
3Harvest International 1990, in The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Coi:poration Ltd ; A &uide to the Growth 
Trian1Ie- Batani Johor, Sinnpore. 1992 (no date). 
252 
Some companies have capitalised on the complementary strengths of the different 
locales in the Growth Triangle. French electronics company, Thomson S.A., had a 
regional network strategy even before the Growth Triangle concept was proposed. 
Beginning operations in Singapore in 1975, it had its first factory in Johor in 1979, and 
was using a subcontractor on Batam Island by 1988. By 1991, Thomson was employing 
more than 15,000 workers within the Growth Triangle area, through its Batam Island 
plant, 2 Johor plants and three Singapore plants where it had its regional headquarters.4 
Others employing a similar strategy include Sumitomo, which uses Singapore as a 
regional base for marketing and distribution, product design and business development 
to support operations on Batam and in Johor, and AT & T which produces cordless 
phones in Batam and high-end communications products in Singapore.5 
Not only did the Growth Triangle aim to enhance inflows of investment, it also intended 
to facilitate subregional cooperation in business and tourism. The Growth Triangle was 
envisaged as a tourism drawcard, for there were advantages to be gained from combining 
the natural advantages of Johor and Riau with Singapore's tourist throughput. For 
instance, visitors to Singapore could have short holidays in the adjoining resorts in 
addition to the normal Singapore 'shopover'. Architects have gone so far as to propose a 
physical link-up of the three areas of the IMS-GT with a US$55 billion system of 
bridges and tunnels in order to facilitate such activity. 6 
Current Status of Cooperation under the IMS-GT 
There are a number of issues and questions surrounding the IMS Growth Triangle. 
Whilst it has been highly praised, it has also been criticised, in particular because the 
Johor-Riau link is virtually non-existent, raising questions as to whether the 'Growth 
Triangle' is really a 'triangle'. In addition, the existence of a 'missing link' has also meant 
that the IMS-GT lacks any institutional arrangement at present. The reasons for this lie 
in a combination of political and economic factors. 
Economic integration within the IMS-GT is essentially between Singapore and Johor, 
and between Singapore and Riau. The Singapore-Riau link is covered by a number of 
formal agreements signed between Singapore and Indonesia, the most important of 
which outlines Singapore's role in the joint development of Riau province. (See below 
for details). The Singapore-Johar link, on the other hand, is not covered by any formal 
agreements beyond an understanding between Singapore and Malaysia for the 'twinning' 
4Lee Tsao Yuan ; "Growth Triangles in ASEAN" PITQ Economic Brief , No.10 (June 1992), p22. Straits Times, 29 
October 1991. 
5Jakarta Post, 2 May 1990. Caroline Yeoh, Lau Geok Theng, Mark Goh & Julie Richardson; Slratei:ic Busjness 
Onportunities in the Growth Triani:Ie, (Longman, Singapore 1992), p 88. 
6Reuters News Service. 20 November 1995. Straits Times, 22 November 1995. Sqaits Twes. 27November1995. 
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of Johor and Singapore.7 Nevertheless, Singapore-Johor economic integration predates 
the IMS-GT, and economic and other links are stronger and broader than the present 
level of Singapore-Riau cooperation. Neither of these arrangements is directly related to 
the Growth Triangle as a whole. 
However, whilst there is agreement that there is complementarity between Singapore and 
Johor and between Singapore and Riau, there are serious doubts about the degree of 
· complementarity between Johor and Riau. No arrangement exists between Malaysia and 
Indonesia, or Johor and Riau. In fact, links between the two areas are virtually non-
existent, and their current levels of economic development do not warrant significant 
flows of trade or investment. Not only do Johor and Riau have similar endowments with 
regards to labour, land and resources, there is a lack of supporting infrastructure linking 
them. There is little cross-border investment and trade, and little incentive for such 
endeavours. s It is doubtful whether deep linkages can be developed and sustained 
between these states, particularly in the short-term. This reality is also seen at the 
national level where the proportion of trade between Indonesia and Malaysia remains 
low.9 
Cooperation in whatever form is likely to succeed only if the benefits are clear and 
balanced between the participants, and currently there are different perceptions of the 
benefits and costs of participation in the Growth Triangle. There are questions whether 
the 'Growth Triangle' affords sustainable, appropriate and desired benefits to all 
participants, particularly when the development aspirations of Malaysia and Indonesia 
do not necessarily accord with Singapore's, and when Malaysia and Indonesia are in 
competition with each other. In the end it must be realised and recognised that the IMS-
GT entails benefits for all three parties involved. 
All three governments share common economic goals, such as a desire for an increase in 
private investment. However, the fact that the 'Growth Triangle' was long referred to as 
SUORI (Singapore-Johor-Riau) in Indonesia, as Nusa Tiga in Malaysia, and the JSR 
(Johor-Singapore-Riau) Growth Triangle in Singapore illustrates the differences between 
7 Malaysian Minister of Trade, Rafidah Aziz, has claimed that the IMS-GT was not balanced, and was more cenlred 
on Batam which involved Singapore and Indonesia. Bisnis Indonesia, 21September1994. There is a Memorandum 
of Understanding for the supply of water and gas from Johor to Singapore, signed in the 1960s. In addition there is 
long-standing liaison between Singaporean and Malaysian officials, particularly those from Johor. 
81t can be noted that some linkages between Johor and Riau have been established, such as a ferry route between 
Johor and Batam (through Singapore), and minor reciprocal investments in Johor's tourism sector and Batam's 
manufacturing sector. An Indonesian-Malaysian joint venture has been formed to develop a tourist resort on Gunung 
Ledang in Johor. Indonesia Development News, Vol.13 No.4 (March/April 1990), p 8. ~ 4 March 1991. 
Amila, S March 1991. Recently Padang lnduslrial Park was set up in West Sumalra as a joint development between 
the state-owned Johor Corporation and the West Sumatra provincial government. Slraits Trmes, S March 1996. 
91t should be noted that Indonesian Minister B .J .Habibie led a high-level team of Indonesian ministers and officials 
to visit Johor in February 1991. Little has come from the joint committee on economic cooperation that was to have 
been set up. XiDllwl. 8February1991. Straits Times, 7 February 1991. 
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the three countries. It is not clear-cut as to who gains more from the arrangement, in 
either the short or long run, even though it is clear that there are benefits to all. As data 
for measuring costs and benefits is not readily available nor easy to measure, perceptions 
are very important. 
The issue of equity, and the distribution of benefits accruing from the Growth Triangle is 
therefore a major impediment to cooperation, especially trilateral cooperation. The 
political commitment of all three governments to the idea will be of over-riding 
importance before more pragmatic policies and implementation issues can be 
considered. Political commitment is also necessary to provide a sense of stability and 
continuation for investors and to pave the way for the formulation and implementation of 
a clear set of policies. 
The IMS-GT claims a competitive edge over other countries' plans to introduce similar 
growth concepts but there are questions as to whether the idea is as viable as it was when 
it was first proposed, and there are real concerns that other regional economic 
arrangements such as the rapidly growing Greater South China Economic Zone could 
attract investments away from the Growth Triangle and ASEAN. These concerns have 
been raised often, and have increasingly been tied to calls for the Growth Triangle 
project to be accelerated and for increased cooperation in the managing of the IMS-GT, 
especially in order to steer it against competing economic arrangements and to attract 
investors.10 
There are good reasons for developing a more formal tripartite framework for the IMS-
GT, yet there are also doubts whether an institutional arrangement is appropriate, let 
alone desired. Certainly, the idea rests heavily on stronger political commitment. Two 
important steps have been taken towards formalising the three-way IMS-GT 
relationship. The first was in February 1992, when the governments of all three 
countries agreed to form a joint committee to promote the 'Growth Triangle' to foreign 
investors. The second was the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in 
December 1994 which endorsed the Growth Triangle concept and provided for 
consultative mechanisms to oversee cooperation. The MOU sent a clear message to 
businesses that the three countries fully supported the concept, were cooperating at a 
government-to-government level, and would facilitate and promote linkages.1 1 
Moreover, at the first formal meeting of senior ministers overseeing the IMS-GT in 
March 1996, the Indonesian province of West Sumatra and the Malaysian states of Negri 
lOausiness Twes. 3 December 1992. 
11Business Times, 16 December 1994. Business Tunes, 19 December 1994. 
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Sembilan and Pahang were included as part of the IMS-GT, substantially increasing its 
reach as well as opportunities for investors.12 
If the area is to be developed into one integrated region for investors with the free 
movement of goods, services and people, as well as a harmonisation of policies, then 
coordination at the government level is necessary. Whilst a joint development agency 
would simplify coordination of development in the IMS-GT, the idea of further trilateral 
cooperation remains a moot one for it is probably both difficult and unacceptable for a 
single decision-making authority to administer and coordinate uniform policies and 
regulations across national boundaries. Despite some multilateral measures, there is 
little political commitment to changing the current format beyond an informal 
arrangement endorsed at the highest levels, for all agree that what is required is mutual 
cooperation rather than a fonnal treaty. 
The fact that there is little linkage between Johor and Riau and that the IMS-GT is 
essentially founded on two Singapore-centred bilateral arrangements leads to the 
conclusion that the tenn 'triangle' is really a misnomer. It also leads to the conclusion 
that the IMS-GT remains a bilateral rather than trilateral arrangement, with Singapore as 
the growth pole. Indeed, perhaps the major issue concerning the IMS-GT centres around 
Singapore. This is not just because the origins of the 'Growth Triangle' lie in Singapore's 
unilateral declaration of a link between its relations with Johor and Riau, but also 
because the linkages within the arrangement centre around Singapore. Whilst this has 
raised questions as to Singapore's motivations, and led the IMS-GT to be seen rather as a 
growth area focussed on Singapore and therefore a project with specific Singaporean 
objectives, the reasons behind them point to the primacy of the role of Singapore. 
Singapore's greater enthusiasm for the IMS-GT in part reflects the city-state's lack of 
separate provinces and associated political complications. It also reflects security 
concerns, for Singapore has always been aware of such long-term implications as its 
dependence on water supply from Johor. Most importantly, however, it reflects the 
greater economic reliance of Singapore upon economic integration with neighbouring 
and regional economies in order to achieve sectoral diversification. 
Singapore was concerned that its industrial development was nearing saturation point, 
for the overall cost of doing business in Singapore rose sharply in the 1980s. Constraints 
of limited labour and land resulted in sharp increases in the costs of labour and property 
which, together with an appreciating dollar, were squeezing profit margins. Singapore 
then looked to cement mutually beneficial bilateral agreements that would make it the 
12Jakarta Post, 14 March 1996. No substantial initiatives emerged from the first meeting in June 1995 of the 
committee set up under the MOU. Business Times, 31May1995. Straits Times, 31May1995. 
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focus of an economic trade area, and to facilitate economic integration with its 
neighbours. Singapore's chief aim was to develop a greater degree of interdependence 
with its neighbours in order to generate economic benefits and reduce threats to its 
security from those states. 
For Singapore, participation in the Growth Triangle was intended to help it achieve a 
number of objectives, including: economic restructuring; becoming a high-value added 
service economy and hub city; promoting the regionalisation and internationalisation of 
Singapore enterprises; providing leisure areas in close proximity to Singapore; achieving 
a secure water supply; and helping to promote the economic advancement of its 
neighbours and ASEAN out of self-interest. 13 
The Growth Triangle offered the possibility of linking the industrial expansion of 
neighbouring states to the Singapore economy. In effect, the idea was to geographically, 
and sectorally, expand the Singapore economy. It provides for capital currently based in 
Singapore's labour-intensive aspects of manufacturing to remain internationally 
competitive, as well as ensures that this manufacturing production is harnessed to 
Singapore's economy. Singapore has aggressively set out to make itself the financial and 
information centre for the region, and has actively promoted and cultivated the use of 
Singapore's advanced infrastructure and managerial expertise in the industrial programs 
being set up under the auspices of the IMS-GT. For instance, Singapore government-
linked companies have played a direct part in creating physical and social infrastructure 
in Johor and Riau. 
It may be said that Singapore has the most to gain from the Growth Triangle, but 
Singapore is also the most dependent on it. At the same time, the Growth Triangle also 
offers an encouraging opportunity for Indonesia and Malaysia to benefit from the 
rapidly-increasing wealth of Singapore. As a result, the IMS-GT is essentially no more 
than a pragmatic context for bilateral cooperation which will grow and fall according to 
national economic priorities and the willingness of each country to cooperate 
economically. To a certain extent, its future will also be determined by the continued 
flow of FDI into the region. 
13one paper identified six ways by which the Growth Triangle facilitates Singapore's internationalisation drive -
transcending resource constraints in land, labour, recreational areas, etc; providing potential access to the domestic 
markets of Indonesia and Malaysia; opportunity for Singapore SMEs involved in supporting industries to relocate 
with MNCs; opportunity for Singapore-based companies to develop a regional business network; creating 1earning 
ground' for Singaporean firms; encouraging competition and cooperation through cross-border operations (alliances, 
joint ventures, networking). Wong Poh Karn & Ng Chee Yuen ; "Singapore's internationalisation strategy for the 
1990s", Southeast Asian Affairs 1991 (!SEAS, Singapore 1991), pp 273-4. 
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The IMS-GT, Growth Triangles and Regional Economic Integration 
Growth Triangles have been a much talked-about example of sub-regional economic 
cooperation, and widely seen as a good business venture. Some see such economic 
growth areas to be the future of economic development in the Asia-Pacific region, 
envisaging the growth of an East-Asian economic development corridor extending from 
ASEAN to China to Korea. 14 
Growth Triangles have often been described as 'regional economic zones', 'sub-regional 
economic zones', 'transnational export processing zones' and 'extended metropolitan 
regions'. These regional economic integration processes have been described as part of a 
recent international trend, particularly in Asia, where economic growth has spread across 
national frontiers into contiguous areas, cutting across political boundaries and systems, 
and occurring with or without government initiative, and with or without formal 
institutions and structures. These economic processes have been used to illustrate the 
nexus between national, regional and international dynamics, whereby it is virtually 
impossible to discuss economic transformation in any location in isolation from wider 
regional and global economic developments, and have been described as part of a trend 
towards a 'borderless world', at least economically speaking. 
To what extent one or more of the above economic integration processes best describes 
the development of the IMS-GT is, however, of conjecture. What is clear is that any 
claim that what has developed within the IMS-GT is something akin to economic 
integration of the three components is far wide of the mark. It is important to understand 
what the Growth Triangle is not. It is not a common market or free-trade area and shows 
no prospects of becoming one in the foreseeable future. It is not a means for penetrating 
domestic markets since all incentives apply to export ventures. What the IMS-GT 
constitutes is official recognition of the underlying potential of three economic areas at 
different stages of development, and an expression on the part of the governments of 
those three areas to cooperate in developing that potential. 
In its current form, the IMS-GT is best considered as its own particular form of sub-
regional economic cooperation carried out under the banner of 'Growth Triangle'. 
'Growth Triangle', as a term to describe the spread of economic activity from Singapore 
into the contiguous territories of Johor and Riau, does not quite fit the definition of any 
one form of regional economic cooperation, for in effect it is the result of two separate 
processes which still characterise its current state. 
14Idea postulated at the International Conference on 'Managing the Mega-Urban Regions of ASEAN countries: 
Policy Challenges and Responses'. Business Times, 2 December 1992. 
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If the IMS-GT were to be described as the result of a spillover from Singapore into its 
less-developed hinterland, modifying the traditional centre-periphery model in that the 
spillover occurs across political boundaries, then this would aptly describe the processes 
which have occurred between Singapore and Johor. However, if the IMS-GT were to be 
described as a transnational export processing zone, whereby investments are induced to 
cross political borders because of a combination of geographical proximity and 
investment incentives, then this would characterise the integration processes between 
Singapore and Riau. What is clear is that the IMS Growth Triangle is a result of two 
separate yet complementary processes. 
Whilst the IMS-GT is seen as a means of achieving more rapid economic integration, it 
is not a form of economic integration in the sense that a free trade area is, but rather a 
pooling of resources to attract investors who intend to market their products outside the 
region. For that reason cooperation appears potentially successful because it does not 
entail sharing of markets. 
The IMS Growth Triangle is best seen as a single investment zone, to an extent 
transcending formal political boundaries, and cooperating to attract capital. It is 
investment driven, for it is investment capital which moves across borders to take 
advantage of differential factor availability and prices. The attraction is not preferential 
access to a domestic or subregional market, but efficient production and distribution 
systems which are competitive internationally for its export-oriented investors. The 
IMS-GT is a form of sub-regional economic cooperation, through investment 
cooperation rather than through trade cooperation. In time it may take on a different 
shape or form but in the short term this is highly unlikely. 
Initially it was feared that the emergence of the IMS-GT would threaten ASEAN's status 
as a regional economic forum, especially if seen as a partial fulfilment of Indonesia's 
suggestion of a 'little ASEAN' involving closer economic and defence cooperation 
between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. However, the IMS-GT has been accepted 
as a supportive mechanism of regional economic cooperation, and is not considered a 
threat to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) but rather as an experiment in sub-
regional integration within ASEAN. 
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The 'Growth Triangle' was officially recognised as a major step in sub-regional 
cooperation by ASEAN Economic Ministers in October 1990. This was mainly due to 
pressure from Singapore. Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong argued that, 
The Growth Triangle implicitly recognises that any joint project within ASEAN could be 
undertaken by any two or three parties, as and when these parties are ready .15 
At the fourth ASEAN Heads of Government Summit in Singapore in January 1992, a 
more important agreement was reached. The Framework Agreement on Enhancing 
ASEAN Economic Cooperation, which identified areas of potential cooperation such as 
trade, industry, finance and banking, transport and communications, also explicitly 
recognised the development of sub-regional growth areas, either within ASEAN or 
involving ASEAN and non-ASEAN states. In some ways the 'Growth Triangle' was 
ASEANs immediate answer to other regional and sub-regional arrangements, such as 
the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), before the materialisation of AFTA. 
Whilst the IMS Growth Triangle may not be the first economic area of its type in Asia, it 
certainly was the first in ASEAN and as a result has generated much interest in the 
formation of other 'Growth Triangles', in particular the 'Northern ASEAN' or 'Indonesia-
Malaysia-Thailand (IMT) Growth Triangle' - involving contiguous areas of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand - and the 'East ASEAN Growth Area' - involving neighbouring 
areas of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei.16 The Asian Development 
Bank is encouraging greater economic cooperation among Asian countries, especially 
'growth triangles', by looking into the potential of such regional groupings, identifying 
suitable projects and financing some key projects to ensure success.17 At this stage, 
however, the IMS-GT is the only substantive economic integrative activity taking place 
inASEAN. 
It is argued that the future of ASEAN lies in its economic achievements, and in many 
ways, the emergence of the IMS Growth Triangle was an important development, 
because it illustrated that small plans are much more likely to succeed than big ones, 
whilst it also had the effect of speeding up sub-regional and intra-ASEAN economic 
cooperation. In fact, AFT A and the IMS-GT have together become something of an 
international symbol of ASEAN economic cooperation, and a reflection of their 
increasing openness to the international economy through restructuring programs. 
However, it is difficult to come to any firm conclusion about the possible regional 
15Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 June 1991, p25. 
160ther proposalss include a link up between Australia's Northern Territory with Indonesia's provinces of Irian Jaya 
and East Nusa Tenggara (lndonesja Headlines, 25 May 1993) and among countries of the Mekong River basin -
Thailand, China, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam (Ban~kok Post, 27 April 1993). 
17 Jakarta Post. 12 April 1995. 
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impact of the IMS Growth Triangle, and as a particular form of sub-regional cooperation 
it should not be over-stated. 
There are certainly doubts about whether the IMS-GT concept can be expanded or 
replicated, or even that this would be desirable, for not all proposals will have the same 
conditions. Indeed, there are a number of conditions upon which the IMS Growth 
Triangle is dependent, and these would presumably need to be present in other 'Growth 
Triangles'. These factors include : economic complementarity and differentials in 
factor endowments for the development of intense economic linkages, and to make 
cooperation mutually beneficial; geographical proximity so as to minimise transaction 
costs and transportation time; a favourable political and policy environment for the 
relaxation of regulations and restrictions on investment, trade and labour flows; 
reasonably well-developed infrastructure in order to to keep operating costs low; 
market access, because of the export-oriented nature of development; a capital-surplus 
state as a member or major investor, because otherwise it could at best only involve 
trade-based cooperation; the private sector as major investor; equitable benefits for all 
participants; and political will. 
Most importantly, however, whilst the idea of a Growth Triangle, at least in theory, is 
very appealing because there appear to be potential economic gains, it must involve 
more than economic rationale or geographic proximity to make possible joint 
development of a subregion. For a Growth Triangle, or indeed any such economic 
cooperation to succeed, both economic logic and complementarity, as well as political 
will are needed, for the problems associated in straddling national boundaries are great. 
The fact that a Growth Triangle involves linking together contiguous areas of sovereign 
nations means that political rationale will be a determining factor, and cooperation will 
require strong political will to overcome mutual distrust if it is to succeed. Cooperation 
in whatever form is likely to succeed only if the benefits are clear and balanced between 
the participants. 
The establishment of the IMS Growth Triangle has been seen as a market-driven 
response, however the term 'market' in Southeast Asia is a nominal one because 
governments often intervene to shape comparative, and competitive, advantage and 
market forces. Whilst the ideal concept of the Growth Triangle is that there is freedom 
of movement of goods, of services, of labour and harmonisation of policies, regulations 
and incentives, the role of government in promoting that freedom of movement and 
harmonisation as well as to deregulate administrative constraints on investment and in 
other areas is extremely important. 
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The state, and leading economic and political forces; have been instrumental in creating 
the IMS Growth Triangle through such means as policy changes, providing 
infrastructure, providing finance and capital, and manipulating spatial patterns of 
national resources. The IMS-GT is therefore is a blend of government initiative and 
private entrepreneurship. For example, the March 1996 IMS-GT ministerial meeting 
was preceded by the signing of a Joint Business Council MOU, and a gathering of the 
private sector to discuss the region's needs, potential and opportunities for joint-
ventures. 18 
Economic factors were not the only driving force behind the IMS Growth Triangle, for 
political factors have played an important part in its development. For those reasons, 
the IMS-GT offers an interesting case study as to the respective roles of the government 
and the private sector, for it was created by a mix of both government initiative as well 
as market-driven factors. The degree to which this mix of market forces and political 
intervention played in the creation of the Singapore-Johor and Singapore-Riau links 
differs greatly. Whilst the Singapore-Johor linkage was proposed largely in response to 
market forces, and official cooperation merely facilitated the already growing economic 
activity undertaken by the private sector, official policy was decisive in creating the 
Singapore-Riau side, where market forces were weak. Economic fundamentals of 
labour and land have been key factors, but the governments involved have actively 
engaged, directly or indirectly, in creating industrial infrastructure, setting in place 
supporting policies and fostering movement of companies. 
Indonesia-Singapore Cooperation under the IMS Growth Triangle 
The IMS Growth Triangle constituted a strategy by which Singapore could maintain 
economic growth by giving it access to resources which it lacked, namely land and 
labour, whilst also contributing to Singapore's efforts to become a regional economic 
centre for activities like banking, management and consultancy. To attain this, 
Singapore required at least the passive consent of countries in the region whilst at the 
same time ensuring that they benefited from Singapore's growth. 
Unlike during the 1970s and early 1980s, the Indonesian government appeared to have 
fewer doubts than Malaysia about the Growth Triangle, and more specifically 
Singapore's motives. Certainly the notion of the triangle made an enhanced Singapore 
presence in the Indonesian province more politically palatable for Jakarta. Many of 
those in government were supportive of Singaporean involvement in the development 
18Straits Times, 5 March 1996. 
262 
of Batam and other islands in Riau province. According to Population and 
Environment Minister Emil Salim, 
Singapore is not a country to be afraid of. We expect to compete with them eventually, so why not 
use the Growth Triangle as a stepping stone to further growth in the meantime.19 
Most importantly, however, the IMS-GT had the approval and support of Soeharto. 
Habibie, who had considerable say since he was in control of Batam Island announced 
that he favoured the Growth Triangle concept, particularly because it was closely in line 
with his balloon theory.20 Radius Prawiro, Coordinating Minister for Economy, 
Finance, Industry and Development Supervision hailed it as a, 
textbook example of how neighbouring countries can harness their goodwill and effort to solve 
common problems. 21 
With strong government support, Indonesia actively pursued cooperation with 
Singapore under the guise of the IMS Growth Triangle. It was originally envisioned 
that only Batam would be part of the IMS-GT, but the concept was soon extended to all 
of Riau and beyond. The main reason for the initial enthusiasm in Indonesia was that 
all the islands of the Riau archipelago, and not just Batam Island, were relatively 
underdeveloped, and the Indonesian government lacked adequate financial resources to 
allocate to their development. It was widely held in Jakarta that private sector 
participation and joint ventures with Singapore, and other countries, were necessary for 
infrastructure and economic development of Batam and other areas of Riau province. 
Soeharto described the IMS-GT as important for national development as well as that of 
its two neighbouring countries, and thus constituted a real effort to strengthen national 
and regional endurance. 22 
There were a number of factors behind Indonesia-Singapore cooperation under the IMS 
Growth Triangle, the origins of which were based on mutual economic interest, and 
aided by close ties between political leaders and economic elites. Firstly, cooperation 
was based on a win-win situation. Cooperation was made with the premise that the 
joint development of the Riau province would benefit Indonesia as well as Singapore. 
Indonesia offered its abundant natural resources of land and water, manpower, culture, 
and political stability. Singapore offered tourists, managerial and capital resources, and 
global business experience. For Singapore, the Growth Triangle was a means for 
overcoming land and labour constraints while enhancing its role as a regional centre of 
growth. Indonesia, with limited industrial and financial capital, could maximise the 
19Far Eastern F&onomic Review, 3 January 1991, p35. 
20iJe also added that they could learn from the cooperation of the Benelux countries. Straits Times, 12 June 1990. 
21Business Times, 30 January 1993. Reuters Textline 30Jan93. 
22~. 20 February 1994. 
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flow of spillover benefits and could not fail to benefit from the presence on its doorstep 
of a concentration of industrial and technical facilities which could be harnessed for its 
own efforts at industrialisation and economic diversification. 
It was clear that high level support was given to the Growth Triangle in Indonesia. 
Indonesia would not seek a relationship if it was not clear what benefits and contribution 
to its development would arise. As Indonesia had only recently adopted an export-led 
strategy, the IMS-GT provided a good way of demonstrating the potential of 
technocratic strategies to accelerate economic development. The Indonesian government 
hoped the Riau islands would become a new economic growth centre in Indonesia. 23 
According to the Department of Industry, joint-projects under the auspices of the Growth 
Triangle offered several benefits. These included : an accelerated pace of economic 
development in Riau; direct employment creation of 150,000 jobs; indirect employment 
creation of 750,000 jobs; annual foreign exchange earnings of US$1-2 billion; and, the 
expansion and deepening of industrial development. 24 
Whilst the primary aim of the IMS-GT - the development of Riau in cooperation with 
Singapore - has not changed, the Indonesian government is now focusing more on 
preparing other less-developed and contiguous areas for trade liberalisation committed to 
under AFrA.25 Indonesia sees benefit in preparing less-developed areas for the impact 
of AFr A, and Soeharto is apparently keen to include the provinces of Bengkulu, South 
Sumatra, Lampung, Iambi and West Kalimantan in the IMS-GT.26 According to 
Hartarto, 
The involvement of more provinces in the sub-regional growth Uiangle's is urgent because we have 
only seven years before the implementation of free trade among the ASEAN counbies. 27 
Secondly, cooperation in the development of Riau was reflective of increasing 
cooperation at all levels between Singapore and Indonesia. The forging of closer 
relations between Indonesian and Singaporean leaders had brought the two countries 
closer together, and although the relationship was dominated by the personalities of, 
and relationship between, Soeharto and Lee Kuan Yew, the institutionalisation of 
Indonesia-Singapore relations in security, military and economic fields played a major 
part. The rapid increase in Singapore's investments and the regular exchange of views 
23suara PeU1baruan. 20 October 1992. Far Eastern F&onomic Reyiew, 22 April 1993 , p41. 
24rKPPR ; Proyek-Proyek: Dalam Ran&ka Kerja Sama Ekonomi Indopesia-Sin&1,1Ura. 
25Straits Times, 5 March 1996. Reuters Textline 5Mar96. Former minister, Emil Salim, suggested that Indonesia 
open its border areas to investors from adjacent countries in order to prepare itself for AFTA. He urged government 
to allow companies from adjacent countries to set up investment projects in border areas without having to obtain 
BKPM licences - open North Sumatra to investors from Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, and open Eastern 
Indonesia to investors from Northern Australia. Jakarta Post, 4 September 1995. 
26Jakarta Post 14 March 1996. Reuters Textline 14Mar96. 
27Reutet News Service, 16 March 1996. Reuters Textline 16Mar96. 
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between Singapore and Indonesian officials, indicated a far more substantive 
relationship than was the case 20 years prior, and that ties would be sustained when Lee 
and Soeharto were gone. Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, 
observed, 
Each individual project makes sense but more than the individual projects themselves is a habit of 
cooperation between officials on both sides. 28 
Thirdly, economic imperatives were only one of the contributing factors for the Growth 
Triangle. For Singapore, economic interests were congruent with political and security 
interests, and the Growth Triangle was a project with the specific objective of securing 
its national interests; to secure its political survival as a sovereign nation state through 
the institutionalisation of links with neighbouring countries and to ensure continued 
economic prosperity. The expectation in Singapore was that greater degrees of 
interdependence would reduce possible threats to its security from economically jealous 
and ethnically different neighbours. 
It is quite possible that Singapore used economic cooperation, in tandem with increased 
security cooperation, to cement much closer relations with Jakarta and possibly to 
neutralise Singapore's dependence on Malaysia. 29 Following a 1988 MOU between the 
Singaporean and Indonesian armed forces which formalised a broad base for 
cooperation, a series of cooperative and interactive measures were taken. There are 
now joint army, navy and air exercises, joint search and rescue operations, coordinated 
anti-piracy and anti-smuggling patrols, and stronger ties between police, immigration 
and drug enforcement officials. The two armed forces also jointly developed an Air 
Weapons Range at Siabu and an Air Combat Manoeuvring Range at Pekanbaru. In a 
twist of the Growth Triangle, this combines Singapore technology and investment 
capital with Indonesian geographical resources for mutual benefit. 30 
Moreover, as a city-state which lacks natural resources such as water, food and raw 
materials, the Growth Triangle provided a framework through which Singapore could 
secure strategic resources such as water, natural gas and agricultural products from 
Indonesia.31 For Indonesia, increased cooperation with Singapore meant not only 
securing its immediate region through military cooperation but also markets for its 
28Business Times, 30 January 1993. Reuters Textline 30Jan93. 
29T.Huxley ; "Singapore and Malaysia : A Precarious Balance" , Pacific Reyiew , Vol.4 No.3 (1991) , pp 204-213. 
30ausiness Times, 26 August 1992. Straits Times, 4 February 1994. Straits Times, 25 May 1995. Business Times, 
31May1995. Weatherbee, Donald E. ; "ASEAN and evolving patterns of regionalism in Southeast Asia" Alim 
Journal of PoJitical Science, Vol.1 No.1(June1993), p 49. A.R. Sutopo; "Relations among Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore: From Confrontation to Collaboration and Re-alliance" Indonesia Ouarterly Vol.XIX No.4, p 326. 
31 The continued shrinkage of agricultural land renders Singapore more reliant on foreign imports and alternative 
sources of food supply. Self-sufficiency in food was a short-lived idea in Singapore, and in 1985 the government 
decided to write off agriculture beginning with the phasing out of pig farms. 
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natural resources. Furthermore, stepped-up investment would enhance the 
interdependent relations between Singapore and Indonesia with the result that each 
would attach more importance to the security and stability of the other. President 
Soeharto observed that, 
The development of the triangle of growth ... will help strengthen resilience both in Indonesia and in 
the region. 32 
It was clear that Indonesia-Singapore economic relations were moving towards more 
complementarity, and developments in trade and investment had shown great progress. 
Furthermore, the relationship was being institutionalised through increased cooperation 
and contact between leaders from both countries. In addition, the national interests of 
both countries with regards to economic and political security were also served. With 
or without the Growth Triangle, economic and political ties between Indonesia and 
Singapore would continue. 
On 28 August 1990, President Soeharto and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew met on 
Batam Island and signed an agreement which has become the basis for all joint 
Indonesia-Singapore projects under the Growth Triangle. The Agreement on Economic 
Cooperation in the Framework of the Development of the Riau Province (or the 
Singapore-Riau Economic Cooperation Agreement) not only extended the Growth 
Triangle beyond Indonesia's existing special export zone on Batam Island to the whole 
of the surrounding Riau province, but explicit was the undertaking to jointly develop 
Riau province, with the understanding that joint development would be led by the 
private sector.33 The agreement essentially aimed to reduce logistical and administrative 
barriers to investment and to foster joint participation in the development of 
infrastructure and marketing of the area. 
Whilst the impetus for the Growth Triangle was due largely to private sector initiatives, 
various government policies also contributed. For instance, the adoption of a policy of 
joint promotion of investment and tourism attracted international investors. 
Cooperation under the Agreement was not confined to industrial delocalisation and 
specific joint projects, but included the marketing and promotion of the Growth 
Triangle concept for investment and tourism, as well as cooperation in supervisory, 
32Jak:arta Post. 21February1994. 
33 A second agreement, 1be Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income was also signed, later formalised by Presidential Decree. Ks;gurusan fresiden No,60 
.l22Q (20 December 1990). One source says that it was another agreement that was signed -1be Agreement on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, which supplemented the ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement, 
guaranteed bilateral investment and provided for Indonesia and Singapore to work together on promoting new inward 
investment. Indonesia DeyelQgment News, Vol.14 No.2 (November/December 1990), p4. 
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administrative and regulatory procedures. Indonesia-Singapore government 
cooperation under the auspices of the Growth Triangle has included joint investment 
promotion missions34, joint tourism promotion35, and various joint committees, most 
important of which is the Joint Ministerial Committee for the Economic Development 
of Riau Province (IMC) which meets regularly to oversee developments and review the 
progress of joint projects. 36 
Whilst the setting of clear government policy direction and commitment was crucial in 
reducing investor risk and uncertainty, it was the formal agreement between Indonesia 
and Singapore that provided the necessary incentive for the private sectors from both 
countries and from overseas to invest in the Riau islands. ID particular, official 
encouragement of joint ventures between public enterprises and private firms from 
Indonesia and Singapore in major investment projects served to enhance cooperation 
and the interlocking of interests among business groups from the two countries. 
Joint Indonesia-Singapore Projects under the IMS-GT 
Within several years, total joint Singapore-Indonesia projects under the auspices of the 
Singapore-Riau Economic Cooperation Agreement, and the IMS Growth Triangle, 
required an investment of US$10.3 billion over the long term. (See Map 7 .1 ). 
34These include to Japan in December 1990 (An&katao Berseqjata. 17 December 1990. Mer<leka, 15 December 
1990. Indonesia Development News, Vol.13 No.4 (September/October 1990), p4. Jakarta Post, 13 December 
1990.), to Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan in September 1991 (Amill:i. 2 October 1991.), and in Singapore in 
September 1995. The Indonesia-Singapore Exhibition, 'Partners in Progress', focused on joint-ventures, in particular 
to showcase cooperation in the industrial development in Batam, Bintan, Karimun. Business Times, 5 September 
1995. Straits Times, 5 September 1995. Business Times, 21September1995. Straits Times, 21September1995. 
35Singapore and Indonesia's tourism bodies are working together to market Singapore and Bintan Island as a single 
tourist destination. Indonesia and 'Singapore agreed to form a high powered joint team of six cabinet ministers to 
handle cooperation in tourism. Under the cooperation the six million foreign tourists that visit Singapore annually 
are to be lured into visiting Indonesia as well, especially to Bintan. The Jakarta Post, 27 June 1994. A tourism 
cooperation agreement signed on 29 September builds on the success and relationship both sides established when 
developing and promoting tourism-related projects in the Riau - particularly the BBIR. It expanded cooperation 
beyond Riau to Lombok, Solo, Yogyakarta, Padang and Ujung Pandang. Straits TlDles, 30 September 1994. 
36The first meeting took place in February 1991, attended by Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, Brig. Gen. Lee 
Hsien Loong, Singapore's Minister of State for Industry and Trade, Mah Bow Tan, Junior Minister for Industry, 
Tungky Ariwibowo, and Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, Radius Prawiro. Jakarta Post, 8 February 
1991. The third meeting was held in January 1993. Straits Times. 30 January 1993. The fourth meeting took place 
in December 1993, attended by Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore Minister of State for 
Trade, Industry and Labour, Goh Chee Wee, Coordinating Minister for Industry and Trade, Hartarto, Minister of 
Tourism, Post and Telecommunications, Joop Ave, and Minister of Industry, Tungky Ariwibowo. Jakarta Post, 1 
December 1993. Business Times, 29 November 1993. Business Times, 1 December 1993. The Straits Times, 1 
December 1993. 
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Of the tourism and industrial projects on Karimun, Bintan and Batam Islands, 
Singaporean investors would eventually account for a 40% share. These joint projects 
include: 
Batamindo Industrial Park 
Batamindo Executive Village 
Bintan Beach International Resort 
Bintan Industrial Estate 
Karimun Industrial Estate 
Karimun Marine Complex 
Bintan Island Water Project 
Sumatra Water Project 
US$350m. 
US$60m. 
US$2,000m. 
US$350m. 
US$600m. 
US$1,000m. 
US$950m. 
US$5,000m. 37 
The Batamindo Industrial Park and Batam Executive Village have already been 
discussed in Chapter Six. The other projects are briefly summarised below. 
Bintan Beach International Resort 
Launched on 1 March 1991, Bintan Beach International Resort (BBIR), is a S$3.5 
billion resort covering 23,000 ha. along an 18 kilometre beach coastline on the north 
coast of Bintan Island. BBIR promises a first-class holiday destination, comprising 
around 20 hotels and beach resorts, 10 golf courses, marinas, villas and condominium 
housing, cultural and shopping activities and recreational facilities, and is expected to 
take up to twenty years to complete. 38 (See Map 7 .2) 
PT Bintan Resort Corporation (BRC), majority ( 60%) controlled by Indonesia, is owner 
and developer of BBIR, and Bintan Resort Management Pte Ltd (BRM), majority 
(60%) controlled by Singapore, is marketeer and manager. The two companies are 
joint-ventures between Singaporean and Indonesian consortiums. The partners of the 
Indonesian consortium, PT Sukajaya Indowahana, include the Salim Group, Bimantara 
Group, Barito Group, Pemda Tingkat I Riau and the Yayasan Angkatan Laut (Navy 
Foundation). The Singaporean consortium, Singapore Bintan Resort Holdings Pte Ltd, 
is made up of Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation, Tropical Resorts Pte Ltd, 
Straits Steamship Land, Overseas Union Bank, United Overseas Bank, Development 
Bank of Singapore, Overseas Chinese Banking and KMP Bincorp Investments. 39 
37Business Times, 20 July 1994. 
38ro better understand its size, Nusa Dua on Bali is only 300 ha. Jakarta Post. 5 February 1991. Jakarta Post, 2 
March 1991. Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 March 1991. TKPPR ; Proyek-Proyek Da)am Ran&ka KeQa Sama 
Ekonomi Indonesia-Sin&aWl1'll · 
39IKPPR ; Proyelc-Proyelc Da!am Ran&ka Ketja Sama Ek;onomi Indonesia~Sin&IPura. The Memorandum of 
Agreement was signed on 12 January 1991. Jakarta Post, 5 February 1991. Jakarta Post, 2 March 1991. 
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Work on BBIR began in November 1991, and by mid-1995 the developers had spent 
S$180m. on infrastructure - including the completion of a power station, 
telecommunications facilities, water reservoir, roads, ferry terminal, water treatment 
plants, as well as recreational facilities. 40 By mid-1995, private firms, led by the 
developers, had taken up 14 of the 18 land parcels offered in the first phase41, and work 
on eight resorts was in progress. 42 By 2000, there will be more than 14 hotels, offering 
3,500 rooms for an estimated 1.5 million visitors.43 
It is generally agreed that the tourism and hotel industry on Bintan will be better than 
that on Batam, particularly because it has better beaches and is a planned 
development. 44 There has been a lot of interest in BBIR, particularly because it has the 
support of both the Indonesian and Singaporean governments. BBIR is included in the 
Singapore Tourist Board's marketing, and fits into its aims to expand Singapore's tourist 
reach from a short-stay destination to becoming an integral part of a multi-destination 
travel market. Perhaps most importantly, apart from offering an attractive natural 
environment, those in the BBIR consortiums have taken the lead by taking equity in the 
hotels, many of them with an international reach into Asia, Australia and Europe. 45 
Bintan Industrial Estate 
The Bintan Industrial Estate (BIB), like its Batam namesake, is a joint venture between 
the Salim Group, Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (STIC), and Jurong 
Environmental Engineering (JEE), signed on 29 January 1993. PT Bintan Industrial 
Estate Corporation - Salim Group (70%), STIC (15%) and JEE (15%) - is the owner 
and developer, investing in the land and seeing to the development of factories, worker's 
housing and other amenities. Bintan Industrial Estate Management Pte Ltd - STIC 
(40%), Salim Group (30%) and JEE (30%) - is the estate designer, and responsible for 
marketing and managing the estate. 46 A subsidiary, Bintan Shipping and Warehousing 
provides shipping and warehousing facilities to tenants. 47 
40witnessed by the author, 15 September 1994. S$130m had already been spent on infrastructure, including S$16m 
on road development project, S$16m on ferry terminal, S$39m on power generation plant, S$26m on man-made 
lagoi reservoir, and S$12m on 2,000 line telecommunications system. Straits Tunes, 14 March 1994. Straits Tim.es, 
19July1994. Straits Times, 5 June 1995. 
41strajts Times. 20 February 1993. The J@karta Post, 25 July 1994. Business Times, 20October1995. 
42straits Times. 5 June 1995. Business Times, 5 September 1995. 
4331,182 tourists visited BBIR in 1995. Busioess Times, 28 February 1996. 
441nterview with senior official of PHRI (Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restauran Indonesia or Indonesian Hotel and 
Restaurant Association). 
45Interview with Hotel executive, 13 October 1994. Located 55 km southeast of Singapore, BBIR will be marketed 
together with Singapore as a single tourist destination. For instance, the Port of Singapore Authority has completed 
building the S$229m Tanah Merah ferry terminal, adjacent to Changi airport, as a complement to the new Teluk 
Sebung ferry terminal at BBIR, and to act as the main entry and departure points for BBIR tourists. The trip takes 45 
minutes. Straits Jimes. 21 April 1992. Reuters News Seryice, 10 November 1995. BRM is reportedly working 
closely with the Indonesian Tourism Promotion Board and the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board. Straits Times. 19 
July 1994. 
46»usiness Times, 20 January 1993. Business Tunes, 30 January 1993. BBC Monitorin& Service, 3 February 1993. 
Reuters Textline 03Feb93. J@karta Post. 20 February 1993. Straits Times, 8 January 1994. A Salim Group 
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Whilst Batara Industrial Park (BIP) caters to electronics-related industries, Bintan 
Industrial Estate (BIB) provides facilities for light and medium industries, especially 
labour-intensive resource-based industries such as textiles and garments, furniture, 
woodworking, footwear, food processing and packaging, toy manufacturing as well as 
electronics. Tenants at BIE are also provided the same conditions as in BIP, such as 
100% foreign ownership for the first five years of operation, and duty-free bonded 
status.48 
Eventually covering 4,000 ha (eight times the size of BIP), and costing S$200-250 
million to develop, the entire industrial estate will be completed in four to five phases 
over six or seven years, depending on market demand. (See Map 7.2). Like BIP, BIE 
provides all infrastructure - port and ferry terminal, water, roads, sewerage, electricity, 
telecommunications, housing and town centre. Work began on the first phase in 
February 1993, at an estimated cost of S$60 million and covering 55 ha., with 20 ready-
built factories, 10 one-hectare lots for custom-built factories, as well as a deep-water 
cargo and container port, and is expected to employ about 6,000 workers when the 
factories are in full swing.49 In mid-1994, garment-maker Gimmil Industrial, a 
subsidiary of the Ramatex Group, became the first tenant to begin operation, with an 
investment of S$3.6m and employing 300 workers.so By late-1995, 15 tenants had 
signed up, nine of whom were already in operation.51 
Karimun Industrial Estate and Karimun Marine Complex 
Exact details about projects on Karimun Island are unclear. Planned developments 
include the building of a Marine Base, including a shipyard, an Oil Terminal and 
Processing Complex, and an Industrial Estate for heavy industry. (See Map 7.3). 
company, PT Suraya Bangan Pertiwi, holds the land on which the industrial estate is sited. Jakarta Post, 13 
December 1990. 
47Economic Bulletin, July 1994. 
48Straits Times, 20 February 1993. Bintan Industrial Estate Management Pte Ltd: Bintan Industrial Estate. TKPPR 
; Proyek;-Proyek Dalam Ran&ka Kecja Sama Ekonomi lndonesia-Sin&apura. 
49Business Times, 20 January 1993. Reuters Textline 30Jan93. Wages range between Rp 105,000 and Rpl 15,000 a 
month according to level of schooling. Bintan Industrial Estate Management Pte Ltd : Bintan Industrial Estate. 
5<>.eusiness Times, 8 February 1994. Straits Times, 18 July 1994. Many of its workers were trained in Singapore 
under the Regionalisation Training Scheme introduced by the EDB. Sini:gpore Investment News, July 1994. . 
51Business Times, 10 November 1995. By February 1993, seven Singaporean and other foreign firms had signed 
letters of intent to set up factories at BIE, reaching ten by December 1993, and thirteen by July 1994, worth some 
S$250m. of investments. Busjness Times. 20 February 1993. Reuters Textline 20Feb93. Jakarta Post, 1 December 
1993. Sini:apore lnyestment News, July 1994. The Jakarta Post 25 July 1994. Economic Bulletin, July 1994. Ten 
of the companies, mostly garment manufacturers, were from Singapore, two from Hong Kong, and one from Japan. 
The Jakarta Post. 20 July 1994. Mizuno Corporation, a Japanese sporting goods manufacturer, became the first 
company outside Indonesia and Singapore to lease a factory, as its first overseas base for manufacturing shoes. With 
an investment of YlOOm., it planned to begin operations in January 1995, with an initial annual production of 
500,000 to 1,500,000 pairs of shoes. JIJI Press Newswire. 7 October 1993. Reuters Textline 070ct93. Bintan 
Industrial Estate Management Pte Ltd : Bintan Industrial Estate. A negative report appeared in Nikkej Weekly, 22 
July 1996. 
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Map7.3 
Land Earmarked for Projects on Karimun Island 
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Among the Indonesian companies developing the site are PT Bangun Cipta, the Salim 
Group, the Indonesian Navy Foundation and Pemda Riau. Singaporean companies 
include the Sembawang Group, Jurong Environmental Engineering and Singapore 
Technologies Corporation. Sembawang's PT Karimun Sembawang Shipyard is 
expected to open in late-1996 at the Karimun Marine Industries Complex. 52 
In addition to new shipyard and petrochemical projects, the government continues to 
support the mining industry, although tourism is also growing. Several new granite 
quarries were set up in the early 1990s to make up for an anticipated shortfall in supply 
in Singapore after the Singapore government announced plans to gradually phase out 
local quarries. In 1990 there were 7 granite mining businesses in operation, and a 
further 6 surveying, many of them joint ventures between Singaporean and Indonesian 
companies. 53 Known for it high quality, Karimun provided around five million tonnes 
of granite to Singapore in 1992. 54 
Riau Water Projects 
Discussions between Singapore and Indonesia about the development of water 
resources in Riau province for sale to Singapore first began when Lee and.Soeharto met 
in October 1989. 55 An agreement to jointly develop water resources in Riau, and to 
provide water to Singapore, was signed on 28 June 1991. The agreement is valid for 
more than 50 years, extendable, and will eventually result in the development of up to 
4,000 million litres per day.56 Two projects have since begun under the umbrella 
agreement 
The first project agreed to was the development of facilities on Bintan Island to provide 
a water supply of around 121 million gallons a day, half of which is allocated and to be 
sold to Singapore, and the remainder to serve the needs of Bintan. The Riau provincial 
government allocated at least 43,000 ha. of protected land on the island as a water 
52Business Times, 13 June 1996. Straits Times, 1August1996. 
53Merdeka, 27 August 1990. 
54Business Times, 27 April 1992. Output is also being marketed on Bintan and Batam where demand was forecast 
to increase from llm tonnes in 1992 to 14m tonnes in 1993. Chemica] Business Newsbase, 30 July 1992. Reuters 
Textline 30Jul92. 
55The first concrete step was taken in April 1990 when several Singaporean officials, including the Minister for 
Health, Minister for Labour and the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Riau to sound out the possibility of 
importing water from Indonesia. Accompanied by Junior Minister for Industry, Tungky Ariwibowo, they considered 
two main locations • Bintan Island and Burung Island. Whilst Burung Island was preferred - despite the need for the 
water to be processed because it was brackish and muddy in colour, the water deposits were far greater - Bintan 
Island was chosen because of its close proximity to Singapore. Suara Pembaruan, 2 May 1990. 
56The agreement was formalised by Presidential Decree. Keputusan Presiden No.32 1991. (18 July 1991). The 
agreement was an exception because according to the Agrarian Law, Hak Guna Usaha only valid for 35 years. UPI; 
KeJjasaroa SIJORI dalam peupektif kepentin1rnn nasiona] Indonesia, p 37. Singapore will finance the bulk of the 
US$5.9b needed to develop the water resources. Business Times, 20 July 1994. State Secretary, Murdiono, pre-
empted that this would be the case when he announced that Singapore would have to bear the burden of financing the 
project because of budgetary constraints in Indonesia following discussions held in late 1989. Straits Times, 24 
November 1989. 
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catchment area, to be developed and maintained by the state-owned forestry company 
Perhutani.57 The project will take fifteen years to complete, cost around S$1 billion, 
and involve the construction of 5 dams, a water treatment plant and the installation of 
underwater pipes from Bintan to Singapore. 58 
Two Singapore-Indonesia joint-ventures were established in March 1992 to develop the 
project. A Singaporean-led joint venture company, PT Bintan Tirta, will build dams, 
pumps and other infrastructure and supply water to Singapore. An Indonesian-led joint 
venture company, PT Bintan Karya Bersama, will be local supplier and distributor, and 
manager of the resources. 59 The Singaporean consortium in the joint ventures includes 
the Public Utilities Board, while the Indonesian Consortium, PT Riau Setia Perkasa, is 
owned by the Salim Group (87 .5%) and Perusahaan Daerah Sarana Pembangunan Riau, 
a BUMD (local-government-owned corporation, 12.5%).60 
A second project, based on a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 29 January 
1993, will supply Singapore with 600 million gallons of water per day from the Kampar 
River Basin on Riau mainland. Feasibility studies, made jointly by Singapore's Public 
Utilities Board and Indonesia's Ministry of Public Works, have been completed but the 
project is yet to start. 61 
By mid-1994 little progress had been made on the Bintan water project - it was one and 
a half years behind schedule - leading to the creation of a joint Singapore-Indonesia task 
force to resolve issues which had caused the delay, attributed to land and dam problems 
caused by the resettlement of residents affected by the project. 62 
Bulan Island 
Whilst Bulan Island is not officially part of joint Indonesia-Singapore cooperation, it is 
often included as part of the Growth Triangle, and the projects are worth mentioning 
because of the strong Singaporean content and orientation. In fact, the creation of the 
pig farm on Bulan Island in 1986 was the first example of Singapore-Indonesia 
57The Jakarta Post 22 June 1991. Surat Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 955/Kots-11/92. 
58Ihe Jakarta Post 22 June 1991. The Jakarta Post. 1July1991. The Jakarta Post, 3 July 1991. ~. 6 July 
1991. Indonesia Development News, Vol.14 No.6 (July/August 1991), plO. 
59it had apparently already been determined that the project would be undertaken by the private sector, not by PAM 
(Perusahaan Air Minum), and that there was a good chance that it would fall to the Salim Group. ~. 28 April 
1990. TKPPR; Pro)'ek-Proyek; Dalam Ran&ka Kerja Sama Ekopomi Indopesia-Sineapura. Mari Pangestu; "An 
Indonesian Perspective", in Lee Tsao Yuan (eel) Growth Trian&le: The Johor-Sionpore-Riau Experience. p81. 
60LIPI; Kedasama SUORI dalam perspektif kepeotinno pasiooal Ipdopesia. p 37. Pemda was included in the 
project because water is a provincial right, and therefore the local government must be involved in its management. 
61TKPPR; Proyek;-Pro)'ek Dalam Raneka Kerja Sama Ek;onomi fodonesia-Sionpura. Business Times, 30 January 
1993. Suara Pembaman. 30 January 1993. 
62Straits Times, 20 July 1994. Business Times, 20 July 1994. ~. 20 July 1994. 
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cooperation in the Riau islands and the precursor to joint cooperation on Batam and 
Bintan.63 
The Salim Group has leased the rights to the entire island of Bulan and converted over 
10,000 ha. into an integrated agribusiness operation which includes pigs, crocodiles, 
chickens, shrimp, flowers and fruit trees. 64 The main business is the commercial pig 
farm, set up with Singapore government support as Singapore was delocalising pig 
farms from Singapore through a phase-out program as an anti-pollution measure. 65 The 
pig farm is owned by PT Sinar Culindo Perkasa, with majority control shared by 
Anthony Salim, through Singapore-based company Kabila Mandiri Persada (KMP) Pte 
Ltd, and United Industrial Corporation of Singapore, and smaller stakes held by Harry 
Murdani, the brother of former Indonesian Defence Minister Benny Murdani, and 
Timmy Habibie. 66 
Singkep Island 
The Indonesian government has been exploring opportunities for joint Indonesia-
Singapore projects on Singkep Island. One advantage of developing Singkep was that 
assets such as a workforce and basic infrastructure were already in place, built and 
payed for by the state mining company, PT Timah, which had abandoned its mining 
operations because of declining world tin prices and low productivity. 
Following the drafting of an interdepartmental study on development and employment 
prospects, ten cabinet ministers visited the island in May 1991, and various proposals 
for Singkep's development were put forward. Habibie envisaged a bonded area for the 
storage of equipment for off-shore oil industries, for warehouses, an oil refinery and 
distilling centre. Minister for Mines and Energy, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, announced 
that he intended to offer Singkep to Singaporean investors to be managed as an 
industrial estate like Batam and Bintan. 
63Interview with former Singapore minister, Goh Keng Swee, 29 September 1994. Interestingly, Bulan Island had 
previously been kept in reserve for the future expansion needs of Batam Island. Interview with former BIDA Vice-
Chairman, Hemomo, 22 August 1994. It has been incorrectly suggested that Bulan Island was a concession to the 
Salim Group for its heavy involvement in other projects in Riau. Is:m,gQ, 7 September 1991. 
64one example of the integration is that fruit and orchid plantations are fertilised with manure collected from the pig 
farms, and the crocodiles fed on pigs which die before making it to the slaughterhouse. The orchid plantation is 
owned by Piranti Gemilang, a Salim joint venture with Singapore flower company Willington. Indonesia 
Deyelogment News, Vol.11 No.3 (January/February 1988), p4. Far Eastern Economic Reyiew, 18 October 1990. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 March 1991. 
65Philippe Regnier; SingQPOre: City-State in Southeast Asia (S.Abdul Majeed & Co., Kuala Lumpur 1992), p 77. 
Straits Times. 16 March 1984. Interview with former Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore, Sujatmiko, 24 August 
1994. 
66Eddy Soetriyono ; Kisah Sukses : Liem Sioe Liong (lndonmedia, Jakarta 1989), p 119. Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 18 October 1990. In addition to increasing production from 180,000 to 300,000 heads a year by 1995, 
mainly for the Singapore market and accounting for around 10% of Singaporean demand, they are also setting up a 
S$30m. joint venture abattoir as part of a recent expansion. The Jakarta Post, 17 June 1994. 
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However, it appears that the private sector has been reluctant to open business on 
Singkep, mainly because infrastructure remains rudimentary. A Singapore business 
was reportedly interested in opening a shipyard, but failed to go ahead with the plan 
because the ideal location was distant from electricity and clean water supplies. 
Moreover, researchers from the University of North Sumatra concluded that Singkep 
was not suited to agriculture. 67 
The IMS-GT and Indonesia's Development Strategy 
The spread of economic cooperation between Singapore and Indonesia from Batam 
Island to other areas in the Riau archipelago under the auspices of the IMS Growth 
Triangle was to expose divisions within the Indonesian government about the most 
appropriate development strategy that should be adopted. In particular, at the centre 
different views were held about exactly which niches in the technological spectrum 
should be occupied by each island. 
That the development scenarios for Batam, Bintan and other islands would be different 
was clear from the beginning. It was then Coordinating Minister for Economics and 
Finance, Radius Prawiro, and not Habibie, who invited Singapore to assist in the 
development of Bintan in 1990. 68 Radius took a deliberately different approach from 
Habibie, whereby Bintan would be more complementary to, and less in competition 
with, Singapore, and developments would be almost entirely private-sector led. 69 Other 
Indonesian ministers have since included their own development projects in particular 
parts of Riau under the auspices of the Growth Triangle and joint Indonesia-Singapore 
cooperation - Minister of Mines and Energy, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, has added 
Singkep Island, and Coordinating Minister for Industry, Hartarto, has added Riau 
mainland and West Sumatra. 10 
The result has been that the Riau islands are divided into different areas of control -
Habibie and BIDA are in charge of Batam Island and the Barelang extension, the 
Ministry of Industry oversees projects on Bintan and Karimun Islands, Galang Island is 
under the Ministry for Defence and Security, Singkep Island is under the Ministry for 
Mines and Energy, while the rest of the Riau archipelago remains the preserve of the 
Governor and the Riau provincial government. The result has been a lack of 
67Jakarta Post 8 February 1991. Straits Times, 3 April 1991. Suara Karya, 25 April 1991. Jakarta Post, 4 May 
1991. Suara fembarµan, 23July1991. Suara Pembaman, 24 August 1991. ~. 7 September 1991. Kompas, 
20 May 1992. Suara Perobaruan. 24 June 1992. Kompas, 24 September 1994. Mubariq Ahmad; "Economic 
Cooperation in SIJORI Growth Triangle: An Indonesian Perspective", Ekonomi dan Keuan&an Indonesia, Vol.40 
No.4 (1992), pp 415,430. 
68Forum Ke@dilan, 22 December 1994. 
69Interview with Radius Prawiro, 29 July 1994. 
70rorum Ke@dilan, 22December1994. 
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consistency of policies and in the implementation of a single coordinated developmental 
strategy. This is clear when looking at Batam, Bintan and Karimun Islands where a 
division of development scenarios has now developed - Batam Island is designated for 
electronics and technology-based industries, Bintan is for leisure and light to medium 
industries, and Karimun is for shipyards, petrochemicals and heavy industry. 
Whilst the development of Batam Island has remained firmly under the control of 
Habibie and BIDA, the development of Bintan Island is strictly the preserve of the 
Ministry of Industry, and managed by a body quite different in style from BIDA. The 
TKPPR (Tim Koordinasi Pembangunan Propinsi Riau or Riau Industrial Development 
Agency) was formed in July 1990 to function as a one-stop service agency for investors 
on Bintan and Karimun Islands, and to coordinate policies, programs and development 
for all projects in Riau Province outside BIDA's working area, under the auspices of the 
Indonesia-Singapore Economic Cooperation Agreement signed in August 1990. 71 The 
TKPPR is overseen by the Coordinating Minister for Trade and Industry, its office 
headquartered in the Industry Ministry's building, with a branch on Bintan, and is 
staffed by representatives from various ministries. 72 
Whilst the Vice-Chairman of both BIDA and TKPPR is the same person, the Junior 
Minister of Industry Tungky Ariwibowo, little is mentioned of BIDA-TKPPR 
cooperation, and despite Tungky's seemingly high-ranking position, it does not appear 
to have led to effective coordination of the two bodies. In many ways the extension of 
BIDA's working area through the creation of Barelang appeared to have been a reaction 
to the formation of the TKPPR, governing Bintan and Karimun Islands, since BIDA's 
mandate was to reduce its role and withdraw from Batam, not to expand its role or 
authority. 
When plans for the development of Bintan were released, Junior Minister for Industry 
Tungky Ariwibowo announced that the Indonesian government would not match the 
facilities given to investors in the Riau Islands with Batam because the two were 
designed for different purposes. 
71Ke.putusan Presiden No.31 1990 (25 July 1990). 
72The membership and organisation of the TKPPR has undergone several changes. See Ke.putusau Presiden No.32 
.1223. (3 May 1993). Keputµsan fresjden No.33 1993 (2 June 1993). 
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According to Tungky, the government had different development concepts for the Riau 
Islands - manufacturing industries and tourism on Bintan and Batam, and agro-based 
and petrochemical industries on other islands and the Riau mainland. 73 That there 
would be a difference between the manufacturing industries on Batam and Bintan 
Islands was clear. 
Batam and Bintan are complementary. [Batam] is for high-technology and [Bintan] is for low to 
middle technology.74 
Tungky also announced that Jakarta would not interfere in the operations of foreign 
investors but would provide a suitable business environment because Bintan was to be 
built by the private sector, clearly delineating the difference with Batam Island which 
was dominated by government investment 
Up until now in Indonesia, infrastructure has been built by the government, but for the 
development of Bintan all of it will be done by the private sector. 75 
However, Tungky's stance came into conflict with Habibie's desire for the Riau islands 
to be developed into a world-class high-tech centre.76 In April 1993, Habibie 
announced that not only Batam, but also Bintan Island, was earmarked for high-
technology and high-value-added industrial operations, and that like Batam Island, 
Bintan was closed to the manufacturing of textiles, furniture, shoes and garments.77 
Habibie also said that he had his own concept for the development of Bintan Island, but 
did not elaborate, only to say that, 
Batam and Bintan are to be developed based on a regional scenario, not on a national scenario. 
This is the basic idea for developing the islands.78 
Habibie's comments quickly provoked questions about the status of Bintan Island, and it 
was widely reported that Singaporean officials and businessmen were adopting a wait 
and see attitude for Indonesian policy on low technology industries on Bintan.79 Not 
only was there a perception that Habibie's policies would receive greater weight in the 
future in the Riau Islands, but Habibie's comments reflected his desire to stamp his 
mark on the direction of economic development in Indonesia. As a result, Habibie's 
comments drew a sharp response from other members of the Indonesian government. 
73»isnis Indonesia. 29 June 1990. 
74Re,publika, 20 February 1993. 
75suara Kacya, 8 February 1991. See also Straits Times, 20 February 1993. Suara Kacya, 20 February 1993. 
76~, 7 February 1991. 
77 Amari, 17 April 1993. The Jak;arta Post 19 April 1993. 
78straits Times, 20 April 1993. 
79strajts Times- 23 April 1993. Mersieka, 24 April 1993. 
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Within a fortnight, BKPM Chairman Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo, after a meeting with 
President Soeharto and Habibie, announced that there had been no change to Indonesia's 
long-standing policies concerning the development of Bintan and the kind of industries 
which would be welcomed on the island, stressing that Indonesia would abide by the 
understandings and agreements reached between Singapore and Indonesia on Bintan's 
development 
It is true that Batam is closed for factories which produce high levels of pollutants and need a lot 
of water such as those for the manufacturing of rattan and wood furniture, ships, shoes, toys and 
garments. But Bintan is not entirely closed to manufacturers of such products. 80 
The announcement, a clear response to concerns that Habibie's statement signalled a 
change in Indonesia's policy on Bintan, aimed to correct the 'misunderstanding' that 
Indonesia would not allow labour-intensive operations on Bintan Island. Sanyoto was 
also reported as saying that Indonesia needed every kind of industry regardless of 
whether it was labour-intensive or capital-intensive. 
I do not think that it is possible to stick to any one particular type especially when we have to think 
about creating jobs for 2.5 million people annually. That is why we would welcome any type of 
industry. 81 
Sanyoto did add conditions of his own - whilst low-tech industries would be allowed, 
they must source as much as possible, raw materials from Indonesia, as well as employ 
the local workforce. 82 However, Sanyoto's reply also reflected the technocratic view in 
the government that it was not necessary to limit the types of industries on Bintan Island 
because its development was being carried out predominantly by the private sector. 
Habibie appeared to accept, and only because of the intervention of Soeharto, that 
Bintan Island was for those industries not allowed on Batam. However, the separation 
of the development strategies of Batam and Bintan continued to be a point of 
contention, and competition. In July 1994, BIDA served notice on at least 60 small 
garment manufacturers operating out of shophouses on Batam Island to cease 
operations by mid-September, maintaining that they had no legal permit to operate on 
the island, and suggested that they could set up operations on Bintan Island. According 
to the local association, at least 3,500 employees would lose their jobs because of the 
closure.83 
8°'The Ja1carta Post, 3 May 1993. See also comments by Tungk:y Ariwibowo in ~. 3 May 1993. 
81The Straits Times, 3 May 1993. See also Busjness Tjmes, 4 May 1993. 
82Bisnis Indonesia, 3 May 1993. See also KomPas· 3 May 1993. 
83Straits Times, 30 July 1994. Business T1ffieS. 13 September 1994. 
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The move was in line with BIDA's long-standing policy to discourage low-technology 
labour-intensive and polluting operations, and promote Batam as a hub for high-tech 
and high value-added industries. The argument was that it had been costly for the 
government to establish infrastructure on the island, and that it would be unfortunate if 
it was used by industries like garments which have a low added-value content. 
Electronics industries with labour-intensive productions lines were welcomed because 
such industries produced value-added products as well as ensured transfer of 
technology. Whilst BIDA had long been opposed to industries such as garment-
manufacturers, the move indicated that it was going to enforce the policy more 
effectively. According to the BK.PM, there was no government stipulation that barred 
labour-intensive operations on Batam but that BIDA had the authority to prohibit 
industries which it considered would affect the environment and resources on the 
island. 84 
BIE organised a visit to its industrial estate on Bintan Island in August for the garment 
manufacturers and invited them to set up operations, even dedicating a flatted factory to 
be partitioned for their use.85 Already Bintan was preferred by the small and medium-
sized enterprises in the SMA (Singapore Manufacturers Association) because of 
Batam's pollutive and negative list. 86 However, whilst BIE was created as an 
alternative for those who desired a lower cost base than Batam, in late 1995 BIE began 
wooing electronics manufacturers because of a cooling of interest of Singapore-based 
garment manufacturers due to uncertainty over new export rules imposed by the USA. 
The new rules required that textiles and garments be assembled in Singapore to qualify 
for export quotas, when they previously had required that only the cutting process be 
done in Singapore, thus allowing manufacturers to shift assembly work offshore. 87 
Bintan has one important advantage over Batam - the daily minimum wage on Bintan in 
1995 was Rp3,150, less than half of that on Batam. 88 As a result there was no reason 
why electronics companies would not be more attracted towards Bintan than Batam, 
especially if the costs of doing business on Batam continued to rise. For some time the 
BKPM stood in the way of electronics companies investing on Bintan by supporting 
Habibie's plans for Batam and not issuing investment licences for electronics 
84straits Times, 30 July 1994. Business Times. 13 September 1994. 
85By September 1994 none bad taken up the invitation. Straits Times, 13 September 1994. Bisnis Indonesia, 13 
September 1994. 
861nterview with BIP Executive, October 1994. 
87Business Times, 10 November 1995. 
88Straits Times, 9 December 1993. One report puts the wage difference at S$60 a month on Bintan and S$220 a 
month on Batam. Reuters News Service, 10 July 1995. 
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manufacturers on Bintan.89 However, in mid-1996, BIE received its first electronics 
tenant, indicating that the BKPM's position had changed. 90 
Habibie's development strategy also clashed with plans for the shipyard on Karimun 
Island. In April 1992, more than six months after plans had been announced to develop 
the Karimun facilities, the shipyard industry and container ports were included in a 
negative list of investments on Karimun and Bintan.91 One of nine strategic industries, 
shipyards were closed to foreign and domestic private investment in Indonesia, and 
confined to the control of the Habibie-led BPIS (Badan Pengelola Industri Strategis or 
Strategic Industries Management Agency). Moreover, the building of the container port 
on Karimun clashed with Habibie's long-held ambition to develop the giant Asiaport on 
Batam Island. 
It was suggested in Indonesia that Singapore wanted to establish a shipyard industry on 
Karimun because its own coastal areas were full.92 Indeed it appeared that the main 
target of Singaporean investors on Karimun was the shipyard business rather than the 
integrated petroleum-based industrial complex, for it was difficult to imagine that 
Singapore would be helping to develop a competitor while its own oil industry was still 
being expanded and developed. However, its strategic position only 40 km from Pulau 
Bukom, Singapore's primary oil terminal and processing centre, and the fact that 
Singapore was involved in the project, suggests collusion rather than competition. 
It appears that the rules were relaxed for Karimun, for it would be difficult to imagine a 
6,000 ha. industrial estate without container port facilities. Projects are finally getting 
off the ground, more than four years after first mooted. It is clear that the restrictions 
placed on the project were instigated by Habibie, despite the project having the support 
of other ministers within the Indonesian government, and it was those restrictions which 
caused the long delays in getting it off the ground. What caused the tum-around is not 
clear. Certainly the EDB played a key role in getting the project off the ground. It was 
suggested that things picked up when Philip Yeo, Chairman of the EDB and strong 
supporter of developments on Batam Island, became Chairman of the Sembawang 
Group, one of the Singaporean partners in the project.93 That the two main Indonesian 
investors were the Salim Group, close to President Soeharto, and the Bangun Cipta 
Group, headed by Minister for Housing, Siswono Yudohusodo, also suggests that there 
89interview with BIP Executive, September 1994. 
~usiness Times, 28 May 1996. .. 
91Mubariq Ahmad ; Economic Cooperation in the Southern growth Triangle: AN Indonesian Perspective" in Toh 
Mun Heng and Linda Low (eds) Reeional Cooperation and Growth Trianeles in ASEAN, pp 106-7, 112-3. 
92~. 30 January 1993. . 
93Uoyd's List, 7 August 1993. Reuters Textline 07 Aug93. Business Times, 19 September 1994. 
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was opposition to Habibie's stance at the most senior levels of the Indonesian 
government. 
Despite divisions within the government, the policy environment for Bintan and 
Karimun Islands has slowly been brought into line with that on Batam Island. Further 
to the agreements signed between the governments of Singapore and Indonesia, a 
number of regulations have been issued to promote and enhance development projects 
in the Riau Islands, in particular the provision of a duty-free bonded status and special 
land tenure of 80 years. It is important to note that these facilities are granted only on a 
case-by-case basis, and currently pertain only to the projects described above. 
The most important series of regulations followed a Presidential Instruction in 1992 
which instructed several senior ministers to take specific steps to support development 
of Riau Province under the framework of Singapore-Indonesia cooperation - the 
Chairman of the BKPM was instructed to allow 100% PMA investment, the Head of the 
BPN to provide for long-term land tenure, and the Minister of Finance to provide 
exemptions on various goods and materials from tax and duties.94 These regulatory 
changes were swiftly carried out by the ministries concerned. 95 
It is clear that the two development areas of Batam and Bintan/Karimun are in 
competition, not just as opposing development scenarios, but because the spreading of 
the Growth Triangle area beyond Batam has created a buyers' and no longer a sellers' 
market, providing investors with a choice about where to set up their industries. 
Habibie and BIDA claim that Bintan relies on Batam's facilities, and that Bintan is the 
next balloon to be inflated under Habibie's scenario.96 However, and to take Habibie's 
balloon theory a step further, to even out the inflating inputs and to inflate several 
balloons simultaneously may in fact slow down the growth of each balloon. 
94Ins!ruksj Presjden No 4 1992 (19 September 1992). Exemptions on all materials, equipment and machinery used 
for the construction and operation of development projects include : bea masuk, bea masuk tambahan, Penangguhan 
Pajak Pertambahan Nilai - Value added Tax), Pajak Penjualan Atas Barang Mew ah (Luxury Goods tax), and Pajak 
Penghasilan Pasal 22- Income Tax). These changes essentially made those areas determined as part of Indonesia-
Singapore cooperation a duty-free zone. 
95For information on tax exemptions see Keputusao Menteri Keuaoean No.1071/KMK,00/1992 (14 October 1992). 
Keputusan Menteri Keuaoean No 1072/KMK 00/1992 (14 October 1992). Keputusan Menteri Perda&aoean 
No.05/Kp/I/93 (12 January 1993). Keputusan fresjden No,90 1993 (4 October 1993). Suara Pembaruao, 20 
February 1993. Jakarta Post, 20 February 1993. Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 April 1993. Business Tunes, 29 
May 1993. For information on investment regulations see Peraturan Pemerintah No.7 1993. 28 January 1993. f!! 
Eastern Economic Reyiew, 22 April 1993. For information on land titles of 80 years, made up of 30 year lease with 
guaranteed 20 year extension and further 30 year renewal see Peraturan Pemerintah No.40 1993. 17 June 1993. 
Bjsnis lndonesja, 7 July 1993. 
961nterview with BIDA Executive, Gunawan Hadisusilo, 10 August 1994. 
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The IMS-GT and the Indonesian Conglomerates 
In light of the convenient marriage between economic and political interests in 
Indonesia, domestic economic interests have a vested interest in promoting the Growth 
Triangle. Developments on Bintan, Karimun and Bulan Islands have undoubtably been 
dominated by the conglomerates. In fact, apart from the involvement of Pemda Riau or 
an ABRI yayasan, domestic share-holding in projects is nearly confined to well-
connected conglomerates, particularly those with strong Presidential links such as the 
Salim Group, the Bimantara Group, the Barito Group, and family members of serving 
and former government ministers, such as Harry Murdani and Timmy Habibie. These 
powerful domestic interests have stood to gain considerably from cooperation with 
Singapore under the auspices of the Growth Triangle. (See Table 7 .2). 
The most prominent domestic investor is the Salim Group. Indeed, the Salim Group 
has almost single-handedly fashioned the Indonesian comer of the Growth Triangle, 
through a diversified investment program ranging from pig farms and granite mining to 
industrial parks and property development. Former Executive Director, Judiono Tosin, 
boasted, 
We are creating the Growth Triangle. 97 
The Salim Group was on the ground on Bintan Island well before any official 
pronouncements were made regarding its development. As early as May 1990, 
Anthony Salim was talking about the imminent development of north Bintan. 
Newspapers in fact reported that the area had already been divided up by speculating 
cukong.98 The fact that the TKPPR was not set up until July 1990, and that the 
Agreement with Singapore was not signed until August, certainly suggests that the area 
had long been earmarked for development. 99 
97 Asiaweek. 18 January 1991. 
98suara Pembaruan, 8 May 1990. 
99-rbe area had long been identified as having tourist potential. In 1979 a tourism study, Survai Wisata Bahari was 
made of Bintan Island. In 1980 a study was made of Bintan as a compass for the development of tourism. It looked 
at the East Coast beaches, Trikora, and historical sites in Tanjung Pinang and Penyengat. The study saw the 
importance of proximity to Singapore and Marketing in Singapore. PT ldacipta ; Studi Pen&embannn Wisata Tu1a 
Pulau Bintan Riau. (Draft Final Report, 17 February 1981). The Governor has discussed a UNDP survey from 1986 
which said that the natural and beautiful long sandy beaches of Bintan could be developed into a tourist area. 
An&Jcatan Berseniata. 24 December 1990. 
Table7.2 
Major Domestic Investors on Bintan, Karimun and Bulan Islands 
Salim Group Salim Group Pf BUaila Megawisatama 
(100%)100 
BBIR Property 
Pf Sukajaya Indowabana Pf Bintan Resort Corporation BBIR Developer 
(80% Salim Group) (60%)101 
Singapore Bintan Resort Holdings Pf Bintan Resort Corporation BBIR Developer 
PteLtd (40%)102 
(?% KMP Bincorp Invesunents) 
Pf Sukajaya lndowabana Bintan Resort Management Pte Ltd BBIR Manager 
(80% Salim Group) (40%)103 
Singapore Bintan Resort Holdings Bintan Resort Management Pte Ltd BBIR Manager 
PteLtd (60%)104 
(?% KMP Bincorp Invesunents) 
Salim Group (?%)105 Hotel Rasa Indah 
Salim Group SAFE Bintan Resort Hotel Sedona Bintan Lagoon 
(10%)106 
Salim Group Tropical Bintan Laguna Bintan Resort 
(10%)107 
100 Jakarta Post 5 February 1991. 
101 TKPPR ; Provek-Pmyek Dalam Ran&ka Ketja Sama Ekonomi Indonesia-Sinnpura (no date). Forum Keadilan. 15 July 1996. BRC are also developing several resorts : Mayang Sari Resort, 
Mana Mana Beach Club, Erisindo Bintan Adhik:a Resort. Busineu TUnes, 28 February 1996. 
102JKPPR ; Proyek-Proyek Dalam Ran&ka Keija Sama EJconomj lndopesia-Sin&apura (no date). 
103TKPPR; Provek-Proyek Da1am Ran&ka Kerja Sama Ekonomi lndonesia-Singapura (no date). Forum Ke@dilan, 15 July 1996. 
104TKPPR; Provek-Proyek QaJam Raneka Keria Sama Ekonomi lnc!onesia-Sjneapwa (no date). 
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Most of the Salim Group's ventures in the Riau Islands are in partnership with 
Singapore companies. The division of labour allows each company in the joint-venture 
to concentrate on its particular area of expertise. For instance, in BBIR, STIC handles 
the engineering aspects of the project, and the Salim Group tackles thorny indigenous 
problems that may crop up from time to time, in particular the resettling and 
compensating of peoples moved from the site of the project. The Singapore partners in 
fact submit monthly progress reports to the Salim Group, which then resolves any 
problems. 143 
The predominance of large Indonesian conglomerates in joint projects in the Riau 
islands under Indonesia-Singapore cooperation has been a contentious issue, forcing the 
Indonesian government to respond to comments from some quarters that Riau's 
development would benefit only certain individuals or groups. Riau Governor, 
Soeripto, has at various times insisted that the development of Bintan was a strategic 
government project which intended to raise the standard of living of the community, 
that the development of Bintan was not for private interests, and that the developtij.ent 
and management of Bintan would not be handed over to just one conglomerate.144 
The central government, too, has responded to local concern. Tungky Ariwibowo's 
explanation was that, as everywhere else in the world, the government could not control 
capital, for only the capital owners themselves have the power to decide where capital 
must be invested.145 Important politically, and in order to dispel claims that 
development is monopolised by several Jakarta conglomerates and foreign investors, 
BBIR's developer's have taken care to break up large infrastructure projects into smaller 
parcels to allow participation from small Indonesian enterprises, because of strong 
pressure from the indigenous business community to share in the development of 
Riau.146 
Many indigenous groups are concerned that by opening up Riau to foreign investment, 
the government has provided yet another means by which Indonesian conglomerates, 
especially Indonesian Chinese business interests in association with Singaporean 
143 Straits Tunes, 14 March 1994. BRM bas engaged a team of environmental and sociological consultants to ensure 
minimal disruption to local people's livelihood, and to the natural environment. Straits Tunes, 23 September 1994. 
144Media Indonesia. 3 October 1991. Media Indonesia, 28 October 1992. 
145Merdeka, 2 December 1993. Soeripto too, claims the private sector was there because the cost involved was too 
substantial for the Indonesian government to go it alone. Suara Katya, 23 September 1991. The Straits Tmies, 24 
September 1991. 
146 Straits Times, 14 March 1994. A master plan bas been drawn up for the development of four retail villages with 
the aim of getting small and medium-sized retailers and restaurateurs to take up land leases. The aim is to keep them 
small scale so that there are opportunities for the smaller enlrepreneur. The consortium behind the Bintan Beach 
International Resort will invest in the village's infrastructure at a cost of around S$50 million. Business Times. 27 
August 1992. Both Indonesian and joint-venture conlractors are currently being used. Interview with TKPPR 
official, 15 September 1994. 
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companies, can acquire even more wealth.147 As noted by Indonesian economist, Kwik 
KianGie, 
Bintan island is controlled by one of the private-sector business groups that bas been 
transformed into a joint venture with Singapore in a manner far from being transparent 148 
Salim Group companies, PT Buana Megawisatama and PT Surya Bangun Pertiwi, own 
the property for the BBIR and BIB sites respectively.149 How the Salim Group was so 
easily able to obtain the 27 ,000 ha. of land, which affected around 3,000 people, for the 
industrial and tourism projects is not clear.150 Anthony Salim was forced to deny 
charges that the Salim Group was coercing landowners to sell their land.151 However, it 
is more likely that they used the local government apparatus. According to membe( of 
the DPR, Harun Amin, private interests used the government's hand in freeing the land, 
and the carrying out of compensation was done without community consultation but 
under the pretext of the importance of a government project 152 There were even 
suggestions that the Governor was protecting business interests, for he was seen to be 
close to the conglomerates.153 
Just who set the low level of compensation for land is muddied, perhaps deliberately, by 
the numerous and conflicting statements of government officials. Officially, the level 
of compensation was determined by a Compensation Committee set up by Pemda Riau. 
Other reports state that the level of compensation was set by the Governor in 1991. 
Pemda in fact distanced itself from the issue, claiming that the level of compensation 
had been decided by the central government 154 Some questioned whether it was the 
conglomerates who desired low land compensation, leading President Soeharto to claim 
that development was of national interest and for the benefit of investors or 
businessmen.155 Indeed, the Salim Group has avoided being associated with the issue 
of land acquisition and compensation, claiming that the decisions were all made by 
Pemda.156 
147 Asianlntellipnce, 26 June 1991, pp 6-7. 
148 Jakarta Post. 11March1994. 
149 Jakarta Po§L 13 December 1990. Jakarta Po§L 5 February 1991. 
150The Jatarta Post. 22Ju0e 1991. 
151 Far Eastern F&onomic Reyiew, 14 March 1991. 
152~ 19 November 1991. 
153 Suara Pembaruan, 7 July 1992. 
154Jakarta Post, 3 October 1991. Suara Karya. 18 November 1991. According to the Governor, a land 
compensation committee for the area had been set up in 1989. Media Indonesia. 3 October 1991. According to the 
Bupati, however, it was 1990. Suara Katya, 19 November 1991. More information might be given in the Surat 
Keputusan Panitia Pembebasan Tanah No.KPTS 05/580/1990. Suara Pembaman. 18 April 1991. 
155 .Kwmma. 24 January 1994. 
156Media Indonesia. 10 October 1991. 
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The Indonesian government has gone to great lengths to stress that the Riau provincial 
government is a partner in the consortium involved in Bintan's development, and that 
the Salim Group would be 'just one' of the investors.157 Anthony Salim, too, has 
stressed that development is coordinated by the local government, central government 
and Singapore.158 However, the involvement of certain business groups in 
developments has also opened up charges of corruption and suggestions of collusion 
between private business and government agencies, particularly with regards to land 
acquisition and compensation on Bintan.159 There were reports that five members of 
the DPR, said to be a strong Salim Group lobby, were using land compensation cases to 
further their own interests, by making a private visits to Bintan under the sponsorship of 
the Salim Group. The deputy head of Commission VII DPR admitted being a 
connection in the visit but denied having received money and facilities from the Salim 
group.HiO 
One further consequence of the Growth Triangle and cooperation with Singapore has 
been the increased penetration and presence of Singaporean Chinese in Riau. Them are 
strong fears of the prospect of an enclave of Chinese capital forming within the Growth 
Triangle. Singapore capital has had a long and an unofficial involvement in Riau. 
According to Indonesian researcher, Alfitra Salaam, around 17,729 fishing households 
in the Riau Islands work for or sell their catch to Chinese shop-owners which are 
financed by Singaporean businessmen.161 Whilst there is a wariness of the power of 
external Chinese capital, the government tacitly accepts the links between domestic 
Indonesian and overseas Chinese communities, and the possible advantages and 
potential it holds. Some groups, however, are attempting to reactivate Malay cultural 
links in order to balance the Chinese influence, led by the Habibie-linked FOKUS. 
Indonesia's, and particularly its large conglomerates', participation in the Growth 
Triangle stands as a good example of Indonesian big business playing a larger regional 
role. The government-business relationship as it has pertained to the Growth Triangle 
is interesting, particularly for the way in which business interests have had an impact on 
bureaucratic decision-making and government policies and development strategies. As 
early as August 1990, the Governor of Lemhanas (National Defence Institute), Major-
General Soekarto, warned that the decision to create the Growth Triangle showed the 
prominent role played by certain groups in controlling the economy.162 As the large 
157 See comments by Tungky Ariwibowo in Straits Twes, 8 February 1991. 
158 Suara Pembarµan, 8 May 1990. 
159~ 6 August 1992. 
160&1itl. 26 June 1992. &lit&. 27 June 1992. ~. 30 June 1992. 
161 All1iwl, 9 February 1994. 
162He made the comments at a Lemhanas forum held on 20 August 1990. Jakarta Post, 21August1990. MerdeJca, 
27 August 1990. An&katan Bersenjata. 21 August 1990. 
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domestic corporate groups seek to expand through internationalisation it is only natural 
that they first spill over to their neighbouring regions. The trend, therefore, is towards 
joint-ventures and strategic alliances of regional business interests. 
The IMS-GT in the Domestic Context 
The reaction in Indonesia towards the IMS Growth Triangle and cooperation with 
Singapore was generally positive, although it was clearly obvious that some were 
suspicious about the merits of cooperation with Singapore. Indonesian cooperation 
with Singapore under the auspices of the IMS Growth Triangle raised a number of 
questions about what the benefits of cooperation were for Indonesia. The most 
important questions, or perhaps more correctly domestic criticisms, are that such 
cooperation legitimises Singaporean economic expansion, that the relationship favours 
Singapore to the detriment of Indonesia, and that it will not assist regional development 
or involve local people in projects. 
Criticism of specifically Indonesia-Singapore cooperation in the Riau islands has 
erupted in Indonesia from time to time, forcing senior government officials to stress the 
benefits of joint projects. These criticisms have come from various groups including 
the media, the DPR, former ministers and leading economists. The most common 
perception is that cooperation is based on an unequal relationship and tends to be 
exploitative, to the benefit of Singapore. As a result, it has invited comment from 
nationalist groups in Indonesia who see foreign domination in Riau as weakening the 
Indonesian nation and people, economically, politically and culturally.163 For instance, 
economist, K wik Kian Gie, has expressed concern that Indonesia is pawning its islands, 
with Batam, Bintan and Bulan as the precedents.164 
Members of the DPR, through its various Komisi, have consistently criticised aspects of 
cooperation with Singapore. At various times concerns have been raised about : sharp 
price rises in the islands; land speculation by major Jakarta investors to the detriment of 
local people; land compensation issues; the management of joint projects; and possible 
ecological dangers, particularly from water projects. 165 
163 .An1m, 9 February 1994. 
164 Jakarta Post. 11 March 1994. 
165 Suara Kazya, 20 November 1990. Subardi, of Golkar, a member of the House Commission X on the environment 
said in a bearing with State Minister for Environment Emil Salim that the removal of 3.5 billion litres of water a day 
for a period of 100 years could jeopardise Bintao's ecology. He also said that sand quarrying bad also aggravated 
environmental degradation on the island. The Jakarta Post. 28 June 1991. It bas also been argued that the pig farm 
on Bulan Island was evidence that Singapore was only moving highly polluting industries to Indonesia. UPI ; 
Ketiasama SJJORI dalam perspektifke,pentinean nasional Indonesia, p 13. 
·- . 
293 
The legality of the various agreements made with Singapore has been an important 
point of concern, particularly for those desiring to strengthen the role of the DPR. 
Several members of the DPR have called for all Singapore-Indonesia agreements 
pertaining to Batam, Bintan and Karimun Islands to be ratified by the DPR, and called 
on the government to have the DPR ratify those related to the IMS-GT, recalling 
Paragraph 11 of the 1945 Constitution, which stipulates that the President can, but only 
with the agreement of the DPR, make agreements/treaties with other countries. They 
point out that the Timor Gap Treaty with Australia had been ratified but not the Riau 
Agreement, despite the fact that the latter covered far more fields of activity than simply 
oil exploration. They insist that ratification by the DPR is the only proof that the 
Indonesian people consent to the arrangements.166 
Criticism of Indonesia-Singapore joint projects has been carried strongly by the media, 
usually in phases. As a result, defence of cooperation has come in waves, and 
importantly has been made by more than one minister, indicating that government 
support of cooperation with Singapore was fairly unanimous. On the one._hand, 
ministerial comments are made to assure the Singapore government and foreign 
investors that the Indonesian government is committed to developing the Riau Islands. 
Junior Minister of Industry, Tungky Ariwibowo, went so far as to comment that 
Singapore's active role in the development of Riau province would not be an election 
issue for the Indonesian government.167 More importantly, however, ministerial 
remarks are usually directed at easing domestic concerns that Indonesian resources were 
being exploited and developed for Singapore's benefit. According to Tungky, 
unhappiness among some Indonesians was simply due to a lack of understanding and 
information. 168 As a result, Indonesian ministers have stepped in to correct such 
misunderstandings. 
Several ministers came to the defence of the January 1993 Riau water agreements, and 
more generally the new cooperative efforts in the Riau islands. In response to claims 
that cooperation only profited Singapore, Coordinating Minister of Economy, Finance 
and Industry, Radius Prawiro, remarked that joint development of the Riau islands did 
not damage Indonesia, and denied that the agreement to supply water to Singapore 
meant the government was selling 'tanah air kita' ('Our Motherland', but more literally 
'our land and water') to Singapore.169 The Governor of Riau also defended the 
agreements, saying that the water projects benefited Riau because they would help it to 
l66suara Km:ya, 20November1990. Media Indonesia, 19May1993. 
167Business Dmes, 27September1991. 
168Business Twes, 27 September 1991. 
169"Yang kitajual,jelas bukan tanah air. Tetapi air tanah.", he said jokingly, in reference to the fact that Indonesia 
also sold land to Singapore for reclamation. Suara Pembaruan. 30 January 1993. ~. 30 January 1993. 
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overcome problems in providing clean water to its inhabitants, as well as overcome the 
yearly floods which affect Riau mainland.110 Tungky Ariwibowo, was more forthright, 
exclaiming the virtues of the relationship. 
It is clear, Indonesia and Singapore both enjoy benefits from these cooperative efforts.171 
Following another wave of criticism in July 1994, Tungky Ariwibowo refuted 
suggestions that Bintan and Karimun Islands were being sold to Singapore, pointing out 
that ownership of all joint projects was divided 60% Indonesian and 40% Singaporean, 
and that Indonesia gained from foreign exchange earnings, tax receipts, work 
opportunities, technological know-how and other multiplier effects.172 His comments 
were followed days later by Hartarto who refuted suggestions that Singapore _set 
development policies for Bintan Island.173 
Former Finance Minister, Frans Seda, expressed concern that the areas surrounding 
Singapore would gain, with only limited benefit to the rest of Indonesia and to the 
detriment of other more needy areas, particularly the under-developed eastern part of 
the country.174 Whilst there is criticism that Jakarta's participation in the Growth 
Triangle could draw resources away from development in other parts of the country, 
particularly Eastern Indonesia, the government's response has been that it is inaccurate 
to talk about government participation because involvement was primarily by the 
private sector, and the government simply drew up regulations and provided a good 
investment climate as they did for other parts of the country .175 
The government's attitude is that Indonesia's linkages with Singapore in the Riau islands 
not only ensure faster growth for Riau province but have created a· centre of economic 
development whose benefits, such as employment generation and foreign exchange 
earnings, could be felt widely across other parts of the country.176 Tungky Ariwibowo 
claimed that Indonesia's linkages with Singapore in the Riau islands have created a 
centre of economic development whose benefits are being felt widely across other parts 
of the country, and that on-going cooperation not only ensured faster growth for Riau 
province, but also generated employment and earned foreign exchange necessary for 
economic programs elsewhere in Indonesia.177 
170suara fembaman. 30 January 1993. 
171 Suara Pembaruan· 20 February 1993. An&katan Berseqjata, 20 February 1993. 
172suara Pembaruan. 20 July 1994. 
173Merdeka.. 25 July 1994. 
174Strajts Times, 12 June 1990. 
175 Straits Txmes. 28 March 1991. 
176 See comments by Industry Minister, Tungky Ariwibowo in Straits Tmies. 1 December 1993. 
177 Straits Times, 1 December 1993. 
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At times, ministers have addressed local concerns about cooperation with Singapore. 
Various senior Ministers have responded to local community concerns about the lack of 
availability of clean water, by stressing such things as : half of the water collected in 
catchment areas on Bintan island would be channelled for domestic consumption on the 
island, and was not being developed solely to meet Singapore's needs178; that what was 
to be sold was rain water from river catchment areas and not ground-water.179 
According to Riau Governor, Soeripto, there was nothing wrong with Singapore gaining 
something for itself through cooperation with Indonesia while providing 'inputs' for 
Riau's development, because Indonesia also stood to gain.180 Soeripto dismissed the 
notion that Indonesia might appear to be "selling off' the province given the active 
involvement of Singapore and the private sector in developing its vast potential 
because, 
Singapore possesses a capacity, so why don't we make use of it?181 
For the provincial government, the involvement of parts of Riau in the Growth Triangle 
offers the possibility of growth in industrial activity which might not otherwise have 
been attained. Indeed, two main features of economic development in Indonesia in the 
past two decades have been that economic activity has remained predominantly located 
in Java, and to a lesser extent Sumatra, and that most modem manufacturing and service 
sectors continue to be located on Java.182 On Bintan Island, tourism and industrial 
projects are already set to replace the activities of Pertamina and bauxite mining as the 
traditional industrial mainstays of the local economy. 
Riau officials see Singapore as the engine of growth for the development of Riau 
province.183 Pemda Riau has for the most part been enthusiastic about the possibilities 
offered by Indonesia-Singapore cooperation in the province, the Governor often 
articulating the economic opportunities which will arise as a result of the development 
of industrial and tourism areas on Batam, Bintan, Karimun and other islands.184 
178straits Times, 1December1993. See also Riau Pos. 7 January 1992. 
179See comments by Minister for the Environment, Emil Salim in The Jakarta Post, 28 June 1991; and comments by 
Public Works Minister, Radinal Moochtar in The Jakarta Post, 3 July 1991. 
180suara Karva, 23September1991. The Straits TlllleS, 24 September 1991. 
181 Suara Kazya, 23September1991. The Straits Tlllles, 24 September 1991. 
182Hal Hill & Anne Weidemann; "Regional development in Indonesia: Patterns and Issues", in Hal Hill (ed) .!.!nm'. 
and Diversity· Reejona! economic develQpment in Indonesia since 1970 , p5. In the period 1967-September 1985, 
Jakarta and West Java attracted around 40% of the total of approved foreign and domestic investments in the non-oil 
sectors (ie excluding investments in oil, gas, banking and insurance), and Java over 50%. Hal Hill & Anne 
Weidemann ; "Regional development in Indonesia : Patterns and Issues", in Hal Hill (ed) Unity and Diyersity: 
Reeional economic development jn Indonesia since 1970, p22. In the period 1967-September 1985, Riau received 
1 % of realised foreign investments, worth US$49m, and 2.3% of approved domestic investments. The three largest 
sectors were 'Other Mining' 33.1 %, 'Forestry' 22.2% and 'Wood Industry' 14.2%, making a total of 69.5%. Hal Hill 
& Anne Weidemann ; "Regional development in Indonesia : Patterns and Issues", in Hal Hill (ed) Unity and 
Diversity : Reeional economic develQpment in Indonesia since 1970 , pp 28-29. 
183 Anekatan Bersenjata, 28 January 1992. 
184suara Kazya, 12 December 1990. 
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According to Governor Soeripto, little by little Riau's potential will begin to be used, 
and as that potential is utilised the surrounding community will become involved. 185 
Whilst the Riau provincial government is currently encouraging all areas of Riau 
province to participate, concentrating on tourism, agro-business and industry, the lack 
of even the most basic infrastructure will limit foreign investment interest in the smaller 
or more remote islands, and as a result, Batam, Bintan and Karimun will continue to 
offer the most potential to investors. 186 
Whilst there is some pessimism in Riau, in general the local people place hope on 
Indonesia-Singapore joint projects to raise prosperity and increase economic 
opportunities.187 According to the Riau Provincial Secretary, Rivaie Rachman, there 
were several positive features about the IMS-GT - employment and business 
opportunities, and faster economic development - the negative factors being the fear 
that it will only profit Singapore, and that local communities will have little opportunity 
to participate and benefit fully.188 
There is criticism that local communities do not benefit from the joint Indonesia-
Singapore projects in Riau. In many ways, the development projects are not local-
people-friendly. Member of the DPR, Harun Amin, even described the level of 
compensation given to landowners as "inhumane" .189 According to Indonesian 
academic, C.P.Luhulima, while these development projects are promoted as "regional 
development", the truth is closer to "development in the region" .190 
Indeed, there is no succinct policy to enhance the economic well-being of the people in 
the islands, and economic activities do not appear to integrate local small and medium 
scale enterprises. In addition, there is an imbalance in the value factors used in the 
production process - Riau only contributes land and unskilled labour and both are 
extremely low in value as compared to capital, knowledge, technology and 
entrepreneurship owned and provided by the domestic conglomerates and foreign 
investors. 
l85~ 17September1990. 
186 Sinnpore Business, December 1990. Most of Riau is retarded by inadequate telecommunications and transport 
facilities. Airports are located on the islands of Karimun, Bintan, Singkep, Anambas, Natuna and Bat.am. Telephone 
services are available in Bat.am, Bintan, Karimun, Kundur and Singkep. Sineapore Business. December 1990. 
187 Suara Karva, 4 February 1993. 
188Rivai Rahman ; "Sudut Pandang Riau" , in Adi Sasono, A.Makmur Makha, Moh.Jumhur Hidayat (eds) 
Pertemuan Serantau , (CIDES, Jakarta 1993) , p 114. See also the comments made by the Governor in Merdeka, 9 
March 1991. 
189 Suara Karya, 19 November 1991. ~. 19 November 1991. 
190c.P.F.Luhulima; "The Performance of ASEAN Economic Cooperation", Indonesia OuarterlY Vol.XXII No.l, p 
19. 
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The centralist nature of the Indonesian economy - proceeds of exports accrue to the 
nation as a whole and only a small share is returned to the respective exporting regions -
and the Indonesian political structure, means that provinces have little control over their 
economic destiny. Whilst greater emphasis is currently being accorded to 'regional self-
reliance', policies and development projects decided by the central government, as in 
the case of the IMS-GT, are inclined to reflect a centralist attitude which weakens the 
authority of local govemment.191 The centralist attitude is strong. Habibie told a 
business audience on Batam in 1991, 
Don't consider SIJORI as owned by Riau, because Riau does not have the funds and 
skills.192 
However, it has received criticism. Prominent Indonesian businessman, Laksamana 
Sukardi, blames the slow progress of the IMS Growth Triangle on the central 
government because it does not give the Riau government full authority to formulate 
policies related to cooperation among the triangle's members.193 Some changes are 
evident, for there is no doubt the inclusion of the Governor of Riau on the Supervisory 
Board of the TKPPR was aimed at increasing the participation of the Riau provincial 
government in the development of Bintan and Karimun Islands, in stark contrast to its 
virtual exclusion on Batam.194 However, further steps need to be taken. What is 
required are clear and succinct policies aimed at enhancing the economic well-being of 
people living in and around development projects in the Riau Islands. 
Whilst it is clear that the Indonesian government will continue to strongly support 
cooperation with Singapore under the banner of the IMS-GT, the Indonesian 
government will also continue to monitor and respond to domestic sentiment about the 
role of Singapore in the Riau islands. However, its response will continue to be typical 
of elsewhere in Indonesia - the projects and developments are of national importance. 
Policy-Making 
The Indonesian comer of the IMS Growth Triangle provides an interesting insight into 
Indonesian policy-making. Events and processes in the Riau islands were dominated by 
general features of Indonesian political economy - Presidential Domination, 
Clientelism, Intra-elite Politicking and External Influence. The formal endorsement 
191 The administrative capacity in the provinces is stronger, especially following the establishment of regional 
planning agencies, such as the Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Bappeda). Hal Hill & Anne Weidemann ; 
"Regional Development in Indonesia: Patterns and Issues", in Hal Hill (ed) Unity and Diversity· Rei:ional Economic 
Development in Indonesia since 1970, p47. 
192 AD1'la. 28 October 1991. 
193The Jakarta Post, 28 July 1993. 
194other members include the Head of the BPN, Minister for Public Works, Minister for Tourism, Post and 
Telecommunications and Chairman of the BKPM. 
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process and sanctioning at the highest levels of the Indonesian and Singaporean 
governments, the role of political elites, their networks, and those of the business elites 
clearly come to the fore when one takes a critical look at both the formation and 
management of development projects in Riau. 
President Soeharto's support of Singaporean participation in developments in the Riau 
Islands was, of course, pivotal, and through the signing the 1990 Riau Cooperation 
Agreement, Soeharto provided a framework under which cooperation would continue. 
He entrusted Economic Coordinating Minister, Radius Prawiro, and later Hartarto, to 
oversee Indonesia-Singapore cooperation. That Radius, a technocrat, was chosen to 
secure cooperation with Singapore rather than Habibie, who had overseen the 1980 
Batam Agreement, suggests that the technocrats were strongly behind the initiatives and 
that Soeharto felt Habibie would try to impose restrictions on joint projects, something 
that neither the technocrats, the conglomerates or Singapore desired. When Habibie did 
attempt to hijack those joint projects, Soeharto forcibly intervened. 
Intra-elite struggles were clearly evident in the development of Bintan and Karimun 
Islands which had been set up by the technocrats for quite different purposes than 
Batam Island, where they had been largely unsuccessful in influencing developments. 
Initially Habibie was not inclined to interfere in Bintan and Karimun, and instead 
sought expansion of his own working area on Batam through the Barelang project. 
However, with the retirement of technocratic adversary, Radius Prawiro, in early 1993, 
Habibie moved quickly onto the offensive by staking his claim to control over 
development, and attempting to impose his high-technology strategy on the rest of the 
Riau islands. He failed in this regard because of the strong resistance of the Minister 
for Industry and the BKPM Chairman who had enlisted the support of Soeharto. Whilst 
not unambiguously members of the technocratic camp, those officials have maintained 
the strategy adopted by Radius Prawiro and the technocrats. 
Whilst Batam was a government-led development followed by private sector 
involvement, the pattern on Bintan and Karimun was the exact opposite, where the 
private sector led developments. It is clear in this case, that the 'national goals' of the 
Indonesian state benefited the economic and business elites. Their role in the 
institutions, initiatives and management of developments on Bintan and Karimun 
Islands was highly important. Certainly matters such as those of land acquisition and 
compensation involved collusion between businessmen and government officials. 
The Salim Group was at the forefront of developments, clearly dominating the private 
investment scene, and taking a large share in every joint Indonesia-Singapore project, as 
well as interest in other commercial ventures. Other Jakarta conglomerates were also 
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involved, particularly the Bimantara, Barito and Bangun Tjipta Groups. In all cases of 
Indonesia-Singapore joint projects, the conglomerates were in partnership with 
Singapore consortia put together by the EDB. The official encouragement of joint 
ventures between public enterprises and private firms from Indonesia and Singapore in 
major investment projects served to enhance cooperation and the interlocking of 
interests among business groups from the two countries. 
Non-state actors played a role but had little, if any, impact on policy-makers. As a 
member of TKPPR, and a partner in several joint projects, Pemda Riau appeared to be 
consulted on most matters pertaining to developments on Bintan and Karimun. 
However, whilst Pemda Riau had a far greater role in developments on Bintan than on 
Batam, that role did not necessarily equate with more influence. 
The media carried stories of land acquisition and compensation, and DPR members 
expressed their concerns over similar matters, contributing to the general debate in 
Indonesia about developments under the auspices of the IMS-GT. However, ·whilst 
sometimes critical, at no stage did either of them have an impact on the policy-making 
processes. One newspaper criticised the DPR for its inaction and ineffectiveness over 
land acquisition problems on Bintan, asking the question, "Does the DPR have any 
bite?"195 
The Singapore government was involved in almost every economic activity in the Riau 
islands, and its role in the setting of the policy agenda appeared to have been 
significant. Singapore had influence through direct representations to the government, 
and through the EDB and GLCs who cooperated primarily with Indonesian 
conglomerates with special access to power and policy-making. The large number of 
projects and initiatives under the IMS-GT have clearly cemented ties between 
Singapore and Indonesia and will mean that Singapore will remain of policy importance 
well into the future. 
195 "DPR, Di Mana Giginya?" Suara Pembaman. 7 July 1992. 
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8 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to describe and analyse the political and economic 
transformation of Batam Island. The preceding chapters have traced the history and 
political economy of Batam Island, and illustrated the policy debates, policy shifts and 
policy processes as they have been played out. 
The main aim, however, was to investigate what the experiences of developing Bauim 
Island tell us about the policy-making processes in Indonesia, and about Indonesian 
political economy under the New Order in general. Batam Island offered a useful case 
study. Not only did economic events on Batam mirror Indonesia's national economic 
transformation, but the political and policy processes reflected those occurring at the 
centre. 
As has been described in earlier chapters, Batam Island underwent a significant 
transformation, physically, economically and politically, since development began in the 
late 1960s. In just over twenty-five years, what was once a sparsely populated island of 
subsistence farmers and fishermen is today a seemingly thriving manufacturing, industrial 
and tourism area. 
Growth data comparing the development of Batam over the period 1968-1993 illustrates 
the economic transformation which has taken place. (See Table 8.1). Economic 
indicators show impressive growth in most facets of the Batam economy - labour force 
numbers, tourists, exports, foreign investment, foreign exchange revenue as well as 
infrastructure and utilities. The most significant trend, however, is the enormous growth 
which has occurred since 1989. 
Despite early promise, the results of development on Batam Island before 1988 were 
quite limited. Reliance on the oil industry meant that the fortunes of Batam Island were 
strongly tied to those of the domestic and international oil markets. When those markets 
were strong, particularly in the early 1970s, economic activity on Batam was vibrant, but 
downturns in the international oil sector in the mid-1970s and in the mid-1980s, 
adversely affected Batam Island. 
Population 
Labour Force 
Tourists 
Paved Roads 
Fresh Water 
Electricity 
Telephone Lines 
Flight Arrivals 
Airport Run Way 
Maximum Sea Berth Capacity 
Total Investment 
a. Government 
% of total 
b. Private 
% of total 
Total Foreign Exchange Revenue 
a. Tourists 
b. Export 
Local Government Revenue 
Foreign Exchange Revenue 
capita/year 
Table 8.1 
Growth Data Comparison of Batam Island 
(Years 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993) 1 
1968 1973 1978 1983 
3,000 6,000 31,800 43,000 
. 3,400 2,240 5,500 
. a 21,000 
. b l.4km 105km 
. 20 It/sec 55 lt/sec 160 It/sec 
. 2MV 5MV 18MV 
. lOSS lOSS 1,470SS 
. c 7 x week 
. 850m 850m 2,500m 
. 5,000DWf 5,000DWf 10,000DWf 
. US$202m US$502m 
. US$64m US$116m US$253m 
58% 50% 
. US$85m US$249m 
42% 50% 
. US$0.3m US$4m 
. US$1m 
. US$0.3m US$3m 
. RplOm Rp167m 
US$10 US$93 
.. 
1988 1993 
79,400 146,000 
9,478 44,000 
227,981 680,373 
313km 
850 It/sec 
200MV 
12,500 SS 
27 x week 109x week 
2,500m 3,600m 
15,000DWf 35,000DWf 
US$4,525m 
US$408m US$743m 
17% 
US$3,782m 
83% 
US$75m US$1,175m 
US$31m US$250m 
US$44m US$925m 
Rpl.19b Rp6.95b 
US$945 US$8,048 
1 BIDA; Various sources. a - 12, 630. Prior to 1983, all visitors, domestic and foreign, passed through Singapore. b - 186km unpaved roads. c - Prior to 1983, all aircraft were small commuter. w 0 
-
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Reliance on the oil industry was compounded by several other factors. The first was the 
restrictive controls placed on foreign investment following the Malari incident in 1974, 
which dampened investor interest in Indonesia generally. The second was the 
restrictions placed on foreign investment by the 1982 Batara Island DSP, which 
discouraged investment in many, and often the most viable, manufacturing activities, 
particularly by those companies wishing to relocate from Singapore. 
In the mid-1980s, declining world oil prices necessitated a shift in economic policies 
towards progressive deregulation of the Indonesian economy. Initially deregulation was 
moderate and confined to the few areas where the technocrats had greatest influence. 
With increasing success in the late 1980s, particularly a dramatic increase in non-oil 
exports, especially manufactured goods, the Indonesian government, influenced by a 
convergence of technocratic economic arguments and political pressure from the 
Singaporean government, became convinced of the need for regulatory change on 
Batara Island. Therefore, the changes on Batara must be seen in the light of Indonesia's 
commitment to the diversification of its economy, to substantial deregulation, and to the 
promotion of non-oil exports. 
The resultant changes to the investment regime in 1989, as well as other reforms, 
brought far-reaching changes within a year - a massive influx of investment and the 
growth of an export-oriented manufacturing sector. Within only a few years, plans to 
tum Batara Island into an industrial area were finally coming to fruition as a rapidly-
growing industrial economy increasingly centred around a strengthening manufacturing 
sector. The growth of non-oil exports gave credence to liberal economic policies and 
provided strong support for the Growth Triangle development idea as part of 
Indonesia's strategy to increase efficiency and its competitiveness in world markets. In 
that way, the processes involved have been an important element in Indonesia's 
economic transformation. 
One interesting feature of the development of Batara Island was the way in which it was 
used by the Indonesian government to test the ability and effectiveness of state policy in 
shaping economic development. For instance, both the recent boom periods of 1984-85 
and 1990-92 were closely related to a decision/policy from the central government. The 
lessons learned through the Batara experience can, and have, been applied to other parts 
of Indonesia. Because Batara was a 'frontier' area of Indonesia, it provided an insulated 
enclave for experimenting with economic development strategies, both those of the 
economic nationalists and those of the technocrats. However, whilst at times 
procedures and policies on Batam have differed radically from the rest of Indonesia, 
they have for the most part reflected what has gone on in the rest of Indonesia. 
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Bataln Island cannot be separated from developments at the national level - economic, 
political and social. The development of Batara clearly illustrates Indonesia's political 
economy throughout the New Order period, for policy-making on Batain exhibited all 
of the major features of New Order political economy described in Chapter Two. What 
is most clear from the study of the policy-making processes on Batam Island is that 
those processes have changed little over time. Whilst policy-making today is far more 
complex than twenty-five years ago, in part due to the growing complexity of the 
economy, but also due to the growing complexity of society, the main determinants of 
policy remain the same. It is useful here to summarise the main features of the Batain 
Island polity, recapping on the major points and qualifying each feature where 
necessary. 
The policy-making processes were highly centralised and generally insulated from non-
state pressures. Three features consistently influenced the policy processes throughout 
the period of the study - Presidential Domination, Intra-elite Politicking and 
Clientelism. Whilst the processes were not insulated from non-state pressures, societal 
and external, which emerged especially in the late-1980s, these did not play a consistent 
nor significant part in the policy-making processes. 
At the apex of the policy-making structure for Batam Island was President Soeharto. 
Soeharto has achieved a remarkable degree of personal authority and power in his more 
than twenty-five years in power, and the political system very much reflects his 
personality and his personal style. Without his consent the Batain project initially could 
not have gone ahead, could not have been continued after the Pertainina crisis placed 
serious doubts on its viability, and could not have received the support that it does 
today. In fact, Soeharto has become Batara Island's strongest advocate, clearly 
illustrated by the way in which the story of Batam's origins has been tailored to his 
background. 
Executive control of Batara illustrated the importance of the President, particularly in 
his relationships with his ministers, and in the way policies were formulated, decided 
and made into law. Whilst his influence was not obvious on a daily basis, Soeharto was 
the key player in the policy-making processes for Bataln Island. Soeharto left the major 
daily decision-making processes to Ibnu Sutowo, Sumarlin and Habibie respectively, 
giving them almost complete control over the Batain Island project, but it also meant 
that they remained in those positions for only as long as Soeharto desired. Soeharto 
demonstrated his power most clearly where there was conflict among his ministers by 
intervening directly. Soeharto also placed former colleagues and staff into positions 
where they could exert some influence on his behalf where necessary. 
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Differences among key senior Indonesian officials were crucial to the policy-making 
processes on Batam, for the debates over economic policy at the national level were 
played out on Batam as various groups sought to stamp their mark on the development 
strategy. Against the national backdrop, the debates surrounding the development of 
Batam were in no way unusual, but they illustrate how different economic policies as 
well as seemingly opposing development aims and objectives are formulated and 
applied in Indonesia. 
Both the economic nationalists and technocrats experimented with their respective 
development strategies on Batam Island, in order to create a useful case to argue against 
the strategies of the other. If the experience was one of substantially accelerated 
economic development in a politically manageable way, it could assume the status of a 
model for the rest of the country. In the early-1970s, it was lbnu Sutowo's oil-industry-
based strategy; in the late-1970s, it was Sumarlin's broad-based industrialisation; during 
the 1980s, Habibie's economic nationalist structure; and, during the 1990s, an amalgam 
of Habibie's nationalist high-technology approach with the technocrats' focus on export-
oriented manufacturing. 
The major conflicts involved those between lbnu Sutowo and the technocrats, and later 
between Habibie and the technocrats. In most regards, Ibnu Sutowo and Habibie had 
complete control over developments on Batam, and they were largely unaffected by 
interference from the.technocrats. This was clear by the way in which Habibie quickly 
changed the focus of development away from the technocrat's target of broad-based 
industrialisation towards intermediate, high-technology and capital intensive industries. 
Where conflict occurred, Soeharto intervened in favour of either of the protagonists. 
Whilst the technocrats generally had little influence where Ibnu Sutowo and Habibie 
were concerned, when Sumarlin handled the project between 1976 and 1978, they 
stamped their influence heavily on the Batam project This was obvious in the types of 
changes enacted for Batam, particularly the regulatory and administrative reforms, 
which foreshadowed what the technocrats would do to the Indonesian economy when 
their power and influence increased in the mid-1980s. Their influence was also visible 
in the regulatory changes introduced on Batam in 1989, as well as other changes during 
the 1990s. 
In the Batam case, however, the policy debates illustrated that the situation at the 
planning stages was far more fluid than the categories 'technocrats' and 'nationalists' 
would imply, for divisions in both the technocrats' ranks and among the nationalists did 
emerge. This was clearly demonstrated by conflict among the technocrats over the 
issue of Batam's duty-free status in 1978. It was also noticeable in the types of inter-
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ministerial conflicts of the mid-1990s where, after the retirement of many of the 
longest-serving technocrats, the traditional technocrats versus nationalists dichotomy 
was less obvious than in the past, and conflict became based less on economic ideology 
and more on personality and portfolio clashes. 
Interacting within this structure were clientelistic relationships, highlighting the 
importance of political and financial patronage. Indeed, one of the most enduring 
features of the New Order has been the numerous political and economic coalitions 
between Soeharto, senior bureaucrats and army officers with leading Indonesian 
business corporations. 
Whilst less obvious from the late 1970s to late 1980s, mainly due to the fact that limited 
economic activity had removed a source of patronage for possible patron-client 
relationships to develop, Clientelism clearly dominated the economic landscape on 
Batam under Pertamina during the early-mid 1970s, and later in the 1990s following the 
quick influx of Jakarta conglomerates who brought with them the business cultur~ of 
Jakarta. This was particularly clear in the designation of land plots and licenses, and in 
the awarding of government contracts. 
Up until the late 1980s, the state monopolised economic policy and activity on Batam -
it was the main investor and it tightly controlled the activities of the private sector 
through economic nationalist policies - and business was characterised by patrimonial 
and patron-client relationships. However, as at the national level, the state was forced 
to tum in the late 1980s to the private sector, because it was both short of resources and 
had failed to bring about economic development. 
Much has been made of the increased importance of the private sector to the Indonesian 
economy, with the implication that an increased economic role would lead to an 
increased political and policy role. On Batam Island, the percentage of private 
investment to total investment was 84% in 1993, up from 50% in 1983. In a sense, this 
would suggest that the private sector would have more policy input, commensurate with 
its economic importance. However, this has not been the case. 
Not only have patrimonial practices continued unabated but the majority of new 
domestic private investment on Batam has been made by business elites with good 
political connections. This is not to deny the importance of small and medium-sized 
firms, for they have been an active and important component of economic growth on 
Batam, but relative to the conglomerates, they were small in number and commercial 
importance, they lacked the capital resources necessary to take up the investment 
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function being vacated by the state, and they found it difficult to mobilise in the face of 
powerful figures within the government. 
With more experience and greater access to capital, a small number of politically 
connected conglomerates were better equipped than most pribumi and smaller-sized 
businesses to seize the opportunities created by deregulation, and the strengthened 
commitment to the private sector. With an economy increasingly reliant on private 
sector participation, it was the conglomerates which had the financial resources and 
expertise to carry out projects identified by the state. As Robison noted, 
It is ... within the mainstream of the existing networks of patronage and the major corporate-
political alliances that the most dynamic and powerful domestic groups ~ to be found, and it 
is here that we see the greatest potential for private capital to fill the increasing investment 
void left by the state.2 
The strong clientelistic relationship of leading businessmen and conglomerates with the 
state on Batam appears to be strengthening and broadening, and there are no indications ~ 
to suggest that the flow of patronage in the form of business opportunities and other 
favours such as privileged access to government contracts has slowed in any way. It is 
more likely that deregulation simply raised the general level of business activity on 
which fund-raising for patronage purposes depended. Indeed, despite deregulation, 
business associates of the President, ministers and other senior officials have been able 
to secure extraordinary favours and preferential treatment in the application of 
government regulations. 
It is important here to emphasise two main points about the conglomerates, and 
business in general, in Indonesia. Firstly, whilst there is strongest merit in the 
impression that political patronage and not entrepreneurial energy is the means for 
accumulating wealth in Indonesia, it is recognised that this description requires 
qualification. A number of domestic entrepreneurs have developed independent 
business capabilities, and more than a few businessmen have demonstrated impressive 
business acumen and real initiative with relatively little political backing. However, 
whilst there are some relatively independent private capitalists, patrimonial-type 
behaviour continues to be common and particularly evident in the allocation of 
contracts for development projects. 
Secondly, although political connections have been extremely important in determining 
the success of major business groups, the extent to which different businesses rely on 
political connections and state patronage varies considerably, covering the entire 
2Richard Robison ; "Industrialisation and the Economic and Political Development of Capital : The Case of 
Indonesia" in Ruth McVey (ed) Southeast Asian C31>italists, p 85. 
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spectrum from absolute dependency to complete autonomy. 3 In many cases, the major 
conglomerates derive their profits from both rent-seeking behaviour as well as from 
production and competition, and not simply on the basis of their political connections. 
While firms enjoying patrimonial privileges are likely to resist deregulatory pressures, 
not all will be greatly threatened by them. Some businesses are considerably less 
dependent on patrimonial privileges than others, particularly those which are large and 
sufficiently diversified. There are also many who benefit from but do not wholly 
depend upon protection. 
The key to the success of initiatives under the Growth Triangle was the close 
cooperation of Jakarta's politically well-connected business groups with the Indonesian 
government. The conglomerates, led by the Salim Group, were at the forefront of all 
developments, clearly dominating the private investment scene, and both initiating and 
taking a large share in most major commercial ventures. Moreover, the official 
encouragement of joint ventures between public enterprises and private firms from 
Indonesia and Singapore in major investment projects served to enhance cooperafion 
and the interlocking of interests among business groups from the two countries. 
The predominance of the conglomerates on Batam, and their close cooperation with the 
Indonesian government, raises questions about the nature of business-government 
relations in Indonesia, most particularly how far these conglomerates influenced the 
Indonesian government's decision to pay closer attention to cooperation with Singapore, 
and to what extent they have influenced the policy environment since then. The formal 
endorsement process and sanctioning at the highest levels of the Indonesian and 
Singaporean governments, the role of political elites, their networks, and those of the 
business elites clearly come to the fore when one takes a critical look at both the 
formation and management of development projects in Riau. Given the obviously close 
cooperation between the Indonesian government and leading conglomerates in 
developments in the Riau Islands, the question arises whether that cooperation is due 
solely to clientelistic connections or whether it represents a process of change in 
business-government relations. 
It can be argued that the signalling effects of government intervention are instrumental 
in fostering development, but the issue is actually what causes those signals. Direct 
involvement in infrastructure development, institution building, regular discussions 
3Due to the importance of these political connections and the various forms of special privileges, contracts, 
protection, and subsidies received by most of the conglomerates over the previous twenty years, they have been 
labelled 'rent-seekers' and 'ersatz capitalists'. Kunio Yoshihara ; The Rise of Ersatz C!lPitalism in Asia. The 
inference is that they are therefore not true entrepreneurs. Whilst criticism may be partly true with regards to many 
of them, it is an exaggeration to apply it to all. Several have shown impressive business acumen and real initiative, 
with relatively little political backing. As has been pointed out by Mackie, that they are 'rent-seekers' does not make 
them any less 'real' capitalists. 
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with the private sector, and coercive tactics all have profound signalling effects. Yet, 
surely if the government can have signalling abilities, then so can the private sector 
through its networks, business activities and personal contacts. For instance, whilst 
general development on Batam was government-led followed by private sector 
involvement, the pattern of the major projects on Bintan and Karimun Islands suggests 
the exact opposite. This tendency has become an important part of developments in the 
Riau Islands, and may well become an important element in the country's economic 
management as the private sector's, and particularly the conglomerate's, role is 
augmented. 
The political and economic nature of the government-business relationship on Batam in 
the 1990s leads one to consider that in the not-too-distant future, Indonesian business 
interests in coalition with the state will adopt a model similar to Japan's Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (Mm) Corporation and cooperate in both domestic 
and foreign policy.4 However, not only would there be objections to an Indonesia 
Incorporated because it would appear to legitimise the practice of government-business -- T 
coalitions, but the partnership is yet to evolve from a patron-client to a transparent and 
accountable one. There is no doubt that, and regardless of business acumen, those with 
strong political connections have benefited considerably on Batam, but there is little 
evidence to suggest there is something more to the alliance between state actors and 
businessmen or that it represents a new phase in government-industry relations. The 
operations of the conglomerates as well as other well-connected businessmen on Batam 
simply illustrates the way in which the interests of the economic elites are inter-twined 
with those of the political elites. 
Pluralist pressures, particularly non-state societal influences, on the Batam project were 
initially very weak. The reasons for this lay in the fact that Batam Island was isolated 
from mainstream Indonesian society; the local population was small, politically 
marginal and lacked mechanisms for influencing the Indonesian government; and the 
Riau provincial government was weak in the face of the national government 
However, societal pressures since the late-1980s have impacted on Batam in several 
ways, and they have centred around distributional issues; that is, the question of the 
sharing of benefits from the development of Batam. The main distributional issues 
were : uneven and unequal development on Batam; disparity between Batam and other 
parts of Riau, and between Riau and other areas of Indonesia; the dominance of 
domestic political and economic elites in the development of Batam; and the role of 
Singapore, which nationalist groups held unfairly benefited from Indonesian economic 
4certainly the recent merging of the Trade and Industry Ministries is similar in some respects to Mm. Far Eastern 
Economic Reyiew. 21 December 1995. 
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development. These criticisms were not necessarily specific to Batam but also appeared 
at the national level, but they did force the national government to manage what were 
inherently political overtones. 5 
The main societal and non-state influences since the late 1980s were Pemda Riau, the 
DPR, the Mass Media, and business associations. Pemda Riau's fortunes on Batam 
varied over the years but with the creation of the Batam Mayoralty in 1983, and with 
the strong support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the early 1990s, Pemda Riau 
began to exert more influence over the Batam project where its interests differed from 
those of the central government. 
Both the DPR and the Mass Media contributed to the general debate in Indonesia about 
developments on Batam Island, and were outspoken on issues such as land acquisition 
and compensation, on the involvement of Singapore, on the role of local government, 
and the amount of government expenditure involved in the Batam project. However, 
whilst sometimes critical, neither the DPR or the Mass Media have been consistent in 
their impact on the policy-making processes. 
Up until the early 1990s, business associations were non-existent on Batam, and where 
business had influence it was through clientelistic channels, or through tightly-
controlled corporatist channels. However, in line with the increasing scope and 
complexity of economic activity, industry associations emerged on Batam in the 1990s, 
several of which were outspoken and had policy input. 
The influence of external variables is clearly apparent on Batam where we are 
introduced to external factors and actors previously not considered as an important 
influence on policy-makers. The experience of Batam illustrates that the Indonesian 
state has faced external constraints, political but overwhelmingly economic, for it is 
clear that external forces and uncertainties in the international economy made it difficult 
for the Indonesian government to pursue consistent policies. 
The international economic system had an impact on the policy choices facing Batam 
Island. In the late 1960s favourable international conditions, especially for the oil 
industry, made investment in the Indonesian oil industry, and thus the oil services and 
logistics base on Batam viable, if not attractive. In the same way, however, it was 
50n numerous occasions the Indonesian government has defended itself against these criticisms, down playing 
parochial sentiments and countering 'economic nationalism', thus indicating that distributional issues are politically 
important. If the fruits of growth are not distributed evenly or quickly enough, any inequities will bring about 
discontent. Because negativism is often based on perception as much as fact, the government has a role to play in 
managing the political overtones, in as much as they have a role in liberalising investment regulations, facilitating 
infrastructure development and overseeing overall development. · 
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unfavourable international economic conditions - a recession and decreased demand for 
oil in 1974/1975 - which adversely affected Pertamina's plans for Batam Island. In the 
mid-1980s, a further downturn in the oil market forced a serious re-thinking and re-
orientation of development on Batam away from the oil sector towards the current focus 
on export-oriented manufacturing. 
Two external variables were apparent - international capital and foreign governments. 
Foreign capital played an important role on Batam. Batam's very origins lie in Ingram's 
choice of a site for its logistics base. Moreover, the need to meet investor conditions in 
order to attract and maintain foreign investment on Batam meant that foreign capital had 
an important influence on the policy processes. This was particularly so during the 
boom periods of the early 1970s and early 1990s. The-increased internationalisation of 
the Indonesian economy has made the state more susceptible to the demands of 
international investors for an increasing range of reforms. 
Cooperation between Singaporean and Indonesian companies proved crucial to the 
success of Batam. Official encouragement of joint ventures between public enterprises 
and private firms from Indonesia and Singapore in major investment projects served to 
enhance cooperation and the interlocking of interests among business groups from the 
two countries. Not only has this meant long-term beneficial effects in terms of the 
development of corporate networks, but it has given Indonesian companies leverage vis-
a-vis the Indonesian government. The case of BIP is particularly interesting in this 
regard as it is clear that the Singaporean partners were not the only influence on 
Indonesian policy-makers. Whatever their motivation, the fact that several of the large 
domestic conglomerates now have links with the international economy and with 
foreign capital may well be altering their negotiating strength vis-a-vis Indonesian 
policy-makers. 
Foreign governments also influenced the Batam Island policy processes. The Japanese 
government influenced the formulation of the 1972 Batam Master Plan, Kuwait kept 
alive hopes for the construction of an oil refinery, but it was Singapore that was the 
most important external consideration in the minds of Indonesia's policy makers simply 
by virtue of its geographical proximity to Batam Island. 
Whilst there was an element of rivalry and competition between Indonesia and 
Singapore in the early 1970s, the signing of the Batam Agreement in 1980 marked a 
turning-point in Batam Island's development, not only because it focused Batam's 
development on complementing Singapore but because Singapore also appeared willing 
to cooperate. Whilst the Singapore government was not able to achieve its main 
objective in 1980, which was to help develop and manage the Batam industrial area for 
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relocating Singapore companies, in 1989 Singapore was particularly influential in 
obtaining new regulations on foreign investment and industrial estates. It also appears 
quite clear that the Singapore government applied pressure on the Indonesian 
government to participate in the Growth Triangle, the catalyst for the development of 
the Riau Islands. 
The Singapore government continued to be a policy consideration in developments on 
Batam and surrounding islands during the early 1990s, and its role in the setting of the 
policy agenda appeared to have been significant, through either direct representations to 
the government or through Indonesian partners with special access to power and policy-
making. Most importantly, the notion of the IMS-GT which emerged in the early 1990s 
represented a radical departure in Indonesia-Singapore economic cooperation, and 
indicated the emphasis Indonesia's political elite placed on economic cooperation with 
Singapore. The role of Singapore signals that not only external factors, but external 
actors, are a consideration in Indonesian economic policy-making. 
-- ' 
Before concluding this discussion about what these features tell us about Indonesian 
political economy, several important qualifications needs to be made. Although 
developments in regards to Batam ran parallel with national developments, they were 
not identical. The first difference was that a key feature of Indonesian political 
economy was starkly absent. As the most powerful New Order institution, ABRI 
permeates Indonesian politics, society and economy, but on Batam its influence appears 
to be marginal, confined to matters of internal security and some minor business 
investments. In the wider Indonesian political economy, the role of ABRI cannot, of 
course, be discounted. 
The second difference is that conflict between the technocrats and their rivals on Batam 
was less pronounced than at the centre, particularly vis-a-vis lbnu Sutowo in the early 
1970s, Habibie in the 1990s, and the cronies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The 
reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, because of its relative isolation, developments on 
Batam and other Riau Islands were unlikely to be disruptive to the totality of national 
policy issues and considerations. As it was insulated from the rest of the economy, 
policies were less likely to become a source of conflict between the technocrats and the 
nationalists. Secondly, because Batam was started from scratch there were no powerful 
established vested interests, particularly business interests, which were harmed by 
technocratic policies. This goes some way to explaining why there was apparently little 
conflict between the technocrats and the cronies. 
The third difference is that because it is located on the geographic periphery of 
Indonesia, Batam was more susceptible to external influence than many other areas of 
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Indonesia. This factor explains the influential role of Singapore on developments on 
Batam and surrounding islands, a role which Singapore does not play elsewhere in 
Indonesia. Therefore the heightened sense of external influence on Batam may not 
reflect its true importance to Indonesian political economy as a whole. 
Nonetheless, and despite the differences, the similarities of the policy-making processes 
do suggest that policy-making on Batam Island is strongly indicative of Indonesian 
political economy under the New Order in general. Like the Indonesian political 
economy in general, the political economy of Batam is characterised by what might best 
be described as elite politics. Patrimonialism, combined with the closely-connected 
features of patron-client relationships and intra-elite politicking, has consistently 
dominated the policy-making processes under the New Order government headed by 
President Soeharto. 
That Indonesian politics is so centralised and political competition so confined to senior 
officials (and their clients) in the upper reaches of the government is not to deny the -- y 
existence of other influences. Indonesian societal groups have demonstrated that they 
can have policy input. Likewise, external variables have affected the policy 
environment It should also be remembered that society places inhibitions on a range of 
policy choices - the political legitimacy of the Soeharto regime is essentially based on 
its ability to solve economic problems efficiently and equitably. However, non-state 
actors have been inconsistent in their infiltration of the policy-making processes. Non-
state influence has been the exception rather than the rule, and has generally occurred 
where the interests of the political and business elites have been separate. The view 
here, therefore, is that societal influences are not a major constraint on the Indonesian 
state's policy-makers but at the same time it is recognised that policy-making is not 
confined simply to actors within the state apparatus. 
In tracing Batam's economic development, various interactions become apparent -
between domestic and international variables, between public and private interests, 
between state and civil society, and within the state itself. This study therefore 
illustrates the need for studies of the political economy of Indonesia, as well as those in 
a wider, regional context, to take several factors into account Whilst the state is clearly 
important, and is likely to remain the pivot point, approaches to Indonesian political 
economy need to be supplemented by a focus on society in order to understand its true 
character. Consideration must be given to an institutional approach which emphasises 
pressures from the private sector, provincial governments, the parliament and other 
societal and non-state groups, as well as external variables. It is argued, therefore, that 
while the main focus should be on the state, non-state influences must also be analysed 
in order to explain Indonesian political economy. 
' 
- .:
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Moreover, beyond a need to make a comprehensive consideration of all actors - real and 
perceived, probable and possible - it is also important to understand that their 
importance or influence varies over time. The balance between the numerous political, 
economic and social actors and forces is ever-changing. Political economy is not static, 
rather it is a complex and dynamic set of variables, difficult to depict in hindsight or in 
situ, and highly unpredictable as a future form. 
What then of Indonesia's future? The longevity of the New Order state under Soeharto, 
and the persistence and dominance of patrimonial politics suggests that the main 
features of policy-making are systemic. However, whether the policy-making processes 
will remain unchanged under a new government or President is difficult to determine. 
On the one hand, the widespread entrenchment of patrimonial and patron-client 
relationships in Indonesia suggests that a change of President would simply change the 
face of government but not the processes of policy-making. On the other hand, a 
change in the structure of governance would likely have an impact on those processes, 
but this would require changes to political institutions and to the Executive's dominance 
of the state's processes. 
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Appendix A 
Agreement 
between 
TIIE GOVERNMENT OF TIIE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
aOO 
TIIE GOVERNMENT OF TIIE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE 
ON THE ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN TIIE FRAMEWORK 
OF TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF BAT AM* 
TIIE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
INDONF.SIA 
AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
SINGAPORE 
DESIROUS to promote economic cooperation between the two countries (herinafter referred to as the 
Parties), on the basis of equality and mutual benefit within the ASEAN spirit, particularly in the 
development of the Industrial Region of the Batam Island of the Republic of Indonesia (hereinafter referred 
to as Batam). 
WIT11 A VIEW TO ARTia..ES 1 and 2 of the Basic Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation 
between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of Singapore 
signed on the 29th of August 1974. 
Have agreed as follows : 
ARTICLE 1 
TRADE OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
(1) Without prejudice to their respective ttade systems, both Parties agree to develop, between Singapore 
and Batam, a simplifies and mutually beneficial procedure of flow of goods, payment and delivery. 
(2) Within the framework of enhancing international trade, both Parties shall develop a mutually 
beneficial system of marketing of goods and services, with the possibility thereof to facilitate joint 
undertakings, and shall utilise, to mutual benefit and to the maximum extent possible, the available 
transhipment and warehousing facilities in Batam. 
* Source : Keputusan Presiden No.64 1980 (21 November 1980). 
. . . . . l 
ARTICLE2 
INDUSTRY 
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(1) Without prejudice to their respective industrial systems, both Parties shall cooperate to develop a 
mutually beneficial industrial system, including the industrial, infrastructural and technological 
development 
(2) In implementing the cooperation in the field of industty, both Parties agree to utilise the available 
services in Singapore and Batam in the sector of industrial repair work and other industrial services. 
ARTICLE3 
CAPITAL AND BANKING 
Both Parties agree to take necessary steps to facilitate the availability of capital and banking services 
needed for the development of Batam in accordance with their respective prevailing laws and regulations. 
ARTICLE4 
COMMUNICATION 
Both Parties shall cooperate to develop to mutual benefit pursuant to their respective laws and 
regulations, the services in the field of communication including Land, Sea and Air Transports, Post and 
Telecommunications, Tourism, Meteorology and Geophysics and Search and Rescue (SAR) between 
Singapore and Batam. 
ARTICLES 
EXCHANGE OF ADVISERS, EXPERTS AND 'IECHNICIANS 
Each Party shall, in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations, adopt necessary measures to 
facilitate exchange of advisers, experts and technicians carrying out activities under this Agreement. 
ARTICLE6 
TAXATION 
Both Parties agree to take measures in the field of taxation which will encourage investment in Batam, 
including simplification of tax administration procedures and methods for the avoidance of double 
taxation, in accordance with their respective prevailing laws and regulations. 
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ARTICLE 7 
CUSTOMS AND EXCISE 
Both Parties agree subject to their respective laws and regulations to simplify the procedures for the flow 
of goods between Singapore and Batam, including the processing of documents for such a speedy flow of 
goods. 
ARTICLES 
IMMIGRATION 
( 1) Both Parties agree, within the framework of cooperation set forth in this Agreement, to establish 
regulations to facilitate the flow of persons between Singapore and Batam. 
(2) Both Parties, if they deem necessary, shall cooperate to solve any immigration problem relating to the 
flow of persons between Singapore and Batam. 
ARTICLE9 
RJRTHER ARRANGEMENT 
With due observance to the regulations in each country, both Parties can make further arrangements to 
secure the implementation of the Agreement conducted by the respective authorities. 
ARTICLE 10 
LIABILITY CLAUSE 
(1) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall be responsible for dealing with claims which may 
be brought by third parties against the Singapore advisers, experts and technicians or other persons sent at 
the request of the Government of Indonesia and performing official services in Batam and shall hold them 
harmless in Batam in respect of claims or liabilities arising from operations under this Agreement, except 
liability arising from the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the said individuals. 
(2) The Government of the Republic of Singapore shall be responsible for dealing with claims which may 
be brought by third parties against the Indonesian advisers, experts and technicians or other persons sent at 
the request of the Government of Singapore and performing official services in Singapore and shall hold 
them harmless in Singapore in respect of claims or liabilities arising from operations under this 
Agreement, except liability arising from the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the said individuals. 
ARTICLE 11 
TERRITORIAL APPLICATION 
(1) This agreement shall be applied within the territory of the Republic of Singapore and of the Republic 
of Indonesia in the Industrial Region of the Batam Island. 
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(2) The "Industrial Region of the Batam Island" consists of Batam Island, group of Islands of Janda Berias, 
and Islands of Tanjung Sau, Ngenang and Kasem as stipulated by the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
(3) The provisions of this Article shall not prejudice relevant national laws and regulations of the 
Republic of Indonesia and of the Republic of Singapore and existing agreements between the two Parties. 
ARTICLE 12 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUIE 
Any dispute between the two Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement 
shall be settled amicably through consultation or negotiation and without having to resort to legal or 
quasi-legal bodies for the justiciable resolution of any dispute. 
ARTICLE 13 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
-- If 
(1) Each Party shall notify the other on the fulfilment of their respective constitutional requirements for 
the entry into force of this Agreement. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of notification 
of either Party who makes the later communication. 
(2) This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years and shall be tacitly extended for 
successive period of five years. 
(3) This Agreement may be denounCed by either Party subject to six months prior written notice. 
(4) In order to promote the implementation of this Agreement and of the further arrangements to be 
concluded in accordance with Article 9 of this Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet as 
and where required to inform each other of the progress in the implementation of this Agreement and any 
other matters pertaining to the development of Batam. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed 
this Agreement. 
DONE at the Republic of Singapore on this thirty-first day of October 1980, in duplicate in the 
Indonesian and English languages. 
In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail. 
SUDJA1MIKO 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
GOH CHOK TONG 
Minister for Trade and Industry 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Singapore 
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